I don't see any point in Judge Jones' decision where he imposes his views over the experts in science who were called to testify.  I do not find this to be a case of a judge deciding what is or is not science, so much as a judge following accepted legal procedures in use of expert testimony. 
 
For what it matters, Kuhn sided with evolution against intelligent design creationism, and he uses the slow triumph of evolution over intelligent design as an example of where it takes time for better science to displace old, disproven ideas.  I do not think it is accurate to paint intelligent design as favored by Kuhn's philosophy in any form.
 
Richard Feynman put it most succinctly, I think, when he said that science is what happens on the lab bench.  The Dover transcripts in deep detail go over what can be found on the lab benches right now.  There was no significant evidence of scientific pub! lication for intelligent design presented. There was no evidence of scientific research into intelligent design presented.  There was no hypothesis of intelligent design presented.  There was no evidence of any possibility of a positive contribution to science by ID presented.  Without making serious inquiry into the details of the science, it would be fair to say there was no evidence of ID as science presented.  This is not a case of a judge substituting his beliefs; it is a case of a judge paying careful attention to the evidence given at trial.
 
This is why I dislike discussions of philosophy in these issues.  Philosophically, Invisible Pink Unicorn Poofing could be taught as science in science classes, if there were science there to back up the idea.  These questions will always turn on what has actually been done on the lab benches.  After the 1987 Supreme Court decision, advocates of creationism had a choice to! go into the laboratory and into the field to do serious science to back up their claims of science, or try to subvert the legal machinery to get around the definitions of science.  As the evidence clearly showed in Dover, the creationist advocates chose to try to subvert the legal machinery rather than go into the lab. 
 
Shakespeare was right about tangled webs.  In nature, of course, we don't find tangled webs.  Judge Jones saw that, and noted it accurately.  IMHO, of course.
 
Ed Darrell
Dallas


[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
        Although I do not disagree with the result in this case, I am trou! bled by the idea of judges deciding what is or what is not science.  As far as I can tell, a Kuhnian conception of scientific change in principle supports the possibility of intelligent design being understood as expanding the current notion of science. ( I say "in principle" for the reason that just because a particular conception theoretically can be advanced in a Kuhnian fashion does not mean that the change in paradigm will be successful). Hence, to say that intelligent design cannot be considered a science according to our current paradigm of science can be answered by intelligent designers with a strident "So what?"
 
        Don't get me wrong.  According to my own understanding of the philosophy of science, I do not see any likelihood of intelligent design providing the thrust for a paradigm shift concerning what is or what is not science. That aside, what ! justifies judicial determinations of this matter?  I suppose one reply is that the court is merely reflecting what its best understanding of the current scientific paradigm is.  Moreover, courts are forever involving in making judgments about complex factual and conceptual matters. Still, an opinion based solely on the EC might be more in line with the basis of a court's authority and expertise. 
 
Bobby

Robert Justin Lipkin
Professor of Law
Widener University School of Law
Delaware
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