Coming late to this thread, and noting that the discussion has gone off in a 
different direction, I'd simply reinforce Marty's observation that "the view 
that 'religious transformation [and]  faith' are good (when freely embraced)" 
is a theological proposition, by noting that it's perfectly coherent 
(theologically) to accept the proposition that religious transformation and 
faith are good even when embraced as a result of coercion (though of course 
there may be evidentiary concerns in particular instances of whether the faith 
is indeed "embraced" in the theologically relevant sense after coercion).

----- Original Message -----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Friday, May 5, 2006 9:30 pm
Subject: Use of Religion to Achieve Secular Ends

> The other day I posted about the unconstitutionality of the BOP 
> religious-rehabilitation funding program.  See 
> http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/blatantly-unconstitutional-
> federal.html.
> FYI, the Freedom from Religion Foundation has now sued to 
> challenge the program:
> 
> http://ffrf.org/legal/gonzales_complaint.html
> 
> Rob Vischer and Rick Garnett have each posted thoughtful questions 
> about my assertion that the state's interest in promoting 
> religious transformation is an illegitimate (and troubling) 
> governmental objective.
> 
> Vischer:
> 
> http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/2006/05/government_fund.html
> 
> Garnett:
> 
> http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/05/religion_in_pri_1.html
> 
> Rick writes, for example, the following:
> 
> I certainly share Marty's (and Madison's) concern about religious 
> faith being reduced to a convenient means for achieving the 
> government's "secular" ends.  That said, I'm not sure why it 
> should be unconstitutional -- or, in any event, why it would be 
> "profoundly disturbing" -- for the government, as a general 
> matter, to take, and act on (in non-coercive ways, of course, and 
> consistent with the freedom of conscience), the view that 
> "religious transformation [and]  faith" are good (when freely 
> embraced).  There are dangers here, absolutely.  Still . . . (To 
> be clear:  I'm not necessarily endorsing this particular program.) 
> 
> Also, Marty writes, "[t]he government cannot specifically aim at 
> religious transformation as a means of accomplishing those secular 
> ends."  Does this mean, I wonder, that government may (or should) 
> not act with an eye specifically toward protecting, and even 
> creating, the conditions required (in the government's view) for 
> the flourishing of religious faith and freedom?
> 
> 
> To which I have posted a response that includes the following.  
> (I'd very much appreciate reactions on, especially, the fourth and 
> final point):
> 
> 1. You ask whether my critique means "that government may (or 
> should) not act with an eye specifically toward protecting, and 
> even creating, the conditions required (in the government's view) 
> for the flourishing of religious faith and freedom?"
> 
> No, it doesn't *entirely* mean that. One of the principal 
> objectives of the religion clauses themselves is to encourage or 
> require the government to act so as to eliminate *government-
> created obstacles* to the flourishing of religious faith and 
> freedom. So, for example, I favor -- and have worked to enact and 
> defend -- certain religious "accommodation" statutes, such as RFRA 
> and RLUIPA.
> 
> However, although the state may advance the view that religious 
> *freedom* (including the freedom to reject religion) is a good 
> thing in and of itself, it may not advance the view that religious 
> *faith* is a positive good in and of itself -- or that it's the 
> means to valuable secular ends.
> 
> 2. The government is simply not capable of determining whether 
> "religious transformation [and] faith" are a "good" thing (when 
> freely embraced) -- that's a question that is beyond the ken of 
> secular authorities, who do not have the (basically theological) 
> tools to make such determinations. Nor should the state try to do 
> so -- that's not the proper role of government. (Or so argues the 
> Madisonian, and modern, view of the Religion Clauses -- and I 
> agree, although I'm very interested in hearing dissenting views.) 
> And so it surely follows that government may not discriminate in 
> favor of religion in the dispersal of funds on the basis of such 
> judgments concerning the value of faith.
> 
> 3. I think it's also "troubling," and unconstitutional, for the 
> state to conclude that religious transformation or faith is 
> correlated with secular objectives that the state *is* entitled to 
> promote, such as civic behavior, rehabilitation, cessation of 
> alcohol dependence, etc. For one thing -- and this isn't a 
> constitutional point -- as far as I can tell, it's simply not 
> true: If anything, human history (including, of course, obvious 
> dramatic recent examples) pellucidly demonstrates that religious 
> faith is no guarantee at all of righteousness, lack of cruelty, or 
> law-abiding conduct.
> 
> More to the (constitutional) point, there is something profoundly 
> troubling about the state itself adopting any view about the 
> "typical" comparative social behaviors, and human qualities, of 
> believers and nonbelievers.
> 
> 4. The hard question, I suppose, is this: Assume the state is 
> entirely agnostic as to the value or "truth" of religious 
> transformation and faith, but actually discovers a strong 
> empirical correlation between faith and some other quality that is 
> a proper object of the state's concern. For example, let's say 
> studies show a cause-and-effect correlation between faith and 
> graduation rates, or between religious transformation and 
> resisting drug addiction. (I'm not aware of any such empirical 
> evidence, but I'm willing to assume arguendo . . . .) I don't 
> think this would give the state the power to itself promote 
> religious faith -- after all, in that case the state would be 
> promoting something *that it does not believe,* which truly is a 
> perversion of religion. But if there is such a correlation, can a 
> government give resources to private groups that *do* have 
> religious faith, to enable them to transform those individuals who 
> don't?
> Can the state, for instance, say: "Look, we really don't know 
> whether faith is true, or valuable, or something to which all 
> citizens should aspire. Those are eternal mysteries that are 
> appropriately left to individuals. And we beleive in religious 
> liberty -- so to each their own on questions of faith. But what we 
> *do* know, from rigiorous scientific studies (indulge me the 
> hypo), is that, for *whatever* reason -- indeed, for reasons that 
> we are incapable of understanding or assessing -- many prisoners 
> who would otherwise become recidivists do not do so if they come 
> to believe in God, and for *that* reason (and that secular reason 
> alone), we're giving discretionary grants to private religious 
> organizations that can help such prisoners make such 
> transformations. Indeed, the strongest correlation of all is with 
> conversion to *Christianity*, and so we're going to give our funds 
> primarily to Christian organizations. There's no such evidence 
> with respect to Islam, or Wicca, and so!
>  we wil
> l not provide money to groups who have applied to encourage faith 
> in those traditions."
> 
> Can the state do this? Madison thought not -- and I agree. But, 
> unlike the other questions raised by the BOP program, that truly 
> *would be* an interesting and difficult question (that is, 
> assuming once again that there were any such evidence).
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