To be precise:  Heffron said religious speech gets *no* extra constitutional 
protection as compared to "other organizations having social, political, or 
other ideological messages to proselytize," and to "other social, political, or 
charitable organizations."  452 U.S. at 652-53.  This is not terribly precise, 
but it pointedly excludes commercial speech.  Religion gets no extra protection 
as compared to other high value speech.  

Quoting "Volokh, Eugene" <vol...@law.ucla.edu>: 

>         I agree with Alan on all these points, but I should also add 
> that the one time in the Sherbert/Yorder era that the Court 
> considered a free speech claim coupled with a free exercise claim, it 
> seemed to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause should be 
> interpreted as providing *no* extra protection for religious speech 
> -- that was in Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
> 
>> -----Original Message----- 
>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- 
>> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Brownstein, Alan 
>> Sent: Saturday, June 20, 2009 5:53 PM 
>> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
>> Subject: RE: "A Bible study group and a book club are not treated the same" 
>> 
>> If we had a constitutional regime that confers special protections for non- 
>> expressive religious exercise against neutral laws of general 
>> applicability, the 
>> issue of how to treat expressive religious exercise would require 
>> some difficult 
>> line drawing and analysis. But since Smith controls the meaning of the free 
>> exercise clause, there is no special federal constitutional 
>> protection for religious 
>> exercise -- whether it is expressive or not. Under this regime a 
>> statute that 
>> confers special protection for expressive religious exercise is 
>> going to confront 
>> serious and unavoidable establishment clause and free speech clause issues, 
>> isn't it? 
>> 
>> Alan Brownstein 
>> ________________________________________ 
>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
>> [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
>> On Behalf Of Bezanson, Randall P [randy-bezan...@uiowa.edu] 
>> Sent: Friday, June 19, 2009 9:05 AM 
>> To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' 
>> Subject: RE: "A Bible study group and a book club are not treated the same" 
>> 
>> Let's see ... speech is fully protected, but religious speech is 
>> even more fully 
>> protected, indeed advantaged.Can that be right?  Yes, if the Free Exercise 
>> Clause confers special protections for religious speech exercise -- a not 
>> implausible theory.  Yet I have always thought that the 
>> non-establishment clause 
>> could justify greater or additional limitations on religious speech. 
>>  Could both be 
>> true?  I don't see any reason why not since the two religious 
>> clauses are often, 
>> though not always, at war with one another because they serve two distinct 
>> purposes. 
>> 
>> Randy Bezanson 
>> 
>> -----Original Message----- 
>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- 
>> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene 
>> Sent: Friday, June 19, 2009 10:05 AM 
>> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
>> Subject: "A Bible study group and a book club are not treated the same" 
>> 
>>         I haven't read the whole opinion yet, but in my skim I was 
>> struck by this line: 
>> 
>>         "The trial court appears to have been troubled that an 
>> operation which can 
>> be and often is conducted for purely secular purposes could be entitled to 
>> increased protection from government regulation if conducted for religious 
>> reasons. But TRFRA guarantees such protection. Just as a Bible study group 
>> and a book club are not treated the same, neither are a halfway 
>> house operated 
>> for religious purposes and one that is not. Under Smith, the Free 
>> Exercise Clause 
>> does not require strict scrutiny for religious activity affected by 
>> neutral laws of 
>> general application,66 but TRFRA imposes the requirement by statute." 
>> 
>>         Is it clear that it's constitutional, given the Free Speech 
>> Clause and the 
>> Establishment Clause, and the position of 6 of the votes in Texas Monthly v. 
>> Bullock, for the law to treat Bible study groups better than book clubs? 
>> 
>>         Eugene 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- 
>> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock 
>> Sent: Friday, June 19, 2009 7:58 AM 
>> To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu 
>> Subject: Texas RFRA 
>> 
>> The Supreme Court of Texas has unanimously given the Texas RFRA its 
>> intended meaning to provide real protection for exercises of 
>> religion.  Barr v. City 
>> of Sinton, Link to opinion below.  The case involves a religious 
>> halfway house in 
>> a small town in South Texas.  The city made no serious effort to prove a 
>> compelling interest in closing the halfway house; its main argument 
>> seemed to be 
>> that there was no burden because the halfway house could leave town, 
>> and that 
>> that Texas RFRA should not apply to zoning anyway. 
>> Most of the opposition to Texas RFRA was from neighborhood associations 
>> worried about land use.  The lead sponsor in the House told me that 
>> if people got 
>> the idea that this meant that black churches could locate in white 
>> neighborhoods, 
>> the bill would be dead.  The compromise was to provide that cities 
>> would have no 
>> less land use authority than they had had under federal law on March 
>> 17, 1990 
>> (the day before Smith.)  The land use folks claimed that Sherbert 
>> and Yoder had 
>> never applied to them; the bill's supporters claimed that Sherbert 
>> and Yoder had 
>> been a generally applicable test that applied to all regulation, 
>> including land use 
>> regulation.  The state supreme court just resolved that argument in 
>> favor of the 
>> bill's supporters. 
>> http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2009/jun/060074.htm[1] 
>> 
>> Douglas Laycock 
>> Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law 
>> University of Michigan Law School 
>> 625 S. State St. 
>> Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215 
>>   734-647-9713 
>> _______________________________________________ 
>> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu 
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>> 
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>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________ 
>> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu 
>> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
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>> _______________________________________________ 
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> 
> _______________________________________________ 
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu 
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw[5] 
> 
> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as 
> private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are 
> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can 
> (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. 
> 
> 
> 

Douglas Laycock 
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law 
University of Michigan Law School 
625 S. State St. 
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215 
  734-647-9713 

Links:
------
[1] http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2009/jun/060074.htm
[2] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
[3] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
[4] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
[5] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
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