I agree with Doug on this, and I wasn't trying to suggest the contrary. But I take it that discussion of literature would be no less protected than "social, political, or other ideological messages" (even setting aside book club meetings that discuss political books, or discuss books from a political perspective).
Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Saturday, June 20, 2009 7:40 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: "A Bible study group and a book club are not treated the same" To be precise: Heffron said religious speech gets *no* extra constitutional protection as compared to "other organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselytize," and to "other social, political, or charitable organizations." 452 U.S. at 652-53. This is not terribly precise, but it pointedly excludes commercial speech. Religion gets no extra protection as compared to other high value speech. Quoting "Volokh, Eugene" <vol...@law.ucla.edu>: > I agree with Alan on all these points, but I should also add > that the one time in the Sherbert/Yorder era that the Court > considered a free speech claim coupled with a free exercise claim, it > seemed to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause should be > interpreted as providing *no* extra protection for religious speech > -- that was in Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- >> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Brownstein, Alan >> Sent: Saturday, June 20, 2009 5:53 PM >> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >> Subject: RE: "A Bible study group and a book club are not treated the same" >> >> If we had a constitutional regime that confers special protections for non- >> expressive religious exercise against neutral laws of general >> applicability, the >> issue of how to treat expressive religious exercise would require >> some difficult >> line drawing and analysis. But since Smith controls the meaning of the free >> exercise clause, there is no special federal constitutional >> protection for religious >> exercise -- whether it is expressive or not. Under this regime a >> statute that >> confers special protection for expressive religious exercise is >> going to confront >> serious and unavoidable establishment clause and free speech clause issues, >> isn't it? >> >> Alan Brownstein >> ________________________________________ >> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu >> [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] >> On Behalf Of Bezanson, Randall P [randy-bezan...@uiowa.edu] >> Sent: Friday, June 19, 2009 9:05 AM >> To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' >> Subject: RE: "A Bible study group and a book club are not treated the same" >> >> Let's see ... speech is fully protected, but religious speech is >> even more fully >> protected, indeed advantaged.Can that be right? Yes, if the Free Exercise >> Clause confers special protections for religious speech exercise -- a not >> implausible theory. Yet I have always thought that the >> non-establishment clause >> could justify greater or additional limitations on religious speech. >> Could both be >> true? I don't see any reason why not since the two religious >> clauses are often, >> though not always, at war with one another because they serve two distinct >> purposes. >> >> Randy Bezanson >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- >> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene >> Sent: Friday, June 19, 2009 10:05 AM >> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >> Subject: "A Bible study group and a book club are not treated the same" >> >> I haven't read the whole opinion yet, but in my skim I was >> struck by this line: >> >> "The trial court appears to have been troubled that an >> operation which can >> be and often is conducted for purely secular purposes could be entitled to >> increased protection from government regulation if conducted for religious >> reasons. But TRFRA guarantees such protection. Just as a Bible study group >> and a book club are not treated the same, neither are a halfway >> house operated >> for religious purposes and one that is not. Under Smith, the Free >> Exercise Clause >> does not require strict scrutiny for religious activity affected by >> neutral laws of >> general application,66 but TRFRA imposes the requirement by statute." >> >> Is it clear that it's constitutional, given the Free Speech >> Clause and the >> Establishment Clause, and the position of 6 of the votes in Texas Monthly v. >> Bullock, for the law to treat Bible study groups better than book clubs? >> >> Eugene >> >> >> >> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- >> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock >> Sent: Friday, June 19, 2009 7:58 AM >> To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >> Subject: Texas RFRA >> >> The Supreme Court of Texas has unanimously given the Texas RFRA its >> intended meaning to provide real protection for exercises of >> religion. Barr v. City >> of Sinton, Link to opinion below. The case involves a religious >> halfway house in >> a small town in South Texas. The city made no serious effort to prove a >> compelling interest in closing the halfway house; its main argument >> seemed to be >> that there was no burden because the halfway house could leave town, >> and that >> that Texas RFRA should not apply to zoning anyway. >> Most of the opposition to Texas RFRA was from neighborhood associations >> worried about land use. The lead sponsor in the House told me that >> if people got >> the idea that this meant that black churches could locate in white >> neighborhoods, >> the bill would be dead. The compromise was to provide that cities >> would have no >> less land use authority than they had had under federal law on March >> 17, 1990 >> (the day before Smith.) The land use folks claimed that Sherbert >> and Yoder had >> never applied to them; the bill's supporters claimed that Sherbert >> and Yoder had >> been a generally applicable test that applied to all regulation, >> including land use >> regulation. The state supreme court just resolved that argument in >> favor of the >> bill's supporters. >> http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2009/jun/060074.htm >> >> Douglas Laycock >> Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law >> University of Michigan Law School >> 625 S. State St. >> Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215 >> 734-647-9713 >> _______________________________________________ >> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw >> >> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed >> as private. >> Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; >> people can >> read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the >> messages to others. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw >> >> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed >> as private. >> Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; >> people can >> read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the >> messages to others. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw >> >> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed >> as private. >> Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; >> people can >> read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the >> messages to others. > > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are > posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can > (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. > > > Douglas Laycock Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law University of Michigan Law School 625 S. State St. Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215 734-647-9713
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
