I wrote:

              I'm no great fan of the more expansive readings of Shelly.  But 
when a government actor is deciding who gets a particular (lucrative) position 
based on that person's religion, it seems to me that state action is eminently 
present, or more specifically that the government actor is discriminating based 
on religion in presumptive violation of the Free Exercise Clause and the First 
Amendment.  To be sure, the government actor isn't motivated by religious 
animus; it's just trying to enforce a contract.  But it is still deliberately 
treating people different from other people based on whether they are Muslims 
or not.  (When the court just enforces an arbitration conducted by a private 
party, there is not such discrimination by a government entity, even if the 
private party discriminates based on religion or sex in selecting the 
arbitrators.)

Nathan Oman writes:

Why say that the government is discriminating on the basis of religion if it is 
simply apply neutral principles of contract law.  I understand that there is a 
question as to whether the contract can be enforced using merely neutral 
principles, but that isn't your argument here.  Rather, I take it that your 
objection rests on a non-discrimination principle.  Where is the discriminatory 
legal principle at issue?


              I don't see a discriminatory legal principle at issue here.  But 
I see a discriminatory decision by a judge:  I will not appoint Joe Schmoe as 
an arbitrator, because he is not Muslim.  To be sure, the judge is just 
enforcing a contract.  But he is still a government actor, allocating a 
particular post based on religion.  That he is just doing that in enforcing a 
contract does not, I think, prevent his discriminatory conduct from being state 
action.

              By the way, what do you think about a state university 
administering a privately funded scholarship for "Christian students"?

              Eugene
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