That is a different argument, and potentially a plausible one.  The concern 
isn't that the parent is trying to force his religion on his daughters, but 
rather that taxpayers will be left holding the bag.  (I don't think the 
"temptation" argument suffices, at least under the strict scrutiny test, but 
the burden on taxpayers one is different.)

But doesn't Sherbert suggest that (assuming a substantial burden is present), 
avoiding any burden - even a relatively slight one - on taxpayers is not 
necessarily a sufficient government interest?  Likewise, doesn't Yoder suggest 
that claims of burden on taxpayers have to be demonstrated to a significant 
degree, and considered together with any countervailing fiscal benefits that 
the group's practices might have?  (The question of the net fiscal cost of 
unwanted pregnancy, for instance, is complicated; unwanted children cost the 
government money for prenatal care, and may burden the social welfare system, 
but they may also grow up to be taxpayers who help fund that social welfare 
system.)

One merit of a pure Smith regime is that courts don't have to get in to these 
questions of deciding what is and what isn't an externality, and what the 
empirical effects of particular conduct are.  But if we are to have a RFRA 
regime, then there has to be a limit to these sorts of 
externalities-on-taxpayers arguments, it seems to me, at least if Sherbert and 
Yoder are among the cases being "restored."

Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu
Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 5:32 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate

The baseline set by the ACA is NOT a matter of obligation between parents and 
children.  In that regard, the parent has no obligation to obtain health 
coverage for his non-minor daughters (although the 12 year old, either now or 
sometime later but before the age of majority, might need emergency 
contraception for health reasons, and then the parent might indeed have some 
obligation to cover or pay for the service).

The baseline is the minimum coverage requirements ("essential services," which 
include pregnancy prevention services) for policies that will satisfy the ACA.  
In the Missouri case, allowing the parent to buy a policy that excludes those 
services puts the insured daughters at increased risk of unwanted pregnancy.  
And I'm sure we all agree that unwanted pregnancies impose substantial costs 
(many of which are not covered by health insurance) on third parties, including 
but not limited to the women who experience such pregnancies.

Here's another analogy -- a parent wants to buy her non-minor child a car, but 
the parent makes a religious freedom argument that she should be free to buy a 
car without seat belts.  (Assume this is a sincere religious claim.)  The 
parent of course has no obligation to buy the car at all, but if we allow that 
exemption, we allow the parent to put the child at increased risk of serious 
injury.  Of course, we could frame the objection in terms of the government's 
compelling interest in reducing the risk of that kind of injury.  But we could 
also say that the parent is imposing costs on the child (who is tempted to take 
the free but less safe car) as well as other third parties (insurors, who might 
have to pay more in case of an accident, or other drivers, who might face 
increased liability for injury.)   The real ACA case might be stronger in terms 
of negative externalities than the hypothetical car case, because the ACA 
involves both universal obligation (everyone, including those non-minor 
daughters, must be insured) and entitlement (a policy that satisfies the ACA 
must include essential services).

On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 12:05 AM, Scarberry, Mark 
<mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu<mailto:mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu>> wrote:
Eugene has a very good point. My employer gives me a choice of signing up for 
(1) employee-only health insurance (lowest cost) , (2) 
employee-plus-one-dependent insurance (higher cost), or (3) 
employee-plus-two-or-more-dependents insurance (highest cost). (And then the 
premiums are also different depending on whether I choose an HMO or an EPO or a 
PPO plan.) That's probably typical of employers who offer coverage beyond just 
the employee.

I don't believe the law requires me to sign up for a plan that provides 
coverage for any or all of the members of my family. A child can stay on the 
parent's plan until 26 under the ACA, but that doesn't mean the parent has to 
sign the child up for coverage; at least I don't think it does.

My contribution to the monthly premiums under the "employee plus two or more 
dependents" option is the same whether I'm covering 2 dependents or 12. But in 
any event the coverage only extends to the dependents that I sign up. I could, 
for example, have several children ages 18 to 26, and I could sign up all of 
them, or none of them, or some of them.

Mark

Mark S. Scarberry
Professor of Law
Pepperdine Univ. School of Law


From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, August 16, 2013 8:36 PM

To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate

                But wait:  How can you read ACA as setting a baseline that the 
parents should guarantee their adult children a full bundle of health services? 
 The ACA doesn't require parents to do this.  It allows parents to do this, and 
many parents do indeed do this, but adult children have no right vis-à-vis the 
parents to get insurance coverage.  The father is free to just tell his 
children, "Sorry, I won't get you health coverage"; that's not "taking" health 
coverage from them, it's just choosing not to give health coverage to them.  
How is it "taking" for him to offer to give less than complete health coverage 
to them?

                Eugene

From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu
Sent: Friday, August 16, 2013 6:07 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate

Eugene and I agree that this legislator is not substantially burdened in his 
religious freedom, because he is under no duty to buy a family policy.  He can 
avoid the burden without the government penalizing him.
So he is in a different position than employers, like Hobby Lobby, who will 
have to pay a penalty if they drop their health coverage of employees.

But the question of "imposing costs" on his daughters is not as simple as 
Eugene and others seem to want to make it.  This is a classic baseline problem. 
 If the baseline for the daughters is no insurance coverage, then their father 
seems to want to make them better off (just not as well off as he might).  But 
if the baseline is the full bundle of health services that the United States 
has asserted should be guaranteed to women covered by a policy that satisfies 
ACA, then the daughters are worse off, because their father has asserted his 
religious freedom as a justification for talking one essential (according to 
the government) item out of their bundle.

(Sometimes I think that what people see in these ACA cases is what they want to 
see, but I suppose I am no more capable of escaping that tendency than anyone 
else.)


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--
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg
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