What's ironic to me is that the same legislators (I.e. All of them) who
attack the courts for overreaching and making policy-decisions chose to
bestow immense policy-making power on those same courts through RFRA.
There's a legislative process lesson in there somewhere.

On Monday, June 9, 2014, Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','icl...@law.gwu.edu');>> wrote:

> It is worth recalling that federal RFRA itself was anything but divisive.
>  Au contraire.  It passed with overwhelming support from both parties, and
> wide support among civil rights and civil liberties groups (with Hobby
> Lobby under advisement, some of these groups are now running from RFRA like
> it was the plague).
>
> The problem now is not divisiveness, per se.  Like any controversial
> Supreme Court decision, some will hate it and others will love it.
>  Inevitably, these folks will be divided by their disagreement.
>
> The problem is legitimacy.  Free exercise standards, pre-Smith, were
> incredibly plastic -- sometimes you got Yoder, Thomas, or Frazee, and
> sometimes you got Goldman, O'Lone, Lyng, and Smith itself (O'Connor's
> concurrence).  RFRA codifies the regime of Sherbert-Yoder, but that has
> proven in the lower courts to be equally plastic at every turn.  What is a
> substantial burden, a compelling interest, a less restrictive means?  Does
> RFRA restore U.S. v Lee, including its dictum about commercial actors
> accepting relevant regulatory regimes?  Does it restore Braunfeld v. Brown?
>  (See the Kagan -- Clement colloquy at oral argument about what RFRA
> "restores.")
>
> The fussing over state RFRA's recently has reflected the same massive
> uncertainty over what they will be held to protect -- wedding vendor
> refusal to serve same sex couples?  Employer refusal to provide spousal
> benefits to same sex spouses of employees?  Let's just leave it to the
> courts (in these cases, state courts) is not reassuring to anyone.
>
> What I fear is that, whatever the outcome in Hobby Lobby, the losers will
> never believe that they lost based on any legal principle that will be
> applied consistently over time.  Accordingly, they will believe that they
> lost only on culture war politics. Religious exemptions present many deep
> problems, including judicial appraisal of the religious significance of
> particular acts, but this problem of inconsistency (and therefore
> illegitimacy) over time seems particularly severe.
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 11:10 AM, Volokh, Eugene <vol...@law.ucla.edu>
> wrote:
>
>>                I appreciate Alan's attempt to cabin the "divisiveness"
>> concept, but I wonder whether it works.  Nothing is beyond the scope of
>> political decision-making -- there is always the possibility of
>> constitutional amendment, and, more importantly, so long as various
>> decisions involve the contested interpretation of constitutional language,
>> there is the possibility of using political processes to select Justices
>> who will take a different view of the matter.  Indeed, my sense is that
>> some of the most prominent political divisions along religious lines have
>> come with regard to decisions that aimed to take things off the table, but
>> have failed to do so.  Roe v. Wade is the classic example, though in some
>> measure the various government speech decisions, from the school prayer
>> case onwards, have had that effect as well.
>>
>>
>>
>> Now it may well be that other decisions have indeed settled matters in
>> considerable measure, and thus diminished religious groups’ political
>> mobilization as religious groups.  But my guess is that it’s often not easy
>> to predict which creates more mobilization of religious groups as religious
>> groups: a particular executive or legislative policy decision, or a Supreme
>> Court decision reversing that policy decision.
>>
>>
>>
>>                Eugene
>>
>>
>>
>> > -----Original Message-----
>>
>> > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
>>
>> > boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan Brownstein
>>
>> > Sent: Sunday, June 08, 2014 7:37 PM
>>
>> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
>>
>> > Subject: RE: "Divisiveness"
>>
>> >
>>
>> > If divisive means that people will be upset by a substantive decision
>> than Eugene
>>
>> > is clearly correct. I have always thought the issue was whether a
>> decision was
>>
>> > one that provoked political divisions along religious lines in the
>> sense that if
>>
>> > government could promote religion (or interfere with religion)
>> religious groups
>>
>> > would have an additional incentive to organize and mobilize as
>> religious groups
>>
>> > in order to make sure that it was their faith that the government
>> promoted and
>>
>> > that it was not their faith that was subject to government
>> interference. Placing a
>>
>> > church-state issue beyond the scope of political decision-making by
>> subjecting it
>>
>> > to constitutional constraints avoided (or at least mitigated) these
>> kinds of
>>
>> > political/religious divisions.
>>
>> >
>>
>> > There is probably a better term for this concern than divisiveness.
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Alan Brownstein
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>
>
>
> --
> Ira C. Lupu
> F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
> George Washington University Law School
> 2000 H St., NW
> Washington, DC 20052
> (202)994-7053
> Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular Government, Religious
> People" (forthcoming, summer 2014, Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co.)
> My SSRN papers are here:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg
>


-- 
Hillel Y. Levin
Associate Professor
University of Georgia
School of Law
120 Herty Dr.
Athens, GA 30602
(678) 641-7452
hle...@uga.edu
hillelle...@gmail.com
SSRN Author Page:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=466645
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