I agree with Chip that an accommodation analysis may permit the creation of 
these facilities, but the analysis changes if we are evaluating a general 
funding program where no substantial burden on religious liberty requires 
accommodation.

One important difference is that the accommodation can be tailored to religious 
needs. The courts have upheld accommodations for religious individuals, 
institutions, and practices that are not available for secular individuals, 
institutions, and practices. A funding program operating outside of the 
accommodation context must be neutral and cannot discriminate in favor of 
religion. I do not consider the government funding of a chapel for prayer, even 
a non-denominational chapel,  to be a neutral expenditure allocated on the 
basis of neutral criteria. If funding for secular contemplation rooms were also 
available (or if the uses of the rooms were sufficiently generic), one might 
avoid the neutrality issue. But we would still be left with cases like Tilton 
and the remaining Establishment Clause principle that government funds cannot 
be used for religious instruction, proselytizing or worship – even if the funds 
are allocated according to ostensibly neutral criteria.

Alan

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 10:21 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Muslim-focused "reflection room" in airport

Is this any different than creating chapels or worship/reflection spaces on a 
state university campus, in a county hospital, or on a military base?  What 
holds these examples (including the airport) together is the desire to 
accommodate the worship needs of patrons/participants who have no ready 
alternative available (they are far from home, perhaps trapped physically for a 
long time, and perhaps under unusual stress).  So government may make these 
spaces available, but may not encourage or promote their use.  Eugene's airport 
example may just reflect the likely "gerrymandering" of traditional chapel 
space in the design associated with Christian worship.

We would think very differently about all this if the government set up a 
program for helping nonprofits more generally (like schools or social service 
providers) construct new space, and permitted the construction of worship 
spaces within such a program. That would go to the core of the Establishment 
Clause prohibition on government financial support for salary of clergy or the 
building of churches. What Nyquist and Tilton said about that seems to me quite 
good law still, and it has nothing to do with denominational neutrality.

On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Volokh, Eugene 
<vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote:
               A blog reader asked me about this, and I thought I’d pose the 
question to the list.  Orlando Airport is apparently spending $250,000 to build 
a “reflection room” where Muslim travelers can more conveniently pray, 
especially given the expansion of the airline Emirates at the airport.  See 
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/os-orlando-international-airport-reflection-room-20150808-story.html
 .  The reflection room is in addition to “the small, nondenominational chapel 
tucked away on Airside B, just past the security checkpoint,” where Muslim 
travelers sometimes now go (and where there are some prayer rugs available for 
them).  The reflection room would be open to all religious groups, as I 
understand it, but will be primarily designed with Muslim travelers in mind.

               Now I don’t think this should be a problematic accommodation, 
any more than serving kosher meals (or halal meals) in those government 
cafeterias in which there is sufficient demand.  But I wonder whether there 
might nonetheless be a First Amendment problem under the 1970s cases barring 
the use of government funds for physical places where religious services will 
be held.  (I realize the issue arises as to “reflection rooms” more broadly as 
well.)  What do people on the list think about it?  Thanks,

               Eugene

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--
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular Government, Religious 
People" ( Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2014))
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg
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