Between Stephen Prothero's highly accessible *Religious Literacy *and Pew's
survey <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/28/u-s-religious-knowledge-survey/> on
the topic, you will find a lot of back up for the proposition that most
American Christians know very little about the knowledge of their religion.
In a very real sense, the proposition that knowledge about Christianity is
in any way a requirement of Christianity is antithetical to the Evangelical
tradition, especially in it's Pentecostal forms. It gets worse: of the
reasonably common knowledge among Christians, much has significant
factional (that is, religious in nature) implication. For example, who
wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews? Well, scholarship and most of the
mainline churches would say someone other than Paul. Many of the
Evangelical churches will insist to their dying breath that such liberal
scholarship should be rejected and Pauline authorship is indisputable as a
matter of faith. Passing a college course that discusses the documentary
hypothesis can put people into serious dispute with their own religion.
Christianity is a religion that is obsessed with orthodoxy, an obsession so
deep that we consider it the normal way religions deal with issues. To try
to judge factually what beliefs make one an actual Christian is to be
perilously close to making normative declarations on whether one is a good
Christian.
Any judge that attempts to determine sincerity of a Christian on any
factual test so fraught is a fool or a chauvinist. Deciding on the *sine
qua non* of Christianity would be a stupendous judicial overreach
considering the history of schism on such a topic as old as the religion
itself. (Luke-Acts depicts, among other things, James and Paul having a big
debate on the requirements of Christians as to Jewish dietary law).
Judging the sincerity of a Christian as a Christian will necessarily have
almost nothing to do with one's consistency to any vision of Christianity
and everything to do with the rest of the standard toolbox we have for
determining whether people are lying to us.
-Kevin Chen
On Dec 11, 2015 5:51 PM, "Paul Finkelman" <paul.finkel...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Just out of curiosity, how many Christan faiths, sects, denominations,
> require that a convert know all 12 of the apostles to be Baptized? I would
> hazard a guess that millions of American Christians cannot pass this test.
> Furthermore, my understanding (as an outsider) is that "Christianity
> begins" with the acceptance of Jesus as the "savior" and "the son of God"
> -- so does the unnamed immigration judge here fail his/her own test?
>
> I give talks all the time on the Ten Commandments, and most of the people
> in my audiences do now know all Ten or the order they are in; virtually
> none have a clue that Jews, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and
> Anglicans/Episcopalians all have a different Ten Commandments. Does that
> mean they are not Christians (or Jews)?.
>
>
> ******************
> Paul Finkelman, Ph.D.
>
>
>
> *Senior Fellow Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and
> Constitutionalism University of Pennsylvania and *
>
>
> *Scholars Advisory Panel National Constitution Center Philadelphia,
> Pennsylvania *
> 518-439-7296 (w)
> 518-605-0296 (c)
> paul.finkel...@yahoo.com
> www.paulfinkelman.com
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* James Oleske <jole...@lclark.edu>
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
>
> *Sent:* Thursday, December 10, 2015 9:22 PM
> *Subject:* Re: the unconstitutionality of barring Muslims from entering
> the U.S.
>
> Thanks, Chip. I can see why sincerity might be more difficult to judge in
> the denial-of-affiliation situation than in the claim-of-affiliation
> situation, but I'm not sure a sincerity inquiry is impossible in the former
> situation. And I do wonder how often the line between a permissible
> sincerity inquiry and an impermissible judicial development of a religious
> test gets blurred in the latter situation. In one BIA decision affirmed by
> the Ninth Circuit, an immigration judge included this explanation for why
> it had found that the claimant had not converted to Christianity:
>
> "The respondent cannot even name the 12 apostles of Jesus Christ. With the
> Court's understanding that Christianity begins with the life and teaching
> of Jesus Christ in the New Testament, the 12 apostles have some of the most
> important, if not the most important, writings of Christianity. The Court
> has serious doubt in the respondent's conversion to Christianity when he
> cannot even give the names of the 12 apostles of Jesus Christ."
>
> Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the
> BIA's decision after finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review
> the IJ's factual findings). But see id. at 1000 (Berzon, dissenting)
> ("[T]he question is *not* what Toufighi believes but what Iran
> understands him to believe—or, more accurately, *not* to believe. It is
> thoroughly plausible that because he attends Christian services and belongs
> to a Christian church, Toufighi will be taken to have renounced Islam.
> Neither the BIA's nor the IJ's 'opinion[s] ... consider[ed] what could
> count as conversion in the eyes of an Iranian religious judge, which is the
> only thing that *would* count as far as the danger to [the petitioner] is
> concerned.' Even if his conversion is not 'genuine,' he remains at risk.")
> (quoting Bastanipour v. I.N.S.*,* 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir.1992)).
>
> Putting aside the dispute between the majority and dissent in Toufighi
> over the relevance of the IJ's factual finding, I think the finding itself
> could be viewed not only as a questionable sincerity finding, but also an
> impermissible assumption of judicial authority to determine the religious
> importance of the 12 apostles.
>
> - Jim
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu> wrote:
>
> Thanks, Jim, for the kind words about the book.
>
> On the asylum and refugee problem -- someone asked me about this
> yesterday, off-list. I answered with a variation on the following:
> In persecution cases, someone is claiming to be of a certain faith (or at
> least that she fears persecution because others perceive her to be of that
> faith). Sincerity is an appropriate inquiry into either of those
> assertions. But the context of the Trump proposal involves someone denying
> that she is a Muslim. If the person seeking entry denies affiliation, what
> questions can you ask? The government may not assert that anyone who
> believes X is therefore a member of Faith Y. If immigration judges probe
> affiliation, I'll bet they don't ask whether the applicant believes in the
> divinity of Christ, or believes in the inviolability of teachings in the
> Koran. Reaching conclusions based on those questions would involve the
> government taking a position on matters disputed within the faith itself.
>
> On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 5:23 PM, James Oleske <jole...@lclark.edu> wrote:
>
> I agree with Marty that this whole discussion is unnerving, but given the
> initial polls showing (1) substantial majority support for Trump's proposal
> among likely Republican primary voters, as well as support from a sizable
> minority of likely Democratic primary voters, and (2) Trump reaching new
> heights in the GOP primary, I think a discussion of the constitutionality
> of Trump's deplorable proposal is inevitable.
>
> And even putting Trump's proposal aside, some of the proposals from more
> "conventional" candidates would seem to raise similar issues to those that
> we've been discussing here. For example, Governor Bush recently indicated
> that Christian refugees from Syria should receive preference over other
> Syrian refugees because there are "no Christian terrorists in the Middle
> East." When asked by a reporter about how the screening process would work,
> Bush responded: "You’re a Christian — I mean, you can prove you're a
> Christian. You can’t prove it, then, you know, you err on the side of
> caution.”
>
> This approach would potentially implicate both the "ecclesiastical
> question" rule and the "denominational discrimination" rule (assuming
> persecuted Christians are given preference over persecuted Yazidis,
> Shiites, etc.). Which brings us back to the question of whether these rules
> are best viewed as structural constraints on the federal government, rather
> than rights-oriented rules, and thus have extraterritorial reach.
>
> On the issue of the Establishment Clause's extraterritorial reach, many
> thanks to Paul and Jesse for the suggested resources. In the meantime, on
> the broader structural-v-rights issue, I went back and took another look at
> the opening chapters of Chip and Bob's book, and I commend to list members
> their discussion of the "evolution of rights talk as a mode of
> Establishment Clause discourse," which they counter with "an alternative
> account of nonestablishment, one framed as a jurisdictional limitation on
> civil authority." (Note: As I was writing this, Chip and Bob posted their ACS
> piece
> <http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-legality-of-muslim-exclusion-part-ii-the-establishment-clause>
> elaborating on the applicability of their approach to the Trump proposal.)
>
>
> Finally, a question for those familiar with asylum and refugee
> proceedings: when addressing claims based on religious persecution, do the
> proceedings typically focus on how a claimant is likely to be treated by
> their home country based on their perceived religion or also on whether the
> claimant actually qualifies as a member of the persecuted religious group?
> To the extent the proceedings focus on the latter question, does that raise
> the problem Chip and Bob have flagged of the government answering
> ecclesiastical questions? (In some initial research, I have found a couple
> Seventh Circuit decisions and one Ninth Circuit dissent indicating that the
> proceedings should not focus on the latter question, albeit without any
> mention of the Establishment Clause).
>
> - Jim
>
> On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 7:24 AM, Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> This post by Steve Vladeck strikes me as just right:
>
>
> https://www.justsecurity.org/28221/missing-constitutional-analyses-donald-trumps-muslim-immigration-ban/
>
> Three relatively minor additional points:
>
> 1. I don't believe there have ever been any Supreme Court cases in which
> the "plenary power" doctrine was ever applied as to expressly *racial or
> religious* terms of exclusion; so even as a matter of *stare decisis*,
> there's nothing there.
>
> 2. As Paul suggests, when it comes to the EC, there is the additional
> complication of whether and how it applies to aliens overseas -- the old
> *Lamont
> v. Woods* question. This has practical implications, in that the US
> government occasionally spends money overseas to promote certain forms of
> religion that it could never do here in the States.
>
> 3. There's something a bit unnerving, frankly, about so many of us ConLaw
> academics treating this question so seriously. Lends the whole thing an
> air of "Trump has raised a serious, close, contested question," which, of
> course, implies that this is something that should even be a topic of
> public debate, rather than dismissed straight away as an abomination. Not
> saying we shouldn't set the record straight once it's being discussed --
> Steve and Chip are 100% right not to let the Posner/Spiro view go
> unchallenged. But the whole discussion is deeply disturbing (as are the
> Court's precedents, of course!).
>
> On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 1:01 AM, Paul Horwitz <phorw...@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> I'm sorry not to see reference in the discussion to preexisting scholarly
> discussions of the question of the extraterritorial reach of the EC or
> other clauses of the First Amendment. No offense to the worthy statements
> of those who have posted, or written elsewhere, although I do think
> academics generally have a comparative advantage at calm and slow
> reflection, not short-term reactions and predictions, in which they are
> largely as subject to cognitive limitations as all humans are.
>
> To that end, may I commend Timothy Zick's The Cosmopolitan First
> Amendment: Protecting Transborder Expressive and Religious Liberties
> (Cambridge University Press, 2015),
>
> http://www.amazon.com/The-Cosmopolitan-First-Amendment-Transborder/dp/1107547210.
> His endnotes point to other relevant and reflective treatments. See also
> this valuable report of a task force on religion and U.S. foreign policy
> sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs:
> http://kroc.nd.edu/sites/default/files/engaging_religious_communities_abroad.pdf.
> I think everyone will find both sources valuable, interesting, and
> time-consuming.
>
>
> On Dec 9, 2015, at 11:12 PM, James Oleske <jole...@lclark.edu> wrote:
>
> Although Rick and Chip agree that Trump's proposal violates the
> Establishment Clause, they travel different paths to that conclusion, and
> those different paths raise (I think) an interesting question:
>
> Under the Court's precedents, is it clear that the "denominational
> discrimination" rule Rick invokes is, like the "ecclesiastical question"
> rule Chip originally invoked, structural in nature and not rights oriented?
>
> Between O'Connor's opinion in Lynch, and the Court's opinions in Grand
> Rapids, Allegheny, Sante Fe, and McCreary, there is a a fair amount of
> language that makes the issue of endorsement or disapproval sound in
> individual rights ("person's standing in the political community" "not full
> members of the political community" “perceived by … nonadherents as a
> disapproval[] of their individual religious choices"). In its latest
> explanation of the denominational-discrimination rule in McCreary, the
> Court wrote that "Manifesting a purpose to favor one faith over another ...
> clashes with the 'understanding, reached ... after decades of religious
> war, that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance that
> respects the views of all citizens." If we're talking about non-citizens
> who are not part of the American political community, could one colorably
> argue that the denominational-discrimiantion rule -- as currently
> understood by the Court -- does not apply?
>
> - Jim
>
> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 12:21 PM, Rick Duncan <nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com>
> wrote:
>
> I missed Chip's great post before I asked my question.
>
> I agree completely with what Chip says here. It seems like a clear
> violation of EC limitations on National power. The clearest command of the
> EC forbids denominational discrimination by the National government
> ("Congress shall make no law").
>
> The only problem might be standing. Would a non-citizen-foreign-national
> have standing to challenge the exclusion under the EC?
>
> Rick Duncan
> Welpton Professor of Law
> University of Nebraska College of Law
> Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu>
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 8, 2015 7:10 PM
> *Subject:* the unconstitutionality of barring Muslims from entering the
> U.S.
>
> There has been much discussion in the press and on blog posts re: the
> constitutionality of of Trump's proposal to bar (non-citizen?) Muslims from
> entering the U.S. Several commentators have suggested the "plenary power"
> doctrine, governing Congressional power over immigration, would insulate
> such a proposal from a finding of unconstitutionality.
> I think the strongest constitutional argument against this proposal is
> based on the Establishment Clause, which severely limits the government's
> power to decide who is and who is not a Muslim. Suppose the person seeking
> entry disputes the label; how will immigration officials adjudicate the
> question? What criteria would the government apply to decide who fits the
> disqualification? This is an ecclesiastical question, the decisions of
> which are off-limits to the government. (See Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC; more
> generally, see Lupu & Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People, chaps.
> 1-2.)
> Because the Establishment Clause is structural, and not rights-oriented,
> It does not matter whether or not the decisions pertain to American
> nationals. The plenary power doctrine cannot undo this structural
> limitation, any more than it can undo limitations based on separation of
> powers (e.g., Congress may not delegate to a congressional committee the
> power to process immigration cases).
>
> Reactions from list members to this argument?
>
> --
> Ira C. Lupu
> F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
> George Washington University Law School
> 2000 H St., NW
> Washington, DC 20052
> (202)994-7053
> Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular Government, Religious
> People" ( Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2014))
> My SSRN papers are here:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>
> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are
> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or
> wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>
>
>
>
> --
> Ira C. Lupu
> F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
> George Washington University Law School
> 2000 H St., NW
> Washington, DC 20052
> (202)994-7053
> Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular Government, Religious
> People" ( Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2014))
> My SSRN papers are here:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg
>
> _______________________________________________
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>
> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are
> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or
> wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>
> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are
> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or
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>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>
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> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are
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> wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>
_______________________________________________
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