Dan -- I agree that Lukumi did not answer this question directly, but didn't Yoder? Here's what the Court said about the issue there:
"A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. Although a determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal, rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses." - Jim On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 8:52 AM, Conkle, Daniel O. <con...@indiana.edu> wrote: > I don’t think this is obviously so, Marty. Lukumi didn’t present this > question because a narrow sense of religion was clearly at issue. I think > the constitutional definition of religion remains an open question, and the > resolution of that question could bear on the proper application of the > Lukumi analysis as to deliberate targeting as well as general applicability. > > > > Dan > ************************************************ > Daniel O. Conkle > Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law > Indiana University Maurer School of Law > Bloomington, Indiana 47405 > (812) 855-4331 > fax (812) 855-0555 > e-mail con...@indiana.edu > ************************************************ > > > > > > > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marty Lederman > *Sent:* Tuesday, June 28, 2016 11:44 AM > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > *Subject:* Re: Cert. Petition Filed in Pharmacy Free Exercise Case > > > > *Seeger *provides a definition of "religion" for a particular *statute*. > I don't think there's any dispute that the FEC -- and *Lukumi* -- adopts > a narrower view of what constitutes "religion." > > > > On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 11:32 AM, Conkle, Daniel O. <con...@indiana.edu> > wrote: > > With respect to the issue of religious as opposed to other moral and > ethical objections: > > > > Does it matter for purposes of the Lukumi analysis whether religious > exercise, as protected by the Free Exercise Clause, is defined narrowly and > traditionally or, instead, is defined broadly enough to include the > exercise of moral and ethical beliefs that are comparable to traditionally > religious beliefs? Cf. Seeger. > > > > Dan > > ************************************************ > > Daniel O. Conkle > > Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law > > Indiana University Maurer School of Law > > Bloomington, Indiana 47405 > > (812) 855-4331 > > fax (812) 855-0555 > > e-mail con...@indiana.edu > > ************************************************ > > >
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