> But the risk is not completely eliminated, since the usage of the HSM itself
> may have become compromised. An attacker may have gained access to a system
> with HSM access and issued malicious signatures. If this should happen, a key
> replacement is most probably warranted.
Absolutely! That said, I imagine any decent HSM can perform internal
time-stamping, in which case only signatures before a certain point need to be
invalidated.
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