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The News International  (Pakistan)
May 25, 2005

Nukes' seventh anniversary-III
The successes and failures of Pakistan's nukes

M B Naqvi

>From the start Pakistan's nuclear programme was 
military-oriented and India-specific. The initial 
proposition was that Pakistan was a weaker rival 
of India and had business to transact with India 
that could require application of military force. 
The ambivalent nature of India-Pakistan relations 
is known, with its three wars and three 
semi-wars. Pakistan was decisively defeated in 
1971 and concluded thereafter that there is no 
future in conventional wars with India because it 
is richer and can always outspend Pakistan. 
Pakistan therefore decided to go nuclear to 
offset India's advantages.

When exactly Pakistan started its nuclear 
programme does not signify; it was sometime in 
1970s. Pakistan succeeded in the middle of the 
1980s in enriching uranium. That key success led 
to other successes and soon Pakistan was able to 
fabricate nuclear weapons, admitting only its 
major components in 1990. But it was able in 1986 
to threaten India with a nuclear riposte to the 
likely extension of India's exercise Brass Tacks 
into a thrust into Sindh, as was feared.

Once Pakistan became nuclear-capable, it decided 
to twist the Indian lion's tail in Kashmir, 
fearing no military response from it. It chose an 
undercover semi-war with India in Kashmir. Events 
in India-administered Kashmir late in the 1980s 
gave Pakistan an opportunity: it metamorphosed 
Kashmiris' non-violent secular political protest 
agitation -- against India's manipulation of 
elections in Kashmir -- and captured the 
movement's leadership, converting it into an 
Islamic jihad. It did so through jihadis, most of 
them veterans of Afghanistan's anti-Soviet war 
and many of whom had doubled as Taliban. This led 
to many consequences.

India chose to suppress the jihad by inflicting 
horrible human rights violations on Kashmiris. 
The Indians need to be blamed for these gross 
human rights violations. But Pakistan also shares 
some responsibility. Why? Because it did not 
think its options through. It should have 
foreseen what the Indian reaction would be. And 
whether the pressure Pakistan was putting on it 
was enough to make India cry "uncle." In the 
event, Indians fought on -- i.e., to kill as many 
Kashmiris as possible. The result is that 
Kashmiris have lost something like 80- to 85,000 
lives and many more limbs. Loss of property is 
astronomical in purely Kashmiri terms. Despite 
these sacrifices the Kashmiris are not an inch 
nearer their azadi. The outlook is more Indian 
atrocities, if jihad continues.

True, India might continue to inflict human 
rights violations even after Pakistan has stopped 
sending militants from outside. So long as there 
is an armed insurgency in Kashmir, the Kashmiri 
freedom fighters are offering India its chance: 
in a violent conflict, India would crush the puny 
violence by Kashmiris with its far greater 
violence-making machine. Adopting violent 
insurgency is a foolish game for Kashmiris.

Remember Pakistan's military thinkers, who 
controlled the nuclear programme throughout, wove 
strange strategic doctrines in the hubris created 
by nuclear weapons. On the one hand, they dreamed 
dreams of federating Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan in order to confront India with this 
strategic depth. How unrealistic this foolish 
project was should be clear. On the other hand, a 
theory was evolved that keeping Indians engaged 
in a proxy war in the Kashmir Valley would free 
Pakistan from the worry of an Indian attack. So 
long as India was kept on the hop, Pakistan was 
safe. In retrospect, this can be seen as foolish 
ratiocination.

In 2002, the Indians called Pakistan's bluff. 
They brought forward their troops on the Pakistan 
border in staggering numbers. They made as if 
they would invade. The threat was credible for 
both friend and foe. The rest of the world 
thought that thanks to balance of power, Pakistan 
would be obliged to use its nuclear option first. 
A nuclear war will result. The rest of the world 
was not prepared to accept it. Everyone advised 
the two to make up.

Pakistanis too saw that the Indians meant 
business. Pakistan made a U-turn in the Kashmir 
policies by promising no more infiltration from 
this side. That firm promise by Pakistan's 
president resolved the crisis and Indian troops 
began withdrawing by October 2002. Normalcy took 
some time to return. India later offered 
negotiations and the hand of friendship (April 
2003). How genuine it was, or is, is hard to say. 
Anyhow, the long stalled Composite Dialogue, 
first agreed in 1997, was resumed. Although it 
has gone nowhere for over a year, it has not 
finally broken down. The talks are going on and 
more are scheduled.

Dispassionate assessment of the true utility of 
Pakistani nukes is urgent. There are two clear 
negative entries in the national ledger. One, 
nukes were of no use to Pakistan vis-ý-vis 
Kashmir and it had to promise it will not longer 
send jihadis. The promise was repeated several 
times to Indians and Americans. The second 
context was the 2002 war crisis. India was ready 
to attack if Pakistan had it not made those 
promises about Kashmir. That is to say, India was 
taking the risk of a war despite the presence of 
Pakistan's nuclear deterrent, probably not less 
effective than India's own. One calls for taking 
purposeful note of the mere fact that Indians 
made a credible move to attack Pakistan, ignoring 
the presence of the Pakistani nuclear deterrent. 
That simply shows that this Nuclear Deterrent did 
not deter India threatening war.

Why does one make such a sweeping claim? Because 
Pakistani nuclear devices were sold as giving 
Pakistan an impregnable defence against India; it 
was argued that given the nukes' presence, no one 
would dare attack. The fact that India dared 
makes those nukes less credible than they were 
thought to be. It is being argued that India did 
not finally attack because of those nukes. But 
that is a non sequitur and takes us nowhere. The 
decisive moment was when the Pakistan president 
made the premise of virtually ending the jihad in 
Kashmir. Obviously, nukes were no help to 
Musharraf; if the notional benefit of the nukes 
had to be sacrificed to keep peace, the nukes' 
value gets heavily diluted. The nukes are no 
longer vital for Pakistan's security because (a) 
Pakistan could not win Kashmir through the proxy 
war; and (b) these nukes could not defend 
Pakistan against India's threatened attack 
without Pakistan making vital political 
concessions.

Let's note that no outsider loves Pakistan 
because of these nukes. No outsider appears to 
dread Pakistan's nukes, not even India. No 
outsider is prepared to do as Pakistan wishes him 
to do because it has nukes. It is true the same 
is true of India. But India is out of context 
here.

There is another negative aspect of the nukes: 
there is Dr A. Q. Khan's underground bazaar of 
nuclear contraband. The story has not ended. The 
rest of the world is still interested. They all 
think that Pakistan is vulnerable to various 
threats from inside. They believe that there are 
anti-Musharraf and anti-Pakistan elements inside 
who can get hold of these weapons. They feel that 
extremist forces can, in conceivable 
eventualities, get control of these weapons. 
Pakistan is more vulnerable because of these 
nukes. Conceivable threats of external 
intervention exist.

Pakistanis have paid through their nose for these 
nukes. Pakistan's economy has been put under a 
pressure that it cannot really bear. The kind of 
inflationary pressures and the growth of poverty 
that has taken place are due to Islamabad not 
being able to invest enough in the social 
sectors. The economic price of the nukes is lost 
opportunities.

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SOUTH ASIANS AGAINST NUKES (SAAN):
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