Re: One subject
On 13 Jun 2012, at 02:31, meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2012 4:40 PM, Pierz wrote: I didn't say that we would all turn into self-deniers concerned only to help others. I said we would achieve an optimal moral society. Such a society would always bear in mind the absolute equality of all subjects (not in the 'royal subject' sense!), with each person knowing their actions are received by none other than themselves. The best moral action would be the selfish action, seen from the perspective of the entire self rather than the fragmentary self. Imagine you share an island with a person for one year, and you know that the next year, you will become the other person on the island at the start of the same year again - ie, you will experience everything from their perspective. How will it change the way you behave? So does this universal person include dogs? apes? spiders? rocks? You put the finger on the difficult question.. Is the universal person the person associated with the universal machine (this includes Robinson Arithmetic, bacteria, spiders, your laptop, ... up to you and me, and beyond) Rock? plausibly trivially if the quantum fields description is correct, in the sense that the exact solution of the quantum wave of the rock is a quantum universal dovetailer as the quantum vacuum is), but plausibly meaningless in the sense that you have not provided a way to attribute an individual person to a rock. Or is the universal person the Löbian machine (this includes Peano Arithmetic, *jumping* spiders, octopi, and you and me). The first one can *do* everything, but *understand* about nothing. The second one can *do* everything but also, they *know* that they can *do* everything. They still *understand* about nothing, but they *can* understand why they understand about nothing. They can understand where the questions could come from. The jump "Universal" ==> "Löbian" is the jump from consciousness to self-consciousness. I am currently thinking. Basically Löbian = Universal + induction axioms. Or K + []([]p->p)->[]p. Smullyan explains how a K4 reasoner becomes Löbian when he visited the Island of Knight and Knaves, as we discussed a long time ago, and with comp, we are K4 reasoner, and computer-land *is* an Island of Knight and Knaves. cf: K = [](p->q)->([]p->[]q) 4 = []p->[][]p Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One subject
On 13 Jun 2012, at 01:44, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 4:27:29 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Jun 2012, at 04:19, Pierz wrote: Yes, of course, and I made this exact point in relation to free will and determinism. One should not mix up levels. But I think there is still a distinction in perspectives if all things occur as opposed to only some. If the range of experiences that occur is finite, then my actions one way or another will change the sum total of happiness in the experiences I will have as the universal subject, whereas in an 'everything happens' model, I may still have grounds for moral action, but knowing I go through everything anyway seems to make the case for altruism a little less compelling! Mind you (and this is my gripe with comp as an explanatory framework), it is never clear in an infinite field what local conditions might apply. Perhaps we live in a universe created by an old testament god who thinks its an abomination for a man to lie with a man or to eat goat's flesh on Wednesdays. Such a possibility cannot be excluded because of the infinite calculation depth of the UD - indeed somewhere in a universe just like ours, that is the case! OK, but we belong to all universe at once (among those who reaches our computational states), never in one universe. You have to manage the statistics. So our choice, with respect to our most probable universal neighboors/computation, can change our proportion of accessible internal universes, and altruism/egoism makes sense. Ah yes, I'd lost sight of that detail. That is why you take the lift instead of jumping out of the window. That is why some people quit smoking. Bruno, it may be why *you* don't jump out the window. But most people aren't thinking about their proportion of accessible universes when they take the stairs! Yeah, the tree distracts from the multi-tree. yet, people naturally think about the possible normal consequences of their act (when not too much sleepy). They don't jump out the window because they feel that it would normally end at the hospital, or cemetery, when taking the stairs ends normally with home and family and friends, and dogs and cats. They intuit correctly the (perhaps correct) theory. What they feel naturally reflect the theory, a bit like when I do a cup of coffee, I don't think at all about all the physical laws involved in the process, yet the coffee is made possible by the laws, and the knowledge of the laws can help to improve the coffee, waste less energy, etc. Likewise, some people will say "yes" to the doctor, without given a damn to any metaphysical question. They will say: "Doctor, just do what you need to do so that I have a chance to see the next soccer cup, and please preserve me from any bloody technical details". Theories are true of false independently of those who believe or disbelieve those theories. The truth of a belief is independent of the believer, except for first person self-referential beliefs (which can be objects of science, but cannot be part of science). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One subject
On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 10:31:31 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: > > On 6/12/2012 4:40 PM, Pierz wrote: > > I didn't say that we would all turn into self-deniers concerned only to > help others. I said we would achieve an optimal moral society. Such a > society would always bear in mind the absolute equality of all subjects > (not in the 'royal subject' sense!), with each person knowing their actions > are received by none other than themselves. The best moral action would be > the selfish action, seen from the perspective of the entire self rather > than the fragmentary self. Imagine you share an island with a person for > one year, and you know that the next year, you will become the other person > on the island at the start of the same year again - ie, you will experience > everything from their perspective. How will it change the way you behave? > > > So does this universal person include dogs? apes? spiders? rocks? > Well of course it must include all minds, which means dogs, apes and spiders. Rocks? Who knows? If rocks possess any sentience I very much doubt it has any moral bearing. > > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/2klVzkg5gI0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One subject
On 6/12/2012 4:40 PM, Pierz wrote: I didn't say that we would all turn into self-deniers concerned only to help others. I said we would achieve an optimal moral society. Such a society would always bear in mind the absolute equality of all subjects (not in the 'royal subject' sense!), with each person knowing their actions are received by none other than themselves. The best moral action would be the selfish action, seen from the perspective of the entire self rather than the fragmentary self. Imagine you share an island with a person for one year, and you know that the next year, you will become the other person on the island at the start of the same year again - ie, you will experience everything from their perspective. How will it change the way you behave? So does this universal person include dogs? apes? spiders? rocks? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One subject
On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 4:27:29 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 Jun 2012, at 04:19, Pierz wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: >> >> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI >> > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a >> > new topic. >> > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality >> > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible >> > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned >> > about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only >> > solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the >> > idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering >> > how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being >> > resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as >> > the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new >> > subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear >> > they are you), or is the new subject really you? >> > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself >> > the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected >> > should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might >> > have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my >> > memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes >> > even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain >> > atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- >> > dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity >> > of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since >> > there is no physical continuity at all. >> > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, >> > resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all >> > memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and >> > reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the >> > future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain >> > is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following >> > this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the >> > division between subjects is not absolute. What separates >> > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the >> > computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious >> > 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to >> > one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner >> > of a specific physical brain). >> > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's >> > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must >> > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every >> > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the >> > UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of >> > morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they >> > *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge >> > of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change >> > the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, >> > wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since >> > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of >> > every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can >> > only steal from yourself. >> >> I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong >> to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition >> true but capable of becoming false if justified "too much", like all >> protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, >> etc.). Cf "hell is paved with good intentions". >> >> Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, >> BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not "don't do to the others >> what you don't want the others do to you", but
Re: One subject
On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 12:14:26 AM UTC+10, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 6/11/2012 10:19 PM, Pierz wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: >> >> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI >> > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a >> > new topic. >> > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality >> > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible >> > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned >> > about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only >> > solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the >> > idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering >> > how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being >> > resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as >> > the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new >> > subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear >> > they are you), or is the new subject really you? >> > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself >> > the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected >> > should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might >> > have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my >> > memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes >> > even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain >> > atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- >> > dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity >> > of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since >> > there is no physical continuity at all. >> > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, >> > resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all >> > memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and >> > reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the >> > future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain >> > is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following >> > this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the >> > division between subjects is not absolute. What separates >> > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the >> > computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious >> > 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to >> > one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner >> > of a specific physical brain). >> > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's >> > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must >> > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every >> > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the >> > UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of >> > morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they >> > *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge >> > of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change >> > the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, >> > wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since >> > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of >> > every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can >> > only steal from yourself. >> > > Hi Pierz, > > A few comments. What is the process or relation that defines the "I"? > If there is one "I", as you discuss here, would not that "I" have > experiences that are mutually contradictory? How would this not do damage > to the idea that a conscious experience is an integrated whole and thus > contains no contradiction? > > The idea of a single mind or observer does not imply that everything is happening at once in that mind - or rather, it does not imply that the I is aware of everything at once. That is patently not the case. It is hard to define in objectiv
Re: One subject
On 12 Jun 2012, at 04:19, Pierz wrote: On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a > new topic. > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned > about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only > solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the > idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering > how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being > resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as > the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new > subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear > they are you), or is the new subject really you? > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself > the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected > should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might > have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my > memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes > even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain > atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- > dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity > of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since > there is no physical continuity at all. > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, > resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all > memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and > reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the > future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain > is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following > this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the > division between subjects is not absolute. What separates > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the > computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious > 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to > one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner > of a specific physical brain). > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the > UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of > morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they > *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge > of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change > the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, > wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of > every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can > only steal from yourself. I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition true but capable of becoming false if justified "too much", like all protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, etc.). Cf "hell is paved with good intentions". Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not "don't do to the others what you don't want the others do to you", but "don't do to the others what *the others* don't want you do to them". In fact, unless you defend your life, just respect the possible adult "No Thanks". (It is more complex with the children, you must add nuances like "as far as possible"). I don't know what G* and G are, but I get the gist, and I agree. In fact, questions like how to deal with punishment become interesting when considered through this 'one subject' lens. When 'I' am the offender, I don't want to be punished for my crimes, but 'I' as the victim and the broader community think the offender should be. We have to balance competing views. Also, there is sense in looking after oneself ahead of others to the extent that I of all people am best equipped to lo
Re: One subject
On 6/11/2012 10:19 PM, Pierz wrote: On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a > new topic. > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned > about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only > solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the > idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering > how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being > resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as > the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new > subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear > they are you), or is the new subject really you? > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself > the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected > should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might > have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my > memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes > even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain > atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- > dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity > of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since > there is no physical continuity at all. > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, > resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all > memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and > reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the > future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain > is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following > this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the > division between subjects is not absolute. What separates > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the > computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious > 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to > one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner > of a specific physical brain). > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the > UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of > morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they > *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge > of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change > the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, > wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of > every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can > only steal from yourself. Hi Pierz, A few comments. What is the process or relation that defines the "I"? If there is one "I", as you discuss here, would not that "I" have experiences that are mutually contradictory? How would this not do damage to the idea that a conscious experience is an integrated whole and thus contains no contradiction? I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition true but capable of becoming false if justified "too much", like all protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, etc.). Cf "hell is paved with good intentions". Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not "don't do to the others what you don't want the others do to you", but "don't do to the others what *the others* don't want you do to them". In fact, unless you defend your life, just respect the possible adult "No Thanks". (It i
Re: One subject
On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: > > > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI > > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a > > new topic. > > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality > > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible > > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned > > about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only > > solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the > > idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering > > how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being > > resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as > > the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new > > subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear > > they are you), or is the new subject really you? > > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself > > the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected > > should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might > > have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my > > memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes > > even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain > > atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- > > dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity > > of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since > > there is no physical continuity at all. > > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, > > resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all > > memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and > > reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the > > future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain > > is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following > > this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the > > division between subjects is not absolute. What separates > > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the > > computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious > > 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to > > one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner > > of a specific physical brain). > > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's > > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must > > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every > > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the > > UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of > > morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they > > *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge > > of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change > > the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, > > wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since > > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of > > every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can > > only steal from yourself. > > I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong > to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition > true but capable of becoming false if justified "too much", like all > protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, > etc.). Cf "hell is paved with good intentions". > > Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, > BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not "don't do to the others > what you don't want the others do to you", but "don't do to the others > what *the others* don't want you do to them". > In fact, unless you defend your life, just respect the possible adult > "No Thanks". (It is more complex with the children, you must add > nuances like "as far as possible"). > > > I don't know what G* and G are, but I get the gist, and I agree. I
Re: One subject
On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition true but capable of becoming false if justified "too much", like all protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, etc.). Cf "hell is paved with good intentions". Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not "don't do to the others what you don't want the others do to you", but "don't do to the others what *the others* don't want you do to them". In fact, unless you defend your life, just respect the possible adult "No Thanks". (It is more complex with the children, you must add nuances like "as far as possible"). Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end of all actions, both good and bad. This is true from outside, but not from inside, where the good/bad is relative to you, and you can change the proportion of good and bad in your accessible neighborhoods. And it is obligatory like that by comp, making moral locally sense-full. Looking at the big picture for the moral is as much senseless as justifying a murder by referring to the obedience to the physical laws. It does not work because we precisely don't usually live in the big picture. We are locally embed in it, and that plays the key local role for any practical matter. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~mar
Re: One subject
Wonderful, thank you for the link. On Monday, June 11, 2012 6:18:57 PM UTC+10, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > > On 11.06.2012 03:12 Pierz said the following: > > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI > > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a > > new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is > > in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes > > all possible experiences. > > You may want to read Erwin Schr�dinger, Mind and Matter > Chapter 4: The Arithmetical Paradox: The Oneness of Mind > > "The doctrine of identity can claim that it is clinched by the empirical > fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the > singular. Not only has none of us ever experienced more than one > consciousness, but there is also no trace of circumstantial evidence of > this ever happening anywhere in the world." > > Evgenii > -- > > > http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/03/the-arithmetical-paradox-the-oneness-of-mind.html > > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/WntDRMDahh0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One subject
rios and their variants. In comp, what maintains the continuity of the subject in the duplication experiment? The substitution level. The subject coheres through the teleportation/duplication because the structure of computations is retained - in my thought experiment, the physical brain structure. My statement that the contents of consciousness provide the continuity and the separation of observers is similar to the comp statement that it is the continuity of calculation that provides the cohesion of the 1p perspective. > > (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of > other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as > belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the > owner of a specific physical brain). > > Except it was the structure and implicitly the algorithms of a specific > physical brain > that provided the continuity. > > > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). > > Well, have you experienced them? I remember some experiences but > certainly not all. > Have I? I don't know! I remember being a ten year old, but only a few snapshots. Nevertheless I'm sure I lived every second of being ten. I would not expect to remember every life I have lived/will live (consciousness is out of time, so I can't really put a tense on it). > > What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. > Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is > no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we > grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. > And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal > society, since > > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every > action they commit? > > That's pretty much the Hindu idea, but I don't think they are notably more > altruistic. > Do they 'grok it deep down'? People espouse beliefs with which they have been enculturated without really believing them at a deep experiential level. > > Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. > > Or, no matter what I steal it's OK because it was really mine anyway. > > Ha ha. That would be more like solipsism, and very short sighted. > > Brent > > > Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one > sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end > of all actions, both good and bad. > > > > On Monday, June 11, 2012 12:20:06 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: > > On 6/10/2012 6:12 PM, Pierz wrote: > > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and > eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. > > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about > comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a > paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic > freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether > the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same > consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who > was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who > will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? > > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the > question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be > scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have?" Will they be > happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I > don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine > dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the > continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can > only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes > 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. > > There's continuity of physical structure (I think that's what > 'reassembled' means). I > don't know what 'continuity of self-reference' means?
Re: One subject
On 11.06.2012 03:12 Pierz said the following: I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. You may want to read Erwin Schrödinger, Mind and Matter Chapter 4: The Arithmetical Paradox: The Oneness of Mind "The doctrine of identity can claim that it is clinched by the empirical fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the singular. Not only has none of us ever experienced more than one consciousness, but there is also no trace of circumstantial evidence of this ever happening anywhere in the world." Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/03/the-arithmetical-paradox-the-oneness-of-mind.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One subject
On 6/10/2012 6:12 PM, Pierz wrote: I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. There's continuity of physical structure (I think that's what 'reassembled' means). I don't know what 'continuity of self-reference' means? Anyway this is not a thought experiment. The atoms in your body get replaced as you live, it is only the structure that is, approximately, conserved. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Happens to me all the time. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Are you worried that you may experience a heart attack in 20yrs? Are you eating a cheeseburger? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness That seems to me a tautology; just an implicit definition of "subjectivities"? (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). Except it was the structure and implicitly the algorithms of a specific physical brain that provided the continuity. I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). Well, have you experienced them? I remember some experiences but certainly not all. What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? That's pretty much the Hindu idea, but I don't think they are notably more altruistic. Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. Or, no matter what I steal it's OK because it was really mine anyway. Brent Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end of all actions, both good and bad. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
One subject
I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end of all actions, both good and bad. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ymVml8zv_kMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
