Jerry, list,
Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement went.
Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must admit I'm
not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such as 'coupling' and
'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean something lik
List, Frank:
On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
> That effect of the smoke is in some sense part of what it is to be smoke.
> Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a
> whole, requires the whole work of understanding. But while the percept is no
Jeff, list,
Peirce does say, in paragraph 539 from Vol. 4 of CP, that "[t]he Immediate
Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the
Percept". When you ask whether the percept is the smoke itself, or a visual
impression, I think this statement from Peirce implies you are ri
Gary F,
Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is
considered as a singular phenomenon?
I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is
a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign.
Is it your position that the pe
Franklin, Jeff,
Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To perceive X
as smoke is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of that judgment,
“That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting its subject (that)
with a predicate (__ is smoke), which like
Hello Franklin, Gary F., List,
If a person sees smoke billowing in the distance, is the percept the "smoke
itself," or is the percept the visual impression of the smoke? Peirce
indicates that it is the latter when he provides the following explanation of a
percept: "A visual percept obtrudes
Gary F,
A perceptual judgment must take the form of a dicisign, so I would say the
identification that "that right there is smoke" would be a perceptual
judgment, but smoke itself is not a perceptual judgment, but would have to
be the percept (supposing the percept has been rightly judged as smoke
Peircers,
We can describe how science works.
We cannot prove that it works.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
> On Dec 12, 2015, at 2:49 AM, John Collier wrote:
>
> Clark, List,
>
> Just a couple of points to take up something that Clark says within the more
> general context of
Supplement: I suspect, that my below consideration is non-Peircean, as far as I know, because I ony know examples by Peirce, that are about relatives, that is terms, i.e. language. Language, of course, can only be inter-subjective. An intra-subjective consideration as below may be weird or inc
