Re: [Acme] ACME subdomains

2020-08-04 Thread Jacob Hoffman-Andrews
I haven't followed the "ACME for subdomains" conversation closely, but the
base semantics of ACME are designed such that they can express "all of"
semantics AND "one of" semantics. For a given Order, a client has to fulfil
*all* the Authorizations; for a given Authorization, a client has to
fulfil *one
of* the Challenges.

To take advantage of this, you would need to define a new challenge type
that expresses validating a parent domain. For instance "dns-parent-01." It
would contain the name of the parent domain as a field.

If a server has the policy that validating control of either
foo.bar.example.com or example.com is sufficient to issue for
foo.bar.example.com, it would respond to newOrder requests for
foo.bar.example.com by creating an Order with one Authorization (for
foo.bar.example.com), and that Order would have two Challenges: "dns-01"
and "dns-parent-01" (with a parent domain of "example.com"). The client
could then choose which challenge to attempt.
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[Acme] ACME subdomains

2020-08-04 Thread Felipe Gasper
As regards https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-friel-acme-subdomains-02 ...

Is the idea that the client will, if requesting authz on sub.example.com, 
*only* be able to do authz against the parent domain (example.com)?

It would seem advantageous—from the client’s perspective, anyway—to allow a 
workflow where the client can do authz against one or the other. For longer 
subdomains, e.g., foo.bar.example.com, likewise, ideally the domain itself or 
either parent domain would work.

Was this considered and deemed infeasible?

Thank you!

-Felipe Gasper___
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[Acme] Review of draft-friel-acme-subdomains-02

2020-08-04 Thread Russ Housley
Document: draft-friel-acme-subdomains-02
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Date: 2020-08-04

Major Concern:

The TODO markers regarding wildcard domain names, the 200 response
code, and the security considerations should be filled in with
strawman text before this I-D is adopted by the ACME WG.


Minor Concerns:

General: s/certificate authority/certification authority/ (many)

Abstract: s/certificate authority policy/certificate policy/

Introduction: s/X.509 (PKIX)/X.509v3 (PKIX) [RFC5280]/

Terminology: Correct CA, please.  See above.

Terminology: Please add a definition of subdomain.


Nits:

Section 3: says:

   3.  client sends POST-as-GET requests to retrieve the
   "authorizations", with the downloaded "authorization" object(s)
   containing the "identifier" that the client must prove control of

s/client must prove control of/client must prove that they control/

There is something wrong with the table formatting in Section 6.2.

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