Re: [agi] Re: Language learning
There is no doubt that learning new languages at an older age is much more difficult than younger. I wonder if there are some hard computational constraints that we must observe in order for the learning algorithm to be tractable. Perhaps sensory / linguistic learning should be most intense during the earliest stage of AGI knowledge acquisition, while the emphasis should be shifted to other cognitive areas later. YKY --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
[agi] Other AGI-like communities
To return to the old question of why AGI research seems so rare, Samsonovich et al. say ( http://members.cox.net/alexei.v.samsonovich/samsonovich_workshop.pdf) 'In fact, there are several scientific communities pursuing the same or similar goals, each unified under their own unique slogan: machine / artificial consciousness, human-level intelligence, embodied cognition, situation awareness, artificial general intelligence, commonsense reasoning, qualitative reasoning, strong AI, biologically inspired cognitive architectures (BICA), computational consciousness, bootstrapped learning, etc. Many of these communities do not recognize each other.' Could this be the case: That there are many investigators outside the AGI community who share the goals and many of the methods with AGI-ers? Joshua --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Re: Language learning
On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 10:55 AM, YKY (Yan King Yin) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There is no doubt that learning new languages at an older age is much more difficult than younger. I wonder if there are some hard computational constraints that we must observe in order for the learning algorithm to be tractable. Perhaps sensory / linguistic learning should be most intense during the earliest stage of AGI knowledge acquisition, while the emphasis should be shifted to other cognitive areas later. Can you give some reasonable references that support this position? It doesn't seem obvious that it's indeed the case, and it's probably difficult to come up with an adequate way of comparing adult learning with child learning. Adult can learn a new language in several months, by a full-time effort, on adult level, while it takes much longer for children to get there. -- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] WHAT ARE THE MISSING CONCEPTUAL PIECES IN AGI? --- recent input and responses
On Tuesday 22 April 2008 01:22:14 pm, Richard Loosemore wrote: The solar system, for example, is not complex: the planets move in wonderfully predictable orbits. http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn13757-solar-system-could-go-haywire-before-the-sun-dies.html?feedId=online-news_rss20 How will life on Earth end? The answer, of course, is unknown, but two new studies suggest a collision with Mercury or Mars could doom life long before the Sun swells into a red giant and bakes the planet to a crisp in about 5 billion years. The studies suggest that the solar system's planets will continue to orbit the Sun stably for at least 40 million years. But after that, they show there is a small but not insignificant chance that things could go terribly awry. --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Other AGI-like communities
As usual, it is a matter of degree --- each of the communities Alexei listed has some similarity with AGI in the research goals and techniques explored, but at the same time, there are noticeable differences in the assumptions and focuses, which are not merely a difference in name. Given what is going on, we can expect closer relationship among these communities in the future, though probably not a complete merging very soon. Pei On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 5:21 AM, Joshua Fox [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To return to the old question of why AGI research seems so rare, Samsonovich et al. say (http://members.cox.net/alexei.v.samsonovich/samsonovich_workshop.pdf) 'In fact, there are several scientific communities pursuing the same or similar goals, each unified under their own unique slogan: machine / artificial consciousness, human-level intelligence, embodied cognition, situation awareness, artificial general intelligence, commonsense reasoning, qualitative reasoning, strong AI, biologically inspired cognitive architectures (BICA), computational consciousness, bootstrapped learning, etc. Many of these communities do not recognize each other.' Could this be the case: That there are many investigators outside the AGI community who share the goals and many of the methods with AGI-ers? Joshua agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Other AGI-like communities
On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 5:21 AM, Joshua Fox [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To return to the old question of why AGI research seems so rare, Samsonovich et al. say (http://members.cox.net/alexei.v.samsonovich/samsonovich_workshop.pdf) 'In fact, there are several scientific communities pursuing the same or similar goals, each unified under their own unique slogan: machine / artificial consciousness, human-level intelligence, embodied cognition, situation awareness, artificial general intelligence, commonsense reasoning, qualitative reasoning, strong AI, biologically inspired cognitive architectures (BICA), computational consciousness, bootstrapped learning, etc. Many of these communities do not recognize each other.' I believe these various academic subcommunities ARE quite aware of each other And I would divide them into two categories 1) Those that are concerned with rather specialized approaches to intelligence, e.g. qualitative reasoning, commonsense reasoning etc. 2) Those that do not really constitute a coherent research community, e.g. BICA, human-level AI ... but rather merely constitute a few assorted workshops, journal special issues, etc. -- Ben --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Other AGI-like communities
On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 11:29 AM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Ben/Joshua: How do you think the AI and AGI fields relate to the embodied grounded cognition movements in cog. sci? My impression is that the majority of people here (excluding you) still have only limited awareness of them - are still operating in total totally doomed defiance of their findings: My opinion is that the majority of people here are aware of these ideas, and consider them unproven speculations not agreeing with their own intuition ;-) Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition. Barsalou Grounded cognition here obviously means not just pointing at things, but that all traditional rational operations are, and have to be, supported by image-inative simulation in any form of general intelligence. I wouldn't agree with such a strong statement. I think the grounding of ratiocination in image-ination is characteristic of human intelligence, and must thus be characteristic of any highly human-like intelligent system ... but, I don't see any reason to believe it's the ONLY path. The minds we know or can imagine, almost surely constitute a teeny-tiny little backwater of the overall space of possible minds ;-) -- Ben G --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Other AGI-like communities
Ben/Joshua: How do you think the AI and AGI fields relate to the embodied grounded cognition movements in cog. sci? My impression is that the majority of people here (excluding you) still have only limited awareness of them - are still operating in total totally doomed defiance of their findings: Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition. Barsalou Grounded cognition here obviously means not just pointing at things, but that all traditional rational operations are, and have to be, supported by image-inative simulation in any form of general intelligence. Joshua Fox [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To return to the old question of why AGI research seems so rare, Samsonovich et al. say (http://members.cox.net/alexei.v.samsonovich/samsonovich_workshop.pdf) 'In fact, there are several scientific communities pursuing the same or similar goals, each unified under their own unique slogan: machine / artificial consciousness, human-level intelligence, embodied cognition, situation awareness, artificial general intelligence, commonsense reasoning, qualitative reasoning, strong AI, biologically inspired cognitive architectures (BICA), computational consciousness, bootstrapped learning, etc. Many of these communities do not recognize each other.' I believe these various academic subcommunities ARE quite aware of each other And I would divide them into two categories 1) Those that are concerned with rather specialized approaches to intelligence, e.g. qualitative reasoning, commonsense reasoning etc. 2) Those that do not really constitute a coherent research community, e.g. BICA, human-level AI ... but rather merely constitute a few assorted workshops, journal special issues, etc. -- Ben --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG. Version: 7.5.524 / Virus Database: 269.23.3/1393 - Release Date: 4/23/2008 8:12 AM --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] WHAT ARE THE MISSING CONCEPTUAL PIECES IN AGI? --- recent input and responses
J Storrs Hall, PhD wrote: On Tuesday 22 April 2008 01:22:14 pm, Richard Loosemore wrote: The solar system, for example, is not complex: the planets move in wonderfully predictable orbits. http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn13757-solar-system-could-go-haywire-before-the-sun-dies.html?feedId=online-news_rss20 How will life on Earth end? The answer, of course, is unknown, but two new studies suggest a collision with Mercury or Mars could doom life long before the Sun swells into a red giant and bakes the planet to a crisp in about 5 billion years. The studies suggest that the solar system's planets will continue to orbit the Sun stably for at least 40 million years. But after that, they show there is a small but not insignificant chance that things could go terribly awry. I am confused about the intended message. If you take the above quote from me in its original context, your illustration perfectly supports what I said, but with that one paragraph taken out of context it looks as if you are trying to contradict it. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Re: Language learning
On Apr 22, 2008, at 11:55 PM, YKY (Yan King Yin) wrote: There is no doubt that learning new languages at an older age is much more difficult than younger. I seem to recall that recent research does not support this assertion. Rate of language learning is essentially the same for both adults and children and is a function of the amount of time spent trying to learn it. The apparent absolute differences in rate of learning turned out to be attributable to adults spending a smaller percentage of their time learning a new language than children on average, which gave the false impression that adults learn languages more slowly. I am too lazy to dig up cites at the moment, but I definitely remember discussions of this research in the not too distant past. Cheers, J. Andrew Rogers --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Other AGI-like communities
Ben Goertzel wrote: I wouldn't agree with such a strong statement. I think the grounding of ratiocination in image-ination is characteristic of human intelligence, and must thus be characteristic of any highly human-like intelligent system ... but, I don't see any reason to believe it's the ONLY path Yes, you are correct that it is not the only path. However, the requirement perceptual grounding depends on the definition of intelligence. If you want to make a mathematical intelligence, you do not need it. But if you want to build some life-extension technologies and nanobots, perceptual grounding is needed to build these nanobots. You would require visual intelligence to build these nanobots. Replacing human physical labor would also require visual-motor coordination. It is impossible to bootstrap perceptual grounding from a purely symbolic AGI. It does not know how to build 3D robots. Purely symbolic ontologies can produce unsatisfying results. The categorization of objects are arbitrarily assigned by humans via their perception. It would cause conflict and roundaboutness. If the AI goes through long chains of deductive inference, the result would be inaccurate because small errors and ambiguities in the categorization of symbols would magnify and produce huge errors. Probabilistic reasoning is an improvement, but it would ultimately produce inaccurate results and errors just as the same. Thus, the AI engine needs perceptual grounding to refresh or prune the illogical inferences. Furthermore, symbolic ontologies are /inductive/ and perceptual reasoning is /deductive/. Symbolic ontologies are inductive because categorization inevitably raises ambiguities. Perceptual reasoning, however, is deductive because it is not categorized arbitrarily and is global and continuous. --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
[agi] Why Symbolic Representation without Imaginative Simulation Won't Work
I think one can now present a convincing case why any symbolic/linguistic approach to AGI, that is not backed by imaginative simulation, simply will not work. For example, any attempt to build an AGI with a purely symbolic database of knowledge mined from the Net or other texts, is doomed. This is obviously something I have long argued, but it has been difficult to find a truly focussed argument with sufficiently general application and power. The basic argument: Language depends on 1) General Activity Language - a core, very extensive vocabulary of words for basic kinds of movements, which we all acquire normally very early. These words/movements are essential for moving about, and manipulating the world - and understanding how the world moves. They are also essential for General Intelligence, because they apply to all activities, and are central to the acquisition of new physical activities. 2) Our movement words, (like, in fact, all words), are general, open-ended concepts which cover, in this case, vast, all-encompassing ranges of specific, possible movements. In order to interpret them, we continually have to decide which one of a vast range, is appropriate in a given environment - for example, just which direction and angle we are going to decide appropriate to reach out - horizontally, vertically, at 45% , 60%, 75%, etc. etc. 3). It is, if not absolutely impossible, utterly impractical, and absurdly complicated, to instantiate a movement-word by any kind of symbolic process - by, for example, first trying to symbolically label each and every one of a range of possible movements. The only practical way - and the ideal way - is to decide the specific movement, by an imaginative/ sensorimotor simulation. Exactly what this should entail is open to discussion, (and getting much discussion elsewhere), but for the sake of focussing our minds here, let's think of it , if only provisionally, as some kind of visual mapping process. 4)The same basic argument can be extended to every area of language. I am focussing on this particular area because it is not only fundamental to any worldview, but can be treated very concretely, and from a more or less mathematical and robotics POV. The argument in detail: 1) General Activity Language - it is acknowledged that we rapidly acquire a certain vocabulary of basic words. What I'm focussing on here is that we especially acquire a core of hundreds of basic movement words, such as: reach, push, pull, hit, punch, throw, kick, wave, catch, handle, grab, put, move, enter, exit, slip, slide, remove, connect, disconnect, fit, step, stride, walk, run, climb, jump, hop, leap, press, lift, raise, lower, drop, pick up, fall, slip, knock, tap, shake, rock, roll, scratch, settle, unsettle, slap, slop, fix, propel, repel, rope, stick, withdraw, touch, finger, point, hold, snatch, thrust, scrape, grip, grasp, grope, back, support, circle, rotate, These can be considered as basic level concepts, which, like dog, cat, bird, chair, are the easiest to visualise - in this case as movements. We also acquire a range of superordinate movement concepts, involving much more general, and not so immediately obvious to visualise, categories of movement, like: come, go, make, start, stop, give, take, use, do, be, get, dance, play, heat, cool, add, subtract, travel, journey, advance, retreat (These can be compared to similar superordinate, not so obvious-to-visualise, concepts such as: animal, furniture, etc.) We also acquire a rich range of subordinate concepts, involving more specific types of movements, some of which may belong to specific activities, like: hammer, nail, screw, chop, slice, net, bat, elbow, head-butt, pin, clip, vacuum, catapult, glue, brick, We also acquire a whole set of prepositions which give direction to those movements, such as: in, into, on, onto, out, towards, away from, up, down, through, around, inside, outside, over. under, along, underneath, about An AGI POV allows us to appreciate that this core vocabulary is a brilliant invention of the human mind, although no doubt, animals share many of the same concepts. These are general movements which can be applied to any physical activity. They can be, and are, used to acquire new physical activities/ skills. Look at the instruction manuals for virtually any activity, and you will find that extensive use is made of these basic words. A how-to-cook or a how-to-play-a-sport manual will liberally tell you to move, put, take, go, add etc, and won't be couched in entirely activity-specific words, like play a forehand/backhand/ drop shot, or execute a pas-de-deux. (Any AGI must have this vocabulary to succeed). 2) Our movement concepts are, like all our concepts, general and open-ended. They cover vast ranges of possible specific movements, typically all-encompassing. For example, concepts like reach, push, pull can have a
Re: [agi] Re: Language learning
On Thu, Apr 24, 2008 at 2:20 AM, J. Andrew Rogers [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Apr 22, 2008, at 11:55 PM, YKY (Yan King Yin) wrote: There is no doubt that learning new languages at an older age is much more difficult than younger. I seem to recall that recent research does not support this assertion. Rate of language learning is essentially the same for both adults and children and is a function of the amount of time spent trying to learn it. The apparent absolute differences in rate of learning turned out to be attributable to adults spending a smaller percentage of their time learning a new language than children on average, which gave the false impression that adults learn languages more slowly. I am too lazy to dig up cites at the moment, but I definitely remember discussions of this research in the not too distant past. I think a person thinks in his/her first language, and when talking in a second language there is some extra processing going on (though it may not be exactly a translation process), which slow things down, giving the popular impression that immigrants are a bit dumber. I'm not sure how great this effect is, but I'd be very surprised if it doesn't exist. Afterall, I have spent a lot of time learning English and I still find it a severe handicap when communicating in English. PS: children don't spend a lot of time learning languages. At far as I know, when I was a kid I spend most of my time playing around ;) YKY --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Why Symbolic Representation without Imaginative Simulation Won't Work
I think one can now present a convincing case why any symbolic/linguistic approach to AGI, that is not backed by THE SECRET SAUCE, simply will not work. The only practical way - and the ideal way - is to decide the specific movement, by THE SECRET SAUCE. Exactly what this should entail is open to discussion, (and getting much discussion elsewhere), but for the sake of focussing our minds here, let's think of it, if only provisionally, as some kind of TASTE TREAT. 3) The ideal and simplest way to work out which specific movement is required is by THE SECRET SAUCE - here some TASTE TREAT. And the neuroscientific evidence keeps piling up that we do indeed plan movements by THE SECRET SAUCE . 4)It shouldn't be too hard to see that the necessity of testing symbolic language by THE SECRET SAUCE applies, by extension, to many other areas of the world, as well as that of the movements of objects and creatures. Descriptions of the forms of all objects and things. All physical activities - hunting, sex, eating. All interactions between creatures. Conversations. Emotions... Statements about all these also typically depend on physical, imaginative knowledge of things' forms, movements and behaviour. In fact, there is, as Lakoff argues, no area that can be understood without THE SECRET SAUCE , But I accept the need to demonstrate this further with respect to more abstract areas. By all means challenge me, and I'll think about it. In the meantime, I believe I have made a convincing case that you cannot understand how the world moves - and the core movement vocabulary of language - without THE SECRET SAUCE . And if you can't do that, you can't have a viable worldview. ROTFLMAO! So, why don't you cite real neuroscientific evidence (as in journal citations) for THE SECRET SAUCE? You haven't made any case at all. You've simply made statements that most of us disagree with and call it a proof. BAH! - Original Message - From: Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, April 23, 2008 5:43 PM Subject: [agi] Why Symbolic Representation without Imaginative Simulation Won't Work I think one can now present a convincing case why any symbolic/linguistic approach to AGI, that is not backed by imaginative simulation, simply will not work. For example, any attempt to build an AGI with a purely symbolic database of knowledge mined from the Net or other texts, is doomed. This is obviously something I have long argued, but it has been difficult to find a truly focussed argument with sufficiently general application and power. The basic argument: Language depends on 1) General Activity Language - a core, very extensive vocabulary of words for basic kinds of movements, which we all acquire normally very early. These words/movements are essential for moving about, and manipulating the world - and understanding how the world moves. They are also essential for General Intelligence, because they apply to all activities, and are central to the acquisition of new physical activities. 2) Our movement words, (like, in fact, all words), are general, open-ended concepts which cover, in this case, vast, all-encompassing ranges of specific, possible movements. In order to interpret them, we continually have to decide which one of a vast range, is appropriate in a given environment - for example, just which direction and angle we are going to decide appropriate to reach out - horizontally, vertically, at 45% , 60%, 75%, etc. etc. 3). It is, if not absolutely impossible, utterly impractical, and absurdly complicated, to instantiate a movement-word by any kind of symbolic process - by, for example, first trying to symbolically label each and every one of a range of possible movements. The only practical way - and the ideal way - is to decide the specific movement, by an imaginative/ sensorimotor simulation. Exactly what this should entail is open to discussion, (and getting much discussion elsewhere), but for the sake of focussing our minds here, let's think of it , if only provisionally, as some kind of visual mapping process. 4)The same basic argument can be extended to every area of language. I am focussing on this particular area because it is not only fundamental to any worldview, but can be treated very concretely, and from a more or less mathematical and robotics POV. The argument in detail: 1) General Activity Language - it is acknowledged that we rapidly acquire a certain vocabulary of basic words. What I'm focussing on here is that we especially acquire a core of hundreds of basic movement words, such as: reach, push, pull, hit, punch, throw, kick, wave, catch, handle, grab, put, move, enter, exit, slip, slide, remove, connect, disconnect, fit, step, stride, walk, run, climb, jump, hop, leap, press, lift, raise, lower, drop, pick up, fall, slip, knock, tap, shake, rock, roll, scratch, settle, unsettle, slap, slop, fix, propel,
Re: [agi] Why Symbolic Representation without Imaginative Simulation Won't Work
On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 5:43 PM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [..] And these different instantiations *have* to be fairly precise, if we are to understand a text, or effect an instruction, successfully. The next sentence in the text may demand that we know the rough angle of reaching - and that, say, it was impossible because there was a particular kind of object in the way. The above paragraph is, as I see it, the crux of your argument. If you can't prove that one point, the argument doesn't hold water. But it seems to me that needing to know that there was a particular kind of object in the way is not entirely common. I'd think the exact physical circumstances are typically less important to understand than the intentions of people involved, the purposes of nearby objects, etc. If so, the arguments you make earlier about how many possible combinations of angles there are (and hand positions etc) are irrelevant. Those details can be abstracted away. It would be absurd and almost certainly impossible to try working out movements by symbolic means - by, say, listing every possible angle at which an arm can reach out, and listing the normal heights of different objects that can be reached for - or trying to apply some set of mathematical, formulaic approach to the problem. It is not clear what you mean by symbolic here. Surely any simulation, including those you suggest, will be symbolic-- all we've got to work with are 1s and 0s. But that's not what you mean. It seems as if you mean something any representations that are abstract (as opposed to concrete image-manipulation). But it seems odd to eliminate abstract representations altogether... so perhaps you are suggesting that abstract must always be accompanied by concrete? --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Why Symbolic Representation without Imaginative Simulation Won't Work
Abram, Both to-the-point responses. One: how much, you're asking, are statements about movement central to language? Extremely central. That's precisely why we have this core general activity/movement language that we all share - all those very basic movement words - we use them so often. How if it can't interpret those words specifically, is an AGI going to understand sports reports, murder reports, recipes, or texts re machine assembly, construction, manufacturing, and a million other very physical activities? Or physics, biology, medicine etc etc? How is it going to understand how people walk, run, and generally navigate their environments, houses, cities? You seem to be expressing a desperate hope that maybe language has mainly just a set of general movement statements - generalisations about how things move, that don't need to be interpreted specifically. As I discussed with Stephen Reed recently, it would seem that many texts which AGI-ers apply themselves to, do have this unreal, general nature. He hit him it will say, and you only have to know that that was generally possible, not the precise movement. But in reality and if you are going to engage with specific environments and situations, then of course you have to specify movements to an enormous extent. And how could an AGI have any intelligence worth talking about, if it can't work out, say how to navigate your cluttered house, or a crowded railway station, or conduct a battle, or whatever? Of course, language isn't just All men move, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates moves. Two: yes, I v. much believe that rationality (symbolic language/logic/maths and schematic geometry) and imagination are interdependent. Abstract must always be accompanied by/ grounded in concrete, but definitely not replaced. Two: Abram Demski: MT: And these different instantiations *have* to be fairly precise, if we are to understand a text, or effect an instruction, successfully. The next sentence in the text may demand that we know the rough angle of reaching - and that, say, it was impossible because there was a particular kind of object in the way. The above paragraph is, as I see it, the crux of your argument. If you can't prove that one point, the argument doesn't hold water. But it seems to me that needing to know that there was a particular kind of object in the way is not entirely common. I'd think the exact physical circumstances are typically less important to understand than the intentions of people involved, the purposes of nearby objects, etc. If so, the arguments you make earlier about how many possible combinations of angles there are (and hand positions etc) are irrelevant. Those details can be abstracted away. It would be absurd and almost certainly impossible to try working out movements by symbolic means - by, say, listing every possible angle at which an arm can reach out, and listing the normal heights of different objects that can be reached for - or trying to apply some set of mathematical, formulaic approach to the problem. It is not clear what you mean by symbolic here. Surely any simulation, including those you suggest, will be symbolic-- all we've got to work with are 1s and 0s. But that's not what you mean. It seems as if you mean something any representations that are abstract (as opposed to concrete image-manipulation). But it seems odd to eliminate abstract representations altogether... so perhaps you are suggesting that abstract must always be accompanied by concrete? --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
RE: [agi] Adding to the extended essay on the complex systems problem
Richard, In your blog you said: - Memory. Does the mechanism use stored information about what it was doing fifteen minutes ago, when it is making a decision about what to do now? An hour ago? A million years ago? Whatever: if it remembers, then it has memory. - Development. Does the mechanism change its character in some way over time? Does it adapt? - Identity. Do individuals of a certain type have their own unique identities, so that the result of an interaction depends on more than the type of the object, but also the particular individuals involved? - Nonlinearity. Are the functions describing the behavior deeply nonlinear? These four characteristics are enough. Go take a look at a natural system in physics, or an engineering system, and find one in which the components of the system interact with memory, development, identity and nonlinearity. You will not find any that are understood. . Notice, above all, that no engineer has ever tried to persuade one of these artificial systems to conform to a pre-chosen overall behavior.. I am quite sure there have been many AI system that have had all four of these features and that have worked pretty much as planned and whose behavior is reasonably well understood (although not totally understood, as is nothing that is truly complex in the non-Richard sense), and whose overall behavior has been as chosen by design (with a little experimentation thrown in) . To be fair I can't remember any off the top of my head, because I have read about many AI systems over the years. But recording episodes is very common in many prior AI systems. So is adaptation. Nonlinearity is almost universal, and Identity as you define it would be pretty common. So, please --- other people on this list help me out --- but I am quite sure system have been built that prove the above quoted statement to be false. Ed Porter -Original Message- From: Richard Loosemore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, April 23, 2008 4:11 PM To: agi@v2.listbox.com Subject: [agi] Adding to the extended essay on the complex systems problem Yesterday and today I have added more posts (susaro.com) relating to the definition of complex systems and why this should be a problem for AGI research. Richard Loosemore --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: **SPAM** RE: [agi] Adding to the extended essay on the complex systems problem
I So, please --- other people on this list help me out --- but I am quite sure system have been built that prove the above quoted statement to be false. Sorry, Ed, but I'm not aware of any tightly-coupled system that has all of four of the behaviors. The closest that I can come is a website with a growing twenty-questions or identification game with personalization (and does logging). The real gotcha, though is the Are the functions describing the behavior deeply nonlinear. You're just not going to find that with the first three. Richard is being very careful here and I'd be really surprised if anyone can come up with anything close (that actually exists as opposed to being in the planning stage). --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Why Symbolic Representation P.S.
Abram, Just to illustrate further, here's the opening lines of today's Times sports report on a football match.[Liverpool v Chelsea] How on earth could this be understood without massive imaginative simulation? [Stephen?] And without mainly imaginative memories of football matches? John Arne Riise stood doubled over in his tiny corner of football hell. Agony engulfed him. One by one, teammates offered a pat on the back, a handshake, or just a touch, some form of human contact to show they cared. None of it did much good. He walked, step by aching step, to the sanctuary of the dressing-room, discarding bits of the apparatus of the professional footballer as he went. A tie-up here, a shin pad there. He clamped down on his water bottle and held it between his teeth, like a bit to stop him gnawing through his bottom lip. A camera zoomed in to show muscles around his eyes and mouth tensing as his mind worked overtime. He looked like Harold Shand being driven to his execution in the final scenes of The Long Good Friday. A replay of every mistake he had made to get there was showing on his face. --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Adding to the extended essay on the complex systems problem
Ed Porter wrote: Richard, In your blog you said: - Memory. Does the mechanism use stored information about what it was doing fifteen minutes ago, when it is making a decision about what to do now? An hour ago? A million years ago? Whatever: if it remembers, then it has memory. - Development. Does the mechanism change its character in some way over time? Does it adapt? - Identity. Do individuals of a certain type have their own unique identities, so that the result of an interaction depends on more than the type of the object, but also the particular individuals involved? - Nonlinearity. Are the functions describing the behavior deeply nonlinear? These four characteristics are enough. Go take a look at a natural system in physics, or an engineering system, and find one in which the components of the system interact with memory, development, identity and nonlinearity. You will not find any that are understood. “… “Notice, above all, that no engineer has ever tried to persuade one of these artificial systems to conform to a pre-chosen overall behavior….” I am quite sure there have been many AI system that have had all four of these features and that have worked pretty much as planned and whose behavior is reasonably well understood (although not totally understood, as is nothing that is truly complex in the non-Richard sense), and whose overall behavior has been as chosen by design (with a little experimentation thrown in) . To be fair I can't remember any off the top of my head, because I have read about many AI systems over the years. But recording episodes is very common in many prior AI systems. So is adaptation. Nonlinearity is almost universal, and Identity as you define it would be pretty common. So, please --- other people on this list help me out --- but I am quite sure system have been built that prove the above quoted statement to be false. Ed, You have put words into my mouth: I have never tried to argue that a narrow-AI system cannot work at all. (Narrow AI is what you are referring to above: it must be narrow AI, because there have not been any fully functioning *AGI* systems delivered yet, and you refr to systems that have been built). The point of my argument is to claim that such narrow AI systems CANNOT BE EXTENDED TO BECOME AGI SYSTEMS. The complex systems problem predicts that when people allow those four factors listed above to operate in a full AGI context, where the system is on its own for a lifetime, the complexity effects will then dominate. In effect, what I am claiming is that people have been masking the complexity effects by mollycoddling their systems in various ways, and by not allowing them to run for long periods of time, or in general environments, or to ground their own symbols. I would predict that when people do this mollycoddling of their AI systems, the complex systems effects would not become apparent very soon. Guess what? That exactly fits the observed history of AI. When people try to make these AI systems operate in ways that brings out the complexity, the systems fail. Richard Loosemore P.S. Please don't call it Richard-complexity it has nothing to do with me: this is complexity the way that lots of people understand the term. If you need to talk about the concept that is the opposite of simple, it would be better to use complicated. Personalizing it just creates confusion. --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [agi] Why Symbolic Representation P.S.
Hi Mike, John Arne Riise stood doubled over in his tiny corner of football hell. These sentences are great demonstrations of why I favor a construction grammar. It's not necessary to process the imagery from first principles. These sentences are full of idioms that can be simply treated as constructions (i.e. form -- meaning pairs). doubled over -- from WordNet: bent over or curled up, usually with laughter or paincorner of X hell -- a very uncomfortable situation involving Xtiny corner of X hell -- very uncomfortable situation involving X in which the agent (i.e. John Arne Riise) does not share the situation with anyone else...and so forth for the rest of the passage. The downside of construction grammar is lots of constructions. But human children learn them, by being taught and by observation / induction , so I think a dialog system can too. This sort of text by the way, long ago put an end to the Cyc Project's then ambition to read and comprehend an article in a newspaper. Texai may fail also, but certainly not in the same way Cyc did. -Steve Stephen L. Reed Artificial Intelligence Researcher http://texai.org/blog http://texai.org 3008 Oak Crest Ave. Austin, Texas, USA 78704 512.791.7860 - Original Message From: Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: agi@v2.listbox.com Sent: Wednesday, April 23, 2008 8:07:13 PM Subject: Re: [agi] Why Symbolic Representation P.S. Abram, Just to illustrate further, here's the opening lines of today's Times sports report on a football match.[Liverpool v Chelsea] How on earth could this be understood without massive imaginative simulation? [Stephen?] And without mainly imaginative memories of football matches? John Arne Riise stood doubled over in his tiny corner of football hell. Agony engulfed him. One by one, teammates offered a pat on the back, a handshake, or just a touch, some form of human contact to show they cared. None of it did much good. He walked, step by aching step, to the sanctuary of the dressing-room, discarding bits of the apparatus of the professional footballer as he went. A tie-up here, a shin pad there. He clamped down on his water bottle and held it between his teeth, like a bit to stop him gnawing through his bottom lip. A camera zoomed in to show muscles around his eyes and mouth tensing as his mind worked overtime. He looked like Harold Shand being driven to his execution in the final scenes of The Long Good Friday. A replay of every mistake he had made to get there was showing on his face. --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now. http://mobile.yahoo.com/;_ylt=Ahu06i62sR8HDtDypao8Wcj9tAcJ --- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244id_secret=101455710-f059c4 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
