DIS: Bounty
I hereby place a bounty of one magic cookie and a (virtual) pat on the back to the first person to write a good proto or proposal which would repeal rules 1688, 1482, and 1030. Goodness of protos and proposals will be evaluated relative to my biases, of course. -- C. Maud Image (Michael Slone) Of course we should have a ruleset. Just think of it has a handy set of defaults. :-) -- root, in agora-discussion
DIS: Bounty
Curse you, Maud. Now I am thinking of it. I shouldn't be. I've got two proto-proto entirely new systems lined up. HOWEVER: Is it possible to repeal R1482 with its silly "protective" clause: No change to the Ruleset can occur that would cause a Rule to stipulate any other means of determining precedence between Rules of unequal Power. The answer is, only if we create a rule with higher precedence. This means (a) it's a good thing we didn't make this power-4; (b) that clause is not much help, except as a bureaucratic headache, as once you get a power-3 coalition, some trivial rules ju-jitsu will circumvent it.
Re: DIS: Bounty
Michael Slone wrote: >repeal rules 1688, 1482, and 1030. Do you intend there to be no precedence mechanism at all? And what about supermajority voting? -zefram
Re: DIS: Bounty
On 5/17/07, Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Do you intend there to be no precedence mechanism at all? And what about supermajority voting? I don't intend that supermajority voting vanish. As for precedence, there is almost certainly a nice system out there that we haven't tried, since we've essentially only tried two (as far as I am aware), Suber's and the current one. It might be interesting to see what would happens were the rules to pretend they contain no contradictions. I don't have a proposal of my own here, which is why the magic cookie and (virtual) pat on the back are being offered. -- C. Maud Image (Michael Slone) It's your fault, H. Notary! -- Manu, in agora-discussion
Re: DIS: Bounty
Michael Slone wrote: >I don't intend that supermajority voting vanish. So we'll still need a mutability index, or something equivalent, you just don't want it tied to precedence. There's a basic problem with this. Consider the whole class of systems where precedence is a partial ordering among rules and proposal adoption procedures differ only in the degree of supermajority required. A rational proposal author may be presumed to use the easiest type of proposal adoption that can achieve the level of precedence required. If there is anywhere that a higher precedence can be achieved using a lower supermajority, then proposal authors will use this option, effectively making the higher supermajority (for less precedence) option drop out of the system. The system's effects, taking that phenomenon into account, always yield a strictly non-decreasing supermajority requirement along any chain of increasing precedence. There are more exotic classes of system to consider, which may be what you're looking for. > It might be interesting >to see what would happens were the rules to pretend they contain no >contradictions. Suber's initial ruleset actually works pretty much this way. There are several clauses along the lines of "if not prevented by other rules". We've lost a lot of that cooperative flavour in the current ruleset. With "instrument mechanics" I tried to bring some of it back, among the Power=3 rules. To make the whole ruleset work without contradictions is more difficult. A functionally-equivalent transformation of the current ruleset would have to add hundreds of clauses along the lines of "unless prevented by a rule with Power>1 or Power=1 and Number<2128". *Keeping* the ruleset contradiction-free would entail a reliable procedure to statically detect contradictions, and nullification of proposed rule changes that breach the contradiction-free invariant. We can't do the latter without the former. I'm envisioning writing the entire ruleset in a formal denotational semantics language and automated theorem proving in the pi calculus... we're not going to get there easily. >I don't have a proposal of my own here, There's a refinement of the present system that occurred to me a while ago. We currently have a total ordering precedence, but we could loosen that to a generalised Boolean algebra. Each rule has a set of (zero or more) precedence flags. If two rules conflict, and one has a proper superset of the other's flags, then it takes precedence. If the two flag sets are equal then fall back on numbering for a tie break. If the two flag sets are neither superset nor subset of each other, then there is no precedence between the rules, and the contradiction stands. Not sure what we should do in the no-precedence case, though. Just have the general idea that it would occur with rules that shouldn't interact at all. -zefram
Re: DIS: Bounty
Maud wrote: I hereby place a bounty of one magic cookie and a (virtual) pat on the back to the first person to write a good proto or proposal which would repeal rules 1688, 1482, and 1030. Goodness of protos and proposals will be evaluated relative to my biases, of course. This only achieves two-thirds of your goal, but... Proto-Proposal: Reversing precedent with Agoran consent (AI = 3, please) Repeal Rule 1482 (Precedence between Rules with Unequal Power). Repeal Rule 1030 (Precedence between Rules with Equal Power). Amend Rule 2124 (Agoran Consent) by replacing this text: (c) more players have announced (and not withdrawn) support than have announced (and not withdrawn) objections to the action since the intent was published. with this text: (c) the support index exceeds one and meets or exceeds the consent index of the action. The support index is the ratio of the number of other players who have announced (and not withdrawn) support to the number of other players who have announced (and not withdrawn) objections. The consent index is one unless otherwise defined. Create a rule titled "Precedence between rules" with Power=3 and this text: a) In a conflict between rules with different Power, the rule with higher Power takes precedence. b) In a conflict between rules with equal Power, the rule with lower number takes precedence. c) If at least one of the rules in conflict claims that it takes precedence over another rule (or type of rule) or defers to another rule (or type of rule), and none of the others contradict that claim, then that claim supersedes the previous methods of determining precedence. d) If all the rules in conflict agree on a different method of determining their precedence over one another, then that method supersedes the previous methods of determining precedence. e) A player may, with Agoran consent with a consent index of H/L, perform an action and cause a rule with Power L to take precedence over a rule with Power H with regard to that action. E must be otherwise permitted to perform that action, taking the altered precedence into account. f) No change to the rules can occur that would provide any other means of determining precedence between rules. This rule takes precedence over any rule that would permit such a change.
Re: DIS: Bounty
You could always re-institute the Virus... BobTHJ On 5/17/07, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Maud wrote: > I hereby place a bounty of one magic cookie and a (virtual) pat on the > back to the first person to write a good proto or proposal which would > repeal rules 1688, 1482, and 1030. Goodness of protos and proposals > will be evaluated relative to my biases, of course. This only achieves two-thirds of your goal, but... Proto-Proposal: Reversing precedent with Agoran consent (AI = 3, please) Repeal Rule 1482 (Precedence between Rules with Unequal Power). Repeal Rule 1030 (Precedence between Rules with Equal Power). Amend Rule 2124 (Agoran Consent) by replacing this text: (c) more players have announced (and not withdrawn) support than have announced (and not withdrawn) objections to the action since the intent was published. with this text: (c) the support index exceeds one and meets or exceeds the consent index of the action. The support index is the ratio of the number of other players who have announced (and not withdrawn) support to the number of other players who have announced (and not withdrawn) objections. The consent index is one unless otherwise defined. Create a rule titled "Precedence between rules" with Power=3 and this text: a) In a conflict between rules with different Power, the rule with higher Power takes precedence. b) In a conflict between rules with equal Power, the rule with lower number takes precedence. c) If at least one of the rules in conflict claims that it takes precedence over another rule (or type of rule) or defers to another rule (or type of rule), and none of the others contradict that claim, then that claim supersedes the previous methods of determining precedence. d) If all the rules in conflict agree on a different method of determining their precedence over one another, then that method supersedes the previous methods of determining precedence. e) A player may, with Agoran consent with a consent index of H/L, perform an action and cause a rule with Power L to take precedence over a rule with Power H with regard to that action. E must be otherwise permitted to perform that action, taking the altered precedence into account. f) No change to the rules can occur that would provide any other means of determining precedence between rules. This rule takes precedence over any rule that would permit such a change.
Re: DIS: Bounty
Ed Murphy wrote: > e) A player may, with Agoran consent with a consent index of > H/L, perform an action and cause a rule with Power L to take > precedence over a rule with Power H with regard to that > action. E must be otherwise permitted to perform that action, > taking the altered precedence into account. Sounds dangerous. We have relied on the power-based precedence relationships in drafting high-power rules. -zefram
Re: DIS: Bounty
Kerim Aydin wrote: >The answer is, only if we create a rule with higher precedence. Not true. That paragraph doesn't prevent repeal of the rule at all. Also, if you want to change the precedence mechanism without repealing R1482, all you have to do is amend R1482 to delete that paragraph. >that clause is not much help, except as a bureaucratic headache, It prevents the adoption of a Power=1 rule that says that rules with lower Power take precedence, and other such things that would create ambiguity about the precedence mechanism. That's what it's for. >as once you get a power-3 coalition, It does not prevent anything at Power=3, true. Requiring AI=3 in order to break precedence ought to be sufficient safeguard, because with AI=3 you can enact a rule that takes precedence over everything else even without changing the precedence mechanism. -zefram
Re: DIS: Bounty
here's the first one, the more political one. The second one (later sometime) is more mathematical. Proto: On all our houses Repeal 1688, 1482, and 1030. [Note: order of things must be considered for this bootstrapping] Enact the following Rule, entitled "All our houses" House is a stuck switch for Rules, Proposals, Players, and CFJs with values Ordinary, Senatorial, Democratic, and Constitutional. A Player may change eir house at any time, except a Player may not be Constitutional. A Proposal may be submitted to any house (default Ordinary), and adoption depends on the Rules of that house. A Constitutional Rule is submitted simultaneously to all houses, and must be adopted by all houses to take effect. A non-Constitutional Proposal submitted to a specific house may only change Rules within that house, following submission and adoption procedures specified by that house's rules. If no adoption Rules exist in that house, or a Constitutional Court finds the Rules of that house do not allow the adoption of a proposal in reasonable time, the default procedure for resolving decisions is followed. Enact the following Rule, entitled 'Judicial Houses' A CFJ may be submitted to any house (default Senatorial). A Constitutional CFJ (also called an "Appeal") convenes a panel of one player from each house, appointed as described by the Rules of that house. A conflict bewteen Rules within a house is resolved by a CFJ submitted to that house according to the Rules of that house. If no Rules exist in that house, or a Constitutional Court finds the Rules of that house do not allow the resolution of a CFJ in reasonable time, the default procedure for resolving CFJs is followed. If Rules conflict between houses, they can only be adjudicated by a Constitutional CFJ. In such cases, Constitional Rules may define methods for which certain houses have precedence over others for certain types of Rules. If Constitutional Rules are otherwise silent, precedence is ordered as specified by the list of possible houses. Enact the following Rule, entitled "Primary regulations" If something is said by the Rules of a house to be "primarily regulated" by that house, then that house's rules have precedence over other houses for that thing. If Rules of two houses conflict over claiming primary regulation, the older (lower-Numbered) Rule so claiming shall have precedence. The above Rules are all made Constitutional. Constitutional protections to add later [if this proto is liked] 1. [Rights and privileges] 2. [If mechanism breaks down, a unaimous vote of all players can change rules of any house] 3. [If all else fails, a CFJ can enpanel three players regardless of house to sort things out] 4. [default procedures] Upon the adoption of this Proposal, [All Rules] are mapped onto [Houses] as follows:
Re: DIS: Bounty
Zefram wrote: Ed Murphy wrote: e) A player may, with Agoran consent with a consent index of H/L, perform an action and cause a rule with Power L to take precedence over a rule with Power H with regard to that action. E must be otherwise permitted to perform that action, taking the altered precedence into account. Sounds dangerous. We have relied on the power-based precedence relationships in drafting high-power rules. Which is why allowing e.g. a Power=1 rule to temporarily trump a Power=3 rule would require >= 3/4 support on a case-by-case basis.
Re: DIS: Bounty
On 5/17/07, Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I'm envisioning writing the entire ruleset in a formal denotational semantics language and automated theorem proving in the pi calculus... we're not going to get there easily. That was kind of the idea behind schemenomic -- perhaps having an (authoritative) encoding of the rules in a logic, instead of a programming language, would work better. -- Taral <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you." -- Unknown
Re: DIS: Bounty
Ed Murphy wrote: >Which is why allowing e.g. a Power=1 rule to temporarily trump a >Power=3 rule would require >= 3/4 support on a case-by-case basis. You'd also allow a Power=2 rule to trump a Power=3 rule with a 60% supermajority, where currently a 75% supermajority would be required. Pretty big difference, and more so if we start using Power=2.9 or other intermediate levels. -zefram
