Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Kerim Aydin wrote: > This would be more interesting if it deemed something >with game effect. I don't think bananas are allowed to become Players. But really I'm just hoping to CFJ on "Goethe is a banana". And see whether Michael thinks you've changed species. -zefram
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
I wrote: Only difference today is it takes a conspiracy of several now (pass the proposal, or defend a judgement through the appeals process). Side note: the conspiracy was attempted and failed (CFJ 1346). Bonus: the conspiracy used the word "deemed". http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=1346 -Goethe
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Zefram wrote: Past CFJs do not have the status of Rules. They are meant to guide play, but they cannot overrule a Rule if they conflict with one. Rules are nothing without actors who obey them. And the same actors interpret the judgements and their own authority as judges. In that sense, actors can indeed overrule a Rule through a judgement. Doing so using a similarly egregious example to the emperor proposal in my last post is exactly what created Lindrum World. Only difference today is it takes a conspiracy of several now (pass the proposal, or defend a judgement through the appeals process). In the end, if the collective playership choose to play as if 1==2, there's little a protester can do except resign. Zefram wrote: Upon the adoption of this proposal, Goethe is deemed to be a banana. I already am. This would be more interesting if it deemed something with game effect. How about "Goethe is deemed to be an index value greater than 2, but less than unanimity."? -Goethe
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael Norrish wrote: > However, the 105/106 combination doesn't specify that accumulated > (judicial) decisions as to how rules should be interpreted can not be > changed by proposal. Again, I make the claim that these decisions are > clearly part of the game-state (they're even recorded in an officially > maintained document), so 106 explicitly says we can change them. Right now, we are dealing with a proposal that choses between two reasonable interpretations of a rule. However, using this logic, you could make a change to the "game state" so that any reasonable observer would think that the game-state itself was against the rules. More egregious example, could be done at any AI: "Be it proclaimed that R101 shall be interpreted as if it named Goethe emperor and e was able to change rules at will." If allowed, this sets the gamestate to define the interpretation of the highest-power rule, so it then has precedence over the rule change mechanism. My position is that this scam is currently forbidden, in that proclamations are legislative orders, and can't order forbidden/ illegal gamestates (e.g. CFJ 1381), or at least can't order gamestates into conflict with rules of higher power than those governing legislative orders (a power-1 rule). -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael Norrish wrote: >I deem something. What just happened? An event of deeming. The only way I can interpret that as an event: you took some action in the course of which you deemed something. But since you didn't make any use of whatever you deemed to actually *do* anything, it was a null action. Nothing changed. You seem to be thinking that deeming something is akin to changing something. Deeming does not in itself have any persistent effect. It only has effect indirectly, via events that took place under the influence of the fiction. >I think that rather the rules explicitly support an arbitrary set of >legal decisions, which accumulate until deemed invalid. Past CFJs do not have the status of Rules. They are meant to guide play, but they cannot overrule a Rule if they conflict with one. I maintain that CFJ decisions cannot create legal fictions. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael Norrish wrote: >Good. I feel that Zefram is objecting to the latter (but perhaps I am >mis-representing him, in which case I apologise), I'm not objecting to the latter. Actually I do have an objection to retroactive effects, which is what that one is, but that's a much smaller objection than the one at issue here. I'm objecting to legal fictions, and particularly to legal fictions that are not supported by the Rules that are in effect at the time. >However, the 105/106 combination doesn't specify that accumulated >(judicial) decisions as to how rules should be interpreted can not be >changed by proposal. Again, I make the claim that these decisions are >clearly part of the game-state The decisions don't change what the rules actually require. >I agree that it's aesthetically ugly, but I think the real problem >lies in 106 and the use of the phrase "gamestate", which is nowhere >defined, and which with a common-sense interpretation encompasses far >too much. I'd like to see a much narrower version of ratification, which has not retroactivity and no hint of legal fiction. We can, for example, ratify registration status by having a Rule that allows all registration statuses to be set at the time of ratification to whatever was reported. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Zefram wrote: > Michael Norrish wrote: >> And I claim that a "deeming" event *factually* changes the set of >> legal fictions that we have to respect. > Deeming is not an event. It is the origin of a counterfactual context. I deem something. What just happened? An event of deeming. >> It is clear that the rules >> support the notion of legal fictions, and that they exist. Therefore >> they are part of our game-state. > The Rules do not support an arbitrary set of legal fictions that are > in effect in the game generally. They support certain narrow types > of legal fiction that they specifically mention. I think that rather the rules explicitly support an arbitrary set of legal decisions, which accumulate until deemed invalid. This set of decisions guides play, and is recorded in an official document. We can change that document at any point, thereby creating nonsensical interpretations or legal fictions or whatever we choose. >> As Murphy says, one might also see ratification as the creation of a >> legal fiction. In that case, the language has it that we simply >> assert that the game-state changes, but it seems pretty similar. > That's entirely different. Here the Rules change the actual > gamestate. They do not change the history, of who sent which > message, nor do they deem the history to be other than what it > really is. All they change is the state of entities that are > defined purely by the Rules. I don't see that it's different at all. The interpretations of rules, and the legal decisions that guide play are just as much a part of the game state as Players' registration status. The problem is that 106 is too broad. It should allow for changes to the "current versions" of Official Documents, and Rule Changes, and very little else. In particular, it should not allow for changes to official legal history. Michael.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Kerim Aydin wrote: > > Michael wrote: >> And I claim that a "deeming" event *factually* changes the set of >> legal fictions that we have to respect. > Let me be clear, I am only objecting to a very narrow type of deeming. > I would not object to: > "Be it hereby proclaimed that Goethe is deregistered." > I would also not object to: > "Be it hereby proclaimed that Goethe is retroactively > deregistered, [and actions and 'truth' back to the date > of deregistration be interpreted as if e weren't a player > at the time]." > These are both valid legislative Orders, and the Orders are the > causative agent (even retroactively. Although that's gone from > the Ruleset, it's not forbidden). Good. I feel that Zefram is objecting to the latter (but perhaps I am mis-representing him, in which case I apologise), and I object to his objection, so I feel as if I have gained an Ally, even if that Ally is deregistered :-) > What I object to is: > "Be it hereby proclaimed that Rule R be interpreted >[and by implication, be interpreted in similar >future cases] so that Rule R caused Goethe to be >deregistered." > This is, in effect, re-writing Rule R to be the causative agent, > without a Rule Change and perhaps at too low a power to amend Rule > R. Even if the interpretation is "reasonable" where Rule R was > unclear, it is still contradicting a judicial interpretation. > Either way, the Legislative Order conflicts with Rule R or the > judicial system, in that it orders players to deem something legal > that is in fact against the rules. This is certainly an interesting one. And the rules do specify that the methods in 105 are the only way in which rules may be changed. However, the 105/106 combination doesn't specify that accumulated (judicial) decisions as to how rules should be interpreted can not be changed by proposal. Again, I make the claim that these decisions are clearly part of the game-state (they're even recorded in an officially maintained document), so 106 explicitly says we can change them. I agree that it's aesthetically ugly, but I think the real problem lies in 106 and the use of the phrase "gamestate", which is nowhere defined, and which with a common-sense interpretation encompasses far too much. Best, Michael.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Goethe wrote: [Side note: This is the closest parallel to Lindrum World that I've seen since I've been around here.] I'm honored. I think.
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael wrote: And I claim that a "deeming" event *factually* changes the set of legal fictions that we have to respect. Let me be clear, I am only objecting to a very narrow type of deeming. I would not object to: "Be it hereby proclaimed that Goethe is deregistered." I would also not object to: "Be it hereby proclaimed that Goethe is retroactively deregistered, [and actions and 'truth' back to the date of deregistration be interpreted as if e weren't a player at the time]." These are both valid legislative Orders, and the Orders are the causative agent (even retroactively. Although that's gone from the Ruleset, it's not forbidden). What I object to is: "Be it hereby proclaimed that Rule R be interpreted [and by implication, be interpreted in similar future cases] so that Rule R caused Goethe to be deregistered." This is, in effect, re-writing Rule R to be the causative agent, without a Rule Change and perhaps at too low a power to amend Rule R. Even if the interpretation is "reasonable" where Rule R was unclear, it is still contradicting a judicial interpretation. Either way, the Legislative Order conflicts with Rule R or the judicial system, in that it orders players to deem something legal that is in fact against the rules. [Side note: This is the closest parallel to Lindrum World that I've seen since I've been around here.] -Goethe
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Murphy wrote: Also, two questions for Goethe: if the original paradox was resolved by appeal, (1) do you think it would work and (2) would it convince you to re-register? I think your suggestion is a very reasonable way to deal with it. That was kinda my intent with calling CFJ 1605, so that a judge outside of the "paradox loop" could opine and break the deadlock (at the Appellate level if need be). I was hoping that explaining that desire during the voting period would convince a few folks to vote against the Proposal and let the judgement play out, maybe I didn't explain that well enough :)/.Right now, my main desire is that retroactivity doesn't intervene in determining the "truth at the time of" CFJ 1605. BTW, I might take a break anyway when this calms down, but it won't be this that keeps me away. Game custom states that an Appeals Judge should not overturn a reasonable judgement (and we all seemed to agree that both judgements were reasonable) simply because e would have chosen a different interpretation. Resolving situations in which multiple independent judges come to reasonable but opposite conclusions is an important function of the appeals court both in real life and the game, so no worries there, I think! -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael wrote: We can agree as a matter of fact that Goethe did or did not send particular messages to the public forum, but the legal effect of such messages can be changed by ratification or proposal. Pedantic side note: it's the legal effect of one of my messages, not Goethe's, that was in question. Also, two questions for Goethe: if the original paradox was resolved by appeal, (1) do you think it would work and (2) would it convince you to re-register? To review, here's how that might work: * Potential gamestate #1 = Goethe was deregistered in December. In this gamestate, Sherlock's judgement of CFJ 1594 is appealed and reversed. The gamestate thus becomes consistent; Sherlock's judgement was indeed a judgement, albeit (by decision of the Board of Appeals) an incorrect one. Also, Proposal 4882 becomes a null operation, as it deems that which is judicially true anyway. * Potential gamestate #2 = Goethe was not deregistered in December. This gamestate is self-inconsistent, thus it goes away in favor of #1. If we really want to emphasize the point, then we could appeal and sustain Goethe's judgement of CFJ 1594. Game custom states that an Appeals Judge should not overturn a reasonable judgement (and we all seemed to agree that both judgements were reasonable) simply because e would have chosen a different interpretation. However, there is another reason at work here, namely the desire to resolve a paradox.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael Norrish wrote: >And I claim that a "deeming" event *factually* changes the set of >legal fictions that we have to respect. Deeming is not an event. It is the origin of a counterfactual context. >Sure. But if the scope of the fiction is the registration status of a >particular player, then that will have ramifications in our >game-state, and not elsewhere. You've got scopes and subjects the wrong way round here. Goethe's registration status is the subject of the alleged legal fiction. I claim that its scope is the Proposal that created it. The entire future course of the game does not seem like a valid scope for a legal fiction unless the Rules at the time require it. >Just as, to use one of the Wikipedia's >example, the doctrine of survival can insist that one person died >before another, which will have big effects on the state of the dead >people's estates. The scope of the legal fiction in that case is legal action relating to probate. In any other context, such as a newspaper report, the objective truth prevails. If the doctrine of survival were to be repealed then the truth would prevail in all subsequent legal action, even concerning deaths that occurred prior to the repeal, though the validity of legal actions completed while the doctrine was in effect would probably not be changed. > It is clear that the rules >support the notion of legal fictions, and that they exist. Therefore >they are part of our game-state. The Rules do not support an arbitrary set of legal fictions that are in effect in the game generally. They support certain narrow types of legal fiction that they specifically mention. >Sure it has persistent effect. If in ten years, I call a CFJ on the >question of whether or not someone posted an objection in the sense of >the relevant clause, after they had performed a retraction, then the >court will say that they did not. Only if the Rule creating that legal fiction still exists. If it has been repealed by that time (or amended to remove the fiction) then the CFJ must be judged according to the objective truth. > Moreover some action that is >supposed to occur without objection will have actually occurred. The action that occurred without objection was authorised by R1728 as it was at the time. The operation of R1728, and so the legality of that action, depended on the legal fiction that was in effect at that time. Whether that legal fiction remains in use later has no effect on the validity of the action. >As Murphy says, one might also see ratification as the creation of a >legal fiction. In that case, the language has it that we simply >assert that the game-state changes, but it seems pretty similar. That's entirely different. Here the Rules change the actual gamestate. They do not change the history, of who sent which message, nor do they deem the history to be other than what it really is. All they change is the state of entities that are defined purely by the Rules. >Registrar's report is ratifiable, and if it does not record a >particular registration, and we ratify it what happens to the >game-state then? A person's registration status is an entity defined solely by the Rules, and so the Rules are free to modify it arbitrarily. In this case, upon ratification the person simply ceases to be a Player. That's what really happens, not a fiction. The only awkward bit is the retroactivity. Immediately before the ratification e had been a Player under the Rules and gamestate that then prevailed. The ratification retroactively changes this, so that after the ratification e had not been a Player immediately before. The Rules used to explicitly allow for retroactive effect, and though that's gone we haven't legislated to the contrary either. I think a Proposal could effect a retroactive change to Rule-defined entities, such as a person's registration status. I think using retroactive changes is ugly, and it's certainly unnecessary in this case, so I'd rather we didn't. It's still preferable to a legal fiction, though. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Zefram wrote: > Michael Norrish wrote: >> The Rules admit all sorts of legal fictions. The existence of units >> of currency is a good example for a start. > Not at all. Currencies are entities defined entirely by the Rules, > and so the Rules determine what *factually* happens with those > currencies. A legal fiction, on the other hand, is where there is > some independent reality but the Rules state some facts that legally > override the reality. Entities defined entirely by the rules seem pretty fictional and unreal to me, but I'm happy with your narrower definition. >> Come off it. Upon the adoption of this proposal, rule 101 is amended >> to say something completely different, but *after* the adoption of >> this proposal it goes back to the way it was? > That's quite different. A proposal with that wording *factually* > changes Rule 101, and the Rule won't change back because Rules don't > change without a cause. And I claim that a "deeming" event *factually* changes the set of legal fictions that we have to respect. > A legal fiction applies within a particular context (which might be > a period of time, or a piece of text, for example). Outside that > context the legal fiction does not apply, and reality applies as > usual. Sure. But if the scope of the fiction is the registration status of a particular player, then that will have ramifications in our game-state, and not elsewhere. Just as, to use one of the Wikipedia's example, the doctrine of survival can insist that one person died before another, which will have big effects on the state of the dead people's estates. >> Proposals change the game-state, and the state of the game clearly >> includes the content of any legal fictions that may be in force. > I disagree with the concept that the game state includes an > arbitrary set of legal fictions that are not reflected in the > present Rules. It's tantamount to having unwritten Rules. I > maintain that legal fictions can only continue to apply so long as > the Rules, or other competent instrument designated by the Rules, > specifically require them. Proposals are a competent instrument. It is clear that the rules support the notion of legal fictions, and that they exist. Therefore they are part of our game-state. Proposals can alter the game-state. Therefore proposals can alter the legal fictions that govern us. >> Refer again to 1728: there it deems something be true. > Ah yes, that is indeed a legal fiction. I was incorrect in saying > that the Ruleset does not have any. I think the use of a legal > fiction here is sloppy: the desired semantics can be achieved just > as easily without it. But it's not a very troublesome fiction, > because it only affects the operation of another part of the same > Rule. There is no attempt to give the fiction a persistent effect. Sure it has persistent effect. If in ten years, I call a CFJ on the question of whether or not someone posted an objection in the sense of the relevant clause, after they had performed a retraction, then the court will say that they did not. Moreover some action that is supposed to occur without objection will have actually occurred. That too might have serious consequences. I agree that it's not a very serious fiction, and that one might reword things, but it's clear that the fiction exists. And that's all my argument requires. As Murphy says, one might also see ratification as the creation of a legal fiction. In that case, the language has it that we simply assert that the game-state changes, but it seems pretty similar. The Registrar's report is ratifiable, and if it does not record a particular registration, and we ratify it what happens to the game-state then? We can agree as a matter of fact that Goethe did or did not send particular messages to the public forum, but the legal effect of such messages can be changed by ratification or proposal. Michael.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael Norrish wrote: >The Rules admit all sorts of legal fictions. The existence of units >of currency is a good example for a start. Not at all. Currencies are entities defined entirely by the Rules, and so the Rules determine what *factually* happens with those currencies. A legal fiction, on the other hand, is where there is some independent reality but the Rules state some facts that legally override the reality. >Come off it. Upon the adoption of this proposal, rule 101 is amended >to say something completely different, but *after* the adoption of >this proposal it goes back to the way it was? That's quite different. A proposal with that wording *factually* changes Rule 101, and the Rule won't change back because Rules don't change without a cause. A legal fiction applies within a particular context (which might be a period of time, or a piece of text, for example). Outside that context the legal fiction does not apply, and reality applies as usual. >Proposals change the game-state, and the state of the game clearly >includes the content of any legal fictions that may be in force. I disagree with the concept that the game state includes an arbitrary set of legal fictions that are not reflected in the present Rules. It's tantamount to having unwritten Rules. I maintain that legal fictions can only continue to apply so long as the Rules, or other competent instrument designated by the Rules, specifically require them. >Refer again to 1728: there it deems something be true. Ah yes, that is indeed a legal fiction. I was incorrect in saying that the Ruleset does not have any. I think the use of a legal fiction here is sloppy: the desired semantics can be achieved just as easily without it. But it's not a very troublesome fiction, because it only affects the operation of another part of the same Rule. There is no attempt to give the fiction a persistent effect. See the Wikipedia article [[legal fiction]] for a discussion of what constitutes one. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Zefram wrote: > Michael Norrish wrote: >> I'd say it was clear that this "truth or falsity" refers to the >> situation as the Rules see it. If the rules say "JFK was shot by >> an invisible pink unicorn", and someone calls a CFJ stating that >> JFK was shot by someone else, then it has to be judged false. > In this case, the Rules don't say that -- it's only a proposal that > says it. The Rules don't admit to any legal fictions, and actually > it's not stated so unequivocally anyway. The Rules admit all sorts of legal fictions. The existence of units of currency is a good example for a start. (Admittedly, we don't have any currencies right now, but we have had on multiple occasions.) > I think that, even glossing over whether an adopted Proposal is > capable of having such lasting effect, this one isn't written to > successfully construct a legal fiction. It actually says: > |Upon the adoption of this proposal, Goethe is deemed to have been > |deregistered due to Rule 1789 (Cantus Cygneus) as of the posting of > |Murphy's message Well, I disagree for a start that a proposal can't have as much weight as the rules. Proposals can change any aspect of the game-state (R106), and not just the rules. > It does not say "Goethe was deregistered". It says e "is deemed to > have been" deregistered, which clearly means that in some specific > context e is to be treated as deregistered while tactily admitting > that in general e was not in fact deregistered (or at least might > not have been). Sure, it's tacitly admitting that he may not have, as a matter of fact, been deregistered at that time, but it is insisting that he be deemed to have done so. The use of the word "deeming" is totally consistent with the notion of legal fiction. See for example its use in Rule 1728. > As for what that specific context is, all it says is "Upon the adoption > of this proposal". It says nothing about *after* the adoption of this > proposal. Come off it. Upon the adoption of this proposal, rule 101 is amended to say something completely different, but *after* the adoption of this proposal it goes back to the way it was? > It seems to say that Goethe was deregistered for the purposes of > interpreting the rest of the proposal. The rest of the proposal > actually makes no use of this explicitly counterfactual context, so > I read the whole thing as a nullity. Proposals change the game-state, and the state of the game clearly includes the content of any legal fictions that may be in force. Refer again to 1728: there it deems something be true. No rule is adjusted, nor any other document changed. Nonetheless the state of the game is changed in accordance with a rule. Any change to the game state can be achieved by a proposal, therefore a proposal can, using the word "deem" if it chooses, affect the set of legal fictions governing our behaviour. Michael.
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Zephram wrote: > It does not say "Goethe was deregistered". It says e "is deemed to have > been" deregistered, which clearly means that in some specific context e > is to be treated as deregistered while tactily admitting that in general > e was not in fact deregistered (or at least might not have been). Exactly! Consider three Proposals all claiming to determine the "truth of the gamestate": Proposal A: Players are instructed to act as if Rule R was not in effect at time t. This Proposal is ordering us to behave illegally. It should be ineffective in that directly orders a violation of the rules. Proposal B: Players are instructed to act as if Provision A of Rule R, previously interpreted by a judge as X, was really interpreted as Y. Seemingly muckier, but really asking us to ignore not only the Rule, but the judge's legal interpretation. So this is Proposal A again, but even worse, in that it orders a violation of the judicial system, as well. I believe this is the case with the proposal in question. Proposal C: Upon the adoption of this proposal, the status of player P is hereby set to Y. Outside the context of Rule R, or judicial interpretation X, this legislative order sets something to Y. Assuming there's nothing inherently contradictory about Player P being Y, this should be an effective alteration of the gamestate, an alteration that comes into effect when the proposal takes effect, not altering the truth of Y prior to its taking effect. Please note, btw, that there is no longer any mention of retroactive applicability in the Ruleset. That has been repealed (and thus the Rules are silent on the legality of retroactive application). -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael Norrish wrote: >I'd say it was clear that this "truth or falsity" refers to the >situation as the Rules see it. If the rules say "JFK was shot by an >invisible pink unicorn", and someone calls a CFJ stating that JFK was >shot by someone else, then it has to be judged false. In this case, the Rules don't say that -- it's only a proposal that says it. The Rules don't admit to any legal fictions, and actually it's not stated so unequivocally anyway. I think that, even glossing over whether an adopted Proposal is capable of having such lasting effect, this one isn't written to successfully construct a legal fiction. It actually says: |Upon the adoption of this proposal, Goethe is deemed to have been |deregistered due to Rule 1789 (Cantus Cygneus) as of the posting of |Murphy's message It does not say "Goethe was deregistered". It says e "is deemed to have been" deregistered, which clearly means that in some specific context e is to be treated as deregistered while tactily admitting that in general e was not in fact deregistered (or at least might not have been). As for what that specific context is, all it says is "Upon the adoption of this proposal". It says nothing about *after* the adoption of this proposal. It seems to say that Goethe was deregistered for the purposes of interpreting the rest of the proposal. The rest of the proposal actually makes no use of this explicitly counterfactual context, so I read the whole thing as a nullity. For Suber's sake, Players, if you're dead set on establishing a legal fiction then please at least draft it correctly. -zefram
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Kerim Aydin wrote: > Michael wrote: >> Facts feed into questions of law as evidence, but if the law >> says that we must behave as if such as such were true, then that's >> what we have to do, facts be damned. > Nice principle, but exactly the opposite of what R217 actually *says*. Hardly. First sentence of 217: "All Judgements must be in accordance with the Rules" Later, "When a Judge is considering eir Judgement of a Statement contained in a CFJ, e shall make eir evaluation based on the truth or falsity of the Statement at the time the CFJ was issued." I'd say it was clear that this "truth or falsity" refers to the situation as the Rules see it. If the rules say "JFK was shot by an invisible pink unicorn", and someone calls a CFJ stating that JFK was shot by someone else, then it has to be judged false. Michael.
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Michael wrote: Facts feed into questions of law as evidence, but if the law says that we must behave as if such as such were true, then that's what we have to do, facts be damned. Nice principle, but exactly the opposite of what R217 actually *says*. -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Kerim Aydin wrote: > Murphy wrote: >> Suppose we issued a proposal stating "Upon the adoption of this >> proposal, the gamestate is modified so that Goethe was deregistered >> in December" etc. - how would this be similar, how would it be >> different? > It's a fundamental question of whether you are treating the judicial > system as practical or platonist. Let's take a more sensitive > example. Let's say we passed a proposal to re-engineer the > gamestate to retroactively make some action you performed in the > past a crime. In a truth-based (Platonist) system, you didn't > commit the crime at the time, it wasn't a crime at the time, and > shouldn't be considered a crime, because that was the truth at the > time. In a practical system, you would state that the "truth" was > modified by the proposal and that you were guilty. Judicial systems aren't set up to answer questions of fact; they're set up to answer questions of law, and the two are not the same thing. Facts feed into questions of law as evidence, but if the law says that we must behave as if such as such were true, then that's what we have to do, facts be damned. Michael.
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Quazie wrote: can you file motions as a deregistered player? You are correct, motions are reserved to players. my apologies. -G.
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Murphy wrote:
Suppose we issued a proposal stating "Upon the adoption of this
proposal, the gamestate is modified so that Goethe was deregistered
in December" etc. - how would this be similar, how would it be
different?
It's a fundamental question of whether you are treating the judicial
system as practical or platonist. Let's take a more sensitive example.
Let's say we passed a proposal to re-engineer the gamestate to
retroactively make some action you performed in the past a crime.
In a truth-based (Platonist) system, you didn't commit the crime at
the time, it wasn't a crime at the time, and shouldn't be considered
a crime, because that was the truth at the time. In a practical system,
you would state that the "truth" was modified by the proposal and
that you were guilty.
The body of Rules as a whole is, as far as I know, unclear on how
we are playing this. For the good of the game, it's important to see
if the proposal system can upend the judicial "truth" as a whole.
I mean, we can set the gamestate to pretend what the truth is, but
that doesn't alter the judicial mandate to judge based on what the
truth actually was.
In other words, which has higher precedence, the judicial system
as a whole or the proposal system as a whole??? Pretty important
question!
This is the first time that a retroactive engineering has crossed
back across the timeline of a called but unjudged CFJ ("truth at the
time of the CFJ"). My main purpose for filing the motion was to
enter into the record how important this precedent is. I can see
a judge opining either way in this case where the rules are silent
or at best unclear.
-Goethe
ps. I'll respond to charges of Kelly-like Platonic nihilism in
a more leisurely fashion :).
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
On 1/24/07, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I file a motion for the judge of CFJ 1605 ("Goethe was deregistered in a
Writ of FAGE in December 2006" to consider the following argument:
Murphy claims that certain judgements were "retroactively invalidated"
by Proposal 4882. I strongly dispute this statement. By R217 (power=3)
we are required to judge truth or falsity "at the time the CFJ was
issued." While a proposal may retroactively cause us to treat records
in a certain way, it does not alter what was actually true at that time.
The judge should be cautioned that eir decision in this case will create
a strong precedent governing the ability of proposals to retroactively
alter the truth.
-Goethe
can you file motions as a deregistered player?
DIS: Re: BUS: Judicial motion
Goethe wrote:
I file a motion for the judge of CFJ 1605 ("Goethe was deregistered in a
Writ of FAGE in December 2006" to consider the following argument:
Murphy claims that certain judgements were "retroactively invalidated"
by Proposal 4882. I strongly dispute this statement. By R217 (power=3)
we are required to judge truth or falsity "at the time the CFJ was
issued." While a proposal may retroactively cause us to treat records
in a certain way, it does not alter what was actually true at that
time. The judge should be cautioned that eir decision in this case will
create a strong precedent governing the ability of proposals to
retroactively alter the truth.
It could be argued that, while R217 requires us to look back at the
past, we are still looking at it /from/ the present - thus, we are
still looking at it through the legal-deeming lens. If R217 explicitly
required us to evaluate what we /would have evaluated/ at the time the
CFJ was issued, then that would clearly bypass the lens.
Suppose we issued a proposal stating "Upon the adoption of this
proposal, the gamestate is modified so that Goethe was deregistered
in December" etc. - how would this be similar, how would it be
different?
Also, I've been meaning to respond to your message of the 22nd:
> I was planning on re-joining to help on the spate of CFJs, but...
> I hoped for a judicial game, and presented a judicial solution. I
> object to being retconned in this way (when there are other options
> that were presented) and I don't, personally believe this was legal.
Sixteen CFJs in a month (a spate by your own omission) isn't judicial
enough for you?
It's unclear that a paradoxed CFJ can or should be resolved by a
second CFJ on the same subject. It can just as well be argued that
the appropriate response is to resolve the problem from outside the
judicial system. Come to think of it, it can also be argued that
an appeal would have worked just fine.
CotC: "If Goethe was deregistered in December, then X, Y, and Z are
assigned to the appeal of Sherlock's decision. If not, then
they are assigned to the appeal of Goethe's decision."
X, Y, and Z: "If Goethe was deregistered in December, then we move
to overturn Sherlock's decision. If not, then we move to sustain
Goethe's decision."
At this point, both potential gamestates agree that Goethe was
deregistered in December; the one that started that way is now
self-consistent, the other one remains self-inconsistent and
goes away.
Personally, I might have been a bit more patient about the judicial
approach if the identity of the Speaker /and/ Clerk of the Courts
hadn't been thrown into question at the same time. An ambiguous
Speaker merely slows down the legislative system by an extra week
(due to Rule 2117); an ambiguous or vacant CotC grinds the judicial
system to a halt (an analogue of Rule 2117 may be in order here; I
proposed a generalization a while back, might be time to revive that).
> And perhaps, none of are playing Agora anymore in any case.
This smacks of Kelly-ish Platonic nihilism, depending on how old you
believe the point(s) of divergence is (are). A few months may
reasonably be recalculated; more than a year is likely beyond anyone's
patience, either to recalculate, or to endure the results thereof.
