Re: Median Voter and Sampling
In a message dated 8/28/02 11:18:09 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Another MVT deviation: Personal bankrupcy law. I bet most voters would prefer more lenient laws. Fabio Ironically, Todd J. Zywicki is presenting a paper at GMU Friday in which he argues that people make less use of the current bankruptcy laws than one would expect because they're predisposed to meet their obligations; thus you might say that he's arguing that the bankrupcty laws are already more lenient than the average debtor wants them to be for him or herself. David
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
But I do have a naive question: Is there a median voter for each issue, so that if there n issues, there can be up to n median voters? Or, is there only one median voter who satisfies the vector median as I described above? Can such a person be proven to exist, sort of like a voter version of the Ham Sandwich Theorem? jsh Well, sure. It's just the proof of the regular MVT, but done with multiple integrals. F Ro
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: I think that applications of MVT are very, very sloppy. Four criticisms: 1. You seem to assume that policy responds quite well to public opinion. You assume that if opinion shifts, policy will quickly follow. I believe that policy is very sticky with respect to public opinion. To make it econo-talk, I think policy is not very elastic with respect to changes in the median voter. Elasticity and stickiness are different concepts. But in any case, there is little evidence that policy preferences shift rapidly. When they do markedly shift, we usually see that politicians change a lot by the next election. Very often the existing politician preemptively changes his position to avoid giving his opponents' the opportunity to attack him for being out of touch. 2. Institutions are designed to prevent policy from being overly sensitive to public opinion. Ie, we don't have elections every day. We create rules that allow policy makers to resist every whim of opinion. Examples: rules for changing the constitution, judicial dependence on precedents, etc. In a sense, institutions play the role that contracts do in the labor market - set practices over some time period (ie, you've bought labor at price X and the employee can't leave just because the price is now more than X). Sure, there is a little of this. But again, I doubt this matters much. The Supreme Court held off New Deal legislation a little bit for a couple of years, but after 4 years it caved in completely. In theory, I don't deny that this could matter. In practice, though, I see little evidence. Again, if you can't name the unpopular policies, what reason do we have to think that institutional constraints are binding? They mostly constrain us from doing stuff that the median voter doesn't want anyway. 3. When people (ahem, Mr. B.C.) say look - puzzle - people want X but we get Y - the poll that measures opinion is probably a random sample of adults, or maybe voters. But as I've argued before, this might not be the relevant group. Maybe it's party activists, or party-rank and file. Policies may have select audiences and there is no puzzle until you show that the relevant audience does in fact strongly oppose a policy. Curiouser and curiouser. Re-read this point. Out of context, it sounds like a *defense* of the MVT! You seem to be saying There is no puzzle for the MVT if the electorate is not the relevant group politicians must appeal to. Fine. I am saying that There is no puzzle if existing politician match the median preference. Also true. In other words, you seem to be giving the MVT an extra line of defense. Since I don't think that's your intent, I need clarification. 4. Cognitive limitations: I'm no expert, but my hunch is that many people are only willing to get worked up over a small # of issues - taxes, abortion, immigration, defense... and the dedicated might add their favorites like gun control or affirmative action. Therefore, it's no risk to screw the voter on an issue as long as you don't do it on certain big issues. Therefore it's easy to get a list of dozens of issues and find a descrepancy - what's so puzzling about that? My point, again, is that there are few such discrepancies! It's NOT easy to make a list of issues and find deviations. I will agree that it is safer for politicians to deviate from the MVT on small issues that few people care about. But this does not mean that big deviations on small issues are frequent. So far, there is still a scarcity of examples. It is also worth mentioning that under $1 B is spent on campaign contributions, suggesting that special interests haven't been able to buy much of value. Of course, if the median voter is *indifferent* on an issue, all observed policies satisfy the MVT. So my beef isn't the MVT per se, but the knee jerk use of it. Knee jerk use is appropriate in this case. The theoretical objections are weak, and the empirical evidence in favor is strong. Fabio -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] He wrote a letter, but did not post it because he felt that no one would have understood what he wanted to say, and besides it was not necessary that anyone but himself should understand it. Leo Tolstoy, *The Cossacks*
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
there's nothing rational about being ignorant towards a political system that benefit others at the expence of oneself (or indeed benefit noone at the expense of everyone). It is rational to avoid doing something when the material cost to oneself is greater than the material benefit, where material excludes psychic benfits due to helping others. The cost (including obtaining more knowledge about it) of a typical consumer to actively and substantially oppose subsidies to farmers, lawyers, unions, corporations, and politicans is typically high and the benfits almost all external. Daniel Klein has called this the not worth knowing better problem, which may be a clearer label. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
Another MVT deviation: Marijuana decriminalization Fabio
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
In a message dated 8/28/02 2:02:10 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Sure, there is a little of this. But again, I doubt this matters much. The Supreme Court held off New Deal legislation a little bit for a couple of years, but after 4 years it caved in completely. This must be one of the most inaccurately reported events in US history. The Supreme Court didn't cave in on New Deal legislation under pressure from FDR's toothless court-packing scheme. When FDR announced his scheme, prominent Democrat congressional leaders from the liberal wing of the party publicly denounced him; there was virtually no support in Congress from anyone for his scheme and no chance it would have created the new positions for him to fill. On the contrary, the Supreme Court voided early New Deal legislation because the Court saw the legislation as taking power from Congress and giving it to the president, thus tipping the balance of power in the federal government more to one of the two other branches, and thus potentially threatening the power of the Court itself. The later New Deal legislation scrupulously avoided such transfers of power, and the Supreme Court (same court) had no problem allowing a transfer of power from individuals to the federal government. Thus the Court acted to defend its own relative share of federal power in the early cases while quite consistently acting to expand the total sum of federal power in the later cases. David Levenstam
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: Another MVT deviation: Marijuana decriminalization The failure to decriminalize? 75-80% against according to Gallup. And it hasn't really happened anywhere in the U.S. as far as I know, the medical marijuana loophole aside. Which is incidentally a popular loophole. -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] I was so convinced that soon, very soon, by some extraordinary circumstance I should suddenly become the wealthiest and most distinguished person in the world that I lived in constant tremulous expectation of some magic good fortune befalling me. I was always expecting that *it was about to begin* and I on the point of attaining all that man could desire, and I was forever hurrying from place to place, believing that 'it' must be 'beginning' just where I happened not to be. Leo Tolstoy, *Youth*
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: Another MVT deviation: Personal bankrupcy law. I bet most voters would prefer more lenient laws. They are already very lenient. There has been a lot of populist resistance to creditors' tentative efforts to lobby to mildly tighten them. -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] I was so convinced that soon, very soon, by some extraordinary circumstance I should suddenly become the wealthiest and most distinguished person in the world that I lived in constant tremulous expectation of some magic good fortune befalling me. I was always expecting that *it was about to begin* and I on the point of attaining all that man could desire, and I was forever hurrying from place to place, believing that 'it' must be 'beginning' just where I happened not to be. Leo Tolstoy, *Youth*
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
In a message dated 8/28/02 3:35:39 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Uh, how about the first income tax ever passed? It had super-majority support in amendment form! Congress passed the first federal income tax in 1861, without supermajority support. If you'd asked the average Northern voter in 1861 if he supported taxing the wealthiest northerners to pay for a war against the South, he might have said yes, but if you'd asked him if he supported a precedent which the government could then use to take a large share of his own income and force him to file returns revealing his activities to the federal government, I rather doubt that he would have said yes. David
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
In a message dated 8/27/02 12:19:39 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: 4. Cognitive limitations: I'm no expert, but my hunch is that many people are only willing to get worked up over a small # of issues - taxes, abortion, immigration, defense... and the dedicated might add their favorites like gun control or affirmative action. Therefore, it's no risk to screw the voter on an issue as long as you don't do it on certain big issues. Therefore it's easy to get a list of dozens of issues and find a descrepancy - what's so puzzling about that? I may be mistaken here, but don't public choice economists talk about the concept of rational ignorance to explain how small, concentrated groups can gain large focused benefits while spreading the costs in tiny pieces across the broader population? Sincerely, David Levenstam
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
I may be mistaken here, but don't public choice economists talk about the concept of rational ignorance to explain how small, concentrated groups can gain large focused benefits while spreading the costs in tiny pieces across the broader population? They do - but it doesn't make much sense, since theres nothing rational about being ignorant towards a political system that benefit others at the expence of oneself (or indeed benefit noone at the expense of everyone). As Bryan has pointed out (BC: correct me if I am wrong) RATIONAL ignorant voters would either punish immensely upon detection of political fraud (faliure to deliver on promises, eg.) or they would simply erect institutional barriers that would limit political fraud. However, they don't - and so they are not just rational ignorant. They are either just plain ignorant - or they are (rationally) irrational in their voting behavior - and general attitude towards politics. - jacob braestrup Sincerely, David Levenstam -- NeoMail - Webmail
RE: Median Voter and Sampling
4. is particularly persuasive. The old adage in politics is that if your goal is to find a candidate that you agree with on every issue, run. Otherwise voters have some beliefs held more deeply than others and accept that the politician who supports the view on taxation they prefer does other things they don't like, but do not value as much. They are buying a package. Given the likelihood of being the deciding vote and the costs of getting good answers from politicians to tough questions it is a wonder that anyone votes at all... Regards, Brian Moore ESI Corporation -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of fabio guillermo rojas Sent: Monday, August 26, 2002 9:03 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Median Voter and Sampling So what are you getting at? Since there is a series of elections, each with a different median voter, the MVT doesn't actually predict that the median general voter gets his way? Or what? Prof. Bryan Caplan I think that applications of MVT are very, very sloppy. Four criticisms: 1. You seem to assume that policy responds quite well to public opinion. You assume that if opinion shifts, policy will quickly follow. I believe that policy is very sticky with respect to public opinion. To make it econo-talk, I think policy is not very elastic with respect to changes in the median voter. 2. Institutions are designed to prevent policy from being overly sensitive to public opinion. Ie, we don't have elections every day. We create rules that allow policy makers to resist every whim of opinion. Examples: rules for changing the constitution, judicial dependence on precedents, etc. In a sense, institutions play the role that contracts do in the labor market - set practices over some time period (ie, you've bought labor at price X and the employee can't leave just because the price is now more than X). 3. When people (ahem, Mr. B.C.) say look - puzzle - people want X but we get Y - the poll that measures opinion is probably a random sample of adults, or maybe voters. But as I've argued before, this might not be the relevant group. Maybe it's party activists, or party-rank and file. Policies may have select audiences and there is no puzzle until you show that the relevant audience does in fact strongly oppose a policy. 4. Cognitive limitations: I'm no expert, but my hunch is that many people are only willing to get worked up over a small # of issues - taxes, abortion, immigration, defense... and the dedicated might add their favorites like gun control or affirmative action. Therefore, it's no risk to screw the voter on an issue as long as you don't do it on certain big issues. Therefore it's easy to get a list of dozens of issues and find a descrepancy - what's so puzzling about that? So my beef isn't the MVT per se, but the knee jerk use of it. Fabio
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
--- fabio guillermo rojas [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 4. Cognitive limitations: I'm no expert, but my hunch is that many people are only willing to get worked up over a small # of issues - taxes, abortion, immigration, defense... and the dedicated might add their favorites like gun control or affirmative action. Therefore, it's no risk to screw the voter on an issue as long as you don't do it on certain big issues. Therefore it's easy to get a list of dozens of issues and find a descrepancy - what's so puzzling about that? You mean litmus-test issues that people value above all else? Abortion is a good example. There seems to be alot of people who will choose to not vote for a candidate because of her stance on abortion, regardless of her stance on all other issues. So litmus-test issues could throw off the MVT because that issue decides who one will vote for before any other issue will be considered. I think this criticism fails because the winning candidate would be the candidate who chooses the median vector. That is, she chooses the median for the biggest litmus test issue, then the second biggest, and on down the line. Of course my criticism of your criticism would fail for issues that are under the radar of most people. At which point I would just be wasting bandwidth. But I do have a naive question: Is there a median voter for each issue, so that if there n issues, there can be up to n median voters? Or, is there only one median voter who satisfies the vector median as I described above? Can such a person be proven to exist, sort of like a voter version of the Ham Sandwich Theorem? Humbly yours, jsh = ...for no one admits that he incurs an obligation to another merely because that other has done him no wrong. -Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Discourse 16. __ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Finance - Get real-time stock quotes http://finance.yahoo.com
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: Any decent treatment of the MV states that it is the median *actual* voter who matters, not the median *potential* voter. It's the Median VOTER theorem, not the Median CITIZEN theorem, or the Median SENTIENT BEING theorem. I still think this is true but still misleading. Consider how American politicians succeed - first, they must fund raise and win the favor of party big wigs; then they must must survive a round of primaries; then they must survive the general election. We have at least three successive rounds of MVT. This suggests that policies are probably tailored to one of these three audiences. Thus, I find that arguments of the form survey X says people hate policy Y really miss the point. For there to be a real puzzle, you have to show how policy Y is not preferred by party activists, primary voters and general voters. Ie, you have to understand how institutions partition voters into specific groups. There are several levels of puzzlement. Puzzle #1: The median voter disapproves of existing policy. Puzzle #2: The median voter, primary voters, and party activists ALL disapprove of existing policy. I don't think there are many good examples of #1. There are even fewer good examples of #2. Can you think of any? So what are you getting at? Since there is a series of elections, each with a different median voter, the MVT doesn't actually predict that the median general voter gets his way? Or what? -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] He wrote a letter, but did not post it because he felt that no one would have understood what he wanted to say, and besides it was not necessary that anyone but himself should understand it. Leo Tolstoy, *The Cossacks*
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
In a message dated 8/26/02 6:33:51 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: There are several levels of puzzlement. Puzzle #1: The median voter disapproves of existing policy. Puzzle #2: The median voter, primary voters, and party activists ALL disapprove of existing policy. I don't think there are many good examples of #1. There are even fewer good examples of #2. Can you think of any? So what are you getting at? Since there is a series of elections, each with a different median voter, the MVT doesn't actually predict that the median general voter gets his way? Or what? During the 1990s large supermajorities of American voters indicated a preference for Congressional term limits, while large supermajorities of representatives and senators opposed term limits. At the same time, however, voters often reelected their own representatives and senators, suggesting that perhaps the appeal of term limits came from the notion of getting rid of someone else's representative. I'm not familiar with the median voter theorem, but perhaps the median voter in Mass wanted term limits to get rid of Jesse Helms, while the median voter in NC almost certainly wanted term limits to get rid of Ted Kennedy. (I recall, however, that most of the support for term limits came from the political right, so perhaps something else entirely contributed to the appeal of term limits, in which case it would serve as a good example of an issue on which policy different substantially from what the median voter wanted.) David Levenstam
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
--- fabio guillermo rojas [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There are other sources of non-median-voterness in policy Like the Supreme Court? Brown v. Board of Education might be a good example. Of course it's not a legislative body, so I'm out on a limb here. Maybe there's also a cultural bias that values leadership even if it doesn't start out as being popular. Did the median voter want a man on the moon when Kennedy laid out his vision? Humbly yours, jsh __ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Finance - Get real-time stock quotes http://finance.yahoo.com
