Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure de
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 11:33:15PM -0400, Juiceman wrote:> If you really feel the need to do something like this: > Why not just support blacklisting of CHK's that are known objectionable> material. If the node comes across a request for one of these, it will pass> it along but refuse to cache it thereby making people feel all warm and > fuzzy about not helping the c.p. or whatever spread.Because this would be a token gesture. It would not be useful, it wouldtend to undermine routing, requests would be redirected by per nodefailure tables, there would need to be constant maintenance of blacklists rather than occasional verification of objectionable content,and above all it would not seriously discourage the poster. What Ipropose is a means by which a darknet community can produce a deterrent (which is not to blow the anonymity of the original poster - except tohis friends - but to sever connections with him), and when a poster isan entire subnetwork, it provides a means for the network to fork. Speaking of fork, please release a working freenet (open model or open/darknet) before you go off coding this. -- "I might not like what you have to say, but I will defend your right to say it!" ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > When you say "part of more than one darknet," are you referring to > > separate clusters within one large network, or entirely divorced > > networks? > > Divorced networks. So, does that mean I have to run separate nodes, and participate in different sets of groupthink manually? Isn't that asking a *lot*? Also, suppose I decline to vote on a particular item (or decline to vote in general)? Does my node participate in the correlation attack? If so, why on earth would I want it doing that? If not, don't you need to get rather high involvement? Do I take the blame for the objectionable content too in that case? If so, that seems likely to produce truly rabid groupthink. If not, it seems unlikely to work. > > > > > > > > > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > > > > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > > > > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > > > > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > > > > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > > > > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > > > > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > > > > exacerbate the chilling effects? > > > > > > If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make > > > you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet > > > architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of > > > themselves. > > > > If I'm running an illegal freenet node, that means I'm willing to risk > > the chance of being prosecuted for one count of whatever crime they > > make it. It doesn't mean I'm also willing to risk prosecution for 238 > > counts of knowingly allowing my computer to transmit child porn. As > > best I can tell, the law is reasonably tolerant of "I did everything I > > could reasonably be expected to do" as a defense. If the network is > > such that I can't easily do anything about child porn, and there's no > > evidence I personally looked at or posted it, then I'm at least > > somewhat optimistic about avoiding prosecution. If I actively failed > > Really? If there is primary legislation making it a crime to run a node, > that will presumably make it far easier to convict you of related crimes.. Why should it? In many cases the legal system is more sane than that. If I'm pulled over for speeding, that doesn't make it much easier for them to find the body in the trunk. And if it turns out I'm driving a stolen car, and the body was in there without my knowledge, they're likely to have to find additional evidence to accuse me of murder instead of just grand theft auto. How is this legally different? (I'm sure there's something illegal about being in possession of the body, but I'd be really surprised if you could convict for murder on just that without showing eg motive). Evan ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > /me renames Freenet PornNet. ;) > > I have friends who rsync their porn. But I can see your point. Is this > an issue only for porn? What class of material is subject to this > consideration? Personally I avoid material that could be used to > blackmail me, traceable or not. And I have friends who watch porn in coed groups. I think they're weird, but then they probably say the same about my ex-poultry :) Other classes of material: anything that could be seen as incitement to revolt probably counts. The difference between rebels that history approves of vs condemns appears to be decided after the fact. Having Freenet be relevant to revolutions would be damaged by this, right? And it seems entirely reasonable for me to want to anonymize my revolutionary plots by mixing them up with other people's searches for deceased fowls. Writings about drug use also come to mind, though these seem to be relatively accepted on the public internet. That probably isn't as true in, say, much of Asia, though. > > Your privacy against local nodes is only an issue if your content is > voted down. If you're not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to fear. Evan Daniel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:19:21PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the varrious possible roles in this scheme? Hmm, I'm not sure exactly what you mean... you suggesting a detailed hypothetical? Yes if we are going to seriously consider this, we should try to describe it as accurately as possible: A posts content offensive to B under SSK "A's site" A's peers are A1, A2, A3. After Pre-mix A is known as Z and has connections with Z1, Z2, Z3. B sees it *somehow* and does not like it. B's peers are B1, B2, B3. After Pre-mix B is known as Y and has connections with Y1, Y2, Y3. "A's site" was inserted through "()" represents tunnel: (A1, A3, L7) Z1, H5, R6, L4, S2, S1 "A's site" is known to be stored on: S1 who has peers: S2, S3, S4 B's request path was "()" represents tunnel: (B2) Y1, H2, R4, S3, S1 Given that: Some nodes are offended by everything. Some nodes are offended by nothing. Some nodes never bother to check. Some nodes are unattended. Can you give the ensuing operations on the network, describing each hop and what is involved? Then can we try to make a formulas for: bandwidth consumed, hops required, number of people viewing A's site, how many replicas of the content are made in this process, the amount of storage required, the upper bound of using this as a DNS mechanism, the effectiveness of using this as a "goatse troll" style attack on the network, the upper bound on the effectiveness of using this with colluding cancer nodes to find the identity of: A, B, and S, and when it is all said and done the probability that A's site will actually be brought down? ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:19:21PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, > >as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node > >would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them > >(including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected > >nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to > >be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would > >probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some > >extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective > >is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is > >part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them > >(either all connections or premix connections). > > > > > I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion > given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be > local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, > was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the > varrious possible roles in this scheme? Hmm, I'm not sure exactly what you mean... you suggesting a detailed hypothetical? -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] flaming ;-)
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:05:39PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >It is quite disturbing for the average human to load up Freenet, have a > >look at TFE, and figure "hmmm, so some of that's in my datastore? Fuck > >you all...". But as far as constantly picking offensive content, that is > >not true.. if the mechanism works, complaints should be extremely rare, > >because of an effective deterrent, and we don't need to be quite _that_ > >blunt with them. We'd certainly have a list of current complaints, and > >people would often follow others, and there would likely be means to > >discuss them, but anyone who wanted to could verify that the process was > >not being abused. > > > > > If people look at TFE and says, "Hey that looks bad" and click a few > links, how many more people have to look at (or get a link to) what the > first person was offended by? Your assumption in saying that it will be > infrequent is that there will be a standard for acceptable content, over > which general agreement can be reached by a few people viewing the > offending content without the benefit of real context. This is not the > case, and I don't expect that freenet's users will simply accept that > their site is considered bad. They will try to keep it available and > because there will be some people that agree that it is good, they will > likely succeed. I can't see how this could result in FEWER people seeing No, they won't. Because they will be excluded from the network. We are not just talking about finding stuff and blocking it. In order to have an effective deterrent we need to have effective sanctions - isolating a node, or a block of nodes, being the key sanction. And it wouldn't necessarily be "in isolation" - best to do it at the whole-site level, it gives you the most information, the best chance of tracing the source etc. > things they don't like. If we made sure the pages freenet links to by > default are sufficiently well categorized that users will not click > links to pages that connect to material that they find offensive, then That implies we have index -> porn index -> child porn index. People will still see it. The only way to have people not see it is for the default indexes not to link to child porn at all. Which will not happen because of their political views. > the only way would see offensive material is if some web page was > deliberately misleading people into clicking an offensive link. (Why > would other sites link to such a page?) That's not the issue. The issue is that a majority of the population and a significant minority of the people who are most in need of freenet will not be able to use it because it distributes child porn, and makes no attempt to impede its distribution, and actively thwarts attempts to locate the source of such material. > > So if we are causing people see more offencive content, I don't think > this will improve the user's experence even if they know they are > helping to censor it. We certainly would not cause people to see more offensive content, unless the system is a total failure. Which is possible but by no means certain on the evidence and arguments I have seen so far. The threat of exclusion from the network and being known to your friends to have posted this filth should be sufficient. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 02:41:54PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the problem? Suppose 5% of people want to talk about something 50% find it offencive and 45% don't care? Odds are not every person in that 5% is connected to everyone else in that 5% without going through someone in the 50%! And even if they can through those in the 45%, this clearly implies the network cannot split. So how will routing work for each of these three groups? The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the varrious possible roles in this scheme? ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] flaming ;-)
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:49:29AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: We can easily allow blocking of CHK keys on a per node basis. Yes, it will be ineffective and distributing blacklists won't do too much good as it is easy to alter a file by a few bits. But that is sort of the point: We want people to not feel they are supporting material they don't approve of. However we don't want to allow the network to reveal anyone's identity. What I have suggested is a means to not expose someone's real identity (except to his immediate links), but rather to reprimand him and expel him from the network (or sever links with a larger sub-network). The issue we are addressing here is public perception. It is much less offensive to know that theoretical somewhere there is material you disapprove of and you can only take limited steps to stop it, than it is if the software constantly picks the most offensive content possible and puts it in your browser window and says "Does this disturb you?". It is quite disturbing for the average human to load up Freenet, have a look at TFE, and figure "hmmm, so some of that's in my datastore? Fuck you all...". But as far as constantly picking offensive content, that is not true.. if the mechanism works, complaints should be extremely rare, because of an effective deterrent, and we don't need to be quite _that_ blunt with them. We'd certainly have a list of current complaints, and people would often follow others, and there would likely be means to discuss them, but anyone who wanted to could verify that the process was not being abused. If people look at TFE and says, "Hey that looks bad" and click a few links, how many more people have to look at (or get a link to) what the first person was offended by? Your assumption in saying that it will be infrequent is that there will be a standard for acceptable content, over which general agreement can be reached by a few people viewing the offending content without the benefit of real context. This is not the case, and I don't expect that freenet's users will simply accept that their site is considered bad. They will try to keep it available and because there will be some people that agree that it is good, they will likely succeed. I can't see how this could result in FEWER people seeing things they don't like. If we made sure the pages freenet links to by default are sufficiently well categorized that users will not click links to pages that connect to material that they find offensive, then the only way would see offensive material is if some web page was deliberately misleading people into clicking an offensive link. (Why would other sites link to such a page?) So if we are causing people see more offencive content, I don't think this will improve the user's experence even if they know they are helping to censor it. ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 02:41:54PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > >On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > > > > > >>Matthew Toseland wrote: > >> > >>>Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the > >>>expected result is that the minority would sever links with the > >>>invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority > >>>would oppose the motion. > >>> > >>And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, > >>how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't > >>trust most people.) > >> > >Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a > >contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the > >problem? > > > > > Suppose 5% of people want to talk about something 50% find it offencive > and 45% don't care? Odds are not every person in that 5% is connected to > everyone else in that 5% without going through someone in the 50%! And > even if they can through those in the 45%, this clearly implies the > network cannot split. So how will routing work for each of these three > groups? The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the problem? Suppose 5% of people want to talk about something 50% find it offencive and 45% don't care? Odds are not every person in that 5% is connected to everyone else in that 5% without going through someone in the 50%! And even if they can through those in the 45%, this clearly implies the network cannot split. So how will routing work for each of these three groups? ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 05:22:14PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > > > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > > > > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > > > > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > > > > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > > > > network splits into the two groups. > > > > > > Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority > > > keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with > > > many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an > > > "alternate" network? > > > > Yes... sometimes. Hopefully the subnetworks would already be connected > > when they join up - look at the PGP/GPG web of trust model; you get > > fragments, and the fragments tend to connect with one another. > > Maybe. PGP et al seem to have easier ways of path folding available > than a darknet would -- I don't normally object to identifying myself > and verifying keys with someone I only know marginally, but I do to > exchanging freenet contact info, particularly when people's online > freenet personas are divorced from their node operating personas. I > have no way to learn anything at all about the node operator from > within freenet, without risking my anonymity as a node operator. Certainly... Within the fragment there should already be a functional darknet, but enlarging it could be a problem. > > > > > > If that minority wishes to repair their network, > > > then they have to find each other through other, presumably more > > > vulnerable, channels, right? > > > > Probably, if they didn't have any existing connections. > > > > > It sounds to me like this has potential > > > to enforce groupthink through network value effects. > > > > Please elaborate... > > The central large network is against some content. The fact that it > is larger makes it much more valuable as a network. Therefore I am > inclined to act in such a way as to stay on the big network. That > means participating in and reinforcing any existing groupthink, right? > And that positive feedback loop means there will be groupthink and > that it will probably be strong and evident. Thank you for making that explicit. That's worth thinking about. > > > > > > > Also, there is a chilling effect even without outing nodes, right? > > > Suppose I find freenet valuable as a source of semi-acceptable > > > content, but am also considering "marginally" acceptable content. > > > Wouldn't I be tempted to self-censor out of fear of losing my good > > > connectivity? It seems to me that self-censorship to stay within > > > *percieved* limits is potentially even more limiting than those same > > > limits actually are. > > > > That may be a point. There's no reason you can't be part of more than > > one darknet, but certainly nodes would self-censor to avoid having > > enforcement procedures taken against them. > > When you say "part of more than one darknet," are you referring to > separate clusters within one large network, or entirely divorced > networks? Divorced networks. > > > > > > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > > > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > > > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > > > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > > > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > > > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > > > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > > > exacerbate the chilling effects? > > > > If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make > > you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet > > architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of > > themselves. > > If I'm running an illegal freenet node, that means I'm willing to risk > the chance of being prosecuted for one count of whatever crime they > make it. It doesn't mean I'm also willing to risk prosecution for 238 > counts of knowingly allowing my computer to transmit child porn. As > best I can tell, the law is reasonably tolerant of "I did everything I > could reasonably be expected to do" as a defense. If the network is > such that I can't easily do anything about child porn, and there's no > evidence I personally looked at or posted it, then I'm at least > somewhat optimistic about avoiding prosecution. If I actively failed Really? If there is primary legislation making it a crime to run a node, that will presumably make it far easier to convict you of related crimes.. > to vote against it through nor
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > > > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > > > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > > > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > > > network splits into the two groups. > > > > Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority > > keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with > > many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an > > "alternate" network? > > Yes... sometimes. Hopefully the subnetworks would already be connected > when they join up - look at the PGP/GPG web of trust model; you get > fragments, and the fragments tend to connect with one another. Maybe. PGP et al seem to have easier ways of path folding available than a darknet would -- I don't normally object to identifying myself and verifying keys with someone I only know marginally, but I do to exchanging freenet contact info, particularly when people's online freenet personas are divorced from their node operating personas. I have no way to learn anything at all about the node operator from within freenet, without risking my anonymity as a node operator. > > > If that minority wishes to repair their network, > > then they have to find each other through other, presumably more > > vulnerable, channels, right? > > Probably, if they didn't have any existing connections. > > > It sounds to me like this has potential > > to enforce groupthink through network value effects. > > Please elaborate... The central large network is against some content. The fact that it is larger makes it much more valuable as a network. Therefore I am inclined to act in such a way as to stay on the big network. That means participating in and reinforcing any existing groupthink, right? And that positive feedback loop means there will be groupthink and that it will probably be strong and evident. > > > > Also, there is a chilling effect even without outing nodes, right? > > Suppose I find freenet valuable as a source of semi-acceptable > > content, but am also considering "marginally" acceptable content. > > Wouldn't I be tempted to self-censor out of fear of losing my good > > connectivity? It seems to me that self-censorship to stay within > > *percieved* limits is potentially even more limiting than those same > > limits actually are. > > That may be a point. There's no reason you can't be part of more than > one darknet, but certainly nodes would self-censor to avoid having > enforcement procedures taken against them. When you say "part of more than one darknet," are you referring to separate clusters within one large network, or entirely divorced networks? > > > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > > exacerbate the chilling effects? > > If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make > you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet > architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of > themselves. If I'm running an illegal freenet node, that means I'm willing to risk the chance of being prosecuted for one count of whatever crime they make it. It doesn't mean I'm also willing to risk prosecution for 238 counts of knowingly allowing my computer to transmit child porn. As best I can tell, the law is reasonably tolerant of "I did everything I could reasonably be expected to do" as a defense. If the network is such that I can't easily do anything about child porn, and there's no evidence I personally looked at or posted it, then I'm at least somewhat optimistic about avoiding prosecution. If I actively failed to vote against it through normal software features, then I'm a lot less optimistic. > > > > I must say, I would be hesitant to use a censorship-enabled freenet. > > Small communities with the ability to censor can be very oppressive, > > and it seems entirely reasonable for me to want privacy from the same > > friends I am connected to, even though I mostly trust them. > > Well, you trust them enough to connect to them despite the fact that > Freenet is illegal in itself (in the given scenario). Beyond that, your > anonymity would only be blown (to them, not to others), if you posted > something objectionable
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] flaming ;-)
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:49:29AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > We can easily allow blocking of CHK keys on a per node basis. Yes, it > will be ineffective and distributing blacklists won't do too much good > as it is easy to alter a file by a few bits. But that is sort of the > point: We want people to not feel they are supporting material they > don't approve of. However we don't want to allow the network to reveal > anyone's identity. What I have suggested is a means to not expose someone's real identity (except to his immediate links), but rather to reprimand him and expel him from the network (or sever links with a larger sub-network). > The issue we are addressing here is public > perception. It is much less offensive to know that theoretical somewhere > there is material you disapprove of and you can only take limited steps > to stop it, than it is if the software constantly picks the most > offensive content possible and puts it in your browser window and says > "Does this disturb you?". It is quite disturbing for the average human to load up Freenet, have a look at TFE, and figure "hmmm, so some of that's in my datastore? Fuck you all...". But as far as constantly picking offensive content, that is not true.. if the mechanism works, complaints should be extremely rare, because of an effective deterrent, and we don't need to be quite _that_ blunt with them. We'd certainly have a list of current complaints, and people would often follow others, and there would likely be means to discuss them, but anyone who wanted to could verify that the process was not being abused. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > > network splits into the two groups. > > Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority > keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with > many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an Why would the subgroups be so small? It is likely that the larger network is built of medium sized darknets that have linked up... > "alternate" network? If that minority wishes to repair their network, > then they have to find each other through other, presumably more > vulnerable, channels, right? It sounds to me like this has potential > to enforce groupthink through network value effects. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > > >Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the > >expected result is that the minority would sever links with the > >invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority > >would oppose the motion. > > > > > And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, > how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't > trust most people.) Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the problem? -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
I'm not sure that what you suggest is possible or helpful... It is inevitable that content's popularity will vary from time to time... And with per node failure tables it should be possible to find it on the occasional somewhat-off-specialization node with a big store given enough requests... On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 08:34:13PM +0200, Rainer Kupke wrote: > Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 04:06:08PM +0200, Rainer Kupke wrote: > > > > When a node drops data have it remember the hash for a *long* time. If > > > > somebody tries to reinsert the data just act as if the insertion was > > > > successfull and ignore it. > > > Well, sometimes it's legitimate to reinsert data... > > It is still not impossible to reinsert data. It just depends on the > value of "long time". > > There is only a problem for data that has "recently" fallen out of the > net. > > > How about this variant of my suggestion: > If somebody tries to reinsert the data forward the insert as always, but > never cache the data yourself. > > The insert will be routed as always. > If all nodes in the "target area" have the data blacklisted it will not > be inserted. > On the first reinsert there should be some nodes that don't have it > blacklisted. > The result should be good enough, especially if there are people waiting > for the data (and generating requests until it shows up). > > Subsequent inserts will become more and more difficult as more nodes > blacklist the data. > > Obviously the value of "long time" must be large enough that all nodes > in the "target area" eventually blacklist unpopular data if it is > reinserted in short intervals. > > Maybe "long time" should be dependent on how often the data has dropped > out of the net. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > > network splits into the two groups. > > Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority > keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with > many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an > "alternate" network? Yes... sometimes. Hopefully the subnetworks would already be connected when they join up - look at the PGP/GPG web of trust model; you get fragments, and the fragments tend to connect with one another. > If that minority wishes to repair their network, > then they have to find each other through other, presumably more > vulnerable, channels, right? Probably, if they didn't have any existing connections. > It sounds to me like this has potential > to enforce groupthink through network value effects. Please elaborate... > > Also, there is a chilling effect even without outing nodes, right? > Suppose I find freenet valuable as a source of semi-acceptable > content, but am also considering "marginally" acceptable content. > Wouldn't I be tempted to self-censor out of fear of losing my good > connectivity? It seems to me that self-censorship to stay within > *percieved* limits is potentially even more limiting than those same > limits actually are. That may be a point. There's no reason you can't be part of more than one darknet, but certainly nodes would self-censor to avoid having enforcement procedures taken against them. > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > exacerbate the chilling effects? If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of themselves. > > I must say, I would be hesitant to use a censorship-enabled freenet. > Small communities with the ability to censor can be very oppressive, > and it seems entirely reasonable for me to want privacy from the same > friends I am connected to, even though I mostly trust them. Well, you trust them enough to connect to them despite the fact that Freenet is illegal in itself (in the given scenario). Beyond that, your anonymity would only be blown (to them, not to others), if you posted something objectionable and it could be traced back... > > Evan -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > network splits into the two groups. Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an "alternate" network? If that minority wishes to repair their network, then they have to find each other through other, presumably more vulnerable, channels, right? It sounds to me like this has potential to enforce groupthink through network value effects. Also, there is a chilling effect even without outing nodes, right? Suppose I find freenet valuable as a source of semi-acceptable content, but am also considering "marginally" acceptable content. Wouldn't I be tempted to self-censor out of fear of losing my good connectivity? It seems to me that self-censorship to stay within *percieved* limits is potentially even more limiting than those same limits actually are. And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus exacerbate the chilling effects? I must say, I would be hesitant to use a censorship-enabled freenet. Small communities with the ability to censor can be very oppressive, and it seems entirely reasonable for me to want privacy from the same friends I am connected to, even though I mostly trust them. Evan ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] flaming ;-)
We can easily allow blocking of CHK keys on a per node basis. Yes, it will be ineffective and distributing blacklists won't do too much good as it is easy to alter a file by a few bits. But that is sort of the point: We want people to not feel they are supporting material they don't approve of. However we don't want to allow the network to reveal anyone's identity. The issue we are addressing here is public perception. It is much less offensive to know that theoretical somewhere there is material you disapprove of and you can only take limited steps to stop it, than it is if the software constantly picks the most offensive content possible and puts it in your browser window and says "Does this disturb you?". Matthew Toseland wrote: Well, the point is: The alternative is that the only people who will ever use freenet are: a) Seriously dedicated libertarians like us, who consider the kiddy porn to be a price worth paying, and b) Psychos who don't care. For it to be really useful it needs to be usable by for example oppressed religious minorities in totalitarian states. And it needs to be usable by (relatively) "normal" people too. Such a voting system would allow a much larger range of people to benefit from Freenet. On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 07:01:31PM +0200, Newsbyte wrote: I don't think this is the way to go or ponder about, even apart from the extra technical/software coding to come up with such a system, while we should be concentrating on other things. Freenet is about being anonymous and uncensorable (as much as possible), the moment you deviate from that, then what was the point? Yes, sure, you explain some sort of democratic self-censoring...but that IS still censorship. Democracy is no good if it's two wolves and one sheep deciding what to have for dinner. If one wants to limit the 'wrong' things on the network by any means, then I prefer the way I2P does it; at least there it's the one that publishes that takes the risk, but it doesn't involve the opinion of others to determine what someone could see. I2P does not deal with the problem. If enough people (like in europe) find something 'objectionable' (like hate-speech), then, just because it is widely or at least generally seen as being 'wrong', it will become impractical to use the network for it. So, basically, while it may have little effect on topics most people generally do not object much to (such as d/l copyrighted mp3s), it will censor topics if they are more widely unpopular. Such as child porn, yes. I would hope that most parts of the network are sufficiently liberal as to not block hate speech. But even if they do on some networks, is that bad? They certainly won't block the diebold files, or the Operating Thetan documents. I really think this is the wrong way to go, because in that case, whatever is considered 'wrong' by a large mass of people in a certain age or timeperiod, would be open to censorship (or anonymity-deprivation). And I don't think that is (or at least was) the goal of Freenet. No, it's not the overt goal of Freenet. It's something else that achieves the same ultimate goal - making it difficult for the powerful to impose their views on what we should and should not be able to talk about. If any 'censorship' should be done, it should be done by the individual whome objects to it, for HIM/HERSELF. As a libertarian, I can support someone deciding 'these kinds of files I don't want on my node' (even though I doubt that's technically possible, in the given system), far more then I can accept that other persons create a form of censorship, however popular the drive for censorship may be for a given topic. I don't see how that would be practical. Furthermore, I doubt that the system will become more simple (certainly in respect to anonymity and non-censorship) if you allow *some* form of censorship, while you try to avoid censorship of (potentially) everything. Also, I think it may weaken your legal defence, if someone (including the RIAA) can point out that one received some notice of objectionable material, but you didn't vote to try to censor (or try to focus on the node that send it). Yes, nodes in the darknet are between trusted friends, and maybe the above won't happen much, but still. (and besides, what with the no,-dark network?). That is exactly the same situation as without it. Without it they will say you support the distribution of illegal content by inaction and by running a node. With it they will say exactly the same thing. It makes zero difference; it is likely that the node is illegal in any case. This is precisely why we can do this. All by all, as a matter of principle, I don't think that it's the job of anyone, not even by majority vote, to censor on what is deemed acceptable and not. If you want to have a way of self-censorship, devise a system whereby people can decide what stays on *their* node or not, WITHOUT giving the pos
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:06:35PM -0400, Ken Snider wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of "groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no means to be. Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). Yes, but this community is a global one, and any belief that there is a "consensus" of morality in the global community is shortsighted and doomed to failure, *especially* because these communities overlap for other reasons, and as such, are likely to have overlapping trust relationships as well. You don't think there is a 95%+ consensus in the west on child porn being bad? No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. Yes, but your assumption suggests that the *majority* of Freenetters are good, like-minded individuals. The recent "Brazillian invasion" stories about Orkut are proof positive IMHO that a "darknet" (in the sense that it's invitation-only) can and has been overtaken by parties who do not share the viewpoints of the creators. Have you considered the possibility that, through co-ordinated effort, freenet gets inundated with people that *support* the very kinds of things you want to censor? Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure de
On Monday 11 July 2005 8:33 pm, Juiceman wrote: > If you really feel the need to do something like this: > Why not just support blacklisting of CHK's that are known objectionable > material. If the node comes across a request for one of these, it will pass > it along but refuse to cache it thereby making people feel all warm and > fuzzy about not helping the c.p. or whatever spread. Freesites could > catalog and create a text file that lists known "immoral/illegal/unwanted" > CHK's and visitor's to each of these "list" Freesites can chose to download > these files every so often into the Freenet directory where the node will > check for a changed file and enter the CHK's found in the file into the > "don't cache" routing table. Users of each "list" Freesite could submit > CHK's they have come across and they could be added to the list. Then > communities can form around these sites based around different ideas of > what is "acceptable" and they can all be mind numbingly uniform and bland > "together" without affecting the rest of us thinking individuals. This > could be configured on/off in the config file. > Of course even this route has many dangers: > >- The fascist/communist/ideological dictatorship that forces its >citizen's to all use it's lists blocking free >speech/Christianity/Muslim/(insert your religion here) >- The Freenet Project could be forced to block all known >"illegal/copyrighted material" thus becoming a huge burden on the > project to pay to hire people which it can't because it doesn't make any > money off this product >- Freenet users could be forced to "make a reasonable effort" to >download the above CHK lists or face criminal charges for "distributing" > the content in those files > > I am not a lawyer, I am just looking at it from a "what if" point of view a > few years from now... > In my opinion, you shouldn't implement ANY kind of feature/tool that could > be used to limit free speech WHATSOEVER because the slippery slope is the > enemy of free speech everywhere. I think there is something to be said for the idea of bundling the exploit code for the best attacks against the network with the network itself. However if we do this we could go one step further, and embed in the header of all the files we store an optional entry containing say 16 random bits. This would make creating large archives bandwidth prohibitive. ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] flaming ;-)
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:01:07PM +0200, Alex R. Mosteo wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >Well, the point is: The alternative is that the only people who will > >ever use freenet are: > >a) Seriously dedicated libertarians like us, who consider the kiddy porn > >to be a price worth paying, and > >b) Psychos who don't care. > > I have no further arguments than the ones presented by others, but for > the record I'm too against any censorship. C.p. and whatever are > problems to be dealt with in the real world. Internet is already full of > questionable content. If it is possible to deal with them in the real world. Sometimes it isn't. Usually the easiest way to trace these people is through the internet. > > What I think is that Freenet must be an attempt at the purest free > speech. The moment it has some censorship in place it will be worth no > more than any other politically correct project (just IMO, of course). Other projects do not do any formal censorship except via lawsuits and central blacklists. That is not what I am proposing here. I am proposing that we assume that the network is illegal and let people decide for themselves what should and should not be permitted. And if they have irreconcilable differences then they can form separate darknets. Without anyone not directly involved ever knowing their real world identities. This is way superior to "we don't censor... unless the Church of Scientology, Diebold, or anyone else, sends us a threatening letter", which is the reality in "any other politically correct project". -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Ok, enough is enough. First you start ruling out users with weaker connections and those whose ISPs have a very bad infrastructure, some ISPs that simply can't handle the load generated by there users totally block UDP because all important traffic (pop, smtp, http...) is TCP, by switching the transport to UDP. And now you try to get censorship in it. This isn't freenet anymore. It IMHO totally violates everything a free network stands for, meaning free and easy access for everyone without any censorship at all. You seem to have lost that target (or your mind), and so freenet will become a joke on itself. I don't want to have anything to do with something like that. I'll stay on the old network as long as there is still live in it, but that farce called the freenet rewrite will never make it on my machine. Go on, ruin freenet. Turn it into just another filesharing system without any meaning, I don't care anymore. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFC09Df5Sa8EyIJhugRAnrYAJ9I9JGU0IpmyxoOhoqu0ctBXs/uFACfXM35 x8kqL76sx7DcGu48dfH5Jy4= =JwpO -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:06:35PM -0400, Ken Snider wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > >>- Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this > >>quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of > >>"groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to > >>quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely > >>unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in > >>those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined > >>by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for > >>the "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will > >>have no means to be. > > > >Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some > >level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although > >there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). > > Yes, but this community is a global one, and any belief that there is a > "consensus" of morality in the global community is shortsighted and doomed > to failure, *especially* because these communities overlap for other > reasons, and as such, are likely to have overlapping trust relationships as > well. You don't think there is a 95%+ consensus in the west on child porn being bad? > > >No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me > >are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. > > Yes, but your assumption suggests that the *majority* of Freenetters are > good, like-minded individuals. The recent "Brazillian invasion" stories > about Orkut are proof positive IMHO that a "darknet" (in the sense that > it's invitation-only) can and has been overtaken by parties who do not > share the viewpoints of the creators. Have you considered the possibility > that, through co-ordinated effort, freenet gets inundated with people that > *support* the very kinds of things you want to censor? Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. > > >I can't honestly see why any sane informed human being who isn't a > >scientologist wouldn't support the dissemination of the OT documents. > > You can't perhaps, but that doesn't mean that your viewpoints are a global > majority, either. > > Let me give you another example - what if the government of a large western > state became corrupt, and the "liberal" folk wanted to blow the whistle, > but the majority supporters of said government wanted to keep it covered > up? Would it not be trivially easy to do so if said majority was *also* a > majority in freenet? This would _ONLY_ happen if the network was not a darknet. If people will always vote for the government in the face of the facts, it is normally because they know they're likely to get beaten up if they don't. Which is based on the assumption that the government knows about their nodes and will punish them if they vote incorrectly. > > In fact, would that not apply in the general sense? That the majority views > would trump minority views anywhere on freenet, regardless of whether the > viewpoint was the "correct" one? If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the network splits into the two groups. > > It would appear to me that voting can *only* work if you believe, without > exception, that the majority population is right 100% of the time. All you > have to do is look back to Germany during the WW to see that the majority > of a population *can* be convinced that morally reprehensible items are in > fact not so. > > >Sounds a fairly elitist argument. But lets say you're right. Why would > >people who would vote for political speech they disagree with to be > >censored even join the network? > > Because you're discounting people who may want to join the network for the > *express purpose* of censoring it. > > --Ken. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of "groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no means to be. Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). Yes, but this community is a global one, and any belief that there is a "consensus" of morality in the global community is shortsighted and doomed to failure, *especially* because these communities overlap for other reasons, and as such, are likely to have overlapping trust relationships as well. No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. Yes, but your assumption suggests that the *majority* of Freenetters are good, like-minded individuals. The recent "Brazillian invasion" stories about Orkut are proof positive IMHO that a "darknet" (in the sense that it's invitation-only) can and has been overtaken by parties who do not share the viewpoints of the creators. Have you considered the possibility that, through co-ordinated effort, freenet gets inundated with people that *support* the very kinds of things you want to censor? I can't honestly see why any sane informed human being who isn't a scientologist wouldn't support the dissemination of the OT documents. You can't perhaps, but that doesn't mean that your viewpoints are a global majority, either. Let me give you another example - what if the government of a large western state became corrupt, and the "liberal" folk wanted to blow the whistle, but the majority supporters of said government wanted to keep it covered up? Would it not be trivially easy to do so if said majority was *also* a majority in freenet? In fact, would that not apply in the general sense? That the majority views would trump minority views anywhere on freenet, regardless of whether the viewpoint was the "correct" one? It would appear to me that voting can *only* work if you believe, without exception, that the majority population is right 100% of the time. All you have to do is look back to Germany during the WW to see that the majority of a population *can* be convinced that morally reprehensible items are in fact not so. Sounds a fairly elitist argument. But lets say you're right. Why would people who would vote for political speech they disagree with to be censored even join the network? Because you're discounting people who may want to join the network for the *express purpose* of censoring it. --Ken. ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Re: Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 04:17:03PM +0200, Someone wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > Ok, enough is enough. First you start ruling out users with weaker > connections and those whose ISPs have a very bad infrastructure, some > ISPs that simply can't handle the load generated by there users totally > block UDP because all important traffic (pop, smtp, http...) is TCP, by > switching the transport to UDP. So is most unimportant traffic - Kazaa for example. But when did I say we can't have a TCP transport as well? I think nextgens was interested in writing one. > > And now you try to get censorship in it. This isn't freenet anymore. > It IMHO totally violates everything a free network stands for, meaning > free and easy access for everyone without any censorship at all. Uh, get a grip. It was a _suggestion_, a _proposal_. It wasn't a fait accompli. It was not a dictat. It was simply something I would like people to comment on. > > You seem to have lost that target (or your mind), and so freenet will > become a joke on itself. I don't want to have anything to do with > something like that. > > I'll stay on the old network as long as there is still live in it, > but that farce called the freenet rewrite will never make it on my > machine. Umm, see above. > > Go on, ruin freenet. Turn it into just another filesharing system > without any meaning, I don't care anymore. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Well, sometimes it's legitimate to reinsert data... On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 04:06:08PM +0200, Rainer Kupke wrote: > Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > When a node drops data have it remember the hash for a *long* time. If > > > somebody tries to reinsert the data just act as if the insertion was > > > successfull and ignore it. > > > > What if they just insert it locally on their own node and then propagate > > it by requests? > > If my understanding of request routing is correct a request will be > routed toward the region of the net where the requested data *should* > reside. > > They will be able to insert their data on their own node. > To propagate the data they have to make requests to other nodes. Those > requests will be routed toward the region of the net where the requested > data *should* reside and fail there. > > The only exception is when they control nodes that are right where the > data should reside. Then they can insert locally and propagate the data > with a few requests from random nodes. > > Unless they operate lots of nodes they won't be able to do this for a > relevant portion of their data. > > > We can't interfere with requests propagating data without dire > > consequences, and only dealing with inserts would be impotent. > > I don't suggest to change the behaviour of requests. > > If an insert is unable to place the data where requests will find it the > requests will fail and the data will not propagate. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > When a node drops data have it remember the hash for a *long* time. If > > somebody tries to reinsert the data just act as if the insertion was > > successfull and ignore it. > > What if they just insert it locally on their own node and then propagate > it by requests? If my understanding of request routing is correct a request will be routed toward the region of the net where the requested data *should* reside. They will be able to insert their data on their own node. To propagate the data they have to make requests to other nodes. Those requests will be routed toward the region of the net where the requested data *should* reside and fail there. The only exception is when they control nodes that are right where the data should reside. Then they can insert locally and propagate the data with a few requests from random nodes. Unless they operate lots of nodes they won't be able to do this for a relevant portion of their data. > We can't interfere with requests propagating data without dire > consequences, and only dealing with inserts would be impotent. I don't suggest to change the behaviour of requests. If an insert is unable to place the data where requests will find it the requests will fail and the data will not propagate. ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] flaming ;-)
Matthew Toseland wrote: Well, the point is: The alternative is that the only people who will ever use freenet are: a) Seriously dedicated libertarians like us, who consider the kiddy porn to be a price worth paying, and b) Psychos who don't care. I have no further arguments than the ones presented by others, but for the record I'm too against any censorship. C.p. and whatever are problems to be dealt with in the real world. Internet is already full of questionable content. What I think is that Freenet must be an attempt at the purest free speech. The moment it has some censorship in place it will be worth no more than any other politically correct project (just IMO, of course). ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure de
Matthew Toseland ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: > On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 11:33:15PM -0400, Juiceman wrote: > > If you really feel the need to do something like this: > > Why not just support blacklisting of CHK's that are known objectionable > > material. If the node comes across a request for one of these, it will pass > > it along but refuse to cache it thereby making people feel all warm and > > fuzzy about not helping the c.p. or whatever spread. > > Because this would be a token gesture. It would not be useful, it would > tend to undermine routing, [...] I think you need to stop thinking of Freenet as a collection of homogeneous nodes. The code is freely available. Someone *will* code a blacklist feature, and Freenet nodes *will* misbehave in various ways you haven't thought of yet (whether due to malice, bugs, human error, resource limitations, or acts of aliens/gods). The routing algorithms will be ready for prime time when they can cope with all of that. If someone's blacklist feature breaks the current routing algorithms, then the current algorithms are simply not adequate to the real-world demands of the Freenet network. -- Greg Wooledge | "Truth belongs to everybody." [EMAIL PROTECTED] |- The Red Hot Chili Peppers http://wooledge.org/~greg/ | signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 01:03:08PM +0200, Rainer Kupke wrote: > Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > There is an argument that unpopular content will fall out of the current > > Freenet; it won't if the original insertor keeps on pushing it back in. > > What if you simply make it more difficult to push stuff back in? > > When a node drops data have it remember the hash for a *long* time. If > somebody tries to reinsert the data just act as if the insertion was > successfull and ignore it. What if they just insert it locally on their own node and then propagate it by requests? We can't interfere with requests propagating data without dire consequences, and only dealing with inserts would be impotent. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure de
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:37:45AM -0700, pineapple wrote: > --- Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > > In order to participate on the darknet, you will > > need to connect to a > > few people who you actually know in the real world > > or online. This is so > > that the network can survive harvesting attacks and > > therefore survive > > its own illegality. That is independant of the > > content of this email; it > > is already decided, and it is essential for freenet > > to be usable in > > places where it will be illegal. > > This is a fundamental flaw with the Freenet network, > it only carries Freenet data. A "fundamental flaw", in your terms, with I2P is that it can only provide the traditional centralized web model at present. You can build Freenet on I2P using a DHT. You can build almost anything on Freenet, IF Freenet works. If routing works, there are all manner of services we can provide based on rendezvous-at-a-key. And I2P will always be vulnerable to harvesting with current designs. > I2P on the other hand, > like the internet itself, can carry anything. To > elaborate, Freenet has additional baggage that I2P > does not; mainly storing and forwarding content and > having a weak encryption scheme for the datastore > where censorship can be automated. "Weak encryption scheme" ?! -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure de
--- Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > In order to participate on the darknet, you will > need to connect to a > few people who you actually know in the real world > or online. This is so > that the network can survive harvesting attacks and > therefore survive > its own illegality. That is independant of the > content of this email; it > is already decided, and it is essential for freenet > to be usable in > places where it will be illegal. > This is a fundamental flaw with the Freenet network, it only carries Freenet data. I2P on the other hand, like the internet itself, can carry anything. To elaborate, Freenet has additional baggage that I2P does not; mainly storing and forwarding content and having a weak encryption scheme for the datastore where censorship can be automated. Sell on Yahoo! Auctions no fees. Bid on great items. http://auctions.yahoo.com/ ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure de
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 11:33:15PM -0400, Juiceman wrote: > If you really feel the need to do something like this: > Why not just support blacklisting of CHK's that are known objectionable > material. If the node comes across a request for one of these, it will pass > it along but refuse to cache it thereby making people feel all warm and > fuzzy about not helping the c.p. or whatever spread. Because this would be a token gesture. It would not be useful, it would tend to undermine routing, requests would be redirected by per node failure tables, there would need to be constant maintenance of blacklists rather than occasional verification of objectionable content, and above all it would not seriously discourage the poster. What I propose is a means by which a darknet community can produce a deterrent (which is not to blow the anonymity of the original poster - except to his friends - but to sever connections with him), and when a poster is an entire subnetwork, it provides a means for the network to fork. > Freesites could catalog > and create a text file that lists known "immoral/illegal/unwanted" CHK's and > visitor's to each of these "list" Freesites can chose to download these > files every so often into the Freenet directory where the node will check > for a changed file and enter the CHK's found in the file into the "don't > cache" routing table. Users of each "list" Freesite could submit CHK's they > have come across and they could be added to the list. Then communities can > form around these sites based around different ideas of what is "acceptable" > and they can all be mind numbingly uniform and bland "together" without > affecting the rest of us thinking individuals. This could be configured > on/off in the config file. This is meaningless as discussed above. > Of course even this route has many dangers: > >- The fascist/communist/ideological dictatorship that forces its >citizen's to all use it's lists blocking free >speech/Christianity/Muslim/(insert your religion here) They can do that _now_. All the darknet stuff is assuming that the nodes are illegal in the first place. >- The Freenet Project could be forced to block all known >"illegal/copyrighted material" thus becoming a huge burden on the project > to >pay to hire people which it can't because it doesn't make any money off > this >product We absolutely must not take on the role of censor! >- Freenet users could be forced to "make a reasonable effort" to >download the above CHK lists or face criminal charges for "distributing" > the >content in those files Legality is irrelevant, the whole point of a darknet is that it is hidden and has a reasonable chance of survival despite running a node being illegal. > > I am not a lawyer, I am just looking at it from a "what if" point of view a > few years from now... > In my opinion, you shouldn't implement ANY kind of feature/tool that could > be used to limit free speech WHATSOEVER because the slippery slope is the > enemy of free speech everywhere. The State can mandate the use of such a tool even if we don't implement one. What I have proposed is a means to do it in such a way that censorship is controlled by the people rather than the Authorities, and in such a way that it can present a real deterrent, and communities that don't belong together can separate themselves. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] flaming ;-)
Well, the point is: The alternative is that the only people who will ever use freenet are: a) Seriously dedicated libertarians like us, who consider the kiddy porn to be a price worth paying, and b) Psychos who don't care. For it to be really useful it needs to be usable by for example oppressed religious minorities in totalitarian states. And it needs to be usable by (relatively) "normal" people too. Such a voting system would allow a much larger range of people to benefit from Freenet. On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 07:01:31PM +0200, Newsbyte wrote: > I don't think this is the way to go or ponder about, even apart from the > extra technical/software coding to come up with such a system, while we > should be concentrating on other things. Freenet is about being anonymous > and uncensorable (as much as possible), the moment you deviate from that, > then what was the point? > > Yes, sure, you explain some sort of democratic self-censoring...but that IS > still censorship. Democracy is no good if it's two wolves and one sheep > deciding what to have for dinner. If one wants to limit the 'wrong' things > on the network by any means, then I prefer the way I2P does it; at least > there it's the one that publishes that takes the risk, but it doesn't > involve the opinion of others to determine what someone could see. I2P does not deal with the problem. > > If enough people (like in europe) find something 'objectionable' (like > hate-speech), then, just because it is widely or at least generally seen as > being 'wrong', it will become impractical to use the network for it. So, > basically, while it may have little effect on topics most people generally > do not object much to (such as d/l copyrighted mp3s), it will censor topics > if they are more widely unpopular. Such as child porn, yes. I would hope that most parts of the network are sufficiently liberal as to not block hate speech. But even if they do on some networks, is that bad? They certainly won't block the diebold files, or the Operating Thetan documents. > I really think this is the wrong way to > go, because in that case, whatever is considered 'wrong' by a large mass of > people in a certain age or timeperiod, would be open to censorship (or > anonymity-deprivation). And I don't think that is (or at least was) the goal > of Freenet. No, it's not the overt goal of Freenet. It's something else that achieves the same ultimate goal - making it difficult for the powerful to impose their views on what we should and should not be able to talk about. > > If any 'censorship' should be done, it should be done by the individual > whome objects to it, for HIM/HERSELF. As a libertarian, I can support > someone deciding 'these kinds of files I don't want on my node' (even though > I doubt that's technically possible, in the given system), far more then I > can accept that other persons create a form of censorship, however popular > the drive for censorship may be for a given topic. I don't see how that would be practical. > > Furthermore, I doubt that the system will become more simple (certainly in > respect to anonymity and non-censorship) if you allow *some* form of > censorship, while you try to avoid censorship of (potentially) everything. > > Also, I think it may weaken your legal defence, if someone (including the > RIAA) can point out that one received some notice of objectionable material, > but you didn't vote to try to censor (or try to focus on the node that send > it). Yes, nodes in the darknet are between trusted friends, and maybe the > above won't happen much, but still. (and besides, what with the no,-dark > network?). That is exactly the same situation as without it. Without it they will say you support the distribution of illegal content by inaction and by running a node. With it they will say exactly the same thing. It makes zero difference; it is likely that the node is illegal in any case. This is precisely why we can do this. > > All by all, as a matter of principle, I don't think that it's the job of > anyone, not even by majority vote, to censor on what is deemed acceptable > and not. If you want to have a way of self-censorship, devise a system > whereby people can decide what stays on *their* node or not, WITHOUT giving > the possiblity to decide what stays on someone elses' node (or to make them > lose their anonymity). That would be entirely meaningless. If you don't take some sanctions against the poster there is no deterrent and you'll be perpetually wading through a see of filth just to block the latest release. Meaningful action has to be taken at a semi-collective level (note that we are not talking about global voting here), and if you just block a few files, then the network will simply route around you with per node failure tables. "I don't want my node storing this" is no different to "I don't want my node assisting in the retrieval of this", so I2P's approach does not help either. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL P
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure de
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 06:10:56PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > > > >Granted, there are people abusing that to insert wide varieties of porn, > >including c.p. but you see, that's a price that has to be paid. If freenet > >is to be what it's stated purpose is, then the ONLY action that can be > >taken in regard to content that somebody finds objectionable is to not > >request it. One can also help push older objectionable content out by > >continuing to insert quality content. > > > > > I wonder if the existence of the objectionable content is really the > problem. I mean people know there are things they don't like on the > normal Internet, but largely ignore it because they don't go to those > sites. The issue people see with freenet is that they could be spreading > this content. I think if we could eliminate this it would be better than > forcing people to look at the content that they don't want to see. We can, and we can't. We can, by forcing the pedophiles to fork onto a completely separate darknet, through the proposed means. We can't, in that we can't undermine freenet's whole distributed storage ideal without making it a completely different network. Yes we could implement a non-load-bearing DHT (or something similar that would work on a darknet), but that would not deal with caching. > > >The problem with tracing and taking action against objectionable content is > >that the definition of objectionable content has a tendency to change. > > > >Today the bad thing is c.p., tomorrow it's a certain political view, next > >it's something else... and so on. > > > > > It would be great if we could specify criteria for what is acceptable, > and let the software handle it. However there is no way that software > can KNOW what the content is, at all. So all such decisions are > ultimately made by people. However if people did the right thing, we > would have no need for software. The idea here is that we get people to vet content _occasionally_, and if a certain subnet is a source of stuff we don't like, we warn them, and then we warn them, and then we disconnect from them. > > >I'm thinking ahead to when the thing that is illegal to distribute is > >certain Christian teachings. Given a system like you describe it is true > >that a lot of c.p. can be removed. However that same system would cause > >the deaths of a lot of people in the eventual Hyper-Anti-Christian world > >that is developing. > > > > > DEVELOPING? Where? Today a great number of religious groups including > various Christian ones are illegal in China. Some provinces in India are > no better. 5 years ago Christianity was a capital offense in > Afghanistan, today many of it's neighbors have globalization friendly, > but internally oppressive governments. The "western" world, however is Save us from Western-friendly totalitarian states! :) Seriously, the point here is that I don't see how most religious groups (if we accept that it's legitimate to help them express themselves) COULD use freenet on any scale. > certainly not becoming any more anti-Christian, it is true that there is > more rhetoric as Christianity has come to the forefront of the political > scene. But today in the United States for example, weekly church > attendance as a percentage of the population is at it's highest levels > ever. (and yes that includes those 200 years before it it was founded.) Cool, shame most of them are republicans who ignore the responsibility to care for the poor. :) > So the "Western" world will not become "Hyper-Anti-Christian" in our > lifetimes or our grand children's. However the fact remains that all the > world is not so fortunate. Today more than 2/3rds of the worlds > population lives in arias where free speach is simply not allowed. > > Given that Freenet appeals to a global audience, there are two important > things to consider: > 1. It is easy to filter everything, especially if you control all the > infrastructure and can pass laws requiring monitoring of people. This is a problem but I am of the view that even if the internet is shut down to the point that we can't run FNP over any sort of stego, we will still be able to use _some_ transport. E.g. sneakernet. :) > 2. Most people don't have the Internet. A _lot_ of people do, especially in rapidly developing nations such as India and China. Admittedly in the cities, and more often than not students - but these are exactly the people who need it most. > > So it makes since to try to present Freenet as being reasonable and safe > software to further it's adoption (I doubt most governments really care > about Kazza, but people like it). On the other hand one could try to be > more absolute and try to conceal the network completely. In this case a > darknet makes sense, it might make it's adoption harder, but it would > not be so easily taken down. However I don't see the gain in doing both. > (Technical anilisis of proposeal to come...) S
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: Here's a really whacky idea I came up with on the train back from Strasbourg (please read the whole email before flaming me): *snip voting idea* not only do I think this won't work for philosophical reasons, but I think it underlines one of the most fundamental *weaknesses* of the Darknet. Let me explain: - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of "groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no means to be. Now, take this a step further. Lets assume for a moment a trust system similar to PGP, where a number of existing nodes/Toad's choices/known-good-nodes/etc become the "base" for the darknet - it's assumed that you will need to somehow gain the trust of these core people to join the darknet itself, which means, at some point, you'll be gaining the approval of the "person" behind the node, in some way. Now, in a global community where in some parts of the world things like same-sex marriage are a done deal, and in others it's a crime worthy of execution, for example, how do you propose to ensure you have an acceptable cross-section of "minds" behind the darknet? It's seems inevitable to me that the "prevailing winds" of the collective morals of this core group will go a long way to creating the prevailing moral authority for darknet, even *without* a voting system in place - since you're not likely to "trust" individuals with differing views from your own in most cases, and unless this "trust" mechanism is somehow disconnected from people (which would mean that a nefarious party would need only complete these machine requirements to enter the darknet, so is likely not to be the case). Now, add voting to the mix. Allow this set of "prevailing morals" to be *enforced* within freenet. This about guarantees, given the likely nature of trust, that the aggregate "morality" of the founding Darknet nodes would be preserved within freenet itself, since these founding nodes would have, through overt act or merely by likelihood-of-association, chosen like-minded trustees, who would vote as they do. You don't have to go to extremes like child-porn to see where this kind of thing could have real-world consequences. Just take a few minutes and look at the US mass media, even in the "land of the free" people are deeply, deeply divided over issues far more benign, some of which on religious grounds, some on moral, some on traditional grounds, some due to reasons I have not even personally considered. Do you honestly believe that your "trust-based" system will truly encompass even that diverse a set of thinkers, in one country, let alone the rest of the world, especially in cases where people may be far more polarized on certain topics? I see large cultural voting-bloc-type situations that, largely, will maintain the status quo. But that's the thing - the "status quo" is exactly, IMO, what the freenet should NOT be. You *want* the radical, free-thinking underbelly of the world to have somewhere to go where they can dissimate information that *may be* morally objectionable to large swaths of the populous, even the populous of freenet (think religious or cultural or political here - Tibet, scientology, women's rights, etc). What good will freenet be if someone who thinks "against" the prevailing beliefs of a region (but is otherwise "moral", for whatever that term can mean in this context) is simply "Voted down" by those within their own culture that may not agree? I think the voting would lead to almost a "constitutional" form of "group-morals" that may or may not actually *be* altruistic - I think you'd find human nature would lead to large groups of people voting down information objectionable to *them* on cultural or religious grounds, that, in the broader sense, should not be. I think this will be a darknet-wide problem in and of itself, mind you, but voting will likely make the problem all the more extreme. -- Ken Snider ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure de
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 08:03:15PM -, Thrasher Remailer wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: RIPEMD160 > > In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > >Here's a really whacky idea I came up with on the train back from > >Strasbourg (please read the whole email before flaming me): > > I'm not going to flame, but I cannot begin to state how strongly I disagree > with this idea or any idea even remotely like it. > > >Personally I support Freenet being uncensorable and providing > >untraceability for posters, because there is no way to prevent > >censorship abuses by the powerful (including governments and > >corporations), while still allowing censorship to prevent e.g. > >child porn. I propose below a means that could provide some form of self > >regulation, under locally democratic control, which would provide a > >powerful deterrent to people posting objectionable materials. This is > >only possible because of the trust relationships underlying a scalable > >darknet such as Freenet 0.7/Dark. There is an argument that unpopular > >content will fall out of the current Freenet; it won't if the original > >insertor keeps on pushing it back in. Maybe, just maybe, we can have our > >cake and eat it too. The result would be that freenet could be far more > >mainstream, usable by far more people (e.g. oppressed religious groups in > >china are likely to object to all the kiddy porn on freenet), and its > >content would reflect what its users want rather than what the state > >wants. > > Essentially, this will destroy freenet's original purpose. > > You propose introducing traceability. Bad Idea. The whole point of freenet > is that it's users are NOT traceable and can remain fully anonymous. You > spoke of only people you trust being able to know your IP, I don't trust > ANYBODY! In order to participate on the darknet, you will need to connect to a few people who you actually know in the real world or online. This is so that the network can survive harvesting attacks and therefore survive its own illegality. That is independant of the content of this email; it is already decided, and it is essential for freenet to be usable in places where it will be illegal. As far as sanctions go.. if a complaint is upheld, the node's premix key would be known, meaning that those nodes directly connected would know that the node that inserted that objectionable content is the one they are connected to, and should effectively disconnect from it (broadcasting the node's IP address is an extreme sanction that damages the network and would therefore not be allowed on some darknets, and require a very high supermajority on others). > > I use freenet because I can function anonymously, I rely on the fact that > freenet's distributed nature makes it impossible to identify or take action > against the insertion of any particular content. > > Granted, there are people abusing that to insert wide varieties of porn, > including c.p. but you see, that's a price that has to be paid. If freenet > is to be what it's stated purpose is, then the ONLY action that can be > taken in regard to content that somebody finds objectionable is to not > request it. One can also help push older objectionable content out by > continuing to insert quality content. They will simply reinsert it. Freenet does not provide for meritocratic censorship by the masses through content falling out if the content author is actively reinserting. Why do you think that information that really is in the public interest would be blocked? > > The problem with tracing and taking action against objectionable content is > that the definition of objectionable content has a tendency to change. > > Today the bad thing is c.p., tomorrow it's a certain political view, next > it's something else... and so on. And if the mainstream consensus is that far out, then it's time to fork from the mainstream darknet. Each darknet forms a community with its own standards, and if you don't like it, you fork. If you, as a block, post something which they don't like, the likely result is that they will sever connections with you, so the two darknets go their separate ways (and you have some recruitment issues). > > I'm thinking ahead to when the thing that is illegal to distribute is > certain Christian teachings. Given a system like you describe it is true > that a lot of c.p. can be removed. However that same system would cause > the deaths of a lot of people in the eventual Hyper-Anti-Christian world > that is developing. > > Please pray and reconsider. Do you honestly think that we can help the oppressed Church with a system which openly distributes child porn? A large majority of them would not use it on ethical grounds, certainly once they see what's on TFE. I will certainly pray before implementing anything this radical. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ IC
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 11:52:30AM -0400, Ken Snider wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >Here's a really whacky idea I came up with on the train back from > >Strasbourg (please read the whole email before flaming me): > > *snip voting idea* > > not only do I think this won't work for philosophical reasons, but I think > it underlines one of the most fundamental *weaknesses* of the Darknet. Let > me explain: > > - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this > quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of > "groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to > quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely > unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in > those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined by > numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the > "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no > means to be. Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). > > Now, take this a step further. Lets assume for a moment a trust system > similar to PGP, where a number of existing nodes/Toad's > choices/known-good-nodes/etc become the "base" for the darknet - it's > assumed that you will need to somehow gain the trust of these core people > to join the darknet itself, which means, at some point, you'll be gaining > the approval of the "person" behind the node, in some way. > > Now, in a global community where in some parts of the world things like > same-sex marriage are a done deal, and in others it's a crime worthy of > execution, for example, how do you propose to ensure you have an acceptable > cross-section of "minds" behind the darknet? It's seems inevitable to me > that the "prevailing winds" of the collective morals of this core group > will go a long way to creating the prevailing moral authority for darknet, > even *without* a voting system in place - since you're not likely to > "trust" individuals with differing views from your own in most cases, and > unless this "trust" mechanism is somehow disconnected from people (which > would mean that a nefarious party would need only complete these machine > requirements to enter the darknet, so is likely not to be the case). Hmm. I'm not sure I follow. What is the threat here? > > Now, add voting to the mix. Allow this set of "prevailing morals" to be > *enforced* within freenet. This about guarantees, given the likely nature > of trust, that the aggregate "morality" of the founding Darknet nodes would > be preserved within freenet itself, since these founding nodes would have, > through overt act or merely by likelihood-of-association, chosen > like-minded trustees, who would vote as they do. No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. > > You don't have to go to extremes like child-porn to see where this kind of > thing could have real-world consequences. Just take a few minutes and look > at the US mass media, even in the "land of the free" people are deeply, > deeply divided over issues far more benign, some of which on religious > grounds, some on moral, some on traditional grounds, some due to reasons I > have not even personally considered. Do you honestly believe that your > "trust-based" system will truly encompass even that diverse a set of > thinkers, in one country, let alone the rest of the world, especially in > cases where people may be far more polarized on certain topics? > > I see large cultural voting-bloc-type situations that, largely, will > maintain the status quo. But that's the thing - the "status quo" is > exactly, IMO, what the freenet should NOT be. You *want* the radical, > free-thinking underbelly of the world to have somewhere to go where they > can dissimate information that *may be* morally objectionable to large > swaths of the populous, even the populous of freenet (think religious or > cultural or political here - Tibet, scientology, women's rights, etc). What I can't honestly see why any sane informed human being who isn't a scientologist wouldn't support the dissemination of the OT documents. > good will freenet be if someone who thinks "against" the prevailing beliefs > of a region (but is otherwise "moral", for whatever that term can mean in > this context) is simply "Voted down" by those within their own culture that > may not agree? Sounds a fairly elitist argument. But lets say you're right. Why would people who would vote for political speech they disagree with to be censored even join the network? > > I think the voting would lead to almost a "constitutional" form of > "group-morals" that may or may not actually *be* altruis
