Re: Verizon must comply with RIAA's DMCA subpoena

[Faust]

> Here's a little story: this week I learned that one of our valuable 
> security doctoral candidates doesn't vote, and doesn't want to learn 
> about or discuss politics and the political implications of what she does.  

Sounds very sensible to me.
Leave the voting to those who care.

One of my peeves about Australia is that voting is compulsory here.
Quite apart from enforced voting being an infringement of my civil right, the
problem is that most people do not even know who is standing for 
election from their electorate, far less care what their policies are.

As a result the great unwashed turn up and tick boxes at random.

One rightwing politician used this recently to register 30 fake minor parties
( Gay and Lesbian Party, Marihuana party, Save the Forests Party etc ) and then
directed the preferences of these parties to himself.
This enabled him to get elected to Parliment.



-- 

natsu-gusa ya   / tsuwamono-domo-ga   / yume no ato
summer grasses  / strong ones / dreams site
 
Summer grasses,
All that remains
Of soldier's dreams
(Basho trans. Stryk)


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Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)

[Faust]

> You are coming at this from a software/computer mindset that just isn't
> applicable to this sort of physical world security. 


Matt's paper was about _locks_.
In case you have forgotten, the title was "Cryptology and Physical Security: 
Rights Amplification in Master-Keyed Mechanical Locks".

To weakly criticize his paper because it did not talk about the cost of
fabrication or physical tolerances misses the point entirely.

There _are_ situations where information leakage is of concern.

I can imagine other applications of Matt's methods to other forms of
physical security.

In any case, it is intrinsically interesting 

In practice, social engineering is far easier to use to access secure premises.
Bribe a guard, go to bed with a person with access etc..
However, that is not the proper domain of a study of rights amplification.

-- 

natsu-gusa ya   / tsuwamono-domo-ga   / yume no ato
summer grasses  / strong ones / dreams site
 
Summer grasses,
All that remains
Of soldier's dreams
(Basho trans. Stryk)


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Re: Keep it secret, stupid!

[Len Sassaman]

On Sun, 26 Jan 2003, Matt Blaze wrote:

> The tragic part is that there are alternatives.  There are several
> lock designs that turn out to resist this threat, including master
> rings and bicentric locks.  While these designs aren't perfect, they

I think it is worth pointing out that, while master ring systems (and
master-keyed systems with false steps added) resist the attack Matt
describes, they often make the task of picking the lock (on a case by case
basis) easier.

That needs to be considered when designing a physical security plan. One
may wish to key locks of particular importance separately from the master
ring system if entry by picking is a concern.

(There are some master-key systems, like the one made by Corbin, that
require pin rotation at the proper time to unlock the secondary sheer
line. And, as Matt mentioned, bicentric cylinders avoid this problem
completely. Cost may be a major concern with these solutions, though.)



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Re: Verizon must comply with RIAA's DMCA subpoena

[William Allen Simpson]

With all due respect to the commentator and the tremendous amount that 
he has contributed to the community, I had to go eat a pint of ice cream 
and cool down, I was so incensed after reading his comments.  Here's my 
attempt at a rational reply:

John Young wrote:
> It will be more expensive to obey an ISP's lawyer and somewhat less 
> expensive to sell tappable service. That's the way of economic 
> intimidation.
> 
> Cheapest is to ignore the subpoena and never seek legal advice. The ISP 
> world won't collapse despite chicken little warning. And ISPs look like > cowardly 
>shits for caving.
>... 
> ISPs are using lawyerly advice to cloak betrayal and cowardice.
> Fire the ISP lawyer, especially if in house. Pay the difference to 
> sysadmins willing to fight.
> 
I don't think we caved, or are "cowardly shits".

We're too small for an "in house" lawyer.  But I won't expect sysadmin 
employees to go to jail.  In the main, we have to work with the system 
as it exists, while we work to improve it.

Those who know me well are aware that I've a few experiences along these 
lines in my life.
 - I've been jailed for civil contempt of court.
 - I've endured FBI investigation (google for it).
 - I've survived a 7+ year IRS audit, including 2 cases taken all the way 
   to the 6th Circuit, looking to see whether my cryptographic activities 
   were financially supported by foreigners. 
 - I've been party to many other cases (primarily FOIA), setting local 
   and state precedents argued all the way to our highest state court. 
 - I've been involved in electoral politics for 25+ years, and am 
   reasonably familiar with certain elected officials and governments.

We got one of the main ACLU attorneys in our state.  We sent back the 
original because it misspelled the name of the company, then challenged 
the scope, and finally limited the records provided.  That is, we 
resisted every step of the way. 

Then, we changed our Best Current Practices so that such a subpoena would 
be more difficult to fulfill in the future.  And urged the world to follow 
our example (well, NANOG and later this list). 

Here's a little story: this week I learned that one of our valuable 
security doctoral candidates doesn't vote, and doesn't want to learn 
about or discuss politics and the political implications of what she does.  
This was particularly disturbing to me, as she is a naturalized citizen, 
coming from the old soviet union.  In other venues, new citizens are the 
most active in politics, happy to be somewhere they can participate. 
Sometimes, engineers have persistent tunnel vision

I've always believed there's more to security than bit twiddling, and I've 
done my best to practice what I preach.

As I've written IETF drafts over the past 14 years, I was long an advocate 
of adding a "security considerations" section to everything we've done.  
And I've generally added an "operational considerations" section, too. 

We always need to think about the consequences of our work.  It needs 
to enhance security.  It needs to protect the powerless from the powerful, 
even when the users don't think they have "anything to hide".  It needs to 
be easy to use (or it won't be used).

So, in some respects, you're preaching to the choir.  But there is a 
time and place for civil disobedience.  
-- 
William Allen Simpson
Key fingerprint =  17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26  DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32

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Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)

[Donald Eastlake 3rd]

On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Pete Chown wrote:

> Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2003 11:53:23 +
> From: Pete Chown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)
> 
> Len Sassaman wrote:
> 
> > Most of the time, the lock is not the weakest point of attack.
> 
> Isn't this like saying that cryptography isn't important, because most 
> real world attacks aren't cipher breaks?  Also, if you pick the lock, 

You are coming at this from a software/computer mindset that just isn't
applicable to this sort of physical world security. Sure, in the ~0
fabrication and distribution cost world of software, you might as well
use strong crypto because its costs ~0 and probably a lot of the other
weaknesses are also software and can also be avoided for ~0 cost.

If you can think of a more secure physical lock design that is CHEAPER,
run out and patent it now. You will probably make money. But most
substantially more secure physical locks are substantially more
expensive to fabric being more complex and frequently requiring tighter
mechanical tolerances.

> potentially no one will know that you gained access.  An ordinary 
> burglar can just break a window, but someone with a more subtle reason 
> for wanting to gain access may not want to.

It is usually not that hard to gain invisible access even with quite
crude methods.

> If I wanted to make a building physically secure, my instinct would be 
> to use electronic locks.  While attacks on, say, an iButton are probably 
> possible, it seems to me that it must be an order of magnitude more 
> difficult than attacking a mechanical lock.

The lock almost never has anything to do with it. Why is it you never
see simple pin tumbler locks on safes and vaults? Because, with
substantial metal and/or solid reinforced concrete walls on all sides
and no windows, it is actually worth the cost of good combination locks,
possibly with time lock in addition.

If I wanted to make a building more secure, even if for some reason I'm
just looking at the only door, there are a lot of things I'd look at
right away: Are the hinges on the outside and if so what steps have
beeen taken to stop someone from removing the hinge pins and removing
the door? Is there an astragal to stop people from credit-carding the
door? What steps have been made to stop someone from spreading the door
frame so that any bolts no longer latch? If there is a lock cylinder,
can you just unscrew it from the outside and open the door with a
scredriver (I have determined by experimentation that most cylinder set
screws will easily give way and allow you to unscrew the cylinder with
minimal damage)? Is there any kind of opening above the door, like a
transom (even if it is tiny, you may be able to drop a loop down inside
and turn the internal door knob, opening the door despite its being
locked for the outside knob)? Etc. Etc. Oh, and I suppose you could
think about attacks on the security of the lock itself, which is
probably pin tumbler.

But it probably has lots of window/wall/roof/basement/etc. weaknesses
that have nothing to do with the door.

It's just silly to spend, say, $50 more, on a more secure lock unless
you are really willing, in the forseeable future, to spend hundreds or
thousands of dollars or even more on other weaknesses to make most of
them approximately as strong.

There are also other factors in planning physical security. I've had to
actually break through a wall because an electronic lock's battery back
up power died because the transformer for a building was being replaced
and it had absolutely no power feed for a few days. The repair of such
wall damage is an expense. Mechanical devices do not have the problem of
requiring power (PS: Brass is self lubricating).

> Now, I'm not an expert on locks, so firstly am I right?  If so, does 
> this mean that high security mechanical locks will gradually disappear?

There are markets for a wide variety of locks. I do not believe that
high security or low security mechanical locks will disappear in my
lifetime.

Thanks,
Donald
==
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 155 Beaver Street  +1-508-634-2066(h) +1-508-851-8280(w)
 Milford, MA 01757 USA   [EMAIL PROTECTED]



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Re: Shamir factoring machine uninteresting?

[(Mr) Lyn R. Kennedy]

On Sun, Jan 26, 2003 at 07:29:08PM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 
> I find it odd that there has been so little comment on TWIRL. One
> would think that the crushing of 512 bit RSA keys and a strong
> demonstration of the weakness of 1024 bit RSA keys would have provoked
> some comment on the list.
> 
> Any comments on why no one commented?

It's easier to consider it unimportant than calculate how important it
might be. My questions here trying to understand how significant some
other weaknesses might be make me think most readers are afraid to admit
they don't understand some things.

Is this a mathematician vs engineer problem? (I'm neither, I'm an inventor).



-- 
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Re: Keep it secret, stupid!

[Bram Cohen]

Matt Blaze wrote:

> Once I understood the basics, I quickly discovered, or more accurately
> re-discovered, a simple and practical rights amplification (or
> privilege escalation) attack to which most master-keyed locks are
> vulnerable.
> http://www.crypto.com/masterkey.html

Matt, is there some reason why you didn't bother asking a single locksmith
if they knew about this attack already before claiming it was 'new' in
your paper? Have you looked into the differences in actual costs of
production of the various ways of making locks more secure? Do you have
any information on how common various ways of breaking into locks are done
in practice?

I'm not arguing that security through obscurity is a good thing, just
pointing out that your claims of the importance of your publication are
being made mostly in ignorance.

-Bram Cohen

"Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent"
-- John Maynard Keynes


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Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)

[Len Sassaman]

On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Pete Chown wrote:

> Len Sassaman wrote:
>
> > Most of the time, the lock is not the weakest point of attack.
>
> Isn't this like saying that cryptography isn't important, because most
> real world attacks aren't cipher breaks?

No. It's similar to arguing against a system because it uses 56 bit DES,
but missing the fact that the cryptosystem isn't actually encrypting the
plaintext at all.

> Also, if you pick the lock, potentially no one will know that you
> gained access.  An ordinary burglar can just break a window, but
> someone with a more subtle reason for wanting to gain access may not
> want to.

There are many, many entrance techniques which do not cause any physical
damage whatsoever, which also do not require direct manipulation of the
pin tumbler mechanism.

> If I wanted to make a building physically secure, my instinct would be
> to use electronic locks.  While attacks on, say, an iButton are probably
> possible, it seems to me that it must be an order of magnitude more
> difficult than attacking a mechanical lock.

Again, you're missing the weakest point of attack. *Ignore* the actual
lock. It doesn't matter if you have an iButton or an ASSA or a Kwikset if
the door is secured with an improperly installed spring-latch mechanism,
and it can be opened with a shim. Only after you get the rest of the
physical security aspects addressed should you spend time thinking about
the lock, because it takes a lot more time, effort, or talent to attack a
lock than it does to jimmy a latch.

I would say that 60 percent of the doors I have stood before in my life, I
could have opened with items I carry in my pocket on a daily basis.
Another ten percent would have required picking.

The world of physical security doesn't rely on "security through
obscurity." It relies on security through illusion.

> Now, I'm not an expert on locks, so firstly am I right?  If so, does
> this mean that high security mechanical locks will gradually disappear?

Nearly all installed locks do nothing more than keep honest people honest.
I don't see this changing anytime soon.

I used to jump up and down about physical security problems when I
encountered them, until I learned that people generally don't want to hear
if they have security problems -- they just want to think they are safe.

One of my previous employers was a web hosting company, who had a locked
data center. On my second day working for them, I pointed out that I could
open the door to their datacenter with a credit card. They didn't believe
me. I demonstrated. Did they thank me for this bit of information?

Nope. I was nearly fired.

If you have to sign an NDA before you visit a company's colocation
facility, ask yourself what it is you are about to see that would do
damage to the company if you spoke about it. Locked cages? Look at the
raised floors.

None of these problems even come close to the issues of lost keys and
overly helpful employees, though. Criminals have been using social
engineering techniques to get into locked buildings for as long as there
have been locked buildings.

My comments in this thread have never been intended to criticize Matt for
publishing his paper. In fact, I hope I've praised it. I just don't think
that it will affect the status quo.


--Len.



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Re: Keep it secret, stupid!

[Matt Blaze]

> Matt Blaze wrote:
> 
> > Once I understood the basics, I quickly discovered, or more accurately
> > re-discovered, a simple and practical rights amplification (or
> > privilege escalation) attack to which most master-keyed locks are
> > vulnerable.
> > http://www.crypto.com/masterkey.html
> 
> Matt, is there some reason why you didn't bother asking a single locksmith
> if they knew about this attack already before claiming it was 'new' in
> your paper? Have you looked into the differences in actual costs of
> production of the various ways of making locks more secure? Do you have
> any information on how common various ways of breaking into locks are done
> in practice?

Of course I did.  What gave you the idea that I didn't?

> 
> I'm not arguing that security through obscurity is a good thing, just
> pointing out that your claims of the importance of your publication are
> being made mostly in ignorance.
> 
> -Bram Cohen
> 
> "Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent"
> -- John Maynard Keynes
> 



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Shamir factoring machine uninteresting?

[Perry E. Metzger]

I find it odd that there has been so little comment on TWIRL. One
would think that the crushing of 512 bit RSA keys and a strong
demonstration of the weakness of 1024 bit RSA keys would have provoked
some comment on the list.

Any comments on why no one commented?

-- 
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED]

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Re: Verizon must comply with RIAA's DMCA subpoena

[John Young]

At 09:54 PM 1/25/2003 +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>William Allen Simpson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
>>But there is a strong economic rationale.  We save untold operational
>>expense, support costs, and legal fees.  (The legal cost of complying with
>>that single interstate subpoena cost us an entire month of revenue.)
>
>Lucky Green a while back reported that some European ISPs charge customers
>less if they use IPsec because then there's less cost involved in complying
>with surveillance requirements.

It will be more expensive to obey an ISP's lawyer and somewhat less expensive to sell 
tappable service. That's the way of economic intimidation. 

Cheapest is to ignore the subpoena and never seek legal advice. The ISP world won't 
collapse despite chicken little warning. And ISPs look like cowardly shits for caving. 

Ponder the lessons of defiant, dissident publishers, and plan to increase your sales 
by putting your customers before your firm.

ISPs are using lawyerly advice to cloak betrayal and cowardice.
Fire the ISP lawyer, especially if in house. Pay the difference to sysadmins willing 
to fight.

There's a stampede to comply with obnoxious law, better to throw a TIA party as D 
advises.


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Keep it secret, stupid!

[Matt Blaze]

Here's a note I sent to PGN and Farber's respective lists that might be
of interest to those here.  I think the issues go well beyond my attack
against locks, reflecting a deep cultural clash that perhaps goes a long
way toward explaining things like the DMCA.

-matt



Keep it secret, stupid!

Last year, I started wondering whether cryptologic approaches might be
useful for the analysis of things that don't use computers.
Mechanical locks seemed like a natural place to start, since they
provided many of the metaphors we used to think about computer
security in the first place.

So I read everything I could get my hands on about locks, which
included most of the available open literature and at least some of
the "closed" literature of that field.  Once I understood the basics,
I quickly discovered, or more accurately re-discovered, a simple and
practical rights amplification (or privilege escalation) attack to
which most master-keyed locks are vulnerable.  The attack uses access
to a single lock and key to get the master key to the entire system,
and is very easy to perform.  For details, see
http://www.crypto.com/masterkey.html

I wrote up the attack, in a paper aimed more at convincing computer
scientists that locks are worth our attention than anything else (I
called it "Rights amplification in master-keyed mechanical locks").
As I pointed out in the paper, surely I could not have been the first
to discover this -- locksmiths, criminals, and college students must
have figured this out long ago.  Indeed, several colleagues mentioned
that my paper reminded them of their college days.  There is
considerable evidence that similar methods for master key decoding
have been discovered and rediscovered over the years, used illicitly
and passed along as folklore (several people have unearthed Internet
postings dating back as much as 15 years describing how to make master
keys).  Curious college students -- and professional burglars -- have
long been able to get their hands on master keys to the places that
interest them.

But the method does not seem to appear in the literature of locks and
security, and certainly users of master keyed locks did not seem to
know about this risk.  I submitted the paper to a journal and
circulated it to colleagues in the security community.  Eventually,
the paper reached the attention of a reporter at the New York Times,
who wrote it up in a story on the front page of the business section
last week.

The response surprised me.  For a few days, my e-mail inbox was full
of angry letters from locksmiths, the majority of which made both the
point that I'm a moron, because everyone knew about this already, as
well as the point that I'm irresponsible, because this method is much
too dangerous to publish.  A few managed to also work in a third
point, which is that the method couldn't possibly work because
obviously I'm just some egghead who doesn't know anything about locks.

Those letters, with their self-canceling inconsistency, are easy
enough to brush aside, but there seems to be a more serious problem
here, one that has led to a significant real-world vulnerability for
lock users but that is sadly all too familiar to contemporary
observers of computer security.

The existence of this method, and the reaction of the locksmithing
profession to it, strikes me as a classic instance of the complete
failure of the "keep vulnerabilities secret" security model.  I'm told
that the industry has known about this vulnerability and chosen to do
nothing -- not even warn their customers -- for over a century.
Instead it was kept secret and passed along as folklore, sometimes
used as a shortcut for recovering lost master keys for paying
customers.  If at some point in the last hundred years this method had
been documented properly, surely the threat could have been addressed
and lock customers allowed to make informed decisions about their own
security.

The tragic part is that there are alternatives.  There are several
lock designs that turn out to resist this threat, including master
rings and bicentric locks.  While these designs aren't perfect, they
resist completely the adaptive oracle attack described in my paper.
It's a pity that stronger alternative designs have been allowed to die
a quiet death in the marketplace while customers, ignorant of the
risks, have spent over a hundred years investing in inferior systems.

Although a few people have confused my reporting of the vulnerability
with causing the vulnerability itself, I can take comfort in a story
that Richard Feynman famously told about his days on the Manhattan
project.  Some simple vulnerabilities (and user interface problems)
made it easy to open most of the safes in use at Los Alamos.  He
eventually demonstrated the problem to the Army officials in charge.
Horrified, they promised to do something about it.  The response?  A
memo ordering the staff to keep Feynman away from their safes.

Matt Blaze
26 January 2003






---

Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)

[Pete Chown]

Len Sassaman wrote:


Most of the time, the lock is not the weakest point of attack.


Isn't this like saying that cryptography isn't important, because most 
real world attacks aren't cipher breaks?  Also, if you pick the lock, 
potentially no one will know that you gained access.  An ordinary 
burglar can just break a window, but someone with a more subtle reason 
for wanting to gain access may not want to.

If I wanted to make a building physically secure, my instinct would be 
to use electronic locks.  While attacks on, say, an iButton are probably 
possible, it seems to me that it must be an order of magnitude more 
difficult than attacking a mechanical lock.

Now, I'm not an expert on locks, so firstly am I right?  If so, does 
this mean that high security mechanical locks will gradually disappear?

--
Pete


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[e-lang] Granovetter diagrams and capability bags

[R. A. Hettinga]

--- begin forwarded text


Status: RO
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2003 17:25:37 -0800
To: SPKI List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Bill Frantz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [e-lang] Granovetter diagrams and capability bags
Cc: Ka-Ping Yee <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Ka-Ping Yee is working on a paper which contrasts a number of security
systems including SPKI.  The paper is being discussed in detail on the E
language list (see headers below for information).  For some background on
the terminology Ping is using see:
http://www.erights.org/elib/capability/ode/index.html

He is now asking questions about how SPKI is used in the real world, which
I can't answer.  Can anyone here help him?

>From: Ka-Ping Yee <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: [e-lang] Granovetter diagrams and capability bags
>Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>List-Help: 
>List-Post: 
>List-Subscribe: ,
>   
>List-Id: Discussion of E and other capability languages
>
>List-Unsubscribe: ,
>   
>List-Archive: 

>Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2003 19:01:38 -0600 (CST)
>
>I am realizing as i write this paper that the Granovetter diagram
>is insufficient in one important way: it does not distinguish
>C-lists-as-sets from C-lists-as-maps.
>
>This is an important distinction between the capabilities-as-keys
>model and the capabilities-as-object-references model.  Often
>(though not always) people talk about storing keys on "keyrings",
>and searching the keyring to find the appropriate key.
>
>The distinction between trying all the keys on your keyring and
>using a key which you have previously labelled bears directly on
>the Confused Deputy problem, but is not visible in a Granovetter
>diagram.
>
>SPKI, for instance, *could* be implemented like C-lists-as-sets
>(upon trying to perform an action, flip through all your
>certificates to find one that names the resource you want).
>Such a mechanism would be vulnerable to Confused Deputy problems.
>
>Bill, do you have any sense of how SPKI certificates are typically
>handled -- are they named with local names, or merely thrown in a
>bag?  (For the sake of this question, naming certificates according
>to the names within them is equivalent to throwing them in a bag.)
>
>To avoid confusion with the term C-list, and also to avoid
>"capability set" since that seems to be already a loaded term,
>how about calling these two structures C-maps and C-bags?
>
>
>-- ?!ng
>
>___
>e-lang mailing list
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>http://www.eros-os.org/mailman/listinfo/e-lang
>

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--- end forwarded text


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[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)

[bear]

On Sat, 25 Jan 2003, Sampo Syreeni wrote:

>Sure. But trying those combinations out can be automated -- I don't think
>the kind of automatic lock pickers one sees in current action movies are
>*entirely* fictional.

There are several types of devices that can convince a keylock
to open.  One of them is a kind of spring-loaded bar, usually
on a handle.  The bar is inserted into the keyhole, and then the
spring is released and a weight whacks the bar fairly hard.
This transmits the shock to the pins resting on the bar, and
thence to the other side of the pins resting across the cut
from the shocked side.

The result is that the pins fly apart momentarily against the
retaining springs.  If your timing is good, you can turn the lock
immediately after the 'snap' of the spring slamming shut.  It
usually takes an experienced user no more than three or four
tries to get the timing right.

This is actually a very simple device to construct.  I ran
across it in a book on locks and mechanisms.  Some folks call
it an automatic lock picker, but it's really just a snap
mechanism.  I've never actually seen one in person, but I
can give you the name and publication date of the pamphlet I
saw it in if I can find it around here.

Bear


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Trouble with Prime Numbers: DeCSS, DVD and the Protection of Proprietary Encryption Tools

[R. A. Hettinga]

--- begin forwarded text


Status: RO
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2003 13:39:23 -0500
To: undisclosed-recipient:;
From: Monty Solomon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Trouble with Prime Numbers: DeCSS, DVD and the Protection of
 Proprietary Encryption Tools


Trouble with Prime Numbers: DeCSS,
DVD and the Protection of
Proprietary Encryption Tools


Andrés Guadamuz González
Law Lecturer
University of Edinburgh
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Abstract

The DVD video format has become one of the most important
developments in the home entertainment market since the
popularisation of the magnetic video recording. The film industry
delivered this format with a built in security system which was
supposed to avoid illegal copying of the discs, much as what is
taking place with the music CD and the almost indiscriminate copying
of music into MP3 format over the Internet. This was achieved by
means of encryption technology.

This essay deals with the cracking of DVD encryption and its further
diffusion as a computer programme named DeCSS, which has been made
available over the Internet in various formats, including t-shirts
and a numerical representation of the code. There are three court
cases based on the online posting of this programme, two in the
United States and one in Norway. The article starts by describing the
technology involved, as it is felt by the author that some of these
technical issues are of importance to the legal implications of the
case and should be understood properly. The article then deals with
the developments in all of the three cases up to this date. The essay
then finishes with a look at the legal issues involved, including
hyper-linking, trade secrets, freedom of speech and the translation
of DeCSS into numerical format.



Keywords: Encryption, Prime Numbers, DVD, Hyper-linking, DeCSS




This is a Refereed article published on 6 December 2002.

Citation: Guadamuz A,'Trouble with Prime Numbers: DeCSS, DVD and the
Protection of Proprietary Encryption Tools', The Journal of
Information, Law and Technology (JILT) 2002 (3)
.




http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/02-3/guadamuz.html

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga 
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Verizon must comply with RIAA's DMCA subpoena

[Peter Gutmann]

William Allen Simpson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:

>But there is a strong economic rationale.  We save untold operational
>expense, support costs, and legal fees.  (The legal cost of complying with
>that single interstate subpoena cost us an entire month of revenue.)

Lucky Green a while back reported that some European ISPs charge customers
less if they use IPsec because then there's less cost involved in complying
with surveillance requirements.

Peter.

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Re: making anonymity illegal

[geer]

"Will A. Rodger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:

> That would be a wise move. That would continue for about three weeks, and
> then we'd see a bill out of Congress demanding that ISPs retain identity 
> for, oh, maybe seven years?

The population can be rather easily bought to do this, coercion
won't hardly be required.  Perhaps an example?

NJ Turnpike:  You get a discount for using "EZ Pass"[1] and
there are, of course, records involved[2].  Since there are
generally credit card accounts to which the Passes are billed,
the 90 day limit for credit card dispute might seem to be a
sufficient time to keep said records as the payment for road
use can be fairly said to be complete at 91 days.  Well, no;
those records are kept for seven years.  As the EZ Pass system
is just exactly the same system as is in place in Massachusetts
but under the name "Fast Lane," one should probably assume records
are simply kept in a uniform fashion := max(applicable state regs).
Of course, the credit card companies are already in very highly
regulated record retention regimes in any case.

Tried renting a car without a credit card?

--dan




[1] http://www.state.nj.us/turnpike/tr2003.htm
[2] 
http://lis.njleg.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=103773&Depth=2&TD=WRAP&advquery=turnpike%20toll&depth=4&expandheadings=on&headingswithhits=on&hitsperheading=on&infobase=statutes.nfo&rank=&record={AB92}&softpage=Doc_Frame_PG42&wordsaroundhits=2&zz=


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