all about transferable off-line ecash (Re: Brands off-line tech)

[Adam Back]

A short while ago I wrote this comment on the dbs list describing a
transferable off-line ecash idea I'd been thinking about with
on-and-off:

On Fri, Mar 29, 2002 at 02:43:42AM +, Adam Back wrote:
> [...]
> I spent some time a few years back trying to find ways to do the
> free-circulating tokens ala mondex but with out the trust-me anonymity
> (with proper trust-no-one blinding anonymity) and with off-line fraud
> tracing.)  I'm not sure it's possible, but I think it would be cool if
> it could be done.  If someone could come up with a way to do that, I'd
> be willing for Bob to call that bearer ecash :-)

While looking for a reference to something else to do with ecash I
found that a somewhat general way to convert an off-line ecash scheme
into a transferable off-line ecash scheme has already been proposed:

See Section 8 of "Easy come - easy go divisible cash", by Agnes Chan,
Yair Frankel and Yiannis Tsiounis [1] references [vA90] H van
Antwerpen "Electronic cash", Master's thesis, CWI 1990 as providing a
general way to make coins transferable from a shop (who now acts as a
payer) to another payee.

They say of van Antwerpen's approach:
 
"8 Extensions and open problems Transferability: There is a general
method with which a coin can be transferred from the shop (who now
acts as a payer) to another payee, proposed in [vA90]. The method
preserves the anonymity of the shop and is applicable to all anonymous
off-line e-cash schemes. The coins grow upon each transfer, but
[CP93a] showed that this is inevitable, and the approach is
asymptotically optimal. Intuitively, the shop obtains a "blank"
(zero-valued) blind coin from the bank, and includes it in the hash of
the random challenge to the user (for exact payments divisible "blank"
coins can be obtained). Then the shop can transfer the payment by
"spending" the blank coin with a payee. Note that the blank coin is
"bound" to the original payment (since it is included in the random
challenges used for that payment), while the shop cannot over-spend,
or it is identified. The shop only needs to contact the bank (in an
off-line manner) in order to obtain "blank" coins; finding algorithms
to withdraw multiple (unlinkable) "blank" coins faster than performing
multiple withdrawals in parallel is a problem pending further
research."

So I'm presuming from this description that the trick is, you just
bind a 0-valued fresh coin to the spent coin.  If the 0-valued coin
with spent-coin is double spent it will be the double-spender who is
caught.  The coins here also grow as there will be the original coin,
plus a chain of appended 0-valued fresh-coins taking ownership at each
spend.

(My experiments were somewhat related in that I had got to the stage
of a coin and receipt which grew once with each spend, but had not
thought of directly using a 0-value fresh-coin, and instead was
experimenting with more complex requirement of having the payer and
payee run a protocol to change the embedded off-line fraud information
(eg the identity) as the coin changed hands).

Also they note as I figured that it is unavoidable that the coins must
grow for this type of scheme and reference a proof about this in
[CP93a].  But I would think that is anyway obvious for simple storage
arguments.

Also in trying to find an electronic copy of [vA90], I see that Brands
[2] notes that [vA90] also applies to his ecash scheme.  Getting
interesting.  (Divisibility of Chan et al is nice but it still has
linkability across the divided coins, and I'm not sure how much
analysis Chan's scheme has compared to Brands).

However I still can't find [vA90].  Hans van Antwerpen seems to have
disappeared off the 'Net.


So at a high-level this means you can have off-line ecash with
fraud-tracing the identifies the double-spender, and the participants
do not need to involve the bank they can just transfer coins
peer-to-peer for a fairly arbitrary number of hops.  (The only
restriction being that the coin increases in size by one coin's size
at each spend).

I think depending on the scheme involved (this would be the case for
Brands) you could potentially distribute the double spend database.
Ie there is nothing to stop the users or 3rd party services having
double spend databases to improve the odds of catching double spenders
before the coin gets back to the bank.  This also means that a bank
could realistically be more off-line yet, not needing high
availability, or even itself being pseudonymous (which tends to mean
less online -- eg behind a nymserver account) provided there was some
receiver anonymous way to transfer resources of whatever kind the
ecash represents to it.

Potentially the operation of running the double-spend database could
be separated from the coin minting part which would also occasionally
exchange fresh-coins for multiply exchanged coins which were getting
unworkably large.

Techniques like merkle authentication trees as used in time-stamp
servers where a server can commit to a 

RE: mil disinfo on cryptome

[Faustine]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

John wrote:

>Contrarily, one can argue, that anybody who has
>access to classified material cannot be trusted for
>their unclassified work.

Actually, I agree: that's certainly the safe bet. But can
you imagine what a different world we'd all be living in if
Ellsberg had sent the Pentagon Papers to you instead.


>David Kahn made such an argument when he refused
>to sign a confidentiality agreement for NSA in order
>to have access to classified archives. According to Kahn
>he was the first to refuse that faustian arrangement
>(pun intended, Faustine). Instead he sat at a desk
>outside the classified archives and worked only
>with material that did not require an NDA, doing so,
>he said, in order to help assure reader trust of his
>work.

Spare us the cornball "trust me" hokum: it's not like he
could have printed anything interesting from them anyway.
Looks like a symbolic gesture to me. And if you really wanted
to spread disinformation, what better way to do it than to get
someone jumping through all the right "credibility hoops". 
In the end, there's no way around the fact that we see what
we want to see and are blind to what we don't.


>Kahn's right, and admirably so, for once you get access
>to classified material you  are doomed to be distrusted
>outside the secret world. Too much lying has been done
>by those who have access for anybody with access
>to ever be trusted, which, no doubt, is the intention of
>those who believe in privileged information. You are
>either in or out, no mercy from either side, as Faust
>knew.

For what it's worth, this just made it more likely that any
disinformation flowing your way will be coming through "trusted
outsiders". As if being a lunatic or a greasy little antisec
moneygrubber is any way to establish credibility! Just as I
thought: the well-intentioned schmoe gets it coming and going.
How considerate of you to make this perfectly explicit before
any more of them bust their ass for you. 


>To be blunt, no official can be trusted, period, nor can
>any of their contractors who have agreed to abide
>the official rules. Which, as oft stated here, includes
>all state-empowered and privilieged professionals,
>from architects to lawyers to doctors to priests to
>acupuncturists, and not least, journalists who may 
>pretend to authorize themselves but behave in 
>accord with the rules of their privileged publishers.

OR:

"Cryptome welcomes documents for publication that are 
prohibited by governments worldwide, in particular material 
on freedom of expression, privacy, cryptology, dual-use 
technologies, national security and intelligence -- open, 
secret and classified documents -- unless, of course, you've
ever been in a position to really learn jack shit about anything."
 
Bah. 

Oh, and I can't believe I almost forgot--I'm sure you'll be
tickled pink to learn that ever having had anything to do with 
you can be the kiss of death as far as getting clearance is
concerned. From the adjudication guidelines:

http://www.dss.mil/training/adr/adjguid/adjguidF.htm

"Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:

Any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with:
(...)

d. Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person
engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on
intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology."


"Darwinian justice" indeed.


~~Faustine.


***

He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy
from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent
that will reach to himself.

- --Thomas Paine

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 (C) 1997-1999 Network Associates, Inc. and its 
affiliated companies. (Diffie-Helman/DSS-only version)

iQA/AwUBPLC6jfg5Tuca7bfvEQJN7QCcCa9qhyn1i1VC5bChRhx0wnwZ9PIAoKd9
/MmFUWQYVJ3eNb69QKiV7hUV
=wicA
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

RE: mil disinfo on cryptome

[John Young]

The Pentagon Papers was a classic disinfo operation
confected by RAND. The NYT and Ellsberg will never
let us forget their valor, credible only for those who abide
a fairly narrow belief system, highly elitist and condescending
toward the populace.

Then there's Bill Sheehan's tragic price to remind what can
go wrong with career-enhancing, arranged revelations when 
a beneficiary attempts to go beyond a neat, heavily promoted 
formulation oh so satisfying to those who arranged the op.

Faustine, you lose your cool whenever established methodologies
for handling information and belief about it are challenged, as
if your faith in the way things are and should be is being 
unduly questioned. 

Reputation is a trap not an accomplishment, and you appear 
to have been ensnared by desire to be knowledgeable in a 
particularly sanctioned way. All those citations, all that
homework, cannot beefup what's missing from your own
original contribution. Abundant citing of authority, beware
what it tells about your vacuity.

Losing your cool, though, is swell, for it is a sign of advancement 
over over over-false-confidence and the yearning to have gotten 
matters of the world right once and for all. Nothing more crippling 
than a desire to be free of doubt, but that desire is a salient 
characteristic of those who are recruited into privileged circles: 
a promise of access to privileged information and behavior is 
the bait, the trap is never being able to talk about how sleight 
the secrets are, and how shitty the insiders treat one another,
to anyone outside the magic circle. All secret societies fear
disclosure of their vacuity, that's why secrets are invaluable.

Just don't go there is the best advice, and a way to guard 
against that is to show characteristics that assure you will 
never be invited, that you can't keep secrets, not even
false ones.

Desire to part of an coseted elite is sucker's candy. The 
desire to reputable a pale shroud over insecurity and need

for backing of reputable authority. That's why reputable people 
and forums are erected and selected for leaking worthless 
shit as if shinola.

RAND didn't invent this hagiography of burnished research
but it is a stellar producer of such icons and has an admirable 
network of distribution. You will hear what is intllectually 
corrupting about this orchestrated warped and incomplete
information about world affairs when you talk to a RAND 
insider who has been dumped for stepping out of line, that 
is putting one's ideas and product outside the fearsome 
editorial board of the hallowed institution, as with RAND
so with the hagiography of the New York Times, Washinton 
Post and others of the centrist compulsion.

RE: mil disinfo on cryptome (and sec clearance games)

[Optimizzin Al-gorithym]

At 09:22 PM 4/6/02 -0800, John Young wrote:
>Kahn's right, and admirably so, for once you get access
>to classified material you  are doomed to be distrusted
>outside the secret world.

Another reason: once you get a clearance, you can't speak
freely.  The latest _Tech Review_ interviews an MIT Prof Postol,
who has been pointing out the lies behind Raytheon's Patriot
missile and the anti-ballistic missile sham.  Reportedly,
some friendly DoD folks came to him and asked him to read
a classified report that would put some of his technical worries at
ease.
Postol refused, knowing that this is a scheme used to silence
folks --having been exposed to classified info, you have to
watch what you say.  If you figure it out from open data +
general science, you can speak your mind.

(BTW The basic deception is, if our gizmo can't discriminate this kind
of decoy, well, don't use that kind of decoy in the tests..)

Re: CDR: Re: Julia Child was a Spook

[jamesd]

--
On 7 Apr 2002 at 13:31, F. Marc de Piolenc wrote:
> I'm sorry you've bought the terrorist line that it's all about 
> US support for Israel. I know better. We could withdraw from the 
> Middle East tomorrow, and all that would change would be the 
> excuse.

Possibly, but what does it benefit the US to hang around in the 
middle East?  Why are we sending very large sums of money and 
loads of arms to Israelis, who hate us venemously, to Egyptians, 
who hate us maniacally, to Saudis, who hate us suicidally, money 
that enrages the rest of the middle East, and the subjects of 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia even more?

Now one might suppose there is some benefit to assisting Kuwait, 
which is sitting on a large lake of oil, and whose citizens merely 
hate us irrationally.  Israel, and Palestine however, are mostly 
of significance due the extreme sacredness of three rocks, and the
extreme sacredness of a large pile of municipal fill stacked up by
Herod. One of those rocks is probably not even the genuine thing,
since the crusaders broke most, and presumably all, of the real
thing up for souvenirs. 

--digsig
 James A. Donald
 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
 EUm+xgsSL3siIAf89nl9G3Z/v4GJK5Hl+lrOEPzC
 4mYKD4Z7j4mhud4BHecKF3Qc5JQAnvxvfvW7u8eXQ

1st announcement for ECC 2002 (fwd)

[Jim Choate]

-- Forwarded message --
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 18:47:36 -0500
From: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Digital Bearer Settlement List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: 1st announcement for ECC 2002


--- begin forwarded text


Status:  U
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 09:51:45 -0500
To: Frances Hannigan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Frances Hannigan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: 1st announcement for ECC 2002

THE 6TH WORKSHOP ON ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY (ECC 2002)

University of Essen, Essen, Waterloo

September 23, 24 & 25 2002

First Announcement  April 5, 2002


ECC 2002 is the sixth in a series of annual workshops dedicated to the
study of elliptic curve cryptography and related areas. The main themes
of ECC 2002 will be:
   - The discrete logarithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems.
   - Efficient parameter generation and point counting.
   - Provably secure cryptographic protocols for encryption, signatures
 and key agreement.
   - Efficient software and hardware implementation of elliptic curve
 cryptosystems.
   - Deployment of elliptic curve cryptography.

It is hoped that the meeting will continue to encourage and stimulate
further research on the security and implementation of elliptic curve
cryptosystems and related areas, and encourage collaboration between
mathematicians, computer scientists and engineers in the academic,
industry and government sectors.

There will be approximately 15 invited lectures (and no contributed
talks), with the remaining time used for informal discussions. There
will be both survey lectures as well as lectures on latest research
developments.


SPONSORS:
  Alcatel Canada
  Certicom Corp.
  CV Cryptovision
  Metris
  MITACS
  Philips Semiconductors
  Research Alliance Data Security NRW
  University of Essen
  University of Waterloo


ORGANIZERS:
  Gerhard Frey   (University of Essen)
  Alfred Menezes (University of Waterloo)
  Scott Vanstone (University of Waterloo)
  Annegret Weng  (University of Essen)


CONFIRMED SPEAKERS:
  Dan Bleichenbacher (Lucent Technologies, USA)
  Steven Galbraith   (Royal Holloway College, UK)
  Kiran Kedlaya  (University of California, Berkeley, USA)
  Alan Lauder(Oxford University, UK)
  Kumar Murty(University of Toronto, Canada)
  Phong Nguyen   (ENS, Paris, France)
  David Pointcheval  (ENS, Paris, France)
  Takakazu Satoh (Saitama University, Japan)
  Rene Schoof(University of Rome, Italy)
  Frederik Vercauteren   (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium)


LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS:

Essen is the largest city in the Ruhr region, and is about a 20-minute
drive from Dusseldorf International airport. The second announcement
will be made on May 10, and will include registration and local
(i.e., hotel & transportation) information. If you did not receive this
announcement by email and would like to be added to the mailing list
for the second announcement, please send email to
[EMAIL PROTECTED] The announcements are also available from
the web sites:
   www.exp-math.uni-essen.de/~weng/ecc2002.html
and
   www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca


--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga 
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA

The IBUC Symposium on Geodesic Capital
April 3-4, 2002, The Downtown Harvard Club, Boston
 for details...

"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Julia Child was a Spook

[Optimizzin Al-gorithym]

At 01:31 PM 4/7/02 +0800, F. Marc de Piolenc wrote:
>I'm sorry you've bought the terrorist line that it's all about US
>support for Israel.

RTFM.  Or the Al-Quaeda declarations, at least.

> I know better.

So *you* claim.  Chuckle.

>We could withdraw from the Middle
>East tomorrow, and all that would change would be the excuse.

Why would Al Q. care about the US if the US were not in their backyard?
Its not like they care about US colonialism in the Americas, or Europe.

They learned (via CCCP, Lebanon, etc.) how to evict intruders from their

homeland, and now they are implementing it.  They're acting rationally,
and as a wanna-be analyst you should be able to understand that.
In dropping the Towers, they were trying to wake up US taxpayers to
the actions of their 'leaders'.  Unfortunate that Americans are so hard
to wake up (vaporizing some jar-heads on the other side of the planet
does not truly impress), even harder to get to think, but that's the
situation.

How many virgins for Mike Spann?

[Optimizzin Al-gorithym]

At 06:08 PM 4/6/02 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote:
>>What kind of payback does the USG pay to families of deceased
soldiers?
>
>A flag, and occasionally a cemetary plot in Virginia if they want one,
>and a lot of hype about how they were a heroic martyr for their
country,
>back when hype about being a heroic martyr was supposed to be positive.

1. Is it a Chinese-made flag?

2. How many virgins do they get?  (Round to the nearest dozen)  Do
homosexual soldiers get to "tell" and get nubile young lads?

Re: CDR: RE: mil disinfo on cryptome (and sec clearance games)

[measl]

Note that you also [explicitly] waive your search and siezure rights (at
least this was the case the last time I looked at the forms for TS) - not a
nice thing :-(

On Sun, 7 Apr 2002, Optimizzin Al-gorithym wrote:

> Another reason: once you get a clearance, you can't speak
> freely.  The latest _Tech Review_ interviews an MIT Prof Postol,
> who has been pointing out the lies behind Raytheon's Patriot
> missile and the anti-ballistic missile sham.  Reportedly,
> some friendly DoD folks came to him and asked him to read
> a classified report that would put some of his technical worries at
> ease.
> Postol refused, knowing that this is a scheme used to silence
> folks --having been exposed to classified info, you have to
> watch what you say.  If you figure it out from open data +
> general science, you can speak your mind.
> 
> (BTW The basic deception is, if our gizmo can't discriminate this kind
> of decoy, well, don't use that kind of decoy in the tests..)
> 
> 

-- 
Yours, 
J.A. Terranson
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

If Governments really want us to behave like civilized human beings, they
should give serious consideration towards setting a better example:
Ruling by force, rather than consensus; the unrestrained application of
unjust laws (which the victim-populations were never allowed input on in
the first place); the State policy of justice only for the rich and 
elected; the intentional abuse and occassionally destruction of entire
populations merely to distract an already apathetic and numb electorate...
This type of demogoguery must surely wipe out the fascist United States
as surely as it wiped out the fascist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The views expressed here are mine, and NOT those of my employers,
associates, or others.  Besides, if it *were* the opinion of all of
those people, I doubt there would be a problem to bitch about in the
first place...

Re: Julia Child was a Spook

[Jim Choate]

On Sat, 6 Apr 2002, F. Marc de Piolenc wrote:

> Nonsense. If you can't see any difference between terrorists and
> résistants you are either wilfully ignorant or confused.
> 
> A terrorist strikes symbolic targets, preferably undefended ones. A
> résistant strikes at the occupying power.
> 
> Of course it is possible for one and the same person to be both - it is
> behavior that defines the terrorist. So when an al-Quaida member takes
> on a US patrol, he may define himself as some kind of soldier in that
> encounter. It doesn't change the fact of his complicity in the murder of
> innocents, which makes him a terrorist as well.

And who might those symbols be for? The 'occupying power' per chance?


 --


 The law is applied philosophy and a philosphical system is
 only as valid as its first principles.
 
James Patrick Kelly - "Wildlife"
   
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]  www.open-forge.org

Re: mil disinfo on cryptome

[matthew X]

 >>To be blunt, no official can be trusted, period, nor can any of their 
contractors who have agreed to abide the official rules. Which, as oft 
stated here, includes all state-empowered and privilieged professionals, 
from architects to lawyers to doctors to priests to acupuncturists, and not 
least, journalists who may pretend to authorize themselves but behave in 
accord with the rules of their privileged publishers. <<

I dont trust declan and the petrie dish,(peter Trei) for these reasons,I 
urge others not to either.Thanks jya.(1 architect we can rely on.)
The Govt seems to be concerned about losing its monopoly on disinfo,they 
wheeled out the big guns to hose down
'conspiracy theories' about 9-11.They must really think we're getting out 
of control! I KNOW the SS thinks we are.
Uncle Fester seems reasonably Kosher,not like Kurt Saxon,Tim May.Disinfo's 
shelf life keeps getting shorter,A.

RE: mil disinfo on cryptome

[Eugen Leitl]

On Sat, 6 Apr 2002, Faustine wrote:

> >I'm not an expert on this,
> 
> Then why aren't you following your own advice? 

By being not an expert on this I mean I haven't worked excessively with
HCN (I tried smelling it once), nor administered LD50 tests personally.
 
> If anyone is interested in learning more about CW, a good intro:

Thanks for the links, but I was commenting on HCN, not CW. (No, I'm not an 
expert on CW either, but neither are you, nor anybody on this list).
 
> Detailed reference works you can dig up yourself. But hey, if you prefer
> to stick to your chemistry 101 books and advice from Uncle Fester, that's
> perfectly fine by me. Just watch out throwing the word "disinformation"
> around, that's all.

While I cannot claim any thorough knowledge of clandestine chemistry, 
chemistry is what I used to do professionally. (Professionally as it what 
stands on my diploma, and what paid for the bills).

Re: CDR: Re: Julia Child was a Spook

[F. Marc de Piolenc]

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> You've been listening to Shrub to much.   What makes you think this is about
> hating freedom?  Might this not be about getting us to mind our own fucking
> business???

I really don't give a fig about the opinions of the current resident of
the White House. I've been studying terror and its practitioners for
about 25 years and I know their mentality.

I'm sorry you've bought the terrorist line that it's all about US
support for Israel. I know better. We could withdraw from the Middle
East tomorrow, and all that would change would be the excuse.

Marc de Piolenc

Re: Julia Child was a Spook

[matthew X]

 >>weasl>>"...You have so completely missed the point here that it's almost 
comical. The fact that we provide aid and encouragement to the nazi-like 
Israeli's is but a small part of our problem..."<<

Whats this 'we' whiteman? Do cypherpunks have a country? Is crypto-anarchy 
providing aid to Israeli's? The Internet itself is now bigger outside norte 
america than in and has been for a year or so,the gap is widening.To remain 
UScentric and anarcho-ignorant will make this site more of a laughing stock 
than it already is.Get with the (global) program.
Its the enviroment stupid.

Re: US troops wanted, dead or alive: InfoWar, PSYOPs

[Bill Stewart]

At 11:30 AM 04/05/2002 -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>Hmm, that's about 5x what Union Carbide paid for dead Bhopal Indians...

 They were paying for them wholesale, after the fact.

>but a real bargain compared to many US wrongful-death lawsuits.
>What kind of payback does the USG pay to families of deceased soldiers?

A flag, and occasionally a cemetary plot in Virginia if they want one,
and a lot of hype about how they were a heroic martyr for their country,
back when hype about being a heroic martyr was supposed to be positive.

Re: CDR: Re: Julia Child was a Spook

[measl]

On Sun, 7 Apr 2002, F. Marc de Piolenc wrote:

> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> 
> > You've been listening to Shrub to much.   What makes you think this is about
> > hating freedom?  Might this not be about getting us to mind our own fucking
> > business???
> 
> I really don't give a fig about the opinions of the current resident of
> the White House. I've been studying terror and its practitioners for
> about 25 years and I know their mentality.
> 
> I'm sorry you've bought the terrorist line that it's all about US
> support for Israel. 

Interesting reaction.  I never mentioned Israel, nor do I think that the US
support of Israel is what "it's all about" - although that is likely a good
sized piece of it.  Judging from your response, I'd say you were the one who
has bought into someone's "line".

> I know better.

They always do...

> We could withdraw from the Middle
> East tomorrow, and all that would change would be the excuse.

You have so completely missed the point here that it's almost comical.  The
fact that we provide aid and encouragement to the nazi-like Israeli's is but
a small part of our problem.
 
> Marc de Piolenc


-- 
Yours, 
J.A. Terranson
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

If Governments really want us to behave like civilized human beings, they
should give serious consideration towards setting a better example:
Ruling by force, rather than consensus; the unrestrained application of
unjust laws (which the victim-populations were never allowed input on in
the first place); the State policy of justice only for the rich and 
elected; the intentional abuse and occassionally destruction of entire
populations merely to distract an already apathetic and numb electorate...
This type of demogoguery must surely wipe out the fascist United States
as surely as it wiped out the fascist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The views expressed here are mine, and NOT those of my employers,
associates, or others.  Besides, if it *were* the opinion of all of
those people, I doubt there would be a problem to bitch about in the
first place...

Re: mil disinfo on cryptome

[Steve Thompson]

Quoting John Young ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> To be blunt, no official can be trusted, period, nor can
> any of their contractors who have agreed to abide
> the official rules. Which, as oft stated here, includes
> all state-empowered and privilieged professionals,
> from architects to lawyers to doctors to priests to
> acupuncturists, and not least, journalists who may 
> pretend to authorize themselves but behave in 
> accord with the rules of their privileged publishers.

I would have to disagree.  Everyone has their price, and in so far as one can
buy officials (and ensure they stay bought), such people can be trusted on a
case-by-case basis.  But when your really want to get something right, of
course you should do it yourself.


Regards,

Steve

-- 
Just fake it.


-- 
Include "35da3c9e079dcf68ec3a608e8c0a47f6" somewhere in your
message when you reply.