Re: Palm security

2002-06-05 Thread contrary

On Tue, 4 Jun 2002 16:58:16 -0400, Adam Shostack [EMAIL PROTECTED]
said:
 I find myself storing a pile of vaugely sensitive information on my 
 palm.  Where do I find the competent analysis of this?  


Perhaps this will help..

http://www.atstake.com/research/reports/index.html#pdd_palm_forensics


-- 
  contrary
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]

-- 
http://fastmail.fm - No WWW (Wait-Wait-Wait) required




(Fwd) Re: Palm security

2002-06-05 Thread jayh

I've been using Cryptopad 3 (Memo pad replacement) and like it (uses Eric Young's 
Blowfish).

v4 is available (freeware)

http://www.freewarepalm.com/utilities/cryptopad.shtml
http://www.palmblvd.com/software/pc/CryptoPad-2000-10-12-palm-pc.html


jay

On 4 Jun 2002 at 16:58, Adam Shostack wrote:

 I find myself storing a pile of vaugely sensitive information on my 
 palm.  Where do I find the competent analysis of this?  Ideally, I'd
 like to be able to protect things that I move into a sensitive area
 (passwords), and maybe select items in other places that I want to
 encrypt.  I don't really want to have to enter a password each time I
 look at my schedule and todo lists.
 
 Someone suggested YAPS
 (http://www.palmblvd.com/software/pc/Yaps-2000-11-7-palm-pc.html) are
 there others I should look at?
  
 Adam 
  
  
 --  
 
 
 -- 
 It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.
  -Hume
 
 


--- End of forwarded message ---




Re: Palm security

2002-06-05 Thread Ralf-P. Weinmann

On Tue, Jun 04, 2002 at 04:58:16PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote:
 I find myself storing a pile of vaugely sensitive information on my 
 palm.  Where do I find the competent analysis of this?  Ideally, I'd
 like to be able to protect things that I move into a sensitive area
 (passwords), and maybe select items in other places that I want to
 encrypt.  I don't really want to have to enter a password each time I
 look at my schedule and todo lists.
 
 Someone suggested YAPS
 (http://www.palmblvd.com/software/pc/Yaps-2000-11-7-palm-pc.html) are
 there others I should look at?

I prefer the Keyring for PalmOS (http://gnukeyring.sourceforge.net).
Comes with source code, uses 3DES for encryption (the passphrase is
MD5 hashed as far as i remember). Have a look at it.

Cheers,
Ralf

-- 
Ralf-P. Weinmann [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP fingerprint: 2048/46C772078ACB58DEF6EBF8030CBF1724




Re: CDR: Missing pieces?

2002-06-05 Thread Jim Choate


We're not missing anything, except more users...

http://open-forge.org

On Tue, 28 May 2002, Mister Heex wrote:

 What are the fundamental building blocks that we're missing for a bright 'n'
 shiny crypto-future? 


 --


  When I die, I would like to be born again as me.

Hugh Hefner
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]  www.open-forge.org






RSA SSL-C benchmark on Itanium 2 (vs. Ultrasparc multiproc)

2002-06-05 Thread Major Variola (ret)

from Intel sources, quoted by eweek 3 jun 02:
Itanium 2 does 1,440 secure transactions/sec,
nearly three times the performance of an 8-CPU
Ultrasparc III server

FWIW; there was a thread on SSL performance
here some time ago.




Re: Palm security

2002-06-05 Thread Ben Laurie

Adam Shostack wrote:
 I find myself storing a pile of vaugely sensitive information on my 
 palm.  Where do I find the competent analysis of this?  Ideally, I'd
 like to be able to protect things that I move into a sensitive area
 (passwords), and maybe select items in other places that I want to
 encrypt.  I don't really want to have to enter a password each time I
 look at my schedule and todo lists.
 
 Someone suggested YAPS
 (http://www.palmblvd.com/software/pc/Yaps-2000-11-7-palm-pc.html) are
 there others I should look at?

I use Keyring (http://sourceforge.net/projects/gnukeyring/), though it 
seems to have moved on some since I last looked...

Cheers,

Ben.


-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html   http://www.thebunker.net/

There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff




RE: Degrees of Freedom vs. Hollywood Control Freaks

2002-06-05 Thread Jim Choate


On Mon, 3 Jun 2002, Trei, Peter wrote:

 Well, I'm convinced - I guess that's why every single album today is
 released on both CD *and* vinyl - can't piss off the tens of millions of 
 turntable owners, after all. 

That's not correct. There are lots of albums (aimed at DJ's for example)
that are -NEVER- available except on vinyl. Also, if you'll actually check
the 'yellow book' at your record store you'll find that over the last 4-5
years a growing number of albums are available on CD only; no LP, no
cassette. Start in the techno and related genre. Hint, they are -not- hit
records.

HDTV will come. That you can take to the bank. BUT, that doesn't equate to
the end of NTSC by about 10 to 15 years.


 --


  When I die, I would like to be born again as me.

Hugh Hefner
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]  www.open-forge.org







RE: Degrees of Freedom vs. Hollywood Control Freaks

2002-06-05 Thread Trei, Peter


 Jim Choate[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] wrote:
 
 On Mon, 3 Jun 2002, Trei, Peter wrote:
 
  Well, I'm convinced - I guess that's why every single album today is
  released on both CD *and* vinyl - can't piss off the tens of millions of
 
  turntable owners, after all. 
 
 That's not correct. There are lots of albums (aimed at DJ's for example)
 that are -NEVER- available except on vinyl. Also, if you'll actually check
 the 'yellow book' at your record store you'll find that over the last 4-5
 years a growing number of albums are available on CD only; no LP, no
 cassette. Start in the techno and related genre. Hint, they are -not- hit
 records.
 
Jimbo wouldn't recognize irony if it came up and bit him in the ass.

Peter




Laurie's blinding w/cut and choose?

2002-06-05 Thread Jason Holt

In his paper on Lucre (2nd defence against marking):

http://anoncvs.aldigital.co.uk/lucre/

Ben Laurie gives this as a (possibly patent-free) blinding technique,
where h is the message, and g is the public generator:

r = blind(h) = h^y * g^b (mod p)

To sign,

s = sign(r) = m^h

To unblind,

(s/g^k^b)^(1/y) (mod p)

(where k is the signer's secret exponent. Of course, nobody but the
signer can verify the signature).  Unfortunately, this doesn't work with cut
and choose where the signer signs the product of unrevealed documents, since 
the 1/y exponent above would distribute to all the internal terms:

((r  * r  * r   ...)^k)^(1/y )
   123  1
-- !=  (h  * r  * r   ...)^k   (mod p)
 (g^k)^b 123
1

Can anyone see how to get this to work?  It doesn't matter for Ben's
money system since he doesn't need cut and choose, but I'm working on a
patent-free credential system where the issuer needs to cut and choose to keep
the user from cheating.

Alternatively, is there another way to get some sort of blind mark
(that foils the issuer from adding subliminal information that would
compromise the blinding) without stepping on Chaum's patent?  I hear Chaum
mentioned one himself at PET 2002, but I can't find anything about it online.

-J  




RE: Degrees of Freedom vs. Hollywood Control Freaks

2002-06-05 Thread mean-green

At 05:06 PM 6/3/2002 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
Tim, I think you're missing the point here. Valenti and his ilk would like
nothing more than to force you to to rebuy your visual media *again*, but
they don't have to. I'll bet dollars to donuts that you've rebought some of
your VCR tapes as DVDs. Whey wouldn't the MPAA think they can
make you do it over?

Tim may be willing or able to repurchase his movie collection but many are not.  I've 
backed up all of the movies I have on VHS onto CDs (2-3 per movie average) from DVD 
in a high quality format called SVCD.  As soon as my budget allows I'll be a DVD 
burn'in fool.

Communicate in total privacy.
Get your free encrypted email at https://www.hushmail.com/?l=2

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Re: Laurie's blinding w/cut and choose?

2002-06-05 Thread Nomen Nescio

Jason Holt writes:
   In his paper on Lucre (2nd defence against marking):
 http://anoncvs.aldigital.co.uk/lucre/

   Ben Laurie gives this as a (possibly patent-free) blinding technique,
 where h is the message, and g is the public generator:

 r = blind(h) = h^y * g^b (mod p)

   To sign,

 s = sign(r) = m^h

   To unblind,

 (s/g^k^b)^(1/y) (mod p)

   (where k is the signer's secret exponent. Of course, nobody but the
 signer can verify the signature).  Unfortunately, this doesn't work with cut
 and choose where the signer signs the product of unrevealed documents, since 
 the 1/y exponent above would distribute to all the internal terms:

Boy, you've got a lot of faith asking this question on cypherpunks.
It's not exactly the intellectual center of the crypto freedom movement
these days, you know.  The average IQ is rapidly descending into double
digits, even not counting Choate.  But let's see what we can do for you.

First, let's fix your notation.

r = blind(h) = h^y * g^b  OK
s = sign(r) = r^k, not m^h.
unblind(s) = (s/g^k^b)^(1/y) = h^k = sign(h).

That's what you want to end up with, h^k, as the pseudo-signature on h.

Now for a credential system, you apparently want to create a bunch
of values which have some structure, and get a signature on a product
of them.  Using cut and choose, the client will prepare blinded forms
of all of the values, then the server will ask for half of the blinding
factors to be revealed.  This exposes the raw values to be signed and
the server can make sure they are in the right form.  If so, it then
signs the product of the remaining values, which the client unblinds to
get back a good signature on the product of the unblinded values.

The fundamental problem with this is that the blinding factors have to
be different for each of the values.  If they are all the same, then
when they are revealed for some of the values during cut and choose,
that will reveal them for all of them, and so none of them will be
effectively blinded any more.

But if the blinding factors are all different, we can't unblind since
we don't have a unique power 1/y to raise to.

That's your problem, right?

Here are a couple of possible solutions.  First, you could do a cut and
choose in which all but one of the blinded values are revealed, and only
the remaining (unrevealed) one is signed.  This has the problem that it
has only a 1/n security factor with n values.  That is, the client can
just guess which one the server won't ask to check, and if it sent say 100
values, it has a 1/100 chance of getting lucky, which might seem too high.

However since credential issuing usually occurs in a non-anonymous
context, you can afford to penalize people very heavily if they are
caught in this manner.  (Cutting the connection and refusing to resume
with the previous values has to count as cheating.)

Another approach is as follows.  Go back to the 50-50 cut and choose
with signature on the product.  However, use the same y blinding factor
for all of the values.  Now when the client has to reveal during cut and
choose, it keeps the y value secret but reveals all of the h and b values.
It then proves in zero knowledge that there exists a y such that the h^y
equals the required value.  This is a standard ZK proof of knowledge
of a discrete logarithm.  It is similar to the example Ben's paper gives
of how the bank can prove it is raising to the right power.

Since you don't have to reveal y, you can use the same y for all of them
and successfully perform the unblind operation, getting back the signature
on the product of the h's as required.

But actually another solution is much simpler, which is to do blinding
as just h * g^b, without a y factor.  That works fine as long as the
bank is known not to be misbehaving.  Ben's paper shows how the bank
can use a ZK proof to show that it is raising to the same power k every
time, basically again that same ZK proof regarding discrete logarithms.
If the bank uses such a proof then you can use simpler blinding without
a y factor, and you can recover the signature on the product of your h
values by dividing by g^k^(sum of b's).

So there you go.  A little technical for cypherpunks, but unfortunately
coderpunks, like the little old lady, has fallen and it can't get up.




Re: CDR: RE: Degrees of Freedom vs. Hollywood Control Freaks

2002-06-05 Thread measl


On Wed, 5 Jun 2002, Jim Choate wrote:

 On Mon, 3 Jun 2002, Trei, Peter wrote:
 
  Well, I'm convinced - I guess that's why every single album today is
  released on both CD *and* vinyl - can't piss off the tens of millions of 
  turntable owners, after all. 
 
 That's not correct. There are lots of albums (aimed at DJ's for example)
 that are -NEVER- available except on vinyl. 

Ok, somebody correct me if I'm wrong here, but didn't they officially cease
production of vinyl pressings several years ago?  As in *all* vinyl
pressings???

-- 
Yours, 
J.A. Terranson
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

If Governments really want us to behave like civilized human beings, they
should give serious consideration towards setting a better example:
Ruling by force, rather than consensus; the unrestrained application of
unjust laws (which the victim-populations were never allowed input on in
the first place); the State policy of justice only for the rich and 
elected; the intentional abuse and occassionally destruction of entire
populations merely to distract an already apathetic and numb electorate...
This type of demogoguery must surely wipe out the fascist United States
as surely as it wiped out the fascist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The views expressed here are mine, and NOT those of my employers,
associates, or others.  Besides, if it *were* the opinion of all of
those people, I doubt there would be a problem to bitch about in the
first place...






Re: CDR: RE: Degrees of Freedom vs. Hollywood Control Freaks

2002-06-05 Thread Joseph Ashwood

- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: CDR: RE: Degrees of Freedom vs. Hollywood Control Freaks


 Ok, somebody correct me if I'm wrong here, but didn't they officially
cease
 production of vinyl pressings several years ago?  As in *all* vinyl
 pressings???

They stopped selling them to the general public, but you only have to stop
by a DJ record shop (as opposed to the consumer shops) to see a wide
selection of vinyl albums. DJs prefer vinyl primarily because it allows beat
matching by hand, scratching, etc. The only disadvantage I know of for vinyl
is that it degrades as it is played, for a DJ this isn't much of a problem
since tracks have a lifespan that's measured in days or weeks the vinyl
becomes useless after a few weeks, which is how long it lasts at good
quality.
Joe