Re: [dmarc-discuss] Fwd: Re: Help

[Jonathan Knopp via dmarc-discuss]

To play devil's advocate: it doesn't explicitly provide unsubscribe 
instructions directly in the email itself. A non-savvy user likely wouldn't 
think to follow the non-obvious info link in the footer. And not all mail 
clients make use of the list-unsubscribe header.

That said... why would any such person be on this list in the first place?

On 2018-09-26 02:11 PM, Brandon Long via dmarc-discuss wrote:

Wait, folks are on this list who don't know the basics?

Ie:
List-Unsubscribe: , 
?subject=unsubscribe>

on every message?

Also, the link in the footer, 
http://www.dmarc.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc-discuss, has a section that is the 
same on all mailman lists:
To unsubscribe from dmarc-discuss, get a password reminder, or change your 
subscription options enter your subscription email address:

So.. yeah.

Brandon

On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 2:04 PM Lawrence Finch via dmarc-discuss 
mailto:dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org>> wrote:




On Sep 26, 2018, at 4:44 PM, Bongaerts Contract via dmarc-discuss 
mailto:dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org>> wrote:

Hello, Would someone please be kind enough to tell me how to Unsubscribe 
from these emails ?

Thank you.

Carl Bongaerts    Tel: 416-831-7841



You raise a really good question. The list violates US federal regulations 
by not providing instructions in every message about how to unsubscribe. And I 
just went to the Info page for the list, and there were no instructions to 
unsubscribe there either.

--
Larry Finch
finc...@portadmiral.org 



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Re: [dmarc-discuss] DMARC report from Google shows unexpected result

[Jonathan Knopp via dmarc-discuss]

On 2016-12-24 12:15 PM, Jim Garrison via dmarc-discuss wrote:
> How did the DKIM signature 'pass'? What does the disposition=none
> mean? Did Google not reject the email?

Sounds to me like you may have the wrong idea of DMARC's mechanics. Only one of 
DKIM and SPF has to pass for DMARC to pass. So long as the forwarder doesn't 
edit the message body or any of the fields covered by the DKIM signature, DKIM 
will still pass. DMARC sits atop DKIM and SPF; DKIM and SPF are still 
independent systems.
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Re: [dmarc-discuss] DMARC forensic reporting options

[Jonathan Knopp via dmarc-discuss]

On 2016-12-23 10:09 AM, Juri Haberland via dmarc-discuss wrote:
> When I look at the few failure reports that I receive, they all consist of
> headers only - but all headers, not just a few. They do not include a
> single line of the body.
> So your proposal would just describe the reality - or what am I missing?

Perhaps this is what John meant in the first place, but IMO standardizing a set 
of headers to be included in forensic reports that would clear privacy laws may 
actually get receivers sending them. The idea of "if they wanted to, they 
already would" strikes me as a bit naive, in that a surface level look (vs 
reading through and interpreting in detail the RFCs) would suggest you're 
supposed to send the whole email, and a receiver setting up DMARC reporting 
will just drop the idea there. I've seen ranking figures in this list mention 
privacy as a reason their organization doesn't send forensic reports, and those 
are people that are/should be aware that they COULD send partial forensics, 
which strongly suggests to me that most people will conclude the same. Hence 
developing and promoting a privacy-friendly subset of headers may get alot of 
receivers sending forensic reports, and thus go a long way towards senders 
switching for reject or at least quarantine. And of course that's !
 the ultimate point of DMARC (to me anyway) so it seems an idea worth working 
on.

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[dmarc-discuss] FBL via DMARC?

[Jonathan Knopp via dmarc-discuss]

Has there been any discussion about using DMARC to configure spam complaint 
feedback loops? Currently it is only feasible to register for the big ESPs and 
can be tough to keep them up to date. DMARC could make this automatic and 
universal. It would be well within DMARC's mandate of domain reputation 
protection since it would let you know quickly when someone has infiltrated 
your systems and is sending spam via your legitimate email path.
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[dmarc-discuss] Tracking down issues

[Jonathan Knopp via dmarc-discuss]

Howdy list,

At the risk of incurring the wrath of the "*groan* we know" gods...

Since hardly anyone sends forensic reports, is there any secret sauce I'm 
missing that helps you track down issues? If DMARC reports mentioned the sender 
username at least, then I would know which user to speak to about fixing their 
outbound setup. But as it stands I have tons of errors (some partial, some 
complete) and some may be from such a user, others from bad forwarding, others 
from a misconfigured service/script somewhere, and some just plain spoofed 
spam, and little way to tell which is which.

I'm reasonably certain at this point the answer is "too bad, that's just how it 
is", since ruf was meant to handle exactly that, but thought I'd ask just in 
case I overlooked something.

Unfortunately given the current setup and how many forwarders break DKIM, it's 
looking like we'll never be able to use a reject policy, which is rather a 
shame since that is the major factor that would help fight spam (in general, I 
realize it would have little to no effect on the spam we receive) and help 
protect my clients' domain reputations the most.

Thanks.
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