Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-02 Thread Shumon Huque
On Thu, Mar 2, 2023 at 2:10 AM Paul Vixie 
wrote:

> >
> > Address lookup functions typically invoked by applications won't see
> > a practical impact from this indistinguishability.  For a non-
> > existent name, the getaddrinfo() function for example will return a
> > value of EAI_NODATA rather than EAI_NONAME.  But either way the
> > effect on the caller is the same: it will obtain a response with a
> > non-zero return value and no available addresses.
>
> that's just not true, no matter how it's worded.
>
> if i get NODATA i might try other record types (for example,  after
> A, A after , or both  and A after MX).
>
> if i get NXDOMAIN, i won't.
>

That's a fair point. It may cause calling applications to issue additional
queries, although I guess the final state will be the same.


> there's also a huge impact on operational security.
>
> indistinguishability would a huge problem.
>
> please outlaw it.
>

I don't think this mechanism can be outlawed since it is already so widely
deployed in the field.

What we can do is to make it easier to make the distinction, which is what
we are attempting to do with the distinguishability (pseudo) type in the
type bitmap. As I mentioned earlier, we have some proposed tweaks to
that mechanism which I'll start a new thread about.

Shumon.
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Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-02 Thread Peter Thomassen



On 3/2/23 00:14, Joe Abley wrote:

We are not talking about lies. Referring to these kinds of negative responses 
as lies is confusing and unhelpful. They are signed responses, and the point of 
signing them is that they are verifiably true.

I think "lies" refers to an assumption that a single NSEC makes a maximal 
assertion about what does not exist and that either side of that expanse of empty sand 
lies a soothing oasis of existence. However theprotocol doesn't require that to be the 
case. A single NSEC can cover a single grain of sand, and the mystery of the desert can 
remain substantially intact.


As always, the truth lies with you. ;-) (In other words, ack.)

~Peter

--
https://desec.io/

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Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-02 Thread Shumon Huque
On Thu, Mar 2, 2023 at 1:42 AM Florian Obser 
wrote:

>
> I might not be caffeinated enough yet, but I think the next domain name
> in section 5 should be \000.ent1.example.net:
>
>   ent1.example.net.  3600 IN NSEC \000.ent1.example.net. RRSIG
> NSEC ENT
>

I'm the one who wasn't caffeinated. Good catch. Will fix in next version.


> In section 6, calling getaddrinfo() return values exit codes is a bit
> odd, maybe this will do?
>

Yes, we can say return values.
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Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-01 Thread Paul Vixie




Florian Obser wrote on 2023-03-01 22:42:


I might not be caffeinated enough yet, but I think the next domain name
in section 5 should be \000.ent1.example.net:

   ent1.example.net.  3600 IN NSEC \000.ent1.example.net. RRSIG NSEC ENT

In section 6, calling getaddrinfo() return values exit codes is a bit
odd, maybe this will do?

Address lookup functions typically invoked by applications won't see
a practical impact from this indistinguishability.  For a non-
existent name, the getaddrinfo() function for example will return a
value of EAI_NODATA rather than EAI_NONAME.  But either way the
effect on the caller is the same: it will obtain a response with a
non-zero return value and no available addresses.


that's just not true, no matter how it's worded.

if i get NODATA i might try other record types (for example,  after 
A, A after , or both  and A after MX).


if i get NXDOMAIN, i won't.

there's also a huge impact on operational security.

indistinguishability would a huge problem.

please outlaw it.

--
P Vixie

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Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-01 Thread Florian Obser


I might not be caffeinated enough yet, but I think the next domain name
in section 5 should be \000.ent1.example.net:

  ent1.example.net.  3600 IN NSEC \000.ent1.example.net. RRSIG NSEC ENT

In section 6, calling getaddrinfo() return values exit codes is a bit
odd, maybe this will do?

   Address lookup functions typically invoked by applications won't see
   a practical impact from this indistinguishability.  For a non-
   existent name, the getaddrinfo() function for example will return a
   value of EAI_NODATA rather than EAI_NONAME.  But either way the
   effect on the caller is the same: it will obtain a response with a
   non-zero return value and no available addresses.

-- 
In my defence, I have been left unsupervised.

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Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-01 Thread Paul Ebersman
gih> for what its worth I would like to chime in and support George's
gih> view. The technique is NOT a lie per se.

I'll "me too" this with George and Geoff.

Figuring out a more efficient way to do what is ultimately wanted
(crypographically provable denial of existence) that works better than
the original conception is a good thing. And using "lie" was cute but
George is right here too; clarity/consistency to not confuse the world
is more useful than yet another "in" joke in DNS.

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Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-01 Thread Joe Abley
Hi George,

On Wed, Mar 1, 2023 at 17:40, George Michaelson  wrote:

> My opposition is philosophical and practical.
>
> the philosophical part, is that this is a SIGNED ASSERTION by the zone
> authority. I don't think anything the zone authority says under a
> signature should be called a lie, because the basis of verification is
> that its exactly what was intended to be said about the state of the
> zone.

I agree with this.

We are talking about an assertion by those responsible for the zone contents 
about things that do not exist. There are many different truthful assertions of 
that kind that can be made. The interesting thing about this particular choice 
is that it's a minimal assertion.

We are not talking about lies. Referring to these kinds of negative responses 
as lies is confusing and unhelpful. They are signed responses, and the point of 
signing them is that they are verifiably true.

I think "lies" refers to an assumption that a single NSEC makes a maximal 
assertion about what does not exist and that either side of that expanse of 
empty sand lies a soothing oasis of existence. However the protocol doesn't 
require that to be the case. A single NSEC can cover a single grain of sand, 
and the mystery of the desert can remain substantially intact.

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Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-01 Thread Geoff Huston
for what its worth I would like to chime in and support George’s 
view. The technique is NOT a lie per se. It's a stretch (well
its the opposite of “stretch” - its a “compression”) of the
intended contents of the denial of existence response, but it is not 
a lie as I see it. I would be far more comfortable as well
with Shumon’s “Compact Denial of Existence” as a more accurate
description of the technique.

regards,

Geoff




> On 2 Mar 2023, at 9:40 am, George Michaelson  wrote:
> 
> My opposition is philosophical and practical.
> 
> the philosophical part, is that this is a SIGNED ASSERTION by the zone
> authority. I don't think anything the zone authority says under a
> signature should be called a lie, because the basis of verification is
> that its exactly what was intended to be said about the state of the
> zone.
> 
> its incoherent, its potentially confusing, it needs to be understood,
> sure. but I don't see this as a lie.
> 
> the practical is that I think the IETF/OPS tendency to enjoy "puns"
> causes huge confusion outside the cognoscenti. The re-use of the word
> "peer" for instance has caused significant dismay to people in policy
> or finance space who don't understand that a BGP peer does not mean
> necessarily a peering zero-cost sum arrangement at layer 8 and 9
> (money). -If we use "lie" this freely, then when we want to
> distinguish these signed lies from the intermediary altering payload
> on-the-fly we're going to have a problem of comprehension.
> 
> Having said that, I think I feel like a bit of a party pooper. What in
> Australia would be called a "wowser"
> 
> It's not a big deal btw. I'm not going to go to the AD and complain
> about it or make a fuss at WGLC. I just think.. its the kind of
> language which may not be helpful in the longer term.
> 
> cheers
> 
> George
> 
> On Thu, Mar 2, 2023 at 7:33 AM Shumon Huque  wrote:
>> 
>> Hi folks,
>> 
>> We've posted a new draft describing the former "Black Lies" mechanism
>> for authenticated denial, now renamed as "Compact Lies".
>> 
>>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-compact-lies/
>> 
>> We are hoping to discuss it here and at IETF116, and see if there is
>> interest in adopting the work and publishing it. We feel that it deserves a
>> stable published specification since it is now one of the dominant forms
>> of authenticated denial deployed amongst the commercial online signers
>> today (notably Cloudflare, NS1, and Amazon Route53).
>> 
>> The draft includes the NXDOMAIN/Empty Non-Terminal distinguisher
>> mechanism I described at IETF 111 ( 
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/111/materials/slides-111-dnsop-sessb-black-lies-ent-sentinel-01
>>  ) and currently implemented
>> by NS1.
>> 
>> Christian and I are currently discussing some tweaks to that mechanism
>> which we will broach in a separate email thread shortly. This thread can be
>> used for general comments on the topic of the draft.
>> 
>> George Michaelson, in private email to me, has expressed the view
>> that we shouldn't be calling these mechanisms "Lies" any more (I'm
>> sure he will elaborate if he is inclined). I'm personally okay with that, 
>> and if
>> there is agreement, we could just call this Compact Denial of Existence,
>> and discard the "Lies" meme.
>> 
>> Shumon
>> 
> 
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Re: [DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-01 Thread George Michaelson
My opposition is philosophical and practical.

the philosophical part, is that this is a SIGNED ASSERTION by the zone
authority. I don't think anything the zone authority says under a
signature should be called a lie, because the basis of verification is
that its exactly what was intended to be said about the state of the
zone.

its incoherent, its potentially confusing, it needs to be understood,
sure. but I don't see this as a lie.

the practical is that I think the IETF/OPS tendency to enjoy "puns"
causes huge confusion outside the cognoscenti. The re-use of the word
"peer" for instance has caused significant dismay to people in policy
or finance space who don't understand that a BGP peer does not mean
necessarily a peering zero-cost sum arrangement at layer 8 and 9
(money). -If we use "lie" this freely, then when we want to
distinguish these signed lies from the intermediary altering payload
on-the-fly we're going to have a problem of comprehension.

Having said that, I think I feel like a bit of a party pooper. What in
Australia would be called a "wowser"

It's not a big deal btw. I'm not going to go to the AD and complain
about it or make a fuss at WGLC. I just think.. its the kind of
language which may not be helpful in the longer term.

cheers

George

On Thu, Mar 2, 2023 at 7:33 AM Shumon Huque  wrote:
>
> Hi folks,
>
> We've posted a new draft describing the former "Black Lies" mechanism
> for authenticated denial, now renamed as "Compact Lies".
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-compact-lies/
>
> We are hoping to discuss it here and at IETF116, and see if there is
> interest in adopting the work and publishing it. We feel that it deserves a
> stable published specification since it is now one of the dominant forms
> of authenticated denial deployed amongst the commercial online signers
> today (notably Cloudflare, NS1, and Amazon Route53).
>
> The draft includes the NXDOMAIN/Empty Non-Terminal distinguisher
> mechanism I described at IETF 111 ( 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/111/materials/slides-111-dnsop-sessb-black-lies-ent-sentinel-01
>  ) and currently implemented
> by NS1.
>
> Christian and I are currently discussing some tweaks to that mechanism
> which we will broach in a separate email thread shortly. This thread can be
> used for general comments on the topic of the draft.
>
> George Michaelson, in private email to me, has expressed the view
> that we shouldn't be calling these mechanisms "Lies" any more (I'm
> sure he will elaborate if he is inclined). I'm personally okay with that, and 
> if
> there is agreement, we could just call this Compact Denial of Existence,
> and discard the "Lies" meme.
>
> Shumon
>
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[DNSOP] New draft: Compact Lies/Denial of Existence in DNSSEC

2023-03-01 Thread Shumon Huque
Hi folks,

We've posted a new draft describing the former "Black Lies" mechanism
for authenticated denial, now renamed as "Compact Lies".

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-compact-lies/

We are hoping to discuss it here and at IETF116, and see if there is
interest in adopting the work and publishing it. We feel that it deserves a
stable published specification since it is now one of the dominant forms
of authenticated denial deployed amongst the commercial online signers
today (notably Cloudflare, NS1, and Amazon Route53).

The draft includes the NXDOMAIN/Empty Non-Terminal distinguisher
mechanism I described at IETF 111 (
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/111/materials/slides-111-dnsop-sessb-black-lies-ent-sentinel-01
) and currently implemented
by NS1.

Christian and I are currently discussing some tweaks to that mechanism
which we will broach in a separate email thread shortly. This thread can be
used for general comments on the topic of the draft.

George Michaelson, in private email to me, has expressed the view
that we shouldn't be calling these mechanisms "Lies" any more (I'm
sure he will elaborate if he is inclined). I'm personally okay with that,
and if
there is agreement, we could just call this Compact Denial of Existence,
and discard the "Lies" meme.

Shumon
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