Re: [EM] Fixing Range Voting
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 5:46 AM, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean the geometric sense. For ratings a,b,c,etc., sqrt(a*a + b*b + c*c ...) It has the potential to cause cumulative voting like effects. This is especially true in the initial rounds. Approval and range votings main point is that you can give anyone a high rating without it hurting you. Also, you would treat [+5,-5] different from [+10,0] It id heard to determine which plot refers to which method. (bleh, multiple typos) ... meant it is hard, though you pretty much worked that out. In a sense, part of the result is that there's a pretty tight pack of similar (good) results and a few outliers (IRV, pick-one). Fair enough. Maybe use dotted lines and dot-dash for those 2 ones. Alternatively, since the plots don't cross much, you could arrange the names in the same order as the resulting curves. If only 2 candidates remain, then it will set the window as max and min of those candidates. I think that's pretty similar to what I'd planned to implement. I'm still expecting some tinkering will be needed to get it to do solutions with negligible instability. Ofc, the more complex you make it, the harder it is to explain. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Fixing Range Voting
Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy problem with Range Voting. The strategy problem: You shouldn't cast a ballot with your honest ratings, you should maximize them along Approval strategy lines. It also fixes the counting problem of how if someone does cast votes throughout the range, they might have done better in the end by different values. The method I call Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings (IRNR): 1. Collect ratings ballots 2. Normalize each ballot so that each has an equal magnitude 3. Sum up normalized ballots 4. If there are more than two choices, drop the one with the smallest sum. If there are two choices remaining, one is the winner. 5. Re-normalize from original ballot values but as if dropped choices weren't there 6. Go to 3 I think it gets very near to a utilitarian ideal solution ( http://bolson.org/voting/twographs.html ) and encourages people to vote honestly and uses those honest votes to the best possible effect. I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance. Let my honest rangings be: 100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood 20 percent for the frontrunner Cinderella 0 percent for the other frontrunner Ugly Duckling I think I would vote: 100 Robin Hood; 99 Cinderella; 0 Ugly Duckling If I'm really sure that the race decides between Cinderella and Ugly Duckling, why care too much for poor Robin Hood? And what, if I'm not really sure, because that's the situation which multi-candidate voting is really about? If I lower Cinderella's 99 to her honest 20, I make Robin Hood a little bit more hopeful not to drop first. But more hopeful against whom? Cinderella, of course, because I didn't change Robin and Ugly's obvious rangings. So I made more probable a situation in which more than 50 percent is the probability that the worst candidate wins. This is a doubtful advantage. On the other side, there is the effect that by rising Cinderella's points from the honest 20 to 99 I made more probable the similarly unlikely but positively desirable effect of Ugly dropping first instead of her. So, which does have more weigh? The doubtful little hope for Robin Hood, or the clear little hope against Ugly Duckling? I think the latter. Maybe at some point, let's say Cinderella's 5 percent, I like Robin so much more that I chose the first one. In that case I probably would vote 100-1-0 These voting are not the honest although by one percent honer than the simple Approval voting. But I would be open for persuasion. Peter Barath Tavaszig, most minden féláron! ADSL Internet már 1 745 Ft/hó -tól. Keresse ajánlatunkat a http://www.freestart.hu oldalon! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Range-Approval hybrid
Yet another version of this Approval Strong Sincere Defense, Range method occurs to me: uses ratings ballots with more available slots than there are candidates and on each ballot interpret the highest empty slot as the approval threshold. This is simpler than my previous automatic version which on each ballot interpreted rating above mean as approval, but can still use the same type of ballot as highish-resolution Range/Score/CR. Chris Benham Chris Benham wrote: I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV. http://rangevoting.org/ I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots that have the bottom slots (at least 2 and not more than half) clearly labelled as expressing disapproval and all others as expressing Approval. The default rating is the bottom-most. Compute each candidate X's Approval score and also Approval Opposition score (the approval score of the most approved candidate on ballots that don't approve X). All candidates whose approval score is exceeded by their approval opposition (AO) score are disqualified. Elect the undisqualified candidate that is highest ordered by Average Rating. I suggest many fewer slots than 99 and no no opinion option, so I think the resulting method is not more complex for voters. Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Monday, 29 September, 2008): One way of making it less complex would be to have a cardinal ratings (Range) ballot with both positive and negative integers. The voter rates every candidate, and those candidates that get below zero points are considered disapproved, while those that get above zero are considered approved. This idea doesn't specify where those rated at zero (or those not rated at all) would appear. CB: Thinking about this method idea more, as a practical proposition either a very simple way of handling the zero on a scale that includes negative and positive numbers or not having a zero would be better. One tidy relatively simple version would use a A B C | D E F graded ballot with ABC shown on the ballot as taken to signify approved or acceptable and DEF not. This could perhaps be promoted as Graded Approval. My technical name for the method is I suppose Approval Strong Minimal Defense, CR. Chris Benham Make the switch to the world#39;s best email. Get Yahoo!7 Mail! http://au.yahoo.com/y7mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
Dear Kristofer, you wrote: Since Condorcet is a majoritarian method (as it needs to be in order to be a good single-winner method) ... A good single-winner method *must not* be majoritarian but must elect C in the situation of 55% voters having A 100 C 80 B 0 and 45% voters having B 100 C 80 A 0 :-) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
On Wed, 15 Oct 2008 18:49:41 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Raph Frank wrote: On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders were about equally deserving. It matters because IRV reinforces the 2 party system. it would be interesting to know what would be the effect of electing a parliament by condorcet voting from single seat districts. It is possible that it would also result in a 2 party system. Since Condorcet is a majoritarian method (as it needs to be in order to be a good single-winner method), the resulting parliament would also be majoritarian. This means that a party whose candidates consistently got low support in all districts would find none of those elected. But Condorcet is also a better single-winner method than Plurality, so the candidates would be better representatives of the majority. They would probably be good compromise candidates, so the parliament would be less party-based than one elected by PR methods. This might not be all that good for traditional parliaments; I don't know if the majoritarian nature would lessen competition (except in dominant-party states, where using Condorcet would be an improvement on Plurality in that respect), but it would reduce the voice of the minority. I claim the arguments here as to 2 party domination are overdone - and sometimes in a way to inspire undesirable resistance by those parties. I would rather emphasize the positive aspects: With Condorcet EVERY voter can vote preference between the two major parties, no matter what the voter's primary interest may be. With Condorcet EVERY voter can also express whatever interest may be felt as to other candidates. Note that these abilities do not conflict, though voters can emphasize whichever they choose as most important to them. With Condorcet's N*N arrays all candidates and their backers have a recording of voter interests and can and should adjust based on what they can learn of voter desires from the N*N reports as to pairs of candidates. It might be a good choice for an upper house decided to be a moderating counterweight to a populist lower house. However, based on certain assumptions, IRV is 2 party reinforcing. Also, Australia gives experimental evidence that IRV leads to a 2 party system. How much of that is due to election method, and how much as to other aspects of politics and elections? Condorcet wouldn't necessarily, so that is a good reason to at least try it. It's possible that IRV is a bad single-winner method precisely because STV is a good PR method (with many seats). In STV, one doesn't need to find a candidate that covers a large area of opinion space, since other candidates can be used to cover those areas, but in IRV there are no other positions to be used in such a manner. I'm not sure if this is the reason, but it would fit well with my simulation results that majoritarian IRV (eliminate until only k remains for council size k) is a surprisingly good PR method, at least in absence of strategy. Of course simulations can help but, too often, they are affected by biases of the simulator. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)
Greg Nisbet wrote: Reasons why Range is better and always will be. I would like to end the truce. I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest something reasonable like RP, Schulze or River. Property Related: favorite betrayal, participation and consistency. Implications: 1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate your favorite candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy favorite betrayal is an obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of its glaring flaws (clone dependence *cough*) MMPO's greatest flaw isn't clone dependence but indefensible Plurality failure. Consider this case (by Kevin Venzke): A B = C 1 A = C B 1 B = C A B A = C C wins. Also, MMPO isn't technically a Condorcet method, since it doesn't pass Condorcet. Here's another example, also by Venzke: 30 BC=A 19 A=BC 51 A=CB The Condorcet Winner is C, but A wins in MMPO. If you like Range, this may be to your advantage, since you could say that instead of there being only one Condorcet method that satisfies FBC, there are none at all, or if there is, that this method must be very obscure indeed. 2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner? Condorcet methods are not additive, this calls into question the actual meaning of being elected by a Condorcet method. I'd consider this problem similar to Simpson's paradox of the means, where one can have trends that go one way for the means of two separate groups, but where this trend reverses if the groups are aggregated. It's unintuitive, but doesn't invalidate the use of means in statistics. answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments: 1) Range voting isn't a majority method. answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose to exercise it. concession: it is true that Condorcet methods solve the Burr Dilemma fairly well because parties can simultaneously compete for majorities and swap second place votes. Range Voting can at best allow voters to differentiate between better and worse candidates by one point. So Range's ability to emulate this behavior is competitive. I am not aware of another anti-range voting property one could claim that is applicable to cardinal methods. This is really a question of whether a candidate loved by 49% and considered kinda okay by 51% should win when compared to a candidate hated by the 49% and considered slightly better than the first by the 51%. A strict interpretation of the majority criterion says that the second candidate should win. The spirit of cardinal methods is that the first candidate should win, even though it's possible to make cardinal methods that pass strict Majority. Another argument against Range as a cardinal method might be that it suffers from compression incentive (with complete knowledge, the best strategy is to, for each candidate, either maximize or minimize the rating given). Something like, say, a Condorcet method where rating A 100 and B 20 gives AB 80 points would not be as susceptible to this (though it would probably be vulnerable to other strategies). Computational Complexity (time): Range O(c*v) RP O(c^2*v+c^3) #c^2*v = constucting matrix; c^3 finding local maximum or generating implications c^2 many times. Range Voting is more scalable. I don't think this is much of a concern. With modern computers, voters will have trouble ranking all the candidates long before the computers that do the counting would exhaust CPU processing power, and that'll hold as long as the complexity is a reasonably sized polynomial. Voter Experience: Range Voting (based on the existence of Amazon product ratings, youtube video ratings, hotornot.com http://hotornot.com, the number of movies rated out of stars.) I cannot find a single instance of Condorcet methods besides elections in various open source communities. It doesn't qualify as mainstream. http://en.oreilly.com/oscon2008/public/schedule/detail/3230 mentions that MTV uses Schulze, internally. The French Wikipedia, as well as the Wikimedia Foundation in general, also uses Schulze. The Wikipedia article on the Schulze method also lists some other organizations that, while small, are not communities organized around open source. Understandability: Range Voting (I dare anyone to challenge me on this) Bayesian Regret: Range Voting (same comment) Granted, though DSV methods based on Range do better (and may help with the compression incentive - I'm not sure, though). If they help sufficiently that one doesn't have to min-max in order to get the most voting power, it would keep Range from degrading to Approval and thus (absent other problems) fix the Nader-Gore-Bush problem (where Nader voters don't know whether they should approve Nader and Gore or just Nader). Ballot expressiveness: For elections with less than 100 candidates Range
Re: [EM] Range vs Condorcet Overview (JH)
Hi Jobst, --- En date de : Mar 14.10.08, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : De: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] Objet: Re: [EM] Range vs Condorcet Overview À: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Mardi 14 Octobre 2008, 4h06 Dear Kevin, your wrote: The problem is that if you do not guarantee the majority that they will get their favorite if they vote sincerely, then they will stop telling you who their compromise choices are. No. In D2MAC there is no such guarantee (since it is not majoritarian) and this fact is the *very* reason that under D2MAC majorities *will* tell you what their compromise is (if it's a good compromise) since that is the only way to get the compromise elected instead of ending up with a random ballot lottery! No majoritarian method will elect the compromise in the simple 55/45-example I posted several times, only non-majoritarian methods succeed here. I don't mean to discuss methods with a strong random component. While it is true that no majoritarian method will elect the compromise when there is a majority favorite, I think it is reasonable to claim that (all things being equal, if that is possible) the majoritarian method will elect a compromise more often in the absence of a majority solidly committed to a single candidate, than the method which is not majoritarian. I am assuming voters are strategic. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Strategic Voting and Simulating It
Hi Greg, --- En date de : Mar 14.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I would like to know what is currently wrong with the strategic voting simulations. I believe the simulations work like this: Each voter's sincere utilities are determined randomly and independently, which is problematic because it does not produce realistic scenarios. It would be better to combine voters into factions, although it would be no easier to reach consensus regarding what simulation is realistic. Two frontrunner candidates are determined essentially at random, and this information will be used by the strategic voters. This is problematic because usually when a candidate is called a frontrunner this means there is a perception that this candidate is likely to win, before any strategy is used. When the frontrunners are determined randomly, this is not realistic unless you hold a very pessimistic view about how a candidate becomes a frontrunner in real life. The strategic voters, in any rank ballot method, will simultaneously use favorite betrayal compromise strategy and also burial strategy. There is no calculation, or awareness of the specific election rule. The strategic voters seem schizophrenic in that they are sufficiently paranoid about losing their compromise choice that they will abandon any actually preferred candidate, but at the same time they are sufficiently reckless that they will rank the worse frontrunner dead last even though in methods where this can be an effective strategy, it also creates a major risk that the winner will be a candidate that nobody likes. You could argue that real voters will be highly paranoid and/or reckless, but to that extent, those are not strategic voters in my opinion. No other strategies or information sources are simulated. Equality of preference and truncation are not implemented, so that many popular methods cannot even be tested without ignoring their capabilities. Nomination (dis)incentives can't be examined either. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Range vs Condorcet Overview
Hi Greg, --- En date de?: Dim 12.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a ?crit?: De: Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] Objet: [EM] Range vs Condorcet Overview ?: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Dimanche 12 Octobre 2008, 15h25 I'll attempt to organize the Range Voting vs Condorcet debate somewhat. From what I can see, the following methods have been proposed/have some argument defending them/are reasonably good representatives of the groups being considered: Range Voting: There are two types of arguments against this system: 1) Ratings themselves are useless/unreasonable/illogical/not indicative of reality 2) Nothing survives post-strategy, so any benefit of Range Voting is lost anyway as it reverts to approval. The zero-info strategy is approval. The zero-info strategy is the same as the zero-info Approval strategy. I think that is the same as what you meant. = Yes. That is what I meant. Sorry if I phrased it badly. 3) Range Voting isn't a majority method. My response typically is: 1) The meaning of the vote is substantiated by the system. People vote to achieve a particular outcome. With Range Voting, the different scores have an at-least partway predictable impact on the election (same as any other system). People can tell what is good for the candidates and by how much. Every reasonable voting system preserves this important feature. As a consequence of the votes influence result effect, the different scores now have meaning. This is true, but it would be nice if the scores could also reflect something more psychological, as rankings usually do. = Sure they do. Utility. a. The concept of comparing candidates along a single dimension is more intuitive and hence more meaningful to voters than making O(n^2) binary decisions Rank ballots do this anyway; intransitive rankings are usually not allowed on them. =I see what you are saying =The only dimension is candidate quality. This is true, but allow me to elaborate on my point. =Numbers cannot be reasonably used to represent a ranked ballot with leading to come strangeness. =You could number them with integers for each position, but this isn't quite the same as the integers cannot be used directly. =i.e. (A = 3 B = 2 C = 1) could be a perfectly valid way to represent ABC, but the integers cannot be used as is unless you advocate Borda, which no one sane does. =therefore what you are actually using resembles something like this: =(A = 1 B = 0) (A = 1 C = 0) (B = 1 C = 0) Because this format is sufficient to run any condorcet method. = I might have explained my point badly, but think about it like this. =A dimension has the following properties (a subset of numbers represent positions along it) and (distance between points on the dimension is used directly in the result of the voting methodl) =I argue that minimizing the number of dimensions such as this is a good measure of the relative complexity of something. =My argument is simple. Ranked ballots are more complicated for the average voter. Rated ballots are more simple because they do not involve such ambiguity along the dimension. 2) In order for this to be true, the utility gain from having one's favorite candidate in office must exceed the relative benefit of choosing between the competitors. To the extent which this is true in reality, the results will resemble approval. Actually they will resemble FPP =By favorite candidate I meant favorite candidate set. So, I apologize for forgetting to add set there. EIther way a valid approval ballot is a valid FPTP valid so my point is technically correct, but misleading and phrased badly. =I'm guessing that since my reasoning wasn't attacked that this conclusion is sound. The real question here is: if each voter strongly prefers their favorite candidate set to the set of everyone else, would a non-approval style election really help? I don't understand why you are discussing a favorite candidate. You don't have to settle on one favorite candidate. =I apologize completely for that gaffe. I meant favorite candidate set. Sorry. a. Does zero-info in this case mean a) lack of info about of the behavior of other voters This. =I'm not making fun of you or anything, but I would like to see the rest of this sentence. I'm curious. or b) (a) and lack of info about other candidates as well? Either way, if the problem can be ameliorated by adding info, then add info. This is unrealistic unless you can reduce the number of voters to about four. =Adding info to a system is easier than taking it away. My point is valid that pre-election polls and whatnot can be conducted. I say a system that degrades the more information is added is a worse thing. 3) Any majority can impose its will. a. It is a majority method if you reject the ranked ballot conception of what a majority is. If you regard someone who voted Alice 60% and Bob 100% as
[EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Reasons why Range is better and always will be. I would like to end the truce. That won't work I guess. Using the term better alone is a major flaw of many discussions here. Obviously, it all depends on what goals a method is expected to achieve. Ok, using the term better is biased, you got me. I will proceed to defend my position. I merely mean that it satisfies criteria I think are important and will proceed to attempt to convince why they are important. I do admit the flaws of Range Voting and would be happy to explore them, but I think that including my judgment of which is better is not evil. I too love property based discussions. The definition of the better-ness criterion is as follows: Better-ness Criterion: Arbitrary pronounced by the writer to be more suitable than some other method for elections. :-) I'm not trying to impose my will on anyone; I would just like to see the matter discussed. I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest something reasonable like RP, Schulze or River. As you might guess, I appreciate this, of course :-) Property Related: favorite betrayal, participation and consistency. Implications: 1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate your favorite candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy favorite betrayal is an obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of its glaring flaws (clone dependence *cough*) 2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner? Condorcet methods are not additive, this calls into question the actual meaning of being elected by a Condorcet method. No, it calls into question the actual meaning of being elected in a region. The misunderstanding arises only when you interpret the election of A in a region as meaning that A is best in some sense. But Condorcet methods are based on a different logic than measuring goodness of candidates. They have more to do with stability, for example: Electing a candidate other than the Condorcet Winner always faces immediate opposition by some majority who prefers the Condorcet Winner. So, if you consider majorities significant (which you seem to judging from your reasoning further down), you should consequently not accept different winner when a Condorcet Winner is available. I see your point. Try thinking about it from a different perspective: The regions are the status quo, not the conglomerate super-region. I cite this example: http://www.rangevoting.org/CondNonAdd.html Picture it this way, the region has chosen their representative, but suddenly the introduction of a region that chose exactly the same way has altered the result. This example should justify my original point. The opinions of these two groups are not in conflict with each other per se, yet their aggregate decision is. If you claim that a region is a fictional entity with no real meaning, I say look at the problem from the regions' perspective and consider the super-region a fictional entity. (This might make it seem odd why they are participating in the exact same election, but it seems less so if they are voting on say, the region's favorite color.) answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments: 1) Range voting isn't a majority method. answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose to exercise it. I greatly appreciate your making this clear! Warren has often argued that Range is *not* really majoritarian when I pointed this out. The main point is of course the question of whether one assumes intelligent voters who vote strategically or dumb voters who vote honestly against their own interest (whatever honestly means with a ratings-based method - more on this below). When we assume intelligent voters, Range is clearly a majoritarian method. I was attempting to make a distinction between an active and a passive majority. Any active majority (one unwilling to make any compromises whatsoever, voting every non-them candidate the lowest possible score) will win. A passive majority (clear majority opinion, but makes compromises) will not necessarily win. I argue this isn't a fault because if a majority is passive then they can arguably be considered to support another candidate the percentage that they voted for him. E.g. their partial vote could be used to form a majority per se. That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other majoritarian method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be because every majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less than 100% of the people (the demos in greek). Often, about 60% of the people can consistently impose their will on the other 40% without the latter being given any means at all by the majoritarian method to influence the decision. Of course, this is a problem of most popular election methods, but that does not mean the problem cannot be solved. Democratic decisions
[EM] Issues with the Majority Criterion
This is my understanding of the majority criterion: If X is supported by =(floor(.5*number_of_voters)+) voters as their first choice, then X should win. If the method doesn't satisfy FBC, how can this be regarding as a good thing, isn't it just making a massive compromising incentive? Does a method count as majoritarian if a majority can impose its will, but doesn't necessarily have to? Also, how do you define membership in a majority. Let's pretend Alice votes Candidate X = 100 Candidate Y = 60 With respect to the majority criterion, does she belong in Camp X, or 100% in Camp X and 60% in Camp Y? The answers to these problem are far from obvious, but I would like to at least address the ambiguity. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Worst Voting Method
What is the worst voting method of all time? I suggest methods already made up I suggest antiplurality, if that doesn't count, then... hmmm... North Carolina's weird version of IRV. http://www.fairvote.org/irv/?page=21articlemode=showspecificshowarticle=2229 40% to win? 40%?! WHY? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Issues with the Majority Criterion
Hi Greg, --- En date de : Mer 15.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : This is my understanding of the majority criterion: If X is supported by =(floor(.5*number_of_voters)+) voters as their first choice, then X should win. What is the meaning of the +? I would say it is that if X is ranked/rated strictly first by more than half of the voters, then X should win. If the method doesn't satisfy FBC, how can this be regarding as a good thing, isn't it just making a massive compromising incentive? It is not regarded as a good thing to fail FBC. I don't understand why you say massive. Methods vary widely with respect to how much compromise incentive they provide. Does a method count as majoritarian if a majority can impose its will, but doesn't necessarily have to? I don't think the term majoritarian has an agreed-upon meaning. The way I define the term, it is not directly related to the majority criterion. But the term majoritarian would be almost meaningless if it meant that a majority always has some method to make their first preference win. Also, how do you define membership in a majority. It depends on the criterion. For the majority criterion simply, membership in the majority is determined by you strictly supporting the same first preference. Let's pretend Alice votes Candidate X = 100 Candidate Y = 60 With respect to the majority criterion, does she belong in Camp X, or 100% in Camp X and 60% in Camp Y? I don't know any definition of the criterion that doesn't refer to first preferences. Even your definition refers to first preferences. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)
Hi Greg, --- En date de : Mer 15.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : On the topic of whether there is a method that satisfies both Condorcet and FBC. There is not. I believe I have demonstrated this in the past, by modifying a Woodall proof that shows Condorcet to be incompatible with LNHarm. http://osdir.com/ml/politics.election-methods/2002-11/msg00020.html claims that any majority method will violate FBC. Note the term *strong* FBC. When FBC is mentioned usually only the weak form is discussed because the strong form is almost impossible to satisfy. Think of it this way, any majority method without equal rankings will always encourage betrayal so that a compromise candidate will get the majoirty thereby sparing you potenial loss. Yes. Anything with equal rankings cannot be a majority method b/c simultaneous majorities will form and only one will win, hence allowing a candidate with a majority to in fact lose. This is avoided by defining the majority criterion to refer to strict first preferences. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Re : Worst Voting Method
Hi Greg, --- En date de : Mer 15.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : What is the worst voting method of all time? I suggest methods already made up I suggest antiplurality, if that doesn't count, then... hmmm... North Carolina's weird version of IRV. http://www.fairvote.org/irv/?page=21articlemode=showspecificshowarticle=2229 40% to win? 40%?! WHY? I don't know the rationale behind North Carolina's rule, but this rule is/was used in Costa Rica for top-two runoff. It's mentioned by Shugart and Carey in their book Presidents and Assemblies. They want to suggest ways to help make presidential democracies less prone to collapse. The idea (theoretically) is to combine the positive aspects of plurality and top-two runoff (i.e. with majority required to win on the first round). Plurality's advantage is that it forces all parties to coalesce around two candidates, increasing the likelihood that the president (which is what the book is about) will have some support in the legislature. The disadvantage is that it can be spoiled by the presence of rather weak candidates. TTR's advantage is that it isn't spoiled as easily. Its disadvantage is that it encourages the nomination of more candidates, and the winners of the first round may be somewhat arbitrary or have little support. Lowering the first-round win requirement to 40% makes it more feasible to win on the first round by collecting enough votes. In turn this makes it seem more dangerous to nominate additional candidates who probably can't win. However, I doubt TTR is similar to IRV with respect to nomination incentive. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Multiwinner Voting Methods Request
There seems to be no shortage of single winner methods. I have learned more single-winner voting methods than I can count on one finger since Saturday. Anyway, a large number of multiwinner methods are critical to the study, so... these are the ones I know exist. STV version of IRNR Schulze STV CPO STV (possibly n!, I don't remember) STV (various counting procedures) Contingent Vote can be made multiwinner Cumulative Vote Quota Borda System (n!) I think SNTV Block Vote Preferential Block Vote Limited Block Vote Single winner methods naively made multiwinner: Approval, Borda, Range... (There is no shortage of these) RRV PAV Proportional Approval Voting (n!) PRV Proportional Range Voting (n!) still working out the bugs in this one. PBV Proportional Borda Voting (n!) I see no reason why it wouldn't work. PCV Proportional Condorcet Voting (n!) same comment as PBV If anyone has more, please tell me. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
