Re: [EM] name of multi-winner method
Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear folks, I forgot the name of the following multi-winner method: 1. Each candidate ranks all candidates, herself on top. 2. Each voter votes for one candidate. 3. The candidate who holds the smallest number of votes is excluded and her votes are transfered to the next candidate on her list who is still in the race. 4. Step 3 is repeated until the sought number of candidates remains. Does anyone know how this is called? Perhaps STV-something? That's just the multiwinner adaptation of IRV. I don't think it has a formal name, but here's how I've defined (naive) multiwinner adaptations in my simulations: Take single-winner method X. Produce a social ordering, then if there are k winners to be elected, pick the k highest ranked on the social ordering, and elect them. The social ordering of IRV is opposite of its elimination order: the one who's eliminated in the first round is ranked last, and so on. -- That is, unless the next candidate on her list is the next candidate on the *candidate*'s list, in which case it would be a sort of STV-Asset/Party-list hybrid. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] name of multi-winner method
I think this method is Warren Smith's multiwinner poorest firstasset voting with predefined lists. 2008/11/16 Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi Kristofer, That's just the multiwinner adaptation of IRV. I don't think so! The point is that the *candidates* provide the ranking from which the vote transfers are determined. The idea is to keep it maximally simple for the voters: they still vote for only one candidate. I now realize that it is also different from STV in an important respect: there is no transfer of excess votes! What I want with this method is a maximally simple multi-winner method that does not rely on lists but is focussed on individual candidates and that makes sure that all large-enough minorities are represented. It is not important that it results in proportionality, hence it needs no transfer of excess votes. Perhaps this is actually a new method? If so, what would we call it? Jobst I don't think it has a formal name, but here's how I've defined (naive) multiwinner adaptations in my simulations: Take single-winner method X. Produce a social ordering, then if there are k winners to be elected, pick the k highest ranked on the social ordering, and elect them. The social ordering of IRV is opposite of its elimination order: the one who's eliminated in the first round is ranked last, and so on. -- That is, unless the next candidate on her list is the next candidate on the *candidate*'s list, in which case it would be a sort of STV-Asset/Party-list hybrid. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- Diego Renato dos Santos Mestrando em Ciência da Computação COPIN - UFCG Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Wiki on Electorama no longer maintained?
Does anybody know why the wiki on www.electorama.com is still not working properly? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] name of multi-winner method
Of course! Thank you very much. I was not aware of the poorest first variant and thought that asset voting always involves a negotiation after the voting. So, it could be called automatic bottom-up asset voting or so... Diego Santos schrieb: I think this method is Warren Smith's multiwinner poorest firstasset voting with predefined lists. 2008/11/16 Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi Kristofer, That's just the multiwinner adaptation of IRV. I don't think so! The point is that the *candidates* provide the ranking from which the vote transfers are determined. The idea is to keep it maximally simple for the voters: they still vote for only one candidate. I now realize that it is also different from STV in an important respect: there is no transfer of excess votes! What I want with this method is a maximally simple multi-winner method that does not rely on lists but is focussed on individual candidates and that makes sure that all large-enough minorities are represented. It is not important that it results in proportionality, hence it needs no transfer of excess votes. Perhaps this is actually a new method? If so, what would we call it? Jobst I don't think it has a formal name, but here's how I've defined (naive) multiwinner adaptations in my simulations: Take single-winner method X. Produce a social ordering, then if there are k winners to be elected, pick the k highest ranked on the social ordering, and elect them. The social ordering of IRV is opposite of its elimination order: the one who's eliminated in the first round is ranked last, and so on. -- That is, unless the next candidate on her list is the next candidate on the *candidate*'s list, in which case it would be a sort of STV-Asset/Party-list hybrid. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info -- Diego Renato dos Santos Mestrando em Ciência da Computação COPIN - UFCG Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] name of multi-winner method
--- On Sun, 16/11/08, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What I want with this method is a maximally simple multi-winner method that does not rely on lists but is focussed on individual candidates and that makes sure that all large-enough minorities are represented. It is not important that it results in proportionality, hence it needs no transfer of excess votes. Why not proportionality if you can also easily get that? There are some problematic cases like many minor (minority) candidates ranking some very popular candidate as their second choice. The minor candidates could also form groups that are likely to get many enough votes to get one of them elected and then all rank each others at top. (Then some same size groups could agree to rank each others next etc.) This way the method could become a bit more proportional. Juho P.S. Yes, this kind of methods are interesting since although this limits voters' freedom to rank candidates a bit this approach makes it possible to support higher number of candidates, keeps voting simple and avoids too short votes, and gives additional information on the opinion of the candidates to the voters (and also binds candidates to this). P.P.S. If one wants to further simplify things one could allow the voters to name groups of voters (= ties allowed, or in practice these groups could have names). And further, one could use a tree like structure of the candidates (except that then we would already almost have party lists that you didn't want). Anyway, good to find a good balance between STV and simpler methods for each need. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
