Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 24, 2011, at 8:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >>> : >>> >>> >> Lundell: >>> >> Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot >>> >> has a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in >>> >> determining a winner. >>> >> >>> >> But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot >>> >> scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or >>> >> one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across >>> >> voters. >>> > >>> > --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, >>> > described here: >>> > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html >>> > the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any >>> > voter who foolishly >>> > uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse >>> > election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap," >>> > this was a "new advance" >>> > because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first >>> > voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest >>> > utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. >>> >>> It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs >>> to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to >>> vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? >>> >>> Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A > >>> B > C. >>> >>> On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but >>> A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? >>> >>> In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than >>> a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. >> >> And if the polls suggest that A & B are strong favorites and C is doing >> poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility? >> >> The point of double-range is that it introduces a small random factor to >> keep you honest. Thus, I don't think most societies would accept it as a >> serious system, but it does demonstrate that cardinal ballots can have a >> "meaning" beyond rankings. > > How does it keep me honest in that scenario? Presumably I'd vote 1-0-0; > what's my motivation to do otherwise? > > > Because there's a small chance that your (first "honest" range) vote actually > will decide between a lottery of some chance of A or C and a certainty of B. > If you haven't voted honestly, then that could make the wrong decision. And > such decisions are all your "honest" ballot is ever used for, so there is no > motivation to strategize with it. > > JQ That's always the case with strategic voting when we don't have perfect knowledge of the other votes. There's a larger chance (in this example) that a sincere vote will cause B to defeat A. The more I know about the state of other voters, the more motivation I have to vote insincerely. This is true, of course, of any manipulable voting rule. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
Hi, It seems to me all Warren is saying is that a more practical definition of meaning would be a practical one. Arrow doesn't care about whether the definition is practical, and as you'd then expect it doesn't happen to be all that practical. The Arrow/Tideman view doesn't even care what the election method is. With the minimal assumption of "top = good" you can aggregate the data on claimed relative preferences. When you have data that can't be interpreted even across two ballots (beyond "they chose to vote like this"), and it is proposed to use that data to pick the winner, that feels unpleasant. I'd be the first to say that every election method is basically just a game. But if it comes in a box with plastic pieces and a spinner, the electorate may not be willing to try it. The will of the people, and democratic legitimacy, is serious business. Everybody's right, basically. I'd note though that I've never seen a simulation or estimation of utility that attempted to incorporate any factor other than how happy people were with the winner. So even if we agree with the primacy of "BR" as an EM criterion, we don't really know what this advises us to do. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
Here's a link to Jobst's definitive posting on individual and social utility: http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-February/019631.html Also, I would like to make another comment in support of Warren's thesis that cardinal range scores are as meaningful or more so than ordinal rankings: Consider that Borda is a method based on rankings. Do the rankings in Borda have the same meaning to the voter as the rankings in IRV do? From Arrow's point of view they do; the ballots are identical in format, and in either case (for a sincere vote) you simply rank A ahead of B if you prefer A over B. But now let's compare Borda with Range; Suppose that there are ten candidates and that the Range ballots ask you to rate them on a scale of zero to nine. On the Borda ballot you are asked to rank them from one to 10. Borda elects the candidate with the "highest" average rank (i.e. the lowest average rank number). Range elects the candidate with the highest average range score. Now, tell me why Arrow worries about the supposed incommensurable ratings on a scale of zero to 9, but sees no problem with the one to ten ranking scale? Note that in this case a scoring challenged voter could rank the candidates, and then subtract their respective ranks from 10 to get evenly spaced range scores on the required scale. Thus 1 , 2, 3, 4, ... 9, 10 transform to 9, 8, 7, 6, ... 1, 0, respectively. [When Borda is counted, this transformation is part of the counting process; Borda elects the candidate with the largest Borda score.] If the scoring challenged voter doesn't like the evenly spaced aspect, there is nothing she can do about it in the ranking context, but in the range context she can adjust some of the ratings to reflect bigger and smaller gaps in preference. > It seems to me that Arrow must want a unique generic meaning > that people can relate to independent of > the voting system. Perhaps he is right that ordinal information > fits that criterion slightly better than > cardinal information, but as Warren says, what really matters is > the operational meaning. > > But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal > rating: if you think that candidate X would > vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then > you could give candidate X a score that > is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible > range values. > > Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. > > Furthermore, with regard to commensurability of range scores, > think of the example that Warren gave in > which the optimum strategy is sincere range strategy; in that > example it makes no difference (except for > ease of counting) whether or not each voter uses a different > range; some could use zero to 100, some > negative 64 to positive 64, etc. A ballot will distinguish > among the two finalist lotteries in the same way > after any affine transformation of the scores. > > A few years ago Jobst gave a rather definitive discussion of > this issue. His investigation led to the result > that ideally the scores should allow infinitesimals of various > orders along with the standard real values > that we are used to. Jobst is skeptical about generic objective > meaning for "utilities," but in the context > of voting, especially "lottery" methods, he can give you a > precise objective meaning of the scores. > > For example, if you have a choice between alternative X or a > coin toss to decide between Y and Z, and > you don't care one whit whether or not X is chosen or the the > coin toss decides between Y and Z, then > (for you)objectively X has a utility value half way between Y > and Z. > > A sequence of questions of this nature can help you rationally > assign scores to a set of alternatives. > > I'll see if I can locate Jobst's results in the archives. > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 24, 2011, at 6:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > > 2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell > On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> >> >> 2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell >> On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: >> >> >> Lundell: >> >> Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot >> >> has a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in >> >> determining a winner. >> >> >> >> But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores >> >> as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of >> >> them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. >> > >> > --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, >> > described here: >> > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html >> > the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any >> > voter who foolishly >> > uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse >> > election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap," >> > this was a "new advance" >> > because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first >> > voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest >> > utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. >> >> It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs >> to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to >> vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? >> >> Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A > B >> > C. >> >> On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but >> A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? >> >> In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a >> 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. > > And if the polls suggest that A & B are strong favorites and C is doing > poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility? > > The point of double-range is that it introduces a small random factor to keep > you honest. Thus, I don't think most societies would accept it as a serious > system, but it does demonstrate that cardinal ballots can have a "meaning" > beyond rankings. How does it keep me honest in that scenario? Presumably I'd vote 1-0-0; what's my motivation to do otherwise? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell > On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > > > 2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell > >> On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: >> >> >> Lundell: >> >> Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot >> has a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in >> determining a winner. >> >> >> >> But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot >> scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one >> of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. >> > >> > --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, >> > described here: >> > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html >> > the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any >> > voter who foolishly >> > uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse >> > election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap," >> > this was a "new advance" >> > because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first >> > voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest >> > utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. >> >> It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score >> needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a >> voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of >> a voter? >> >> Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A > >> B > C. >> >> On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but >> A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? >> >> In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than > a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. > > > And if the polls suggest that A & B are strong favorites and C is doing > poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility? > > The point of double-range is that it introduces a small random factor to keep you honest. Thus, I don't think most societies would accept it as a serious system, but it does demonstrate that cardinal ballots can have a "meaning" beyond rankings. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
On 8/24/2011 2:15 PM, Markus Schulze wrote: ... Well, one of the most frequently used arguments against Condorcet methods is that there are too many Condorcet methods and that there is no agreement on the best one. Markus Schulze Perhaps we can add a statement that says something like: "In most cases the different Condorcet methods identify the same winner. Occasionally they identify different winners, but those situations involve complications that make it difficult to objectively determine which candidate is really the most popular. Each of these Condorcet methods has slight advantages and disadvantages compared to one another, and some are easier to explain than others. Yet in all cases they provide dramatically fairer results compared to plurality voting, and significantly fairer results compared to instant-runoff voting, so any of them is suitable for use in governmental elections." Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > > 2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell > On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: > > >> Lundell: > >> Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot > >> has a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in > >> determining a winner. > >> > >> But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores > >> as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of > >> them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. > > > > --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, > > described here: > > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html > > the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any > > voter who foolishly > > uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse > > election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap," > > this was a "new advance" > > because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first > > voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest > > utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. > > It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs > to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to > vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? > > Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A > B > > C. > > On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 > B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? > > In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a > 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. And if the polls suggest that A & B are strong favorites and C is doing poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell > On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: > > >> Lundell: > >> Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot > has a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in > determining a winner. > >> > >> But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot > scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one > of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. > > > > --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, > > described here: > > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html > > the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any > > voter who foolishly > > uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse > > election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap," > > this was a "new advance" > > because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first > > voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest > > utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. > > It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs > to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to > vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? > > Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A > > B > C. > > On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but > A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? > > In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: >> Lundell: >> Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has >> a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in determining a >> winner. >> >> But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as >> a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, >> is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. > > --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, > described here: > http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html > the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any > voter who foolishly > uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse > election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap," > this was a "new advance" > because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first > voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest > utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A > B > C. On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? > --(2) I agree that it is difficult to measure utilities commensurably > across voters. > However, range voting and double range voting do not do so, and do not > claim to do so. What IS commensurable across voters, are the scores > voters give to candidates (since those by the rules of the voting system > lie within fixed bounds). Double range voting will extract honest > utilities from > each voter, but not commensurably, i.e. with different and not-known scaling > factors for each voter. > > As a result, neither range voting, nor double range voting, are > "perfect" regret-free voting systems, and they were never claimed to > be. What I am claiming, > is that a double range voting ballot (honest part) has a MEANING. It > has a very definite, very unique, very clear, meaning, which due to > the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is clearer than the meaning of > ballots in any (rank-order, deterministic) voting system Arrow ever > considered in his life. NO such rank-order system exists or ever can > exist, in which meaning is as clear as in double range voting. > > Therefore, Arrow's "meaning"-based argument against score-type and in > favor of rank-order-type ballots, is busted and has no validity. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
Why not agree to a shared Condorcet method definition to compete here with Range, etc. Condorct ballot has rank level (unranked is bottom, don't care if voter skips levels (only care when comparing two whether ), properly attend to CW. Have to attend to cycles, but differences here not counted as method differences. Dave Ketchum On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/24 Markus Schulze Hallo, I wrote (24 Aug 2011): > In my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement" > endorses too many alternative election methods. > Opponents will argue that this long list > demonstrates that even we don't have a clue > which election method should be adopted. Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011): > Is that worse than what happens if we can't > agree? Well, one of the most frequently used arguments against Condorcet methods is that there are too many Condorcet methods and that there is no agreement on the best one. Yes. And will not agreeing on a consensus statement help that situation? What I'm saying is: yes, it would be ideal if we could reduce the list and all unite behind one system. But we as voting theorists should be able to find a way to keep this apparently-unattainable ideal from getting in the way of whatever agreement is actually possible. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
2011/8/24 Markus Schulze > Hallo, > > I wrote (24 Aug 2011): > > > > In my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement" > > endorses too many alternative election methods. > > Opponents will argue that this long list > > demonstrates that even we don't have a clue > > which election method should be adopted. > > Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011): > > > > Is that worse than what happens if we can't > > agree? > > Well, one of the most frequently used arguments > against Condorcet methods is that there are too > many Condorcet methods and that there is no > agreement on the best one. > Yes. And will not agreeing on a consensus statement help that situation? What I'm saying is: yes, it would be ideal if we could reduce the list and all unite behind one system. But we as voting theorists should be able to find a way to keep this apparently-unattainable ideal from getting in the way of whatever agreement is actually possible. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
Hallo, I wrote (24 Aug 2011): > In my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement" > endorses too many alternative election methods. > Opponents will argue that this long list > demonstrates that even we don't have a clue > which election method should be adopted. Jameson Quinn wrote (24 Aug 2011): > Is that worse than what happens if we can't > agree? Well, one of the most frequently used arguments against Condorcet methods is that there are too many Condorcet methods and that there is no agreement on the best one. Markus Schulze Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
A SAD weakness about what is being said. On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:55 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Michael Allan wrote: "But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree?" TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. To which Warren Smith responded: "--no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes." Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. BUT there could be many previous ballots of which none made any change. Since, as stated, "A single ballot can change the outcome of an election." and "This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes.", why would a voter prefer a new electoral method over the existing plurality method? From the voter's perspective, (s)he is already familiar with plurality, so , if the new method produces the same result, why change? Truly no reason PROVIDED the new method provides the same result, given the same input. Cui bono? Obviously, not the voter. When considering the 'meaning' of a vote, it is more important to examine the question of what the voter is voting for or against. Voting, of the type used in plurality contests, is profoundly undemocratic, not because of the vote-counting method, but because the people can only vote for or against candidates and issues chosen by those who control the political parties - the people Robert Michels' described as oligarchs. If the object of changing the electoral method is to build a more just and democratic government, the proposed methods must give the people a way to influence the choice of candidates and the issues on which they vote. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I was attempting to use your post-feedback statement as an indication of what methods to include in what I wrote, yet I am not familiar with the variations on Bucklin voting beyond what I read in Wikipedia, so I am certainly open to your suggested edits. Just as you created a version that you expected to change as a result of feedback, I too expect that what I wrote will be changed. As I suggested in another response, I think it would be appropriate to post a Google Docs version for you and others to edit. (In another response I suggested some additional paragraphs, and those can be inserted into the Google Docs version.) I too welcome collaboration in this effort to create a declaration. After all, the whole point of voting methods is to use a well-defined process for arriving at a collaborative decision; in this case we do not have a well-defined process, but basically we are voting for a declaration most of us like. As in voting, everyone deserves an informed vote in the process. Speaking of which, I suggested using our signature lines as a way of indicating which declaration-named election method we most prefer, and that's a way of voting. It will be interesting to see which supporters of which methods sign the document. Admittedly that will place IRV proponents in the awkward position of being tempted to sign it so they can indicate their support for IRV. 0 0 \___/ (I wouldn't be opposed to IRV if there was widespread recognition that it uses the right kind of ballot but the wrong kind of counting. One average-person reaction to this concept was "I didn't know there was more than one way to count a ballot".) Richard Fobes On 8/24/2011 5:27 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I like this version, and would sign on to it, as I would with all the other versions which have been discussed. 2011/8/23 Richard Fobes mailto:electionmeth...@votefair.org>> I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... Yes. I believe that it is worth pointing out specific advantages for different groups, including centrist and extremist voters and major party and insurgent politicians. It may sound contradictory, but reform, by helping cause a healthier dialogue, can benefit all of these groups; the customary zero-sum model does not apply. * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. I like your explicit repetition and variations on "we agree". It works. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world, unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results. We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying problems that waste
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Your suggestions make sense. I suggest that someone post a Google Docs version of this declaration that you and others can edit. I've already expressed my opinions about what should be said. As a clarification, the Condorcet-Kemeny method does not "use the same way to find the CW" as other Condorcet methods. The Condorcet-Kemeny method uses an approach that automatically reveals the overall ranking of all the choices (by considering all possible rankings and finding which ranking has the highest sequence score), and if there is a Condorcet winner, it is always the one at the top. Richard Fobes On 8/23/2011 9:10 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ... * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and frustrated voters to take action, and ... * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms. To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials. This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted. Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long. Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes. Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our real areas of agreement. My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much more enthusiasm. - The Declaration of Election-Method Experts - ** Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when there are more than two candidates. The mention of "two choices" confuses. The kind of ballot to be used must be decided, in at least most cases, before one can be certain how many candidates will be chosen from. If nothing else, write-in candidates can mean the possibility of more choices. Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order: * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are not acceptable * Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels * Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an academically recognized name, but the term "single-mark ballot" can be used to refer to this primitive ballot type. Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known? Single-mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual preferences of voters in elections that have three or more reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results. The Approval ballot allows selecting one or more, but does not allow indicating preference among them. When this same ballot was used in plurality it worked because the voter was only allowed to select one. Perhaps the target of this discussion is desire to indicate more than one AND which are more or less desired. ** In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of the Condorcet method to identify a "Condorcet winner" (who is pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, we support u
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
To Ralph Suter, thank you for your extremely useful feedback! You are the kind of person who is in a position to use our declaration as (for lack of a better metaphor) ammunition in the battles against plurality voting. The fact that you like it reveals that we are on the right track. The fact that you do not find the declaration to be too long is very helpful! I like your idea of emphasizing that these election methods first should to be used in non-governmental organizations as a way of educating voters about what works, and what doesn't. This approach could have prevented the situations in which instant-runoff voting was adopted and then rejected. For this purpose we can add paragraphs such as: -- begin -- "The same election methods we recommend here for governmental elections also can be used for electing officers (such as president, treasurer, and secretary) in an organization. In fact, all(?) of the methods recommended here have been used for officer elections, and the fairer results have been widely appreciated (except by incumbents who were not reelected)." "We unanimously agree that plurality voting should not be used to elect corporate board members. As a replacement we support using the same election methods that we recommend for governmental elections. If legal restrictions only allow plurality voting, we unanimously support legal reforms that allow any one (or more) of the election methods supported here." "The above-recommended election methods also can be used in any organization to make single-choice decisions, such as choosing a new logo, choosing a time or date for an event, and choosing a restaurant for a gathering. However, if one of the choices is to not make a change (such as not changing the organization's logo), then two rounds of voting are needed, with the first round choosing the most popular change, and the second round choosing between that change and not making any change." "Although instant-runoff voting is not being recommended for governmental elections, instant-runoff voting is useful when a small group of people is physically gathered together and does not have access to voting software. In this case paper-based ranked ballots can be collected and then physically sorted into stacks based on the ballot's top-ranked remaining choice. Until one of the ballot stacks contains more than half the ballots, the smallest remaining stack of ballots can be re-sorted based on the voter's next-ranked choice. This approach is much fairer than plurality voting." -- end -- Regarding your comment about 1-2-3 ballots, verbally I have used that name numerous times and it seldom produces the glazed and baffled look I get when I use words like ranked ballot and order-of-preference ballot. In other words, I have been testing it with success. Yet I agree that there might be a better name. I agree that the term "pairwise" would benefit from further explanation. Yet I suspect that if I had done so in the first draft, there would be criticisms from supporters of non-Condorcet methods claiming that the declaration is biased in favor of Condorcet methods. Your feedback reveals that this declaration accomplishes what I had hoped it would accomplish, namely that it would be useful to the many people who want election-method reform, but either don't know what would work (and what wouldn't work), or do know what would work but need evidence (they can give to others) to support their beliefs. Again, thank you! Richard Fobes On 8/23/2011 9:38 PM, Ralph Suter wrote: Several thoughts (not a thorough critique) after one straight-through reading: 1. Length: I agree that for the reasons Richard described, the length of his proposed declaration (less than 2300 words) is appropriate and that trying to shorten it very much would be a mistake. It's long compared to previously proposed versions, but it's still very short compared to, say, a small pamphlet or even a fairly short magazine article, and it's only two to three times the length of a typical US newspaper op-ed article. At the same time, I think it is long enough (or nearly so -- see #5 below) to convey clearly, to a broad non-expert audience, at least the minimum necessary information and explanation. 2. Readability: When opening the email Richard's post was in (I got it along 4 other posts in an issue of Election-Methods Digest), I didn't expect to want to take the time to read it carefully all the way through, but after I started reading, I found it well-written and compelling enough to want to do so -- almost like a "page turner" novel. 3. Language: I'm guessing most readers will find the language clear with just a few exceptions. One exception, for example, may be "pairwise". This is a word most non-expert readers will be unfamiliar with and many may find puzzling and jargon-like. To find other exceptions, a variety of non-expert readers should be aske
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
What those considering, or later doing, Condorcet voting should consider. Fred's last principle, about participation, caught my eye. Those writing of Condorcet voting often promote formally ranking all candidates (the least liked retains its position even if the only one not formally ranked). I read that as excessive since it goes against the principle by demanding more effort than useful in properly choosing as winner. To clarify: Assuming a voter has found ranking A to be satisfying "the full extent of the individual's desire and ability", then ranking only A is a proper vote and would have the same effect as a similar vote in FPTP. Note that in FPTP voters often are tortured by wanting to vote for more than one, but being unable to. Assuming a voter has found A & others to be equally satisfying "the full extent of the individual's desire and ability", then ranking them alike is a proper vote and would have the same effect as a similar vote in Approval. Assuming a voter has found A & B, with A preferred, to be satisfying "the full extent of the individual's desire and ability", but showing preference by ranking both with A higher than B is doable here, though not in FPTP or Approval. Combinations of the above ranking are permitted, leaving as many as the voter may choose at the bottom (unranked) level. Dave Ketchum On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:57 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: If one wishes to "distribute a formal statement of the election- method principles that we agree upon.", would it not be wise to start by finding out which principles command agreement? Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the principles before attempting a formal statement. One possibility might start something like this: Electoral Method Principles: * Principles express a consensus. * No principle has primacy over another principle. * Any principle can be challenged by rational argument. Principles of human interaction: * The interactions between humans is known as politics. * The scope of politics is immense. * The immensity of politics requires organization. * The first step of forming an organization is to define its principles. Principles of government: * The people have the right to define their government. * The Electoral Method must implement government by the people. * Government by the people means that every individual in the society can participate in the political process to the full extent of the individual's desire and ability. It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in the discussion must define the principles important to them, and should do so before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by all members. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
On 8/24/2011 6:39 AM, Markus Schulze wrote: ... in my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement" endorses too many alternative election methods. Opponents will argue that this long list demonstrates that even we don't have a clue which election method should be adopted. Markus Schulze I agree it would be advantageous to shorten the list of supported election methods. However, the methods you and I would remove are supported by other potential signers, and they would want to remove what you and I support. As someone (Jameson Quinn?) earlier said, we are "splitting the vote" in our opposition to plurality voting. Ironically, as election-method experts, we know we can't even vote on what to include in our recommendation list, because we wouldn't be able to agree on which voting method to use, and which choices to rank or score. My software negotiation tool at www.NegotiationTool.com attempts to provide a way to resolve such disagreements, but so far I haven't received any feedback about that tool from election-method experts. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Your implication (at the bottom of your message) that our goal should be to create something that is "supported by all members" is impractical. (As we know, a consensus requirement easily leads to a dictatorship by someone "holding out" for their favorite "cause".) I agree with Jameson Quinn that we should try to "write a statement, then see who objects to what." Already that approach is revealing new information. The key word is "try". If we don't succeed and very few people want to sign it, then we have still learned a lot. I am interested in your specific feedback about what you like and dislike about the declaration. If you dislike most of the declaration, then I encourage you to do what I did in response to the previous declaration, which is to write an alternate version. Richard Fobes On 8/24/2011 9:57 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote: If one wishes to "distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon.", would it not be wise to start by finding out which principles command agreement? Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the principles before attempting a formal statement. One possibility might start something like this: Electoral Method Principles: * Principles express a consensus. * No principle has primacy over another principle. * Any principle can be challenged by rational argument. Principles of human interaction: * The interactions between humans is known as politics. * The scope of politics is immense. * The immensity of politics requires organization. * The first step of forming an organization is to define its principles. Principles of government: * The people have the right to define their government. * The Electoral Method must implement government by the people. * Government by the people means that every individual in the society can participate in the political process to the full extent of the individual's desire and ability. It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in the discussion must define the principles important to them, and should do so before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by all members. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
I think that, in discussing the statement specifics, we are discussing our shared principles. And I think that people are more likely to participate when it relates to a specific draft statement. As a python programmer, one of my community's maxims is "It's better to ask forgiveness than permission". In programming practice, what that means is that often the best way to find out how something is broken is to try to use it in a real-world task and see what happens. Not smart when fixing airplanes, but in the realm of ideas or software, where you can fix most anything once you understand the error, it works out. And the application to the current case is: assume we agree and write a statement, then see who objects to what. JQ 2011/8/24 Fred Gohlke > If one wishes to "distribute a formal statement of the election-method > principles that we agree upon.", would it not be wise to start by finding > out which principles command agreement? > > Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the > principles before attempting a formal statement. One possibility might > start something like this: > > Electoral Method Principles: > > * Principles express a consensus. > > * No principle has primacy over another principle. > > * Any principle can be challenged by rational argument. > > > Principles of human interaction: > > * The interactions between humans is known as politics. > > * The scope of politics is immense. > > * The immensity of politics requires organization. > > * The first step of forming an organization is to define its > principles. > > > Principles of government: > > * The people have the right to define their government. > > * The Electoral Method must implement government by the people. > > * Government by the people means that every individual in the > society can participate in the political process to the full > extent of the individual's desire and ability. > > It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an > example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in the > discussion must define the principles important to them, and should do so > before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by all members. > > Fred Gohlke > > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
If one wishes to "distribute a formal statement of the election-method principles that we agree upon.", would it not be wise to start by finding out which principles command agreement? Perhaps it would be better to take one step back and jointly define the principles before attempting a formal statement. One possibility might start something like this: Electoral Method Principles: * Principles express a consensus. * No principle has primacy over another principle. * Any principle can be challenged by rational argument. Principles of human interaction: * The interactions between humans is known as politics. * The scope of politics is immense. * The immensity of politics requires organization. * The first step of forming an organization is to define its principles. Principles of government: * The people have the right to define their government. * The Electoral Method must implement government by the people. * Government by the people means that every individual in the society can participate in the political process to the full extent of the individual's desire and ability. It is not my place to list the principles for this board, except as an example, so the foregoing is merely a suggested outline. Participants in the discussion must define the principles important to them, and should do so before attempting a formal statement alleged to be supported by all members. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
Michael Allan wrote: "But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree?" To which Warren Smith responded: "--no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes." Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. Since, as stated, "A single ballot can change the outcome of an election." and "This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes.", why would a voter prefer a new electoral method over the existing plurality method? From the voter's perspective, (s)he is already familiar with plurality, so , if the new method produces the same result, why change? Cui bono? Obviously, not the voter. When considering the 'meaning' of a vote, it is more important to examine the question of what the voter is voting for or against. Voting, of the type used in plurality contests, is profoundly undemocratic, not because of the vote-counting method, but because the people can only vote for or against candidates and issues chosen by those who control the political parties - the people Robert Michels' described as oligarchs. If the object of changing the electoral method is to build a more just and democratic government, the proposed methods must give the people a way to influence the choice of candidates and the issues on which they vote. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the "meaning" of a vote (or lack thereof)
> Lundell: > Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a > pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in determining a > winner. > > But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as > a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is > that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, described here: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any voter who foolishly uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap," this was a "new advance" because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. --(2) I agree that it is difficult to measure utilities commensurably across voters. However, range voting and double range voting do not do so, and do not claim to do so. What IS commensurable across voters, are the scores voters give to candidates (since those by the rules of the voting system lie within fixed bounds). Double range voting will extract honest utilities from each voter, but not commensurably, i.e. with different and not-known scaling factors for each voter. As a result, neither range voting, nor double range voting, are "perfect" regret-free voting systems, and they were never claimed to be. What I am claiming, is that a double range voting ballot (honest part) has a MEANING. It has a very definite, very unique, very clear, meaning, which due to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is clearer than the meaning of ballots in any (rank-order, deterministic) voting system Arrow ever considered in his life. NO such rank-order system exists or ever can exist, in which meaning is as clear as in double range voting. Therefore, Arrow's "meaning"-based argument against score-type and in favor of rank-order-type ballots, is busted and has no validity. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring, version
2011/8/24 Markus Schulze > > > in my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement" > endorses too many alternative election methods. > Opponents will argue that this long list > demonstrates that even we don't have a clue > which election method should be adopted. > > Is that worse than what happens if we can't agree? Jameson Quinn Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
> > > Again I choke on IRV getting near Condorcet, even though they use the same > ballot. > > I've seen several results arguing for Condorcet/IRV hybrids as having good strategy resistance compared to other Condorcet methods. For instance, http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/FORTHCOMING/I29P1f.pdf . Tideman, for instance, is on record as supporting such a hybrid as the best realistic method. At a more basic level, I think that if we're going to reach consensus, it's important to not be to facile about shooting down methods others favor. I hear several Condorcet advocates reacting to the statement by repeating pro-Condorcet arguments, essentially saying that they are reluctant to sign something which advocates methods they consider inferior to Condorcet. If we have to decide whether Condorcet is better or Approval is better [1] before we have a statement, we're never going to get anywhere. JQ [1] See http://www.cs.brown.edu/~ws/personal/approval.pdf for an example of an argument that Approval is better than Condorcet. I'm not trying to fan the flames here, I'm just trying to illustrate that there are two sides to this issue. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
