Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Greg Nisbet wrote:



On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 3:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:


If you like Range, this may be to your advantage, since you could
say that instead of there being only one Condorcet method that
satisfies FBC, there are none at all, or if there is, that this
method must be very obscure indeed.

 
Before writing this, I knew there were about five versions of Minmax, 
all possessing different properties. I think there is one version that 
satisfies CW but not CLoser and various other weird combinations of 
properties such as that. On the topic of whether there is a method that 
satisfies both Condorcet and FBC. 
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.election-methods/2002-11/msg00020.html claims 
that any majority method will violate FBC. 


Strong FBC. But that's already been answered. Even so, I don't think 
there's a method that satisfies both weak FBC and Condorcet. If there 
is, I'm unfamiliar with it; but the simulations results given at 
http://www.mail-archive.com/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/msg06443.html 
may show that Schulze, while technically failing FBC, does so rarely.



2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two
constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner?
Condorcet methods are not additive, this calls into question the
actual meaning of being elected by a Condorcet method.


I'd consider this problem similar to Simpson's paradox of the means,
where one can have trends that go one way for the means of two
separate groups, but where this trend reverses if the groups are
aggregated. It's unintuitive, but doesn't invalidate the use of
means in statistics. 

 
ONE CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE: Simpsons paradox relies on comparing fractions 
with different denominators to mask statistics. (I know it isn't 
necessarily fractions, it is just different results compared against 
each other that are weighted differently in the final average, but 
'denominator' is easier to say/explain than this sentence.)
 
Here is why that analogy fails:

We are not using different districts for each candidate.
 
Let's say I can divide country X two ways. Into Y1 and Y2 and into Z1 and Z2
 
The consistency criterion states that if I divide my country into Y1 and 
Y2 and both of them are a victory for candidate A and B wins this IS a 
violation of the consistency criterion.
 
Now let's say that for candidate A I divide it into Y1 and Y2 and for 
Candidate B I divide into Z1 and Z2. In addition to this division not 
making sense, let's say A did manage to win twice (however that work 
work). B wins. This DOES NOT constitute a violation of the consistency 
criterion. The regions you are dividing the country into have exactly 
the same weight for every single candidate.
 
The Simpson's paradox is impossible if I am always comparing data of 
like weights.


It can still happen if the method in question weights raw data 
differently, depending on the circumstances. While thinking about this, 
I found an example for Range with Warren's no opinion feature. Consider 
this case:


There are two candidates: A and B, and also two districts.

Range-10 with the no-opinion option.

For the first district, there are 31 voters. All of them have an opinion 
of A, and only 18 of them about B. The magnitude (total) is 200 for A 
and 108 for B, so that you get mean 6.45 for A and mean 6 for B.


For the second district, there are 30 voters. All of them have an 
opinion of B, but only 13 of them about A. The magnitude for A is 124, 
and for B, 280, so the average for A is 9.54, and for B, 9.33 (both 
candidates are very well liked here).


Now, you may guess what happens next. If we sum this up, there are 44 
voters who had an opinion about A, and 48 about B. The total magnitudes 
are 200+124 = 324 for A, 108+280 = 388 for B. Thus B wins with an 
average score of 8.08 against A's 7.36.


For Condorcet, I'll be more general and say that the reason is that when 
it's using a completion method, some preferences count more than others. 
Because the data is broken down from orderings to pairwise preferences, 
that means that some ballot may have an effect on many preferences (the 
direction of the beatpaths or whatever), while others have an effect on 
relatively fewer. The argument would be weakened if one could find a 
consistency failure example where all three ballot groups (two districts 
and sum) produce a CW.


That doesn't "justify" a Condorcet method, though. For that, I'll say 
that consistency is unnecessarily strict. The only methods that pass it 
are those that are summable with vectors of size equal to or less than 
the number of candidates; meaning Approval, Range (without no-opinion), 
and weighted positional methods.


Compression is a problem. A makeshift attempt to avoid it might cause 
more harm than good though. The fact of the matter is that Range at 
least allows voters to express 

Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Jobst Heitzig wrote:

Dear Kristofer,

you wrote:
This is really a question of whether a candidate loved by 49% and 
considered kinda okay by 51% should win when compared to a candidate 
hated by the 49% and considered slightly better than the first by the 
51%. A strict interpretation of the majority criterion says that the 
second candidate should win. The spirit of cardinal methods is that 
the first candidate should win, even though it's possible to make 
cardinal methods that pass strict Majority.


What does this "spirit" help when the result will still be the 2nd 
instead of the 1st candidate, because the method is majoritarian despite 
all cardinal flavour?


Again looking at my 55/45-example shows clearly that compromise 
candidates are not helped by voters' ability to express cardinal 
preferences but rather by methods which require also majority factions 
to cooperate with minorities in their own best interest, as is the case 
with D2MAC and FAWRB.


Would you bother to answer me on this?


Sorry about that. Because I've been away for some time, I've got a long 
backlog of posts, and I'm working my way through them.


Let's look at your example.

55: A 100 > C 80 > B 0
45: B 100 > C 80 > A 0

Range scores are 5500 for A, 4500 for B, and 8000 for C. So C wins. For 
Condorcet, A wins because he's the CW. So Condorcet is strictly 
majoritarian here, while Range is not.


You may say that, okay, the A voters will know this and so strategize:

55: A 100 > C 1 > B 0
45: B 100 > C 80 > A 0

In which case A wins. This, I think, is what Greg means when he says 
that a majority can "exercise its power" if it knows that it is, indeed, 
a majority.


As far as I understand, the methods you refer to aim to make this sort 
of strategy counterproductive.


Because Range isn't majoritarian by default, it doesn't elect A in your 
honest-voters scenario. I would say that from this, it's less 
majoritarian, because majorities don't always know that they are 
majorities. However, it's still more majoritarian than your random 
methods, because in the case that the majority does coordinate, it can 
push through its wishes.


To answer your question: the spirit helps because majorities are not 
always of one block, or the same. You have shown that it's possible to 
be less majoritarian than Range, though.


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Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Raph Frank]

On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 3:17 AM, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> This is called Cardinal Condorcet or something like that and is detailed
> here: http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/cwp13.htm

This is interesting.

I am unsure why the voter has to submit both a ranked list and a rated
ballot, especially since they have to be consistant with each other.
Surely, the rankings can be inferred from the ratings.

I guess some voters might just want to cast a rankings ballot and be
done with it.  In that case, they can just rate 9-8-7-6-5-4 ...
(though it does mean that they have to reverse order from a normal
ranking ballot).

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Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Greg,

--- En date de : Mer 15.10.08, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> On the topic of whether there is a method that
> satisfies both
> Condorcet and FBC.

There is not. I believe I have demonstrated this in the past, by modifying
a Woodall proof that shows Condorcet to be incompatible with LNHarm.

> http://osdir.com/ml/politics.election-methods/2002-11/msg00020.html
> claims
> that any majority method will violate FBC.

Note the term *strong* FBC. When FBC is mentioned usually only the weak
form is discussed because the strong form is almost impossible to satisfy.

> Think of it this
> way, any
> majority method without equal rankings will always
> encourage betrayal so
> that a compromise candidate will get the majoirty thereby
> sparing you
> potenial loss.

Yes.

> Anything with equal rankings cannot be a
> majority method b/c
> simultaneous majorities will form and only one will win,
> hence allowing a
> candidate with a "majority" to in fact lose.

This is avoided by defining the majority criterion to refer to strict
first preferences.

Kevin Venzke


  

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Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Greg Nisbet]

On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 3:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Greg Nisbet wrote:
>
>> Reasons why Range is better and always will be.
>> I would like to end the truce.
>>  I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest something
>> reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.
>>  Property Related:
>> favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.
>> Implications:
>> 1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate your favorite
>> candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy favorite betrayal is an
>> obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of its glaring flaws
>> (clone dependence *cough*)
>>
>
> MMPO's greatest flaw isn't clone dependence but indefensible Plurality
> failure. Consider this case (by Kevin Venzke):
>
>  A > B = C
>   1 A = C > B
>   1 B = C > A
>  B > A = C
>
> C wins.
>
> Also, MMPO isn't technically a Condorcet method, since it doesn't pass
> Condorcet. Here's another example, also by Venzke:
>
> 30 B>C=A
> 19 A=B>C
> 51 A=C>B
>
> The Condorcet Winner is C, but A wins in MMPO.
>
> If you like Range, this may be to your advantage, since you could say that
> instead of there being only one Condorcet method that satisfies FBC, there
> are none at all, or if there is, that this method must be very obscure
> indeed.
>

Before writing this, I knew there were about five versions of Minmax, all
possessing different properties. I think there is one version that satisfies
CW but not CLoser and various other weird combinations of properties such as
that. On the topic of whether there is a method that satisfies both
Condorcet and FBC.
http://osdir.com/ml/politics.election-methods/2002-11/msg00020.html claims
that any majority method will violate FBC. Think of it this way, any
majority method without equal rankings will always encourage betrayal so
that a compromise candidate will get the majoirty thereby sparing you
potenial loss. Anything with equal rankings cannot be a majority method b/c
simultaneous majorities will form and only one will win, hence allowing a
candidate with a "majority" to in fact lose. You are right. Until a few days
ago, I didn't know that much about MinMax, I just remembered hearing
something about a MinMax variation that obeyed FBC and later-no-harm. I
assumed it was a Condorcet method, incorrectly.

>
> 2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two
>> constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner? Condorcet methods
>> are not additive, this calls into question the actual meaning of being
>> elected by a Condorcet method.
>>
>
> I'd consider this problem similar to Simpson's paradox of the means, where
> one can have trends that go one way for the means of two separate groups,
> but where this trend reverses if the groups are aggregated. It's
> unintuitive, but doesn't invalidate the use of means in statistics.


ONE CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE: Simpsons paradox relies on comparing fractions with
different denominators to mask statistics. (I know it isn't necessarily
fractions, it is just different results compared against each other that are
weighted differently in the final average, but 'denominator' is easier to
say/explain than this sentence.)

Here is why that analogy fails:
We are not using different districts for each candidate.

Let's say I can divide country X two ways. Into Y1 and Y2 and into Z1 and Z2

The consistency criterion states that if I divide my country into Y1 and Y2
and both of them are a victory for candidate A and B wins this IS a
violation of the consistency criterion.

Now let's say that for candidate A I divide it into Y1 and Y2 and for
Candidate B I divide into Z1 and Z2. In addition to this division not making
sense, let's say A did manage to win twice (however that work work). B wins.
This DOES NOT constitute a violation of the consistency criterion. The
regions you are dividing the country into have exactly the same weight for
every single candidate.

The Simpson's paradox is impossible if I am always comparing data of like
weights.

>
>
> answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments:
>> 1) Range voting isn't a majority method.
>> answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose to exercise it.
>> concession: it is true that Condorcet methods solve the Burr Dilemma
>> fairly well because parties can simultaneously compete for majorities and
>> swap second place votes. Range Voting can at best allow voters to
>> differentiate between better and worse candidates by one point. So Range's
>> ability to emulate this behavior is competitive.
>>  I am not aware of another anti-range voting property one could claim that
>> is applicable to cardinal methods.
>>
>
> This is really a question of whether a candidate loved by 49% and
> considered kinda okay by 51% should win when compared to a candidate hated
> by the 49% and considered slightly better than the first by the 51%. A
> strict interpretation of the majority criterion says that the sec

Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Kristofer,

you wrote:
This is really a question of whether a candidate loved by 49% and 
considered kinda okay by 51% should win when compared to a candidate 
hated by the 49% and considered slightly better than the first by the 
51%. A strict interpretation of the majority criterion says that the 
second candidate should win. The spirit of cardinal methods is that the 
first candidate should win, even though it's possible to make cardinal 
methods that pass strict Majority.


What does this "spirit" help when the result will still be the 2nd 
instead of the 1st candidate, because the method is majoritarian despite 
all cardinal flavour?


Again looking at my 55/45-example shows clearly that compromise 
candidates are not helped by voters' ability to express cardinal 
preferences but rather by methods which require also majority factions 
to cooperate with minorities in their own best interest, as is the case 
with D2MAC and FAWRB.


Would you bother to answer me on this?

Yours,
Jobst

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Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Greg Nisbet wrote:

Reasons why Range is better and always will be.
I would like to end the truce.
 
I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest something 
reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.
 
Property Related:

favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.
Implications:
1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate your favorite 
candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy favorite betrayal is 
an obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of its glaring 
flaws (clone dependence *cough*)


MMPO's greatest flaw isn't clone dependence but indefensible Plurality 
failure. Consider this case (by Kevin Venzke):


 A > B = C
   1 A = C > B
   1 B = C > A
 B > A = C

C wins.

Also, MMPO isn't technically a Condorcet method, since it doesn't pass 
Condorcet. Here's another example, also by Venzke:


30 B>C=A
19 A=B>C
51 A=C>B

The Condorcet Winner is C, but A wins in MMPO.

If you like Range, this may be to your advantage, since you could say 
that instead of there being only one Condorcet method that satisfies 
FBC, there are none at all, or if there is, that this method must be 
very obscure indeed.


2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two 
constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner? Condorcet 
methods are not additive, this calls into question the actual meaning of 
being elected by a Condorcet method.


I'd consider this problem similar to Simpson's paradox of the means, 
where one can have trends that go one way for the means of two separate 
groups, but where this trend reverses if the groups are aggregated. It's 
unintuitive, but doesn't invalidate the use of means in statistics.



answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments:
1) Range voting isn't a majority method.
answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose to exercise it.
concession: it is true that Condorcet methods solve the Burr Dilemma 
fairly well because parties can simultaneously compete for majorities 
and swap second place votes. Range Voting can at best allow voters to 
differentiate between better and worse candidates by one point. So 
Range's ability to emulate this behavior is competitive.
 
I am not aware of another anti-range voting property one could claim 
that is applicable to cardinal methods.


This is really a question of whether a candidate loved by 49% and 
considered kinda okay by 51% should win when compared to a candidate 
hated by the 49% and considered slightly better than the first by the 
51%. A strict interpretation of the majority criterion says that the 
second candidate should win. The spirit of cardinal methods is that the 
first candidate should win, even though it's possible to make cardinal 
methods that pass strict Majority.


Another argument against Range as a cardinal method might be that it 
suffers from compression incentive (with complete knowledge, the best 
strategy is to, for each candidate, either maximize or minimize the 
rating given). Something like, say, a Condorcet method where rating A 
100 and B 20 gives A>B 80 points would not be as susceptible to this 
(though it would probably be vulnerable to other strategies).



Computational Complexity (time):
Range O(c*v)
RP O(c^2*v+c^3) #c^2*v = constucting matrix; c^3 finding local maximum 
or generating implications c^2 many times.
 
Range Voting is more scalable.


I don't think this is much of a concern. With modern computers, voters 
will have trouble ranking all the candidates long before the computers 
that do the counting would exhaust CPU processing power, and that'll 
hold as long as the complexity is a reasonably sized polynomial.



Voter Experience:
 
Range Voting (based on the existence of Amazon product ratings, youtube 
video ratings, hotornot.com , the number of movies 
rated out of stars.) I cannot find a single instance of Condorcet 
methods besides elections in various open source communities. It doesn't 
qualify as mainstream.


http://en.oreilly.com/oscon2008/public/schedule/detail/3230 mentions 
that MTV uses Schulze, internally. The French Wikipedia, as well as the 
Wikimedia Foundation in general, also uses Schulze. The Wikipedia 
article on the Schulze method also lists some other organizations that, 
while small, are not communities organized around open source.



Understandability:
 
Range Voting (I dare anyone to challenge me on this)
 
Bayesian Regret:
 
Range Voting (same comment)


Granted, though DSV methods based on Range do better (and may help with 
the compression incentive - I'm not sure, though). If they help 
sufficiently that one doesn't have to min-max in order to get the most 
voting power, it would keep Range from degrading to Approval and thus 
(absent other problems) fix the "Nader-Gore-Bush" problem (where Nader 
voters don't know whether they should approve Nader and Gore or just Nader).



Ballot expressiveness:
 
For elections with less than 100 candidate

Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

--- En date de : Sam 11.10.08, Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> De: Greg Nisbet <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Objet: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am 
> Gregory Nisbet)
> À: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Samedi 11 Octobre 2008, 2h01
> Reasons why Range is better and always will be.
> I would like to end the truce.
> 
> I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they
> suggest something
> reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.

I suggest Condorcet//Approval with ranking among disapproved candidates
disallowed. Though apparently you are adamant about Clone-Winner
compliance.

(I also suggest my FBC tweak of this method, but then we have exited 100%
Condorcet compliance.)

> Property Related:
> favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.
> Implications:
> 1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate
> your favorite
> candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy
> favorite betrayal is an
> obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of
> its glaring flaws (clone dependence *cough*)

MMPO fails clone independence rarely; the difficulty with it is its 
potential to give absurd results failing Woodall's Plurality criterion
(is how I would describe it).

> 2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region
> into two
> constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner?

I would say it doesn't matter. I'd also say that in reality, Range isn't
better, even if technically it doesn't seem to have this problem. So 
it's purely a theoretical concern.

> Condorcet methods
> are not additive, this calls into question the actual
> meaning of being
> elected by a Condorcet method.

It would, if one did not know what the meaning is. Of course the CW is
not selected on some additive reasoning.

> answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments:
> 1) Range voting isn't a majority method.
> answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose
> to exercise it.

The reason this is not a satisfying answer is that when a method is a
"majority method" this means that the majority does not have to get
together before the election, identify themselves as being a majority,
and settle on a singular goal.

Otherwise almost every method is a "majority method" in your sense.
Plurality is one too.

> concession: it is true that Condorcet methods solve the
> Burr Dilemma fairly
> well because parties can simultaneously compete for
> majorities and swap
> second place votes. Range Voting can at best allow voters
> to differentiate
> between better and worse candidates by one point. So
> Range's ability to
> emulate this behavior is competitive.

That is a charitable description of Range's capability here, since
with good strategy the differentiation between any two candidates is
either zero or the entirety of the range.

Really though, I do not think Condorcet is too great in this respect.

> Understandability:
> 
> Range Voting (I dare anyone to challenge me on this)

Jobst criticizes that the numbers are meaningless. I would not criticize
this, except that it does not even seem to be possible to use strategy
to come up with a practical meaning of the intermediate ratings.

I could imagine someone perhaps complaining that the meaning of rankings
is not clear. (Perhaps they believe real preference rankings are not always
transitive.) But when you know what the rankings are supposed to do and
when and how to use them effectively under whatever method, you can still
figure out the practical meaning of a ranking, even if it does not mirror
your real and complete sentiments.

With Range this seems lacking.

> Bayesian Regret:
> 
> Range Voting (same comment)

This is trivial to dispute unless you claim that everybody is voting
sincerely under Range. Or, you claim that Warren's simulations do not
have all the limitations that they actually do. In these cases, no, that
cannot be disputed, that Range reigns supreme.

> Ballot expressiveness:

Pure expressiveness is useless. What should be compared instead is the
degree of expression possible after rational strategy is employed.

> Bottom line:
> 
> Range: You can express apathy, but you take your life in
> your hands.

On the contrary, you take your life in your hands when you do not
use the min/max ratings. That is why I prefer Approval: Why invite the
voter to take their life in their hands when it is totally unnecessary?

>  If I overlooked something or made an error, please tell
> me; I'm just a high
> school student.

I wonder if the CRV is your introduction to voting systems? I am a little
curious where the Range advocates come from.

Kevin Venzke
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


  

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Re: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Terry Bouricius]

Greg,

If one limits criteria to the few you selected, Range "looks" good. I will set 
aside for the moment the fundamental issue of whether mixing different 
individuals' different scoring standards can convey any real meaning ( the 
difference in candidate "quality" between candidates you score 8 and 10 may be 
ten times greater than the difference your neighbor assigns to candidates 
scored 2 and 10), and just speak about other criteria.

Personally, I agree that the Condorcet-winner criterion is not as significant 
as it sounds (we may not be looking at a single solid majority, but rather 
antagonistic divergent majorities). I think the mutual-majority criterion is 
more significant (and Range violates it).  However, I think the Condorcet-loser 
criterion is a show stopper. If a candidate would lose in every single 
one-on-one match up, then that candidate should not win. But such a Condorcet 
loser can indeed win under Range voting.

I also believe the later-no-harm criterion is of crucial importance, which 
Range fails. 

Range is more prone to strategic voting manipulation than either IRV or 
Condorcet (see analysis by James Green-Armytage in his doctoral paper  linked 
on this list a couple of months ago).

Range is also more prone to spoiler scenarios than IRV or Condorcet-compliant 
methods, because the score a voter assigns is dependent on what other 
candidates are, or are not in the race to compare with. 

Beyond the realm of standard criteria, I am also concerned about the effect 
different voting methods have on candidate campaign behavior, and resulting 
voter information. Some voting methods discourage candidates from revealing 
their true positions on controversial issues, if avoiding voter alienation is 
more crucial than earning first-preference support (this can be true of both 
Range and Condorcet).

Terry Bouricius

- Original Message - 
  From: Greg Nisbet 
  To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com 
  Sent: Saturday, October 11, 2008 3:01 AM
  Subject: [EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry;I 
am Gregory Nisbet)


  Reasons why Range is better and always will be.
  I would like to end the truce.

  I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest something 
reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.

  Property Related:
  favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.
  Implications:
  1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate your favorite 
candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy favorite betrayal is an 
obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of its glaring flaws (clone 
dependence *cough*)
  2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two 
constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner? Condorcet methods are 
not additive, this calls into question the actual meaning of being elected by a 
Condorcet method.

  answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments:
  1) Range voting isn't a majority method.
  answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose to exercise it. 
  concession: it is true that Condorcet methods solve the Burr Dilemma fairly 
well because parties can simultaneously compete for majorities and swap second 
place votes. Range Voting can at best allow voters to differentiate between 
better and worse candidates by one point. So Range's ability to emulate this 
behavior is competitive.

  I am not aware of another anti-range voting property one could claim that is 
applicable to cardinal methods.

  Computational Complexity (time):
  Range O(c*v) 
  RP O(c^2*v+c^3) #c^2*v = constucting matrix; c^3 finding local maximum or 
generating implications c^2 many times.

  Range Voting is more scalable.

  Voter Experience:

  Range Voting (based on the existence of Amazon product ratings, youtube video 
ratings, hotornot.com, the number of movies rated out of stars.) I cannot find 
a single instance of Condorcet methods besides elections in various open source 
communities. It doesn't qualify as mainstream.

  Understandability:

  Range Voting (I dare anyone to challenge me on this)

  Bayesian Regret:

  Range Voting (same comment)

  Ballot expressiveness:

  For elections with less than 100 candidates Range voting is more 
expressive
  (If anyone thinks about advocating Condorcet for large numbers of 
candidates, think again. Sorting candidates is an O(nlogn) problem. AND that's 
only if you have O(logn) memory available, otherwise its O(n^2). In short, you 
would need to be a genius or have large amounts of time on your hands to do 
this properly. Range Voting does not have this problem)
   Expressing apathy: Okay Condorceties, you got me. voter ignorance in 
Schulze and RP can be expressed with (somewhat) less bias than Range Votings- X 
marks. For those of you who don't believe me, consider the following thought 
experiment: I rate Candidate A 70 (which I cons

[EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

[Greg Nisbet]

Reasons why Range is better and always will be.
I would like to end the truce.

I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest something
reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.

Property Related:
favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.
Implications:
1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate your favorite
candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy favorite betrayal is an
obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of its glaring flaws
(clone dependence *cough*)
2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two
constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner? Condorcet methods
are not additive, this calls into question the actual meaning of being
elected by a Condorcet method.

answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments:
1) Range voting isn't a majority method.
answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose to exercise it.
concession: it is true that Condorcet methods solve the Burr Dilemma fairly
well because parties can simultaneously compete for majorities and swap
second place votes. Range Voting can at best allow voters to differentiate
between better and worse candidates by one point. So Range's ability to
emulate this behavior is competitive.

I am not aware of another anti-range voting property one could claim that is
applicable to cardinal methods.

Computational Complexity (time):
Range O(c*v)
RP O(c^2*v+c^3) #c^2*v = constucting matrix; c^3 finding local maximum or
generating implications c^2 many times.

Range Voting is more scalable.

Voter Experience:

Range Voting (based on the existence of Amazon product ratings, youtube
video ratings, hotornot.com, the number of movies rated out of stars.) I
cannot find a single instance of Condorcet methods besides elections in
various open source communities. It doesn't qualify as mainstream.

Understandability:

Range Voting (I dare anyone to challenge me on this)

Bayesian Regret:

Range Voting (same comment)

Ballot expressiveness:

For elections with less than 100 candidates Range voting is more
expressive
(If anyone thinks about advocating Condorcet for large numbers of
candidates, think again. Sorting candidates is an O(nlogn) problem. AND
that's only if you have O(logn) memory available, otherwise its O(n^2). In
short, you would need to be a genius or have large amounts of time on your
hands to do this properly. Range Voting does not have this problem)
 Expressing apathy: Okay Condorceties, you got me. voter ignorance in
Schulze and RP can be expressed with (somewhat) less bias than Range
Votings- X marks. For those of you who don't believe me, consider the
following thought experiment: I rate Candidate A 70 (which I consider a good
score) and express apathy about Candidate B. I may think 70 is a damn good
score, but this might hurt my cause. I'll call this apathy-participation
failure. In contrast, apathy in Schulze and RP is strictly worse (to the
extent that participation failure allows) than support over ANY candidate.
Think of it this way, let ~ be the apathy comparison; (A > B) > (A ~ B) > (A
< B) in RP and Schulze. Now, the argument could be made for Range Voting
that (A = 100 B = 0) > (A = X B = 0) > (A = 0 B = 100), but this neglects
some important points. In Schulze and RP I am expressing apathy about A
SINGLE COMPARISON. This means I can leave the choice of, say, the two best
members of my party to the members of my party. I can still vote them
superior to all others without bothering to make an internal ranking.
Strictly speaking, Range Voting also somewhat has this property: I could
vote both 100, but the comparison is less explicit and less isolatable and
hence less expressive in this sense.

e.g. A = 100, B = 80, C = X, D = 60, E = 0
If I like A more than B, like C less than B, but am apathetic about C vs D I
am out of luck. Depending on C's average so far, my ballot could influence
the result any number of ways. I need to anticipate in advance what the
average is LIKELY to be.

So... bottom line on apathy.

Bottom line:

Schulze and RP: Precise expression on what exactly it is that you are
apathetic about in such a way that it doesn't spill over into other
comparisons.

Range: You can express apathy, but you take your life in your hands. On the
other hand, your ballot is more expressive

Bottom Bottom line:
Range voting is better for expressiveness (taken as a whole)
Condorcet is better for isolating comparisons, but is less expressive with
each comparison.

Most of these arguments favor Range Voting, there are two (and only two)
that do not:
1) the result of apathy can be unpredicatble in RV
2) a passive majority (one that doesn't exercise its majoritarian might) is
not assured victory.

The rest of the arguments favor Range Voting. Range Voting is victorious.

 If I overlooked something or made an error, please tell me; I'm just a high
school student.

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