Re: [EM] Why do voters vote?
There is an obvious aspect to this that is often overlooking in attempts to understand and predict voter behavior, which is that human beings are social animals and act not just for their own welfare, but for the welfare of the society. To understand the behavior of social animals, one must look not just from the perspective of a society's welfare being some kind of sum of individual welfare values, but also as if the society is itself a kind of decision-making organism, making decisions on behalf of the society as a whole. Society here can range from a small collection of individuals all the way up to every member of a species, and maybe even more than that. In analyzing elections, we may think of collections of voters who act coherently, and the application of game theory as if there is no issue of common welfare, of, say, voting as a ritual in which a collective good is developed (or attempted), is going to be impoverished. As has been pointed out, the individual expected value of voting is miniscule, being the probability that my vote will affect the outcome, times the value of that outcome over the other possibilities, which usually is only one (in partisan elections in the U.S., I have in mind). But I don't vote because of that expected value; rather I behave as part of a whole class of voters who, in some way or other, think like me. Voting is a ritual in which we engage for the value that the participation itself gives us, a sense of satisfaction, perhaps, at having fulfilled a civic duty, and, collectively, of having exercised the power we have instead of taking no responsibility for it. Different voters may have different motivations, and many may never even give the expected value of voting a second thought. They know instinctively that by voting they are participating in something larger than themselves. At that moment, we are making a decision, or trying to. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why do voters vote?
Terry Bouricius wrote: Perhaps most voters are fundamentally not behaving AS INDIVIDUALS, but as a part of a collective ...in solidarity with a team of fellow citizens (or party members, members of an ethnic group, or whatever). Analysis that focuses on the choices of individuals can miss the social aspect of voting, which may be more fundamental. (I suspect the fundamental reasons must be social. There's a satisfying symmetry to it then, because the higher purpose of voting is definitely social.) Some voters may, however, participate as individuals simply because it gives them a feeling of satisfaction. In Bryan Caplan's book, _The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies_, he presents a theory of rational irrationality. He argues that voters rationally choose to vote irrationally (in terms of policy), because the psychological satisfaction of voting in line with one's (erroneous) beliefs outweighs the risk of negative outcomes from that action (since each vote has virtually zero impact on the outcome.) Another perspective: consider other modes of rationality aside from instrumental reason. Instrumental reason posits an objective world that is to be manipulated (pulling levers as it were). But social theory also allows for other worlds, including a subjective (inner) world, and an inter-subjective (social) world. These can have their own particular rationalities (none the less rational or reasonable for that). This is a fascinating topic, that makes the debates about methods, or ordinal vs. cardinal voting seem a bit lacking. I agree, it could open doors. Why vote? Consider a linguistic perspective. Voting can be viewed as a form of self-expression, essentially a form of speech. Why speak? Phrased this way, the question leads into language-based social theory, which might be made serviceable for voting. Practical angle: If voting is a form of speech, then maybe it ought to be as free, easy and ubiquitous as the natural forms I agree, or a simple nod of the head directed at an interlocutor. So we could make the *form* of the vote flexible enough to contain the rational *substance* (the particular why) without distorting it. Then the sum of all these high-fidelity votes might amount, in the end, to a substansive democracy. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why do voters vote?
This is getting too deep in some ways. I buy Terry's collective and think of the rope in a tug of war. We had an election in my village last month. We do Plurality and have local parties (involving national parties would distract from considering local issues - also, few consider themselves members of these local parties) and 800 voters: I, the ins, would like to continue. C would like to throw all the bums out. There has been much controversy this past year. 4 trustee positions: C won each by a dozen votes. Agreement that I had failed to do well. Mayor (I) reelected by a dozen votes. Agreement, though weak, that he was not to blame for what had happened. Certainly no single voter decided the election, but they did know that a very few, together, staying home or getting out and voting, could have affected which way the rope went. I do not see social above - people are affected by, and care about, how well the village board attends to their needs. When I read of rational irrationality below, I wonder if the real topic may be deciding how to measure and add up conflicting needs and desires. Dave Ketchum. On Apr 17, 2010, at 6:52 AM, Michael Allan wrote: Terry Bouricius wrote: Perhaps most voters are fundamentally not behaving AS INDIVIDUALS, but as a part of a collective ...in solidarity with a team of fellow citizens (or party members, members of an ethnic group, or whatever). Analysis that focuses on the choices of individuals can miss the social aspect of voting, which may be more fundamental. (I suspect the fundamental reasons must be social. There's a satisfying symmetry to it then, because the higher purpose of voting is definitely social.) Some voters may, however, participate as individuals simply because it gives them a feeling of satisfaction. In Bryan Caplan's book, _The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies_, he presents a theory of rational irrationality. He argues that voters rationally choose to vote irrationally (in terms of policy), because the psychological satisfaction of voting in line with one's (erroneous) beliefs outweighs the risk of negative outcomes from that action (since each vote has virtually zero impact on the outcome.) Another perspective: consider other modes of rationality aside from instrumental reason. Instrumental reason posits yan objective world that is to be manipulated (pulling levers as it were). But social theory also allows for other worlds, including a subjective (inner) world, and an inter-subjective (social) world. These can have their own particular rationalities (none the less rational or reasonable for that). This is a fascinating topic, that makes the debates about methods, or ordinal vs. cardinal voting seem a bit lacking. I agree, it could open doors. Why vote? Consider a linguistic perspective. Voting can be viewed as a form of self-expression, essentially a form of speech. Why speak? Phrased this way, the question leads into language-based social theory, which might be made serviceable for voting. Practical angle: If voting is a form of speech, then maybe it ought to be as free, easy and ubiquitous as the natural forms I agree, or a simple nod of the head directed at an interlocutor. So we could make the *form* of the vote flexible enough to contain the rational *substance* (the particular why) without distorting it. Then the sum of all these high-fidelity votes might amount, in the end, to a substansive democracy. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Why do voters vote?
Michael, Frank, Fred, et. al. I have changed the subject line for this epicyclical discussion on why voters vote. There has been some interesting writing about disputes over the value of rational choice theory, especially as applied to voting. Since a single voter's vote has almost no chance of having any impact, it is rational to avoid the burden of learning about candidates, and of course rational to not vote if it takes any effort at all. However, most voters who do vote do undertake at least a little effort to learn about some candidates, and bother to vote. Either they are deluded and irrational (which is certainly a reasonable conclusion), or they participate for other reasons. Perhaps most voters are fundamentally not behaving AS INDIVIDUALS, but as a part of a collective ...in solidarity with a team of fellow citizens (or party members, members of an ethnic group, or whatever). Analysis that focuses on the choices of individuals can miss the social aspect of voting, which may be more fundamental. Some voters may, however, participate as individuals simply because it gives them a feeling of satisfaction. In Bryan Caplan's book, _The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies_, he presents a theory of rational irrationality. He argues that voters rationally choose to vote irrationally (in terms of policy), because the psychological satisfaction of voting in line with one's (erroneous) beliefs outweighs the risk of negative outcomes from that action (since each vote has virtually zero impact on the outcome.) This is a fascinating topic, that makes the debates about methods, or ordinal vs. cardinal voting seem a bit lacking. Terry Bouricius - Original Message - From: Michael Allan m...@zelea.com To: election-meth...@electorama.com Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2010 3:27 AM Subject: Re: [EM] How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes ... Consider these two facts: 1. Current voting methods lack the Nash-redeeming addition. In a typical election, no individual vote has any effect on the result. The effect is exactly zero. 2. Voters nevertheless turn out in large numbers. It follows that the individual voter is *not* attempting to affect the results... Raph Frank wrote: Another way of phrasing it would be that people see value in increasing their side's total number of votes... Thus, each vote does in fact count. You may say that, but it does not follow from the facts. The fact of a particular effect does not reveal the purpose of the act. A vote may have any number of particular and general effects, including the shifting of a digit or two in a register somewhere (as you suggest), but no single one of them (nor even the sum) need be of importance to the voter. What does follow is a conclusion from the counterfact. Where a given effect is *not* present, and where no rational actor could expect it, we may safely conclude that it was *not* the purpose of the act. Therefore the facts *do* support this conclusion: The individual voter is *not* attempting to affect the results of the election. Also, each person's vote might make a difference. In actuality, however, it makes no difference to the election. Do you not agree? Time and time again the voter casts her vote, and never once does it have an effect on the results. Yet, come the next election, there she is, once again, casting her vote. Negative implications of this: Nash's theorem (with or without fuzzy logic) is inapplicable. More generally, purposive-rational models of ego-centric behaviour are unlikely to be made serviceable for voting theory. Positive implications: We could look at the real reasons for voting. (Why do people keep doing it? What do they hope for?) We could re-build our theories and re-design our voting methods accordingly. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why do voters vote? (or why do we even bother to have elections?)
On Apr 15, 2010, at 9:46 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote: There has been some interesting writing about disputes over the value of rational choice theory, especially as applied to voting. Since a single voter's vote has almost no chance of having any impact, it is rational to avoid the burden of learning about candidates, and of course rational to not vote if it takes any effort at all. However, most voters who do vote do undertake at least a little effort to learn about some candidates, and bother to vote. Either they are deluded and irrational (which is certainly a reasonable conclusion), or they participate for other reasons. Perhaps most voters are fundamentally not behaving AS INDIVIDUALS, but as a part of a collective ...in solidarity with a team of fellow citizens (or party members, members of an ethnic group, or whatever). Analysis that focuses on the choices of individuals can miss the social aspect of voting, which may be more fundamental. Some voters may, however, participate as individuals simply because it gives them a feeling of satisfaction. In Bryan Caplan's book, _The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies_, he presents a theory of rational irrationality. He argues that voters rationally choose to vote irrationally (in terms of policy), because the psychological satisfaction of voting in line with one's (erroneous) beliefs outweighs the risk of negative outcomes from that action (since each vote has virtually zero impact on the outcome.) This is a fascinating topic, that makes the debates about methods, or ordinal vs. cardinal voting seem a bit lacking. i do *not* think that it makes the debates about methods, etc. lacking at all. it brings the debate to a fundamental level. why do we even *have* voting and participatory democracy? what problem or exercise are we trying to solve by having elections? (alternatives could include qualifying examinations, can you imagine how poorly Bush would have done if he had to pass a meaningful written exam to become president?) when we keep those fundamental questions in mind, we might be able to debate meaningfully about election methods. i also think that this Nash thingie is a non-issue. and i continue to think that, on a fundamental level, if participatory democracy and equal weighting of every participating citizen's vote are axiomatic, then Condorcet is the *only* sensible method, the only issue is, in the unlikely case of a cycle, how to meaningfully resolve that cycle (Schulze is probably the best but Tideman is likely to get the same outcome and is more transparent and easier for One person, one vote yahoos to understand). the alternative (to Condorcet) is that we possibly elect someone when a majority of us agree that another *specific* candidate is a better choice. (and how can that be democratic?) it's amazing to me that this was known about for 2 centuries and never adopted in any governmental election method, and it's amazing to me that FairVote passed over Condorcet in favor of STV when introducing and selling Preferential Voting to various governments. it was and continues to be a big mistake and we need to continue to hold Rob's feet to the fire about that. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
