date:20060706

Hello Norman,

Le 05-juil.-06, à 19:17, Norman Samish a écrit :

Dear Bruno,

You have, more than once, referred to something I (jokingly) said a month ago:
"I've endured this thread long enough! Let's get back to something I can understand!"
I said this because I am hungry for more informed speculation on "Why does anything exist?" and related questions.

All right. Thanks for your kind reply.

Most recently you have very kindly offered to help me understand some of the foundation concepts you are so proficient at.

I have spent years doing scientific Fortran programming, and am already familiar with elementary math concepts such as trig, number bases, statistics, differential equations and the like. It even makes sense to me that natural numbers are countable and real numbers are not.

OK.

However my aged brain is unable, or perhaps unwilling, to exert the time and effort it would take for me to learn concepts such as eigenvalues, diagonalization, Godel's incompleteness theorem, Turing's proof that no algorithm can solve the halting problem, the Universal Dovetailer Argument, etc.

I respect this. Perhaps in time ;-)
If you just remember what a fortran program is, you would be astonished how simple the diagonalization are. I wish you just remain open to get it one day or another. (Two years ago I succeed in explaining the diag trick to a 98 years student, who made a carrier in the human sciences. It just take times, but it is worth of it).
I did react perhaps a little bit strongly, and this is probably related to, well, let us say a future thread, because there is one point where I am, well I mean where comp is closer to Jesus than to Pythagoras, which is that the "theological message" of the universal machine is really universal, all lobian machine can get it: no elitism, no Homo Superior. Some person can be more efficient, more competent, more rapid, ... but no universal machine display behavior unreachable by any other (universal) machine. Pythagorean sectary friendship leads to elitism if not really just corporatism ...

I accept those and many other concepts on faith - enough respected experts (such as yourself) affirm their truth that I have no doubt that they are correct.
Computationalism makes sense to me, and I do not accept this quote from a recent book: "… human cognition is too rich to be simulated by computer programs" (Horgan and Tienson 1996, p. 1).

Reductionist conception of numbers and machines are alas widespread. Incredibly enough, from Pythagoras to Proclus, the greek intellectuals were aware that numbers could have some non reductionist (indeed theological) interpretations. Plotinus (+/- 250 after JC) is almost two millenia in advance in his treatise on "Number". Since Post, Turing, Markov, ... mathematician *knows* that very weak form of computationalist philosophy entails the complete and fatal breakdown of any reductionist conception of numbers, machine, ... Somehow we know that we will never really know what numbers are and what is possible for them.

Thanks again for your offer, but I do not want you to spend your valuable time attempting to get blood from a turnip.

No problem, you are welcome, in any case feel free to ask any questions, or to make any remark.

You know, to understand the result I got, people must understand something in a first stage, and then, in a second stage, they must understand that a lobian machine can understand "in some precise (and a bit technical) sense" that same something, this leads to an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus hypostases including a "complete" theory of the platonician notion of matter/evil.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Only logic is necessary?


Le 05-juil.-06, à 15:55, Lennart Nilsson a écrit :

William S. Cooper says: ”The absolutist outlook has it that if a logic is valid at all it is valid period. A sound logic is completely sound everywhere and for everyone, no exceptions! For absolutist logicians a logical truth is regarded as ‘true in all possible worlds’, making logical laws constant, timeless and universal.”
Where do the laws of logic come from? he asks the absolutist.
Bruno?



If you believe in the more primary notion of arithmetical truth (for example if you believe that proposition like "317 is prime" are independent of you) then you can justify classical logic by the Plato Realm (perhaps limited to numbers and their relations), and the many logics will be filtered through the "mind" of the consistent extension of machines.
Classical logic is the best tool machines can have to go beyond classical logics.
But logic and logics are not fundamental, with comp those emerge from numbers. And nobody knows where numbers come from, and with comp, we can understand what it must be so.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Number and function for non-mathematician


Le 05-juil.-06, à 20:36, George Levy a écrit :

My background is more engineering and physics than mathematics and I do share some of Norman misgivings. Some of it has to do with terminology. For example the term "COMP hypothesis" does not carry any information. 

One of my old name for it was "digital mechanism hypothesis"


Would it be more appropriate to rename it as an invariance, equivalence or conservation law? For example would it be appropriate to call it "invariance of consciousness with (change in physical) substrate?"

It is more the assumption that there is a level of description of myself such that my consciousness is indeed invariant for functional digital substitution made at that level.
You can invoke "physical" but then you must make the proof a bit longer. This is due to the fact that the UDA put doubt on the very meaning of the word physical, so you need to justify that the use of "physical" is harmless in the definition of comp.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: A calculus of personal identity



Le 04-juil.-06, à 23:37, Lee Corbin a écrit :

> Bruno had written
>
>> [Lee wrote]
>> What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know
>> that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated,
>> but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates,
>> and then one of the duplicates is vaporized and the other
>> returned to your bed completely unaware?
>>
>> Zero?  (I.e., you don't survive the "teleportation" aspect at all.)
>>
>> One-half?  (I.e., your soul goes into one at random, and if that's
>> the one that dies, then your number is up.)
>>
>> One?   (I.e., Stathis will wake up in bed for sure tomorrow, and
>> resume his life just as he has done everyday (since our
>>  fiendish experiments began when he was five years old))
>
> and then Bruno said: "Interesting question. I am interested in your
> own answer. I let Stathis answer (to see if he will give the comp one).
> Note that the comp answer here is not needed in the UDA argument where
> overlapping reconstitution (like in duplications) are never followed by
> somethings which looks (at least) like a murder."
>
>
> Well, in the first place, I assume that when a question is asked of
> anyone on this list, EVERYONE is invited to answer. Certainly when
> I ask any question, it is for everyone, even if it's true that at
> the moment I seem more interested in some particular person's answer.

Me too. Now when threads interferes I ask

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: A calculus of personal identity



Le 06-juil.-06, à 17:02, Bruno Marchal a écrit :

>
>
> Le 04-juil.-06, à 23:37, Lee Corbin a écrit :
>
>> Bruno had written
>>
>>> [Lee wrote]
>>> What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know
>>> that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated,
>>> but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates,
>>> and then one of the duplicates is vaporized and the other
>>> returned to your bed completely unaware?
>>>
>>> Zero?  (I.e., you don't survive the "teleportation" aspect at all.)
>>>
>>> One-half?  (I.e., your soul goes into one at random, and if that's
>>> the one that dies, then your number is up.)
>>>
>>> One?   (I.e., Stathis will wake up in bed for sure tomorrow, and
>>> resume his life just as he has done everyday (since our
>>>  fiendish experiments began when he was five years old))
>>
>> and then Bruno said: "Interesting question. I am interested in your
>> own answer. I let Stathis answer (to see if he will give the comp 
>> one).
>> Note that the comp answer here is not needed in the UDA argument where
>> overlapping reconstitution (like in duplications) are never followed 
>> by
>> somethings which looks (at least) like a murder."
>>
>>
>> Well, in the first place, I assume that when a question is asked of
>> anyone on this list, EVERYONE is invited to answer. Certainly when
>> I ask any question, it is for everyone, even if it's true that at
>> the moment I seem more interested in some particular person's answer.
>
> Me too. Now when threads interferes I ask



... then I realize I could only say tautologies here, and that I didn't 
need to send a post, but apparently my computer takes the initiative to 
send the message. Sorry for that everything-spam.
Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive 
(anybody can answer by principle of a mailing list), and nominal 
question when thread interferes makes possible to send less mails. But 
I agree here I miss miserably ...

I take the opportunity to ask you Lee what is your expectation in front 
of the running of a Universal
Dovetailer?
Like with Stathis (and with some other a longer time ago) I feel like 
you understand the six first steps of UDA, including the 1-person 
indeterminacy (which is independent on the identity question as we have 
already agreed sometimes ago); so I am very interested if you get the 
seventh one, that is the reversal (with the extravagant hypothesis that 
there is a physical universe).
(Step eight will eliminate that "extravagant" hypothesis from the 
reasoning, but is not the current main point, if I can say).

Bruno


PS I take the opportunity to repeat that I do not pretend that Hal 
Finney or even Schmidhuber and others are wrong in their "complexity 
based" approach to the measure problem, just that they does not provide 
explanations how their approaches make the first person white rabbit 
disappearing (but I' sure Kolmogorov complexity could play some key 
role, and I encourage those interested to dig deeper. Wei Dai has 
already mentionned the remarkable book by Li and Vitanyi (Springer 
Verlag 1993). We tackle an hard problem: it is not a luxe to approach 
it in different ways.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Only logic is necessary?

2006-07-06 Thread John M




--- Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> 
> John M wrote:
> > Dear Lennart,
> > I did not read Cooper's argumentation, but would
> like to learn (I don't 
> > believe he explained that) with what kind of
> logical system is he capable of 
> > thinking except for the ONE which our mind
> provided - within the 
> > circumstances and evolutionary process (I call the
> 'history' of this entire 
> > universe: evolution)
> > we 'live' in?
> > Whatever one imagines is human-bound.
> 
> Cooper argues that making decisions in accordance
> with logic is an evolved behavoir - so he would 
> agree that it is very much "within the circumstances
> and evolutionary process".  He further argues 
> that classical logic is not the evolutionarily
> stable form of logic, i.e. it not the most fit form 
> of cogitation in our present evolutionary situation.
>  He contemplates more advanced logics that 
> would include more of what we think of as decision
> theory.
> 
> I highly recommend his book, "The Evolution of
> Reason".
> 
> Brent Meeker
> 
> 
>
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
>Thanks for the book-recommendation, as I wrote I will
get it (when I manage to get 'moving out' and go to a
library).  

I think I misread the "classical" distinction.

I also think that any evolutionary situation (decision
theory et al.) are still within "human" thinking in
the "percept of reality" as interpreted into the
mind's "model" of the entirety, not - as you easily
said - "reality" itself (if it exists at all as we
think of it).

John Mikes
(as not identical to our models). 

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Re: Only Existence is necessary?

2006-07-06 Thread Tom Caylor


Thanks for the diagonalization solution.  I apologize for the delay.
4th of July holiday, and now I'm busy.  I will try to give my
particular response to the diagonalization solution in the next day or
so.  I hope that my responses are representative of at least some other
people.  I think a few others give their responses, like Quentin, and I
appreciate it because then I know I'm not the only one.  3rd person
plural is better than 3rd person.  ;)

Tom

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 02-juil.-06, à 08:44, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> > My point is that of the thread title "Only Existence is necessary?"
> > Not that observers are necessary for existence, but that existence is
> > insufficient for meaning.  I'm still holding out for Bruno to work the
> > rest of his diagonalization tricks to maybe try to prove otherwise.
>
>
> OK, and I'm sorry for the interruption. I am also troubled by Norman's
> post, I am afraid he loses the track just for reason of notation. The
> beauty of recursion theory is that you can arrive quickly, without
> prerequisites, to startling fundamental results.
>
> Now, as I said recently, it is really the UD Argument (UDA) which makes
> mental and physical existence secondary to arithmetical truth. The diag
> stuff just isolates a more constructive path so as to make comp
> testable.
>
> Somehow I agree with you: existence (being physical, mental, or
> numerical) is not enough for meaning, but once we assume comp, meaning,
> seen as first person apprehension, is, by definition, related to some
> relative computations.
>
> Now the main point is perhaps that although existence is not enough, it
> is not necessary either. And that is what really UDA shows, mental and
> physical existence are appearances (locally stable for purely number
> theoretical reasons) emerging from arithmetical truth.
>
> Comp gives a way to progress without relying on the mystery of first
> person quale (which makes meaning meaning), nor on the mystery of
> quanta existence.
>
> Our qualitative belief in numbers remains a mystery, like the truly
> qualitative part of qualia.
>
> Don't expect from the diagonalization posts that I solve *that*
> mystery, although it can be argued, assuming comp and self-referential
> correctness, that the lobian interview gives the closer third person
> explanation of why the first persons cannot escape the percept of many
> non communicable mysteries. I would bet consciousness is one of them,
> but hardly the only one. That consciousness is a mystery would already
> follow if you accept the following weak definition of consciousness.
> Consciousness as a qualitative part of an anticipation of (a) reality.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Only Existence is necessary?

2006-07-06 Thread Tom Caylor

Tom Caylor wrote:
> 3rd person plural is better than 3rd person.  ;)
>
> Tom

Or as the "wisest person in history" wrote in his Ecclesiastes:

"Two are better than one...A cord of three strands is not quickly
broken."

I think there is wisdom in looking at what the ancient intellects
wrote, and making connections to our present day perspective.  Even
this process itself is taking advantage of a 3rd person plural
perspective, in order to try to see invariance.  Sort of like
integrating data from telescopes located at different places on the
earth to get a better image, the further apart the better.

Tom

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SV: Only logic is necessary?

2006-07-06 Thread Lennart Nilsson









Bruno;

According
to Cooper classical analysis is plain bad biology, and not a matter of
subjective judgement or philosophical preferens (such as taking atithmetical
truth for granted). I think this is where he would say your whole castle in the
sky tumbles, and that has nothing to do with trying to find a fault in your
argument J

 









Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] För Bruno Marchal
Skickat: den 6 juli 2006 11:53
Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Ämne: Re: Only logic is necessary?



 


Le 05-juil.-06, à 15:55, Lennart Nilsson a écrit :

William
S. Cooper says: ”The absolutist outlook has it that if a logic is valid
at all it is valid period. A sound logic is completely sound everywhere and for
everyone, no exceptions! For absolutist logicians a logical truth is regarded
as ‘true in all possible worlds’, making logical laws constant,
timeless and universal.”
Where
do the laws of logic come from? he asks the absolutist.
Bruno?






If you believe in the more primary notion of arithmetical truth (for example if
you believe that proposition like "317 is prime" are independent of
you) then you can justify classical logic by the Plato Realm (perhaps limited
to numbers and their relations), and the many logics will be filtered through
the "mind" of the consistent extension of machines.
Classical logic is the best tool machines can have to go beyond classical
logics.
But logic and logics are not fundamental, with comp those
emerge from numbers. And nobody knows where numbers come from, and with
comp, we can understand what it must be so.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Only Existence is necessary?



George Levy wrote:

> Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This
> is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain
> the physics and the objects.
>
> This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether
> for waves to propagate? The most up-to-date answer is that  waves carry
> their own "physical substrate." They can be waves and/or particles.
> Similarly there should be equivalence between information and
> matter/energy. Thus a process or algorithm should have inherently within
> itself its own physical substrate.
>
> Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon)

Inasmuch as it is, it isn't somethign that can be equated
with physical properties. Inasmuch as it is something that can be
equated
with physical properties, it isn't observer-dependent.

> this issue brings us
> back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have
> to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the
> mind-body problem.
>

> If I say something to you in Sanskrit you will likely not understand it.
> It will carry zero information. However If I say it in English you will
> be much more likely to understand it.
>
> If I say to you that your name is Lee Corbin, it will not add any
> information to what you already know. Again, it will carry zero
> information.
>
> This is what Shannon calls Mutual Information. In the first case *you*
> don't have the decoder to translate Sanskrit to English. In the second
> case you have the decoder but for *you*, the information is not new: you
> already know that your name is Lee Corbin. Old information is no
> information at all.
>
> Received mutual information is dependent on the information that already
> exists in the mind of the receiver (or observer). In this sense
> Shannon's information theory is a relativity theory of information just
> like Galileo's dynamics and Einstein's relativity are relativity
> theories of physics and just like Everett's interpretation is a
> relativity theory of quantum events.


That's "mutual" information as opposed to other kinds...like
the kind that can be equated with the non-observer-dependent quantity
of entropy.


> George


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Re: Only Existence is necessary?

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi Bruno,
>
> Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
> > Dear Stephen,

> Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me relative
> computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they are in
> platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is
> sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by instantiated.

Being one of a number (0 <= N <= oo) of possible tokens of a type;
existing
in a space-time location, in the case og physical instantiation.

Instantiation is a one-many relationship. One type, many tokens
(instances).

In Platonia, there is exactly one of everything.

There can also be 0 instances -- non-instantiation. Which neatly
solves the Harry Potter/White Rabbuit problem. We do
not see WR/HP universes, because we are instantiated and they
are not.

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Re: Only Existence is necessary?



Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism.

Your version does. Computationalism is standardly
"the thesis that cognition is computation."

In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and
(standard) computationalism. You have bundled them together into
"comp".


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Existence, individuation, instantiation



Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Dear Quentin et al,
>
> I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm
> itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for
> mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation
> in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can
> be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have.
>
> AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any
> property, including properties that involve some notion of chance.

The existence of some (abstract, theoretical, hypothetical)
thing involves all the properties associated (theoretically)
with it. The existence of a camel entails the existence
if a hump. The existence of a unicorn would entail the
existence of a horn.

>First of
> all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable with, an
> object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well.
>
> http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence
>
>
> Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a predicate
> "since it individuates its subject by being its bounds" [from the above web
> reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of
> relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as algorithms and
> thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If
> Existence individuates an entity by "being its bounds" then it seems to
> follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no relationship
> between entities can obtain.
> I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he deals
> with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but
> nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain
> anything that is even close to a notion of implementation.
>
> also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/
>
> Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the
> properties that are brought into our thinking on this.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms "cast
> imperfect shadows" or even why such "shadow casting" was necessary...
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: 
> Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM
> Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
>
>
>
> Hi Hal,
>
> Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
> > What, after all, do these principles mean?  They say that the
> > implementation substrate doesn't matter.  You can implement a person
> > using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same.  But if there is no way
> > in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this
> > philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning.
> > The MWI doesn't change that.
>
> That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that
> physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, there
> is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be
> instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary.
>
> Quentin

Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Lee,
>
> I have no qualms with your point here, but it seems that we have skipped
> past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability
> and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if
> "process" is merely a "relation" between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?!
>
> In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a
> first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish
> one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another.

Things that physically exist , exist in specific spatio-temporal
locations. the fact that something exists in this place rather
than that place is indeed a fact over and above the intrinisc
properties
of the thing.

> The property of
> individuation requires some manner of distinguishability of one "thing",
> "process", etc. from another. Mere existence is insufficient.
> We are tacitly assuming an observer or something that amounts to the
> same thing any time we assume some 3rd person PoView and such is required
> for any coherent notion of distinguishability to obtain and thus something
> "to whom" existence means/affects.
>
> We can go on and on about relations between states, numbers, UDs, or
> whatever, but unless we have a consistent way to deal with the source of
> individuation and thus distinguishability, we are going nowhere...
> 
> Onward!
> 
> Stephen


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Re: Only Existence is necessary?

1Z wrote:

> > Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism.

> Your version does. Computationalism is standardly
> "the thesis that cognition is computation."

> In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and
> (standard) computationalism. You have bundled them together into
> "comp".

The Yes-Doctor scenario using Bruno-comp should really be
a case of saying "yes" to the proposal:

"I'm just going to shoot you. I'm
not going to make the slightest effort to reconsitute you,
teleport you, computerise you, or anything else.
You already exist in Platonia, you always did, and you will continue to"

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Symmetry, Invarance and Conservation (Was Number and function for non-mathematician)

2006-07-06 Thread George Levy

In the July 1-7 2006 edition of New Scientist there is a review of the
book "The Comprehensible Cosmos" by Victor Stenger. You can see here a power
point presentation on symmetry by Stenger.

Stenger discusses the idea of symmetry, in particular the work of Emmy
Noether who proved that the conservation of energy is a direct
consequence of time translation symmetry: the same result is obtained
if an experiment is performed now or at a different time.

Other natural laws can be traced to other symmetries: i.e.,
conservation of momentum to space translation symmetry etc...

I think it may be valuable to express some of our ideas as
symmetries/invariances/conservation/equivalence. For example the
invariance/conservation of information with regard to the recording
substrate is obvious. Information does not change if you transfer it
from your hard drive to your floppy (ie., hardware translation
symmetry.) This fact, however, may be of far reaching consequence. If
one assumes that consciousness is a type of information then
consciousness become independent of its physical basis: "The message is
independent of the medium!" Or even better: "The message needs no
medium!" Marshall McLuhan got it all wrong!
:-)

George Levy

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 05-juil.-06, à 20:36, George Levy a écrit :

My background is more engineering and physics than
mathematics and I do share some of Norman misgivings. Some of it has
to do with terminology. For example the term "COMP hypothesis" does
not carry any information.

One of my old name for it was "digital mechanism hypothesis"

Would it be more appropriate to rename it as an
invariance,
equivalence or conservation law? For example would it be appropriate
to call it "invariance of consciousness with (change in physical)
substrate?"

It is more the assumption that there is a level of description of
myself such that my consciousness is indeed invariant for functional
digital substitution made at that level.

You can invoke "physical" but then you must make the proof a bit
longer. This is due to the fact that the UDA put doubt on the very
meaning of the word physical, so you need to justify that the use of
"physical" is harmless in the definition of comp.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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RE: A calculus of personal identity


Brent writes

> Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming 
> different people; it 
> seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the 
> people you know just as 
> much as if they were clones of yourself.

So I suppose that day by day you become someone different?

If you were to get an unexpected call during the next hour,
would that make you a different person than you would have
become without the call?

Lee


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RE: A calculus of personal identity

Stathis writes and Brent evidently is not one to resist a good pun

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself
> > that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me
> > they were, the worse it would be.
> 
> A sobering reflection. ;-)

An interesting psychological difference. About 35 years ago, I asked
my long since deceased father what would be his reaction to a duplicate.
He was very quick to assert that they would not get along at all. I
have always wondered at that: why exactly would someone not like
himself?

(Of course, the joke would be on me if I found out that all my duplicates
had very annoying personal mannerisms, and that the very sounds of their
squeeky high pitched voices irritated the hell out of me.)

I have always imagined that my duplicates and I would embrace with a
love truer than long-lost brothers.  I fancy that I would like myself
a great deal  :-)

Lee

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Re: A calculus of personal identity


Lee Corbin wrote:
> Brent writes
> 
> 
>>Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming 
>>different people; it 
>>seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the 
>>people you know just as 
>>much as if they were clones of yourself.
> 
> 
> So I suppose that day by day you become someone different?
> 
> If you were to get an unexpected call during the next hour,
> would that make you a different person than you would have
> become without the call?
> 
> Lee

Sure - a little different, even it were expected.

Brent Meeker

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Re: A calculus of personal identity


Lee Corbin wrote:
> Brent writes
> 
> 
>>Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming 
>>different people; it 
>>seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the 
>>people you know just as 
>>much as if they were clones of yourself.
> 
> 
> So I suppose that day by day you become someone different?
> 
> If you were to get an unexpected call during the next hour,
> would that make you a different person than you would have
> become without the call?
> 
> Lee

Sure - a little different, even if it were expected.

Brent Meeker

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RE: A calculus of personal identity


Bruno writes

> Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive 
> (anybody can answer by principle of a mailing list), and nominal 
> question when thread interferes makes possible to send less
> mails. But I agree here I miss miserably ...

Not sure what mistake you think you made  :-)  but whatever, it
could not have been very important.

> I take the opportunity to ask you Lee what is your expectation in front 
> of the running of a Universal Dovetailer?

Well, I once got fairly up to speed on the subject of the UD (i.e.,
I understood it about half as well as you, Hal, Schmidhuber, and 
the rest of the gang here), but it just didn't grab my enthusiasm.

So I will take the liberty of imagining a scenario that may have
a (small) chance of answering your question.

I find out that some aliens have set up a colony on the moon.
Worse, they've subscribed to the everything list, and having
never had had the notion before on their home planet, are 
designing---AND INTENDING TO CUT LOOSE---a Universal Dovetailer
made from some weird computronium substance!

This will either be very good news, or very bad news, because the
compute speed of their substance is utterly incredible. If they
turn the damned thing on for even one whole second, it's easy to
calculate that any given human being will have most of his solar
system OMs generated by it, all his life on Earth relegated to
relative insignificance.

I think that I would be in favor. Because I am having a good life
(i.e. better than one-percent worth living), and believe than 
human happiness derives mostly from chemicals in the brain
produced by genetic settings.  So most of the copies of Lee
Corbin that are generated by the UD should, on the average,
also have good lives.

(It's possible that even miserable people reading this can find
solace in supposing that their genetic setting are not an
intrinsic part of their identity, and that in most instantiations
in most universes, their lives are rather good.)

But alas, that's the limit of my knowledge about the UD.

And my eyes glaze over every time I come to extended discussions
about "1st person", considering as I do those to be a linguistic
mistake/death-spiral almost as bad as discussions about qualia.

Lee

> Like with Stathis (and with some other a longer time ago) I feel like 
> you understand the six first steps of UDA, including the 1-person 
> indeterminacy (which is independent on the identity question as we have 
> already agreed sometimes ago); so I am very interested if you get the 
> seventh one, that is the reversal (with the extravagant hypothesis that 
> there is a physical universe).
> (Step eight will eliminate that "extravagant" hypothesis from the 
> reasoning, but is not the current main point, if I can say).
> 
> PS I take the opportunity to repeat that I do not pretend that Hal 
> Finney or even Schmidhuber and others are wrong in their "complexity 
> based" approach to the measure problem, just that they does not provide 
> explanations how their approaches make the first person white rabbit 
> disappearing (but I' sure Kolmogorov complexity could play some key 
> role, and I encourage those interested to dig deeper. Wei Dai has 
> already mentionned the remarkable book by Li and Vitanyi (Springer 
> Verlag 1993). We tackle an hard problem: it is not a luxe to approach 
> it in different ways.


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Re: A calculus of personal identity


Lee Corbin wrote:
> Stathis writes and Brent evidently is not one to resist a good pun
> 
> 
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Indeed, I would personally find the idea of clones of myself
>>>that I could run into quite disturbing, and the more like me
>>>they were, the worse it would be.
>>
>>A sobering reflection. ;-)
> 
> 
> An interesting psychological difference. About 35 years ago, I asked
> my long since deceased father what would be his reaction to a duplicate.
> He was very quick to assert that they would not get along at all. I
> have always wondered at that: why exactly would someone not like
> himself?
> 
> (Of course, the joke would be on me if I found out that all my duplicates
> had very annoying personal mannerisms, and that the very sounds of their
> squeeky high pitched voices irritated the hell out of me.)
> 
> I have always imagined that my duplicates and I would embrace with a
> love truer than long-lost brothers.  I fancy that I would like myself
> a great deal  :-)
> 
> Lee

I agree - I'd like my clone.  I once found some old lab reports and as I was 
reading through them I 
found one that struck me as unusually well written and insightful - and then I 
realized it was one I 
had written.

But we don't know Stathis. ;-)

Brent Meeker

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RE: A calculus of personal identity


Brent writes

> >>Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, 
> >>becoming different people; it 
> >>seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the 
> >>people you know just as 
> >>much as if they were clones of yourself.
> > 
> > So I suppose that day by day you become someone different?
> > 
> > If you were to get an unexpected call during the next hour,
> > would that make you a different person than you would have
> > become without the call?
> 
> Sure - a little different, even if it were expected.

Well, the whole point, is *how* different. For example, we imagine
that if you were suddenly absconded from your residence a few
moments from now, conscripted into Al Qaeda and forced to learn
Muslim fundamentalist slogans and to enjoy killing unbelievers
working for the Satanic powers of the west, (I am sure that
this would require quite a bit of brainwashing), then it's
safe to say that after a few years of that you become someone
else. 

Even if some atom bombs fell, and you were forced into a horrible
struggle for survival along the lines of Mad Max, you'd probably
become someone else.

But in all *practical* matters, you do sacrifice in the hear-and-now
so that the Brent (say, of next year) does not have tooth pain, 
right? Or are you so good-hearted, that you would gladly go to the
dentist just so that someone else's teeth won't hurt next year?

I mean to say that there really is no use denying that you are the
same person from day to day under normal conditions, and it tells
us something that only philosophers would ever conceive of, let
alone believe for an instant, that they were not the same person
from day to day.

Lee


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RE: A calculus of personal identity


Brent writes

> I agree - I'd like my clone.  I once found some old lab reports and as I was 
> reading through them I 
> found one that struck me as unusually well written and insightful - and then 
> I realized it was one I 
> had written.
> 
> But we don't know Stathis. ;-)

Okay---that makes three of us: you, me, and Norman.  Everybody
else is probably like G. H. Hardy, who, the first thing upon
entering a new hotel room, would put towels over all the mirrors
so that he wouldn't have to see himself.

Lee


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Re: Diagonalization (solution)

2006-07-06 Thread Tom Caylor

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Tom, Hi George,
>
> I recall the (four) diagonalization problems. I show each time the
> diagonal functions, which I will always call g, except for the Fi where
> I call it G. In each case the existence of that g proves something
> different. I have change r1, r2, r3 ... into R1 R2 R3 ... because rn
> looks to much like m in many fonts.
>
> [Apart for Norman and the "non-mathematician": please keep this posts,
> I will send preliminary posts for you to read before]
>
>
> Le 22-juin-06, à 17:03, I wrote:
>
> > The question is: what does diagonalization prove on those
> > following list of functions:
> >
> > 0) R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 ...
> > This is an arbitrary list of functions from N to N  (not necessarily
> > computable one);
>
>
> g(n) = Rn(n) + 1
>
> All Rn are well defined function from N to N, so all Rn(n) + 1 are well
> defined number, and so g is a function from N to N. But g cannot be in
> the given (arbitrary) list, and this show that the set of functions
> from N to N is not enumerable.
>
> Proof by contradiction.
> Indeed, if this was the case, there would be a (precise) number k such
> that g = Rk. I will say that k is the index of Rk = g. Let us apply g
> on its own index k. In that case g(k) = Rk(k) + 1 = Rk(k). Again Rk(k)
> is a precise number, so, by subtraction in the last equality: 1 = 0. So
> g does not belong to the list R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 ... Now that list
> was arbitrary, so this proved that ALL sequences of functions from N to
> N will miss its corresponding "g", that is will miss a function from N
> to N.
> This is the celebrate proof by Cantor of the non enumerability of the
> functions from N to N.
>
> Exercise: show that the functions from N to {0,1} are not enumerable,
> by a similar proof. Hint: find the appropriate slight change in the
> definition of g.
>

Change g to

g(n) = (Rn(n) + 1) mod 2

One way to think about this is to concatenate the output of each Ri and
put a decimal point (actually binary point) in front of it to make a
number between 0 and 1, expressed in binary.  Each Ri is arbitrary,
say,

output of R1 = 0.101...
output of R2 = 0.010...
output of R3 = 0.100...
...

but each R1 is infinitely long, since the domain of each Ri is the
natural numbers N  (i.e. each Ri is total).  If the domain wasn't all
of N, then the diagonalization wouldn't work.  Right?

So

g(1) = (R1(1) + 1) mod 2 = 0
g(2) = (R2(2) + 1) mod 2 = 0
g(3) = (R3(3) + 1) mod 2 = 1
...

and so concatenating these together into a binary number from 0 to 1
gives

output of g = 0.001...

which is different from any of the Ri's.  So here we see Cantor's
original diagonal proof of the uncountability of the real numbers
played out in binary.

I have to repeat though that I have misgivings about using infinite
diagonalization to try to conclude things about real-live reality
(physics, mind/body problem).  We indeed are using the law of the
excluded middle with an infinite sequence.  We are saying that since g
cannot be any particular one of the Ri's, then g is not in the whole
infinite list.  I know that this particular diagonalization is not one
that is used in your argument, but I think that the same fault is in
the other diagonalizations.  Not that this can't be used to argue about
"imaginary" mathematical play things like the set of real numbers, or
the other creatures that come out of the following diagonalizations,
but how can we say that these things have anything to do with reality?
I know you'll probably say that it's testable, but I have yet to see
it.  Diagonalization is not testing.  Diagonalization just produces
negative results.  Something doesn't exist.  How can we test that?

>
> >
> > 1) h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 ...
> > This is a list of total computable functions from N to N that we can
> > generate mechanically (I mean we can generate their codes). It means
> > that we can generate the codes of each hi, written in some language,
> > and that, for some reason, we are sure that each hi is total
> > computable. Examples: Caylor last funny enumeration; all the
> > (transfinite collection of) sequences of growing functions we have
> > defined in this thread (since "Smullyan Smullyan ...");
>
>
> g(n) = hn(n) + 1
>
> All hn are well defined function from N to N, and now we are told they
> are also computable. And then we are also told that we can generate
> mechanically their codes, for example: C1 C2 C3 C4 ... where each Ci
> computes the functions hi. (Meaning the program/codes Ci with input n
> will gives the result hi(n). In particular all hn(m) can be computed.
> Well, this means in particular that I can compute hn(n). Just apply Cn
> on n. So obviously, for any n, I can compute hn(n)+1. Just generate the
> Ci up to Cn, apply it to n and add one. But this is g(n), and so g is a
> computable function from N to N.
> But now g cannot belong to the list h1 h2 h3   The hi does not
> exhaust the computable functions.
>
> Proof by contradiction.
> Indeed if g belo

RE: Re: Fermi's Paradox

2006-07-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Destroying your species runs counter to evolution. I'll rephrase that: everything that happens in nature is by definition in accordance with evolution, but those species that destroy themselves will die out, while those species that don't destroy themselves will thrive. Therefore, there will be selection for the species that don't destroy themselves, and eventually those species will come to predominate. When you think about it, the theory of evolution is essentially a tautology: those species which succeed, succeed.
 
Stathis Papaioannou


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: everything-list@googlegroups.comSubject: Re: Fermi's ParadoxDate: Wed, 5 Jul 2006 22:38:37 -0700




Hi Brent,
 
You say, "They (the Spanish) subjugated the Aztecs and Inca for king and gold.  European disease may have killed a lot of them, but killing them off was not a purpose of the conquistadors - though they were certainly revolted by the bloody sacrificial rites of the Aztecs."I am revolted too.  And I am also revolted by the bloody treachery of  Cortes.  One web site said, "Cholula, with a population of 100,000, was the second city of the Aztec empire. It had thrived for more than a millennium.  In 1519, Cortés chose Cholula to demonstrate his Christian credentials. He massacred several thousand unarmed members of the Aztec nobility in the central plaza and then burned down much of the city."
 
If you Google "Spanish atrocities Inca Aztec" (without the quotes) you'll find many references.  The Spanish Conquest not only subjugated the Aztecs and Inca but destroyed them - along with the cultures of the Caribbean islands.
 
Anyway, all this is beside the point I wanted to make, which is that True Believers, whether Muslim, Christian, or heathen, cause harm, destruction or misfortune, and are therefore evil.  
 
My principal question is this:  Is this evil inevitable in intelligent life?  I suspect it is.  And when life gets intelligent enough, and evolved enough, it figures out how to make A-bombs and other WMDs.  Then it may exterminate itself or, as you suggested, use up the raw materials accessible to it - and this explains Fermi's Paradox.
 
Norman
 
 
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Re: Fermi's Paradox