Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-08 Thread Mark Peaty

as hominem = With, em, respect, I have to say that this thread 
has not made a lot of sense.

SP:
'This just confirms that there is no accounting for values or
 goals rationally.'

MP: In other words _Evolution does not have goals._
Evolution is a conceptual framework we use to make sense of the 
world we see, and it's a bl*ody good one, by and large. But 
evolution in the sense of the changes we can point to as 
occurring in the forms of living things, well it all just 
happens; just like the flowing of water down hill.

You will gain more traction by looking at what it is that 
actually endures and changes over time: on the one hand genes of 
DNA and on the other hand memes embodied in behaviour patterns, 
the brain structures which mediate them, and the environmental 
changes [glyphs, paintings, structures, etc,] which stimulate 
and guide them.


Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 08/06/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 The top level goal implied by evolution would be to have as many
 children as you can raise through puberty.  Avoiding death should
 only be a subgoal.
 
 
 Yes, but evolution doesn't have an overseeing intelligence which figures 
 these things out, and it does seem that as a matter of fact most people 
 would prefer to avoid reproducing if it's definitely going to kill them, 
 at least when they aren't intoxicated. So although reproduction trumps 
 survival as a goal for evolution, for individual humans it's the other 
 way around. This just confirms that there is no accounting for values or 
 goals rationally. What we have is what we're stuck with.
 
 
 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou
  

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Re: Asifism

2007-06-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 07-juin-07, à 15:47, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

  Bruno Marchal skrev:Le 04-juin-07, à 14:10, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
 Pain is the same thing as the pain center in the brain being 
 stimulated.

  In the best case your theory will work for you and other zombie. 
 It cannot work for those who admit the 1/3 distinction or the 
 mind/body apparent distinction.
  You are on the fringe of being an eliminativist philosopher. What I 
 do appreciate is that you offer your theory for yourself. Let me ask 
 you explicitly this question, which I admit is admittedly weird to 
 ask to a zombie, but: do you think *we* are conscious?


  When I look at you (in 3rd person view), I see that you are 
 constructed in exactly the same way as I am.  So I know why you say 
 that you are conscious.  I know nothing sure about you, but the most 
 probable conclusion is that you are equally unconscious as I am.


Actually I do think like Quentin. I don't think you can *know* anything 
if you are not conscious. Knowing is a sort of truth awareness, albeit 
incommunicable as such.





  What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny 
 the existence of the consciousness?


An eliminativist.
(But I don't understand what you mean by persons like me, which is a 
first person notion in need of some implicit notion of consciousness).

In some country, until rather recently, some doctor did operate babies 
without anesthesia, because they did believe that baby are not 
conscious. Now, they have changed their mind, and babies are treated by 
surgeon with anesthesia. Does this controverse makes sense for someone 
who deny totally the existence of consciousness?




  (I also deny the existence of infinity...)


If you deny only what is called in the literature the actual 
infinite, that is the idea of a close and well defined infinite entity 
or set, then you could be an intuitionist, or a finitist, or a 
computationalist. What I call comp, or digital mechanism, is called 
finitism by Judson Webb (ref in my thesis or any of my papers).

If you deny the potential infinite as well, (that is the idea that some 
set can be generated forever although not in any actual form, like when 
se say: {1, 2, 3 *ETC*}, then you belong to the few who are 
ultrafinitist.  I don't believe that the very notion of ultrafinitism 
could be defined in any ultrafinitist way, unless you are materialist 
and physicalist, meaning that when you say that you don't believe in 
infinity, you really are only saying that you don't believe in *primary 
physical*  infinities. Note that by UDA, comp or finitism entails there 
are no physical primary entities at all, neither finite nor infinite.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Asifism

2007-06-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Hi,

On Friday 08 June 2007 14:49:11 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
  Bruno Marchal skrev:
 Le 07-juin-07, à 15:47, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

 When I look at you (in 3rd person view), I see that you are constructed in
 exactly the same way as I am. So I know why you say that you are conscious.
 I know nothing sure about you, but the most probable conclusion is that you
 are equally unconscious as I am.

  Actually I do think like Quentin. I don't think you can *know* anything if
 you are not conscious. Knowing is a sort of truth awareness, albeit
 incommunicable as such.

  By knowing I mean the same thing as when you say that a computer knows
 what are the countries in Europa if you ask the computer: What are the
 countries in Europa?, and the computer answers: Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
 Finland,   I mean nothing more with the term know than just this,
 you have some data stored, and you can use this data in some way. 
 Knowing === Using knowledge.

I see that you like to redifine terms with your on definition.

Taking your definition, a database engine can know... which is totally wrong.

A database engine store information and has methods to retrieve it, but the 
database engine itself doesn't know anything about the information it 
stores... to know it, it must understand it, have awareness of the 
information. Knowing demands a knower, a consciousness.


The definition of to know in contemporary dictionnary is: 
http://www.answers.com/topic/know

#  To perceive directly; grasp in the mind with clarity or certainty.
# To regard as true beyond doubt: I know she won't fail.
# To have a practical understanding of, as through experience; be skilled in: 
knows how to cook.
# To have fixed in the mind: knows her Latin verbs.
# To have experience of: a black stubble that had known no razor (William 
Faulkner).
#

   1. To perceive as familiar; recognize: I know that face.
   2. To be acquainted with: He doesn't know his neighbors.

# To be able to distinguish; recognize as distinct: knows right from wrong.
# To discern the character or nature of: knew him for a liar.

All these definitions requires a knower, a knower is something which has 
awareness of the information it knows. Your definition does not enter in the 
common definition of to know something.

Beside, I don't see how denying consciousness answer the problem... 
Redefining terms does not make the problem goes away.

Regards,
Quentin Anciaux

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Re: Asifism

2007-06-08 Thread Torgny Tholerus

Quentin Anciaux skrev:
 Beside, I don't see how denying consciousness answer the problem... 
 Redefining terms does not make the problem goes away.
   
What is the problem?

If a computer behaves as if it knows anything, what is the problem with 
that?  That type of behaviour increases the probability for the computer 
to survive, so the natural selection will favour that type of behaviour.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus



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Re: Asifism

2007-06-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux

On Friday 08 June 2007 17:37:06 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
 Quentin Anciaux skrev:
  Beside, I don't see how denying consciousness answer the problem...
  Redefining terms does not make the problem goes away.

 What is the problem?

 If a computer behaves as if it knows anything, what is the problem with
 that?  That type of behaviour increases the probability for the computer
 to survive, so the natural selection will favour that type of behaviour.

I claim that if it behaves as if, then it means it has consciousness... 
Philosophical zombie (which is what it is all about) are not possible... If 
it is impossible to discern it with what we define as conscious (and when I 
say impossible, I mean there exists no test that can show between the 
presuposed zombie and a conscious being a difference of behavior) then there 
is no point whatsover you can say to prove that one is conscious and one is 
not. Either both are conscious or both aren't... While you say you're not 
conscious... I am, therefore you're conscious.

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

2007-06-08 Thread Torgny Tholerus





Quentin Anciaux skrev:

  On Friday 08 June 2007 17:37:06 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
  
  
What is the problem?

If a computer behaves as if it knows anything, what is the problem with
that?  That type of behaviour increases the probability for the computer
to survive, so the natural selection will favour that type of behaviour.

  
  I claim that if it behaves as if, then it means it has consciousness... 
Philosophical zombie (which is what it is all about) are not possible... If 
it is impossible to discern it with what we define as conscious (and when I 
say impossible, I mean there exists no test that can show between the 
presuposed zombie and a conscious being a difference of behavior) then there 
is no point whatsover you can say to prove that one is conscious and one is 
not. Either both are conscious or both aren't... While you say you're not 
conscious... I am, therefore you're conscious.
  

The question, as I see it, is if there is anything "more" than just
atoms reacting with each other in our brains. I claim that there is
not anything "more". The atoms reacting with each other explain fully
my (and your...) behaviour. Our brains are very complicated
structures, but it is nothing supernatural with them. Physics explains
everything.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism

2007-06-08 Thread Jef Allbright

On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  Quentin Anciaux skrev:
  On Friday 08 June 2007 17:37:06 Torgny Tholerus wrote:


  What is the problem?

 If a computer behaves as if it knows anything, what is the problem with
 that? That type of behaviour increases the probability for the computer
 to survive, so the natural selection will favour that type of behaviour.

  I claim that if it behaves as if, then it means it has consciousness...
 Philosophical zombie (which is what it is all about) are not possible... If
 it is impossible to discern it with what we define as conscious (and when I
 say impossible, I mean there exists no test that can show between the
 presuposed zombie and a conscious being a difference of behavior) then there
 is no point whatsover you can say to prove that one is conscious and one is
 not. Either both are conscious or both aren't... While you say you're not
 conscious... I am, therefore you're conscious.

  The question, as I see it, is if there is anything more than just atoms
 reacting with each other in our brains.  I claim that there is not anything
 more.  The atoms reacting with each other explain fully my (and your...)
 behaviour.  Our brains are very complicated structures, but it is nothing
 supernatural with them.  Physics explains everything.

While I would point out that physics cannot possibly explain
everything, being a necessarily constrained subjective model of
reality, I would like to reinforce the point about consciousness.
Consciousness certainly exists, as a description relating a set of
observations having to do with subjective awareness, but there is
nothing requiring that we assign it the status of an ontological
entity.

- Jef

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Re: Attempt toward a systematic description

2007-06-08 Thread Tom Caylor

On May 25, 6:55 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Le 25-mai-07, à 02:39, Tom Caylor a écrit :
  On May 16, 8:17 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 ...
  0) historical background

  ARISTOTLE: reality = what you see
  PLATO: what you see = shadows of shadows of shadows of shadows of
  
  what perhaps could be.
  And would that be? nobody can say, but everybody can
  get
  glimpses by looking inward, even  (universal) machines.

  Twentieth century: two creative bombs:

  - The Universal Machine (talks bits): UM (Babbage, Post,
  Turing,
  Church, Suze, von Neumann, ...)
  - The other universal machine (talks qubit):  QUM (Feynman,
  Deutsch, Kitaev, Freedman, ...)

  Could you please expand on how these 20th century ideas extended
  Aristotle and Plato?

 Aristotle is (partially?) responsible to the come back to the naive
 idea that matter exist primitively, and this leads quickly to the idea
 that science = mainly empirical science.
 Plato's intuition is that the empirical world is but one aspect of a
 bigger reality, and that intuition comes from self-introspection.


I should respond to your response.  I'm in a busy pensive state
lately, reading Theaetetus (as you suggested on the Incompleteness
thread) along with Protagoras and some Aristotle (along with the dozen
other books I'm always reading...) in the little time I have.

 The Universal Machine can illustrate that indeed when she introspects
 herself, she can discover her own limitation (Godel and Lob theorem are
 provable by the machines on themselves: a point frequently missed by
 those who try to use Godel against Mechanism).

  Of course the quantum part is an extension, but
  what about the universal part?
  As you may suspect, I am questioning as usual the even-more-
  fundamental assumptions which might be underneath this.  Sorry I don't
  really have any time lately either, so I understand if you just want
  to get on with your description based on your assumptions.

 OK. Never forget I have never defend the comp hyp. I have (less
 modestly) prove that it is impossible to believe in both the comp hyp,
 and the weak materialist thesis (the thesis that there exist primary
 matter having a relation with the physical knowledge). With comp matter
 emerges from mind which emerges from numbers.


But you do make assumptions as part of the comp hypothesis, including
assumptions about numbers.

 ...
 ***
  1) The ontic theory of everything: LRA (Little Robinson Arithmetic),

CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and
  inference
  rules)
AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION
AXIOMS OF ADDITION
AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION

  That's all. It is the Schroedinger equation of the comp-everything!
  The reason is that LRA is already as powerful as a universal machine.
  LRA proves all verifiable sentences with the shape ExP(x), with P(x)
  decidable. It is equivalent with the universal dovetailer.

  Now we have to do with LRA  what Everett has done with QM. Embed the
  observer in the ontic reality.
  For this we have to modelize the observer/knower/thinker.

 ***

  2) The epistemic theory, or the generic observer theory: PA (the
  lobian
  machine I will interview).

CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and
  inference
  rules)
AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION
AXIOMS OF ADDITION
AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION
AXIOMS OF INDUCTION

  Note: the observer extends the ontic reality! It extends it by its
  beliefs in the induction axioms. They are as many as they are formula
  F(x), and they have the shape:

  [F(0)  Ax(F(x) - F(x+1))]  - AxF(x)

 ***

  OK.  Would you say that LRA plays the part of Arisotle and PA the part
  of Plato here?

 No, why? LRA is a version of the universal dovetailer (the ontic
 reality) in the form of a subset of the beliefs of the lobian machine
 like Peano Arithmetic.


LRA looks to be about the particulars of arithmetic.  PA, with
induction, is trying to generalize to come up with some universal
truths about arithmetic.

 I recall often the difference between Aristotle and Plato, because it
 corresponds to two diametrically different conception of reality. With
 Aristotle, roughly speaking, there is mainly a physical world, and
 explanations are supposed to be of a naturallistic type. With Plato,
 and the mystics (those who search the truth by looking inward) the
 physical world is the interface (to borrow Rossler's vocabulary)
 between us and something else: there is a deeper reality, a priori not
 of a naturalistic type.


  OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION: How to interview PA when we dispose
  ontologically only of LRA?

  NOT OBVIOUS SOLUTION: just try to obviate the fundamental SEARLE ERROR
  (cf Mind's I, Hofstadter -Dennett describe it well) in front of the
  LRA
  theorems.

  I 

Re: Attempt toward a systematic description

2007-06-08 Thread Brent Meeker

Tom Caylor wrote:
... 
 The above does not require physical reality, but only concepts that we
 can think about looking inward (eyes closed view).  But even though it
 is only conceptual, my point is that we are taking a leap of faith
 even when we talk about 1+1=2, classifying an infinite number of cases
 into one equivalence class.
 
 Perhaps at the core of this issue is whether things like + are
 prescriptive or descriptive.  Is it possible that there are universes
 with mathematical white rabbits such that when you take 1 thing and
 1 other thing (physical or not) and associate them in any way,
 including just thinking about them, then you don't necessarily get 2
 things (e.g. sometime you get 1 or 3 or 0)?
 
 Tom

Good point.  I think of 1+1=2 as a model.  Sometimes, as in putting two apples 
in a bag, it fits.   Other times, as in putting two drops of water in a cup, it 
can be reinterpreted to fit (in terms of volumes).  Or, as in a gathering of 
the high school basketball team with 12 members in a room with the high school 
tennis team with 10 members, you may find that 10+12=15.  So applying the model 
requires judgment about what counts and what + means.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Asifism

2007-06-08 Thread Mark Peaty

TT:
'
 What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny 
 the existence of the consciousness?'

MP: I think the word you are looking for is deluded.

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Torgny Tholerus wrote:
 Bruno Marchal skrev:
 Le 04-juin-07, à 14:10, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

 Pain is the same thing as the pain center in the brain being
 stimulated.

 If you are really unconscious or not conscious, you could say this, 
 indeed, but I hardly believe you are unconscious.
 In the best case your theory will work for you and other zombie. It 
 cannot work for those who admit the 1/3 distinction or the mind/body 
 apparent distinction.
 You are on the fringe of being an eliminativist philosopher. What I do 
 appreciate is that you offer your theory for yourself. Let me ask you 
 explicitly this question, which I admit is admittedly weird to ask to 
 a zombie, but: do you think *we* are conscious?
 I am constructed in such a way (my brain connections is such that...) I 
 very strongly claim that I am conscious, I very strongly claim that I 
 have feelings, I very strongly claim that I have a mind, I very strongly 
 claim that I have perceptions.  But I know (intellectually) that I am 
 wrong, and I know why I am wrong.
 
 When I look at you (in 3rd person view), I see that you are constructed 
 in exactly the same way as I am.  So I know why you say that you are 
 conscious.  I know nothing sure about you, but the most probable 
 conclusion is that you are equally unconscious as I am.
 
 What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny 
 the existence of the consciousness?
 (I also deny the existence of infinity...)
 
 -- 
 Torgny Tholerus
 
 
  

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Re: Asifism

2007-06-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 09/06/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:'

 What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny
  the existence of the consciousness?'

 MP: I think the word you are looking for is deluded.



I've seen quite a few deluded people who believe that they are dead, but
no-one who thinks they're unconscious...  something to keep an eye out for.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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