Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read French only with difficulty and this unfortunately is probably also the case for many other list members. Perhaps if you do this you could also post it on your homepage, for easier reference. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
I've always thought - and this might just be betraying my lack of understanding - that these are simply two sides of the same coin: we can't distinguish between these quantum events, so we can consider ourselves as either being a classical being 'above' a sea of quantum noise, or as being a bundle of identical consciousnesses generated in many different interacting universes. In the 1st interpretation, we don't split. In the second we do, but the split doesn't change us. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/14 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] Kory Heath wrote: Sorry for the long delay on this reply. On Nov 2, 2008, at 7:04 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: Kory Heath wrote: In this mundane sense, it's perfectly sensible for me to say, as I'm sitting here typing this email, I expect to still be sitting in this room one second from now. If I'm about to step into a teleporter that's going to obliterate me and make a perfect copy of me in a distant blue room, how can it not be sensible to ask - in that mundane, everyday sense - What do I expect to be experiencing one second from now? It's sensible to ask because in fact there is no teleporter or duplicator or simulator that can provide the continuity of experiences that is Kory. So the model in which your consciousness is a single unified thing works. But there are hypothetical cases in which it doesn't make sense, or at least its sense is somewhat arbitrary. If something like the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics is correct, then this kind of duplication is actually happening to me all the time. But I should still be able to ask a question like, What do I expect to be experiencing one second from now?, and the answer should still be I expect to still be sitting at this computer, typing this email. If the many-worlds theory simply disallows me from making statements like that, then there's something wrong with the many- worlds theory. But if the many-worlds theory *allows* me to make statements like that, then in that same sense, I should be able to ask What am I about to experience? when I step into a duplicating machine. I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into significantly different Korys because your interaction with the environment keeps the Kory part of the wave function continuously decohered. So in a Feynman path-integral picture, you are a very tight bundle of paths centered around the classical path. Only if some microscopic split gets amplified and affects you do you split. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. Lawrence Krauss wrote about the problem in The Physics of Star Trek. I'm not sure what it would mean for Bruno's argument if a teleporter were shown to be strictly impossible; after all it's just a thought experiment. On the other hand, I think it's probably not that hard to duplicate a lot of your brain function, enough to instantiate a consciousness that at least thinks it's Kory and fools Kory's friends. But would such an approximate Kory create the ambiguity in the history of Korys that is inherent in Bruno's argument? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Mathematical methods for the discrete space-time.
On 13 Nov 2008, at 14:21, Torgny Tholerus wrote: Bruno Marchal skrev: I have to think. I think that to retrieve a Leibniz rule in discrete mathematics, you have to introduce an operator and some non commutativity rule. This can be already found in the book by Knuth on numerical mathematics. This has been exploited by Kauffman and one of its collaborator, and they have published a book which I have ordered already two times ... without success. It is a very interesting matter. Dirac quantum relativistic wave equation can almost be retrieved form discrete analysis on complex or quaternion. It is worth investigating more. Look at Kauffman page (accessible from my url), and download his paper on discrete mathematics. I will look closer at the Kauffman paper on Non-commutative Calculus and Discrete Physics. It seems interesting, but not quite what I am looking for. Kauffman only gets the ordinary Leibniz rule, not the extended rule I have found. Ah? What I want to know is what result you will get if you start from the axiom that *everything in universe is finite*. Like with comp + occam. Look I think I will concentrate on the MGA thread for a period. Meanwhile I will ask one of my student, who has a craving for discrete math, to take a look on your finite calculus, and he will contact you in case he find it interesting. Sorry but I have not so much time those days. Best, Bruno For this you will need a function calculus. A function is then a mapping from a (finite) set of values to this set of values. Because this value set is finite, you can then map the values on the numbers 0,1,2,3, ... , N-1. So a function calculus can be made starting from a set of values consisting of the numbers 0,1,2,3, ... , N-1, where N is a very large number, but not too large. N should be a number of the order of a googol, ie 10^100. Because the size of our universe is 10^60 Planck units, and our universe has existed for 10^60 Planck times. As the arithmetic, we can count modulo N, ie (N-1) + 1 = 0. This makes it possible for the calculus to describe our reality. A function can then be represented as an ordered set of N numbers, namely: f = [f(0), f(1), f(2), f(3), ... , f(N-1)]. This means that S(f) becomes: S(f) = [f(1), f(2), f(3), ... , f(N-1), f(0)]. The sum or the product of two functions is obtained by adding or multiplying each element, namely: f*g = [f(0)*g(0), f(1)*g(1), f(2)*g(2), ... , f(N-1)*g(N-1)]. and to apply a function f on a function g then becomes: f(g) = [f(g(0)), f(g(1)), f(g(2)), ... , f(g(N-1))]. Exercise: Show that the extended Leibniz rule in the discrete mathematics: D(f*g) = f*D(g) + D(f)*g + D(f)*D(g), is correct! -- Torgny Tholerus http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Hi Brent, On 14 Nov 2008, at 07:02, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into significantly different Korys because your interaction with the environment keeps the Kory part of the wave function continuously decohered. So in a Feynman path-integral picture, you are a very tight bundle of paths centered around the classical path. Only if some microscopic split gets amplified and affects you do you split. You cannot use decoherence to introduce a collapse of the wave function. The MW is just the SWE. If Kory looks at a spin of particle in the superposition state (up + down), the swe gives Kory seeing up + Kory seeing down. Decoherence explains only why none Korys can be aware of their superposition. The many-world is just literal QM without collapse, that is, it is the SWE. The tightness of the Feynman bundle explains the normality (shortness) of the most probable paths. It explains why in most universe quantum white rabbit are rare. I will not insist because it is out of the MGA topic on which, as I said to Tholerus, I will (try to) concentrate May be you could search more detalied explanations on this that I have already given, and others have given, on the FOR-list. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. Lawrence Krauss wrote about the problem in The Physics of Star Trek. I'm not sure what it would mean for Bruno's argument if a teleporter were shown to be strictly impossible; after all it's just a thought experiment. You are right. reasoning with thought experiments asks for possibilities in principle, not for possibilities in practice. This is important to understand for the MGA (as it is for UDA). best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 14 Nov 2008, at 11:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read French only with difficulty and this unfortunately is probably also the case for many other list members. Perhaps if you do this you could also post it on your homepage, for easier reference. Nice to tell me. Sometimes I got the feeling I have no more things to explain to you. And thanks for the suggestion, I will, I certainly should, do that. (I am very lazy when it comes to make change on my webpage I must say) Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Mathematical methods for the discrete space-time.
Torgny Tholerus skrev: Exercise: Show that the extended Leibniz rule in the discrete mathematics: D(f*g) = f*D(g) + D(f)*g + D(f)*D(g), is correct! Another way to see both form of the Leibniz rule is in the graphical set theory, where you represent the sets by circles on a paper. Here I will represent the union of the sets A and B with A + B, and the intersection as A*B. Then you can represent the D operator as the border of the circle. Then you will have: D(A*B) = A*D(B) + D(A)*B, ie the Leibniz rule, ie the border of the area of the intersection is the union of the border of B inside A, and the border of A inside B. I can not show this figure in this message, but you can draw two circles on a paper before you, and you will then see what I mean. Now the interesting thing is what will happen if the circles have *thick* borders: Then the set A is represented by two circles inside each other, and the border will then be the area between the two circles. The set A will then be the interior of the inner circle, and the outside of A will be the outside of the outer circle. What will you then get if you look at the border of the intersection of A and B? This time you will get: D(A*B) = A*D(B) + D(A)*B + D(A)*D(B), ie the extended Leibniz rule. The extra term then comes from the two small squares you get where the two borders cross each other. (Do draw this figure om the paper before you, and you will understand.) This picture with the circles with thick borders is a way to represent intiutionistic logic. The interior of the inner circle is the objects that represent A (such as red), and the outside of the outer circle represent not-A (such as not red). Inside the border you will have all that is neither A nor not-A (such as red-orange, where you don't know if it is red or not...) -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Hi Bruno, a very cool series of posts. I would also like to express my interest in your MGA argument (my French is very rusty). I have read the Maudlin Olympia paper, but would like to hear your version. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious? Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same impression with the discussion about zombie. For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad absurdo which will follow). But now we can redefined, or even just *use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation) without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background. For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term as material implementation, but a non materialist can still believe in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of sort of quasi-material implementation: this would mean for him/her implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations. So we agree that a computation is not conscious. That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have to make the notion of person a bit more precise) Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Indeed, most computer programmer used the term implementation followed by in Fortran (or java, lisp, etc.). A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program) x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are machine capable of implementing all machines. (and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like arithmetic implement all universal machines whose dreams (sharable first person stories) cohere into physical histories which then locally implement these universal machine into person. To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only if you take matter fro granted. I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here. Except for: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested. With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1, asap. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal skrev: For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). If you want a concrete example of a zombie, you can just think of me. I am an entity that have all the appearance of a human, but I have no consciousness... -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Brent, On 14 Nov 2008, at 07:02, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into significantly different Korys because your interaction with the environment keeps the Kory part of the wave function continuously decohered. So in a Feynman path-integral picture, you are a very tight bundle of paths centered around the classical path. Only if some microscopic split gets amplified and affects you do you split. You cannot use decoherence to introduce a collapse of the wave function. The MW is just the SWE. If Kory looks at a spin of particle in the superposition state (up + down), the swe gives Kory seeing up + Kory seeing down. Which is an example of amplifying (since otherwise Kory couldn't see it) a microscopic event. Decoherence explains only why none Korys can be aware of their superposition. The many-world is just literal QM without collapse, that is, it is the SWE. The tightness of the Feynman bundle explains the normality (shortness) of the most probable paths. It explains why in most universe quantum white rabbit are rare. That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in some pure state anyway. They are already fuzzy and their interaction with the environment keeps the fuzzy bundle along the classical path. There are microscopic splittings that are 'within' the fuzz, but I think these are far below the substitution level envisioned for your teleporter thought experiment. Brent I will not insist because it is out of the MGA topic on which, as I said to Tholerus, I will (try to) concentrate May be you could search more detalied explanations on this that I have already given, and others have given, on the FOR-list. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. Lawrence Krauss wrote about the problem in The Physics of Star Trek. I'm not sure what it would mean for Bruno's argument if a teleporter were shown to be strictly impossible; after all it's just a thought experiment. You are right. reasoning with thought experiments asks for possibilities in principle, not for possibilities in practice. This is important to understand for the MGA (as it is for UDA). best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Thanks Günther. A long time ago Russell asks me to explain the UDA, and I have made the first presentation of it into steps for the everything-list. It was UDA in 15 steps, and it has converge to 7 steps, and that has helped a bit. I have also made on the list (with Joel, George and others) a pure one post- one step presentation, in 11 steps, which as been useful (at least for me). Probably MGA can benefit too from a step by step presentation, if only because post- mail fits with this procedure. I hope people will be candid enough to interrupt at the first unclarity. Steps are questions, and when we agree on the answer we can proceed. Soon with zombie and other daemons ! (yes the zombie question is a subproblem of MGA). Bruno On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:16, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi Bruno, a very cool series of posts. I would also like to express my interest in your MGA argument (my French is very rusty). I have read the Maudlin Olympia paper, but would like to hear your version. Cheers, Günther http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious? Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same impression with the discussion about zombie. For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad absurdo which will follow). But now we can redefined, or even just *use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation) without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background. For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term as material implementation, but a non materialist can still believe in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of sort of quasi-material implementation: this would mean for him/her implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations. I don't see this. For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented idea or program is an incoherent concept. So for the non-materialist there can be no such distinction as implemented or not implemented. But then what can it mean to refer to an implementation relative to the most probable computations? Brent So we agree that a computation is not conscious. That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have to make the notion of person a bit more precise) Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Indeed, most computer programmer used the term implementation followed by in Fortran (or java, lisp, etc.). A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program) x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are machine capable of implementing all machines. (and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like arithmetic implement all universal machines whose dreams (sharable first person stories) cohere into physical histories which then locally implement these universal machine into person. To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only if you take matter fro granted. I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here. Except for: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested. With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1, asap. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:43, Torgny Tholerus wrote: Bruno Marchal skrev: For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). If you want a concrete example of a zombie, you can just think of me. I am an entity that have all the appearance of a human, but I have no consciousness... You are very *clever* ! (And I say this against my religion which forbids me to judge things like that). And you may be a zombie, that would perhaps explain how you can be an ultrafinitist. (joke?). I hope you will follow the MGA thread. The opinion of a zombie could be appreciate (joke?). Your last two posts were lovely. See if it is sufficiently new and if not collect and try to publish maybe. (At least collect the ideas. Such logic are useful for the study of the perceptible field. With comp we have to retrieve them or similar from the Z and X logic/hypostasis. The diameter of the thick bord is related to the ignorance hole from which emerge the parallel computations/realities, as seen from inside. Sure it has to be not too sick for eliminating the rabbits. it could also be related to the quantum h) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On Fri, 2008-11-14 at 10:46 -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in some pure state anyway. They are already fuzzy and their interaction with the environment keeps the fuzzy bundle along the classical path. There are microscopic splittings that are 'within' the fuzz, but I think these are far below the substitution level envisioned for your teleporter thought experiment. I think you've hit on an area that is sufficiently ill-understood by a layman like me to warrant further elaboration. It seems to me there is a strong similarity here with statistical mechanics. If I might speak loosely, there are a large number of quantum states that correspond to microstates of the system, while being Kory is a macrostate. Most microstate trajectories stay within the boundaries of a single macrostate trajectory. But sometimes the microstate trajectories can diverge enough, due to an amplification process, to cause the macrostate trajectory to divide into two. (This of course leaves out definitions of all the above, but I hope you get the gist of it.) To me this makes much more intuitive sense than using words like universes splitting into copies, or even many worlds. Part of my difficulty in grasping some of the discussion here is that we tend to speak of aggregrate objects consisting of many particles, yet refer to quantum properties of individual particles when discussing superposition, etc. I get the single particle stuff fairly well, but it's the transition to large systems of particles that have an aggregate identity of me that I think is sometimes glossed over. In statistical mechanics, aggregates have properties and behavior (like temperature, pressure, and density) that don't exist in single particle systems. Likewise, macroscopic objects have independent identities (macrostates) that persist even when their component particles go through many changes at the atomic level. I'm almost to the point where I understand how decoherence causes the above to be true... -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On Nov 13, 2008, at 10:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Ok. I wanted to try putting things in terms of the MWI rather than a more extreme version of many-worlds like Bruno's, since a lot more people accept the MWI. But of course, I can make the point I'm making without talking about the MWI. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. In a previous post, you wrote that someday we'll be able to build robots that really do exhibit conscious behavior. (I agree.) If we can do that, we can also dispense with the robot bodies and just make software that exhibits conscious behavior. When that happens, I will believe that this manufactured person (let's call him Fred) is as conscious as I am. It will be a trivial matter to teleport Fred or make multiple copies of him. Therefore, in the sense that matters to this conversation, we do know that teleportation is physically possible in this universe. If I'm understanding you correctly, you're arguing that it's ok to talk about what Fred should expect to experience one second from now as long as we don't make multiple copies of him. But if we tell Fred that we're about to duplicate him, and put one copy of him in a (virtual) red room and one in a (virtual) blue room, it doesn't make any sense for him to ask, What am I about to experience? I'm arguing that it is still a sensible question, and that You're going to find yourself in a red room or in a blue room is (one) sensible answer. Of course, we have to strip this answer of the metaphysical baggage that makes it *sound* like we're implying that one or the other of the two copies must be the real Fred. I think we can say Fred is going to find himself in a red room or in a blue room, while fully acknowledging that, from the third-person point of view, both copies are Fred (or whatever other way we choose to say it). It's similar to the way that we keep using the word I, even though we don't believe in a soul or a unified consciousness. If you agree with the last paragraph, then we've pretty much been arguing about nothing. If you don't, I'd be interested to hear why. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or computers or whatever) perform in our world. So it's still not quite right to refer to persons represented by unperformed computations. But I still want some concise way of correctly saying what I'm trying to say. Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, At time T, is this cell on or off? For any cell at any time T, there's a mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on or off. My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits (i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons, I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so), because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're all you need for consciousness, and they're all you need for what materialists call physical reality. We can perform acts of computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness. That's not an argument. It's just a position statement. All I'm looking for at the moment is a good one-sentence summary of this position. For instance: Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. Or All persons described by mathematical facts are necessarily conscious. Or even just Collections of mathematical facts can be conscious. Incidentally, I'd also like a name for this position. My top pick is Mathematical Physicalism. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or computers or whatever) perform in our world. So it's still not quite right to refer to persons represented by unperformed computations. But I still want some concise way of correctly saying what I'm trying to say. Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, At time T, is this cell on or off? For any cell at any time T, there's a mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on or off. My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits (i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons, I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so), because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're all you need for consciousness, and they're all you need for what materialists call physical reality. We can perform acts of computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness. That's not an argument. It's just a position statement. All I'm looking for at the moment is a good one-sentence summary of this position. For instance: Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. Or All persons described by mathematical facts are necessarily conscious. Or even just Collections of mathematical facts can be conscious. Incidentally, I'd also like a name for this position. My top pick is Mathematical Physicalism. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote: Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City. Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that reality in PC is still materialist, in the sense that at the root there still is material stuff which is different than bare mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist. One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in order for the dust to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the role that physical existence is supposed to play. Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt the need to jump start the universe he wanted by performing the initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be jump-started. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
