Re: Compatibilism
It seems to me that there is no that much difference between Universes with complete determinism and inherent randomness. Rex put it quite well here Intelligence and Nomologicalism Optionen http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/5ab5303cdb696ef5 From the viewpoint of Wolfram (I guess it is close to the statement that the Universe is some kind of a cellular automaton), it does not matter much if a node is fully deterministic or random. Evgenii on 20.11.2010 23:57 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/20/2010 5:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 19.11.2010 04:11 Rex Allen said the following: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? I guess that something like this Stephen Wolfram says. A few citations from his talk Some Modern Perspectives on the Quest for Ultimate Knowledge It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and connectivity of space and time. But really it’s all completely deterministic. That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior. Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we feel that we have some form of free will. And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws. See more at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/07/stephen-wolframs-computational-irreducibility.html I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? Evgenii But also see the argument by Elitzur and Doleve that the universe has inherent randomness: http://a-c-elitzur.co.il/uploads/articlesdocs/UndoMsrmnt.pdf It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the famous `uneasy truce' be- tween relativity and quantum mechanics has never been uneasier. If there are hidden variables beneath the quantum level, then, by an earlier proof of ours (Elitzur Dolev, 2005a), they must be `forever-hidden variables' in order to never give rise to violations of relativity. But then, by the same reasoning that has lead Einstein to abolish the aether, they probably do not exist. Indeed, it has been proved long ago (Elitzur, 1992) that God must play dice in order to preserve relativistic locality. Hence, randomness, novelty and emergence, which for luminaries like Parmenides, Spinoza and Einstein were mere epiphenomena to be explained away, are likely the Uni- verse's very mode of existence. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Probability, Necessity, and Infinity
On 19 Nov 2010, at 22:37, Brent Meeker wrote: On 11/19/2010 6:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Nov 2010, at 06:10, Rex Allen wrote: In this case, if we had sufficient mental capacity there would no need to think in terms of trees or forests - we could think exclusively in terms quarks, electrons, photons, and whatnot. Thinking in terms of trees and forests is a good enough computational shortcut. This is not obvious. Thinking might *necessitate* such approximation. Thinking is a matter of relations among images or words or concepts. So it must be approximate; it's usefulness in is abstracting and generalizing. Yes. Obviously so once we assume that the brain (or whatever consciousness supervene on) is a Turing emulable machine. However, there is certainly no prediction I could make based on my knowledge of trees and forests that would be as accurate or precise as the predictions I could make if I had the mental and sensory capacity to comprehend the forest at the level of it's constituent quarks and electrons. The only advantage of thinking in terms of trees and forests is brevity and economy. Shortcuts. If you had no need of brevity or economy, then you would have no need for concepts like trees and forests. Rather, you might as well think exclusively in terms of fundamental entities...quarks, electrons, photons, and whatnot. But quarks, electrons, etc. are themselves high level description of what is eventually just relations between numbers. This is derivable from digital mechanism, but is also corroborate from physics itself. Note that you would also have no need of emergent laws like evolution or the laws of thermodynamics. Further, given sufficient computational power there's no abstract interpretation that you couldn't legitimately extract (via the right Putnam mapping) from the collection of electrons and quarks that comprise the forest. It would be like looking for bunny-shaped clouds in the sky. Trees and forests and squirrels and hikers *might* be the most obvious higher-level interpretation of what exists...but certainly not the only interpretation, and not privileged in any way. I doubt this. Dowker and Kent have written a paper showing that there are many possible, quite different quasi-classical worlds consistent with quantum mechanics. So whether our world, or something similar, is necessary seems to be an open question. Our world is ambiguous. But if by our you mean us the (hopefully sound) self-referentially correct machine, then we might (re)define our physical worlds by the set of things which we can observe, and this can be shown to be necessary. With mechanism, there is no primitive physical laws, but the laws of physics are necessary, all the (physical) rest is history and geography. My point being that, even assuming scientific materialism, trees and forests only exist in your mind. They are part of how things seem to us. They are part of us. Like logic and reason and arithmetic descriptions. OK, but then everything is part of us. But I am quite skeptical about the idea that elementary arithmetical truth is part of us. Prime numbers did not wait for humans to have their remarkable properties. I think you are confusing the discovery of numbers by humans, and those numbers abstract properties which are not in the category of time and space. But why should not being in time and space excuse arithmetic from depending on humans? Are you serious about this? Do you really think that the fact that you cannot cut 17 in two, that is I is two equal parts depend on humans? In such a case Church thesis and most of classical mathematics is made false. Price is not in spacetime and neither is love. I'd say that spacetime and number are equally inventions. Inventions by who? Are you taking the set of humans as what exists primitively? Assuming mechanism, both matter and observers emerge from something simpler: the laws of addition and the laws of multiplication. Also, it can be proved that it is just impossible to derive arithmetic from anything simpler than arithmetic, that is why arithmetic or something implying arithmetic has to be assumed, and is the simplest things to assume from which we can derive more complex things (like the belief arithmetic and in space and time by machine/numbers). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On 21 Nov 2010, at 09:11, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: It seems to me that there is no that much difference between Universes with complete determinism and inherent randomness. Rex put it quite well here Intelligence and Nomologicalism Optionen http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/5ab5303cdb696ef5 From the viewpoint of Wolfram (I guess it is close to the statement that the Universe is some kind of a cellular automaton), it does not matter much if a node is fully deterministic or random. The account on free will by Wolfram is coherent with the mechanist assumption, and is a good example of how computer science can help to build a compatibilist account of free will. But his account of physicalness is wrong. He is forced to put the quantum weirdness (non locality notably) under the rug, and he is not aware that if we are machine, then the observable reality cannot be a machine. By the mechanist first person indeterminacy, the observable reality has to be a non constructive (non Turing emulable) first person plural reality. Also, I begin to think that digital mechanism entails also that the physical universe is infinite in time, space and scale. The big bang would only be a local explosion/singularity, and not the (physical) origin of the cosmos. Bruno on 20.11.2010 23:57 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/20/2010 5:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 19.11.2010 04:11 Rex Allen said the following: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? I guess that something like this Stephen Wolfram says. A few citations from his talk Some Modern Perspectives on the Quest for Ultimate Knowledge It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and connectivity of space and time. But really it’s all completely deterministic. That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior. Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we feel that we have some form of free will. And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws. See more at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/07/stephen-wolframs-computational-irreducibility.html I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? Evgenii But also see the argument by Elitzur and Doleve that the universe has inherent randomness: http://a-c-elitzur.co.il/uploads/articlesdocs/UndoMsrmnt.pdf It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the famous `uneasy truce' be- tween relativity and quantum mechanics has never been uneasier. If there are hidden variables beneath the quantum level, then, by an earlier proof of ours (Elitzur Dolev, 2005a), they must be `forever-hidden variables' in order to never give rise to violations of relativity. But then, by the same reasoning that has lead Einstein to abolish the aether, they probably do not exist. Indeed, it has been proved long ago (Elitzur, 1992) that God must play dice in order to preserve relativistic locality. Hence, randomness, novelty and emergence, which for luminaries like Parmenides, Spinoza and Einstein were mere epiphenomena to be explained away, are likely the Uni- verse's very mode of existence. Brent -- You received
Re: Compatibilism
Dear Bruno, Could you please recommend some reading about the mechanist assumption? Especially that then the observable reality cannot be a machine Evgenii on 21.11.2010 15:58 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 21 Nov 2010, at 09:11, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: It seems to me that there is no that much difference between Universes with complete determinism and inherent randomness. Rex put it quite well here Intelligence and Nomologicalism Optionen http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/5ab5303cdb696ef5 From the viewpoint of Wolfram (I guess it is close to the statement that the Universe is some kind of a cellular automaton), it does not matter much if a node is fully deterministic or random. The account on free will by Wolfram is coherent with the mechanist assumption, and is a good example of how computer science can help to build a compatibilist account of free will. But his account of physicalness is wrong. He is forced to put the quantum weirdness (non locality notably) under the rug, and he is not aware that if we are machine, then the observable reality cannot be a machine. By the mechanist first person indeterminacy, the observable reality has to be a non constructive (non Turing emulable) first person plural reality. Also, I begin to think that digital mechanism entails also that the physical universe is infinite in time, space and scale. The big bang would only be a local explosion/singularity, and not the (physical) origin of the cosmos. Bruno on 20.11.2010 23:57 Brent Meeker said the following: On 11/20/2010 5:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: on 19.11.2010 04:11 Rex Allen said the following: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces. And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. The conscious experience that accompanies human behavior is another matter entirely, but I don't think it serves any causal role either. Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? I guess that something like this Stephen Wolfram says. A few citations from his talk Some Modern Perspectives on the Quest for Ultimate Knowledge It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and connectivity of space and time. But really it’s all completely deterministic. That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior. Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we feel that we have some form of free will. And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws. See more at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/07/stephen-wolframs-computational-irreducibility.html I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? Evgenii But also see the argument by Elitzur and Doleve that the universe has inherent randomness: http://a-c-elitzur.co.il/uploads/articlesdocs/UndoMsrmnt.pdf It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the famous `uneasy truce' be- tween relativity and quantum mechanics has never been uneasier. If there are hidden variables beneath the quantum level, then, by an earlier proof of ours (Elitzur Dolev, 2005a), they must be `forever-hidden variables' in order to never give rise to violations of relativity. But then, by the same reasoning that has lead Einstein to abolish the aether, they probably do not exist. Indeed, it has been proved long ago (Elitzur, 1992) that God must play dice in order to preserve relativistic locality. Hence, randomness, novelty
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: My position is: So either there is a reason for what I choose to do, or there isn't. If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. Unless you determined the reason. How would you do that? By what means? According to what rule? Using what process? If you determined the reason, what determined you? Why are you in the particular state you're in? If there exists some rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then there's still no free will. The rule determined the choice. =*=*=*= As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. How does this differ in meaning from my definition? I don't think it does. Not that according to this definition: 1. Free will is not deterministic behaviour. It is not driven by external circumstances. OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 2. Nor is free will is randomness or mere caprice. (Rationally choose and consciously perform). OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 3. Free will requires independence from external circumstances. It does not require independence or separation from one's own self. Ones actions must be related to ones thoughts and motives Related by what? Deterministic rules? Probabilistic? If one's actions are determined by ones thoughts and motives, what determines one's thoughts and motives? And why do some particular set of thoughts and motives result in one choice instead of some other? If there is no reason for one choice instead of the other, the choice was random. 4. But not complete independence. Free will does not require that all our actions are free in this sense, only that some actions are not entirely un-free. (...at least some of which...). OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 5. Free will also does not require that any one action is entirely free. In particular, free will s not omnipotence: it does not require an ability to transcend natural laws, only the ability to select actions from what is physically possible. Select using what rule? What process? What mechanism? Magic? Either there is a reason that you selected the action you did, in which case the reason determined the selection - or there isn't, in which case the selection was random. Also the phrase from what is physically possible is suspicious. If the natural laws determine what is physically possible, don't they determine everything? Where does this leave room for free will? the ability to select actions from what is physically possible Select by means that is neither random nor caused. Okay. That's what I said. 6. Free will as defined above does not make any assumptions about the ontological nature of the self/mind/soul. There is a theory, according to which a supernatural soul pulls the strings of the body. That theory is all too often confused with free will. It might be taken as an explanaiton of free will, but it specifies a kind of mechanism or explanation — not a phenomenon to be explained. OK. Not in conflict with my definition. I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will As for the rest of it, I read it, but didn't find it convincing on any level. RIG + SIS Free Will A random process coupled to a deterministic process isn't free will. It's just a random process coupled to a deterministic process. If you ask most people is this free will? - they will say no. Free will (in most peoples estimation) requires a process that is neither random *nor* determinstic. Not one that is both. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Nov 2010, at 07:31, Rex Allen wrote: As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Why? Well...either there's a reason that they do, or there isn't... Lol. I agree with you. With your definition of free will, it does not exist. I think that if you question most people who believe in free will closely, my definition is what their position boils down to. But your reasoning does not apply to free will in the sense I gave: the ability to choose among alternatives that *I* cannot predict in advance (so that *from my personal perspective* it is not entirely due to reason nor do to randomness). So that is a good description of the subjective feeling of free will. But if you question most people closely, this isn't what they mean by “free will”. They mean the ability to make choices that aren't random, but which also aren't caused. They have the further belief that since the choices aren't random or caused, the chooser bears ultimate responsibility for them. This further belief doesn't seem to follow from any particular chain of reasoning. It's just another belief that this kind of person has. Silly, I know. When you say random or not random, you are applying the third excluded middle which, although arguably true ontically, is provably wrong for most personal points of view. We have p v ~p, but this does not entail Bp v B~p, for B used for almost any hypostasis (points of view). I'd think that ontically is what matters in this particular case? Why would I care about whether or why I or anyone else *seem* to have free will from their personal points of view? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather than some other way. Only causal explanations do that. . And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s intentional stance See my other post in the previous thread on shortcuts, forests, and trees. - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction: Humans are a complex sort of robot. Wild speculation. As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Humans have intentionality. Granted. I do anyway. So at least one human does. Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality Not proven. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Sat, Nov 20, 2010 at 8:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: Have I understood you correctly, that the current discussion has been already predetermined by the initial conditions of the Universe? Well...maybe. But I'm not overly concerned with the question of whether the causal laws of the universe are deterministic or probabilistic. The implications are mostly the same either way. And it's the implications of there being causal laws that mainly interests me. So we have orderly perceptions and ask where the order comes from. Perhaps causal laws? But then where do causal laws come from? What causes causal laws? And why our causal laws instead of some others? Do these causal laws actually cause some things to happen and actively prohibit other things from happening? Or do they merely describe what happens, without any actual causation? In other words, is it the case that A) nothing *can* violate the laws of physics, or is it merely that B) nothing *does* violate the laws of physics. If A), why not? What enforces the causal laws? If B) why not? Why do things happen *as though* there were governing laws? I lean towards B. There are no causal laws, and there is no reason that things happen as though there were. Which is the gist of the Meillassoux paper that started the other thread. I am not sure that I agree but at least with computational irreducibility there is some logic in all this. Do you agree with Stephen Wolfram? I thought it was an interesting talk. Things could be that way I reckon. Though the problem is that things could be lots of other ways instead. If reality is as Wolfram believes instead of as Leibniz believed (e.g., in Monadology), why is that? What explains the difference? And then, what explains the explanation of the difference? And then, what explains the explanation of the explanation of the difference? And so on. If reality is one particular way, we're faced with the question of why this way and not some other?. Which leads directly to infinite regress, as above. The only way to avoid this is to accept, as with Meillassoux, that there *is* no reason that reality is this way. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On 11/21/2010 10:43 AM, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allenrexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather than some other way. Only causal explanations do that. No, causal explanations only push the question back a step. And even the one step is just description plus asserting necessity. . And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s intentional stance See my other post in the previous thread on shortcuts, forests, and trees. - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction: Humans are a complex sort of robot. Wild speculation. As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Humans have intentionality. Granted. I do anyway. So at least one human does. Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality Not proven. Proof is for mathematics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Sun, Nov 21, 2010 at 4:18 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 11/21/2010 10:43 AM, Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality Not proven. Proof is for mathematics. Not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in the juridical sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
This is exactly the model of free will I argue in favour for in my book Theory of Nothing. Thanks 1Z - this is well put. Not that it will convince the others who argue that free will is excluded by being neither deterministic nor random. That debate will rage for centuries... Cheers On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 04:28:51AM -0800, 1Z wrote: I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will These arguments are not to be regarded as finalising the issue of free will, but only of showing that there is a case to be answered. 1. The existence of the introspective sense of free will. (Determinists will quickly tell you this is down to not understanding the causes of our actions — but why don't we intuitively see our actions as being random, or, for that matter determined by unknown causes? (Determinism by unknown causes is certainly thinkable, after all it is just what the determinist thinks. It is not as if we can't conceive of either of those). 2. The tendency to value freedom. (No-one, not even a determinist, would want a benevolent dictator making their decisions, even if the decisions in questions were better than the ones they would have made). 3. Our ability to detect greater and lesser amounts of 'robotic' or 'zombie' like behaviour in others. 4. Creativity and innovation. (Determinists often make a hand- waving argument (like this)listing all the external influences that go to act on an individual, and conclude that there is no room left for any individual contribution. But then why aren't we still in caves ?) It is often claimed that free will is an inherently contradictory idea, or that if free will is possible at all, it must be somehow magical or supernatural. We intend to argue against both these claims by building a consistent theoretical model of free will could work in an indeterminstic universe, that is entirely naturalistic. It is often objected that a random event cannot be rational or responsible. However, human decision-making is not an individual event occurring at the atomic level, it is a very complex process involving billions of neurons. It is often assumed that indeterminism can only come into play as part of a complex process of decision-making when the deterministic element has reached an impasse, and indeterminism has the casting vote (like an internalised version of tossing a coin when you cannot make up your mind). This model, which we call the Buridan model, has the advantage that you have some level of commitment to both courses of action; neither is exactly against your wishes. It is, however, not so good for rationality and self-control. The indetermistic coin-toss can reasonably be seen as the crucial cause of your decision, yet it is not under your control. In our model, by contrast, the indetermistic element is moved back in the descision-making process. A funtional unit we call the Random Idea Generator proposed multiple ideas and courses of action, which are then pruned back by a more-or-less deterministic process called the Sensible Idea Selector. (This arrangement is structurally modelled on random mutation and natural selection in Darwinian theory). The output of the R.I.G is controlled in the sense that the rest of the system does not have to act on its proposals. It can filter out anything too wild or irrational. Nonetheless, in a rewinding history scenario, the individual could have acted differently, as requied by libertarian free will, because their R.I.G. could have come out with different proposals — and it would still be something they wanted to do, because it would not have been translated into action without the consent of the rest of the neural apparatus. (As naturalists, we take it that a self is the sum total of neural activity and not a ghost-in-the-machin). It could be argued that placing indeterminism at the source of decision-making in this way means that our decisions are ultimately unfounded. We respond that being able to give a rational account of your actions, the reasons behind them, the reasons behind those reasons and so on to infinity is setting the bar too high. In real life, nobody is that rational. We also comment on the definitions of free will and determinism, the alleged empirical evidence against free will and the existence and significance of genuine indeterminism. Of course, being able to build a model of it does not show that that free will actually exists, but the claim is made that it is impossible, that there is no way of conceiving it, and the appropriate response to such a claim is in fact to conceive of it. We are only arguing for its possibility, and how else do you argue for the possibility of something other than showing that it can be posited to exist without entailing any contradiction? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group,
Re: Compatibilism
The problem you're making is that, we can't choose (freely) under deterministics rules and we can't choose (freely) under random rules... Because the world is ruled (random or not). I think free will is compatible to both views. As long as you defined it to be ignorance of the knowing entities, the burden rest to define what in that context are the knowing entities (and what knows mean, where I think Bruno is near the truth) ;-) Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
Well it would seem to me that ignorance is not free will. Ignorance is ignorance. Belief in free will is not free will. Belief in free will is *belief* in free will. Why do you want to define it in terms of ignorance? What motivates this? And how does that fit with how the term is used with respect to ultimate responsibility for acts committed (good and bad)? Why not just say: Free will as it is commonly used doesn't exist, but we have this other thing you might be interested in: faux will - which we define in terms of ignorance... On Sun, Nov 21, 2010 at 5:49 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: The problem you're making is that, we can't choose (freely) under deterministics rules and we can't choose (freely) under random rules... Because the world is ruled (random or not). I think free will is compatible to both views. As long as you defined it to be ignorance of the knowing entities, the burden rest to define what in that context are the knowing entities (and what knows mean, where I think Bruno is near the truth) ;-) Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
