Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[Stephen P. King]

On 3/8/2012 4:24 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/8/2012 10:37 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman > wrote:


> "The 1-view from its own perspective" can NEVER be plural.


Why?

> After duplication there are two people, 



One person.

> each of whom must possess a singular perspective. 



Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective.

> Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki
where he would end up


Yes, both would recall identical things.

> Do you dissent from this?.


Only the part about "there are two people", there are two bodies but 
only one conscious person in that symmetrical room because if you 
swap their positions subjectively there is no difference and 
objectively there is no difference so it's not much of a jump to 
conclude there is no difference between them.


But then there's only one room and one body, per Leibniz's identity of 
indiscernibles.


This is similar to Feynman's idea of why all electrons are identical: 
there is only one electron which appears multiple because it zig zags 
back and forth in time as well as space.  Unfortunately we don't know 
what statistics consciousness obeys.

Hi Brent,

Is there any reason why it would be any different? Just consider 
that the electron is conscious and has a 1p... The same measures should 
result. Why is consciousness so mysterious?



Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Two Mathematicians in a Bunker and Existence of Pi

[Stephen P. King]

On 3/8/2012 1:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Mar 2012, at 18:36, Pzomby wrote:




On Mar 7, 5:29 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:





OK.
But it is not valid to infer from this, that mathematics is *about*
description.
On the contrary, mathematicians reason on "models" (realities,
structures), and they use description like all scientists.
mathematical logic is the science which study precisely the difference
between description (theories) and their interpretations (in from of
mathematical structure).
As you mention the notion of cardinal, a discovery here made by
logicians is that the notion of cardinal is relative. A set can have a
high cardinality in one model, and yet admit a bijection with N in
another model.



Yes, but even the symbols =, +, x, *, are notations that are
substitutes for words. Eg. Equals, addition or union, multiplication.
The operational notations are words used to describe the formulation
of the model.


Hmm... OK.
In logic they are symbol associated with axioms and rules, and they 
have (standard) semantics, for exemple the mathematical "meaning" of + 
is given by the set {(0,0,0) (0, 1, 1), (1,0, 1) (1,1,2)  (6,7, 
13), ..., (1, 23, 24), }.





Dear Bruno,

I could not resist! So they are infinite after all! Umm, where did 
I see the idea of representing things as equivalence classes... LOL! I 
wrote of that a while back... Whatever... My apologies, I am in a good 
mood and being my normal sarcastic self.










“In common usage, an ordinal number is an adjective which describes
the numerical position of an object, e.g., first, second, third,
etc.” http://mathworld.wolfram.com/OrdinalNumber.html



Are the “ordinal” numbers actually adjectives describing the
relational position in a sequence (first, second,…one-ness, two-ness
etc.)?


They can be used for that. But they can be much more than that.



Yes. Then it is Ok to use it for that.  eg. 1stness, 2ndness, 3rdness
in sport races gives a quality of feeling to the participants,
observers/bettors.


OK. But I would say the "quality" of being the first is more in the 
mind of the machine winning the competition, or in the mind of the 
machines members of the jury, than in the ordering relation itself.


Are these not equivalent in the Platonic sense? After all, we are 
considering universal machinery that ignores any kind of local gauge 
symmetry.











Are numbers (ordinal) necessarily qualitative descriptions?


Perhaps. In the comp frame, I prefer to ascribe the qualities of
numbers, by the possible computational relation that they have with
respect to their most probable universal environment. This is more
akin with the human conception of quality as being a lived experience.
But what you say might make sense in some other contexts.



It is the “lived experience” that is reality as I understand.


OK. That is the reality of subjective experience, but we can bet there 
is something independent of that reality, and which might be 
responsible for that reality.


It seems to me that any one that would bet against that "there is 
something independent of that reality" would be a sucker or a solipsist 
or some superposition thereof! How does this tie into 1p indeterminancy?







The condition of the universal environment is influenced by an event
at a point in time of the evolutionary process.  eg. Certain
qualitative conditions existed in Oct. 1066 in Britain. Also,
9/11/2001.  In nature: January in central Europe exudes certain
environmental qualitative conditions.


Once universal numbers are in relation with other one, many 
qualitative conditions can happen, assuming digital mechanism.


Wait a second, does not digital mechanism assume a fixed 
substitution level?











Numerals symbolize number position (as in particular instants in the
sequence of the continuum of time).


OK. But that's quantitative for me, or at least a "3p" type of notion.
Quality is more 1p, and can be handled at the meta-level by modal
logic, or by (often non standard) logics.

Bruno



Duration of time is quantitative.  Existing conditions in the duration
are qualitative.


I doubt this. I would bet that if time can be quantitative, and 
objectively measured by different observers, the duration notion is 
more qualitative, and subjective.


How can a "measure of change" be anything but quantitative? Given 
that we are seriously considering that all of our 1p and 3p tropes are, 
literally, nothing more than numbers and relations between them, what 
else is there?







You state: “Quality is more 1p” but it is not exclusive to 1p.  Humans
observe and have  empathy for others qualitative conditions and
states.


I agree.

It could be that "qualities" are just spectral ranging over local 
gauges... THink of how we can associate even an infinite field of 
continuous transformations with a single point using fiber bundles. I 
strongly suspect that this is exactly equivalent to "infinite 
computations runnin

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[David Nyman]

On 8 March 2012 18:37, John Clark  wrote:

>> > each of whom must possess a singular perspective.
>
>
> Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective.

I'm sorry, but your recent comments strongly suggest you have not
fully grasped the premise of the experiment.  After duplication and
reconstitution in W and M the two copies cannot possibly have
"identical perspectives".  They are not in a "symmetrical room" - they
are reconstituted in two different environments and consequently their
personal histories will immediately begin to diverge.  As to their
still being "one person", if you stuck a pin in the one in W, surely
you wouldn't expect the one in M to flinch?

You seem to be pursuing a separate argument about the definition of
"person", which is not the point at issue.  Sure, if we could
routinely duplicate bodies, we would need a more sophisticated
book-keeping method to keep track of them.  But the copies in question
could be in no doubt as to their possession of separate and
mutually-insulated perspectives after duplication, even if they might
be apt argue fruitlessly about which was the "true heir".

David

> On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman  wrote:
>
>> > "The 1-view from its own perspective" can NEVER be plural.
>
>
> Why?
>
>>   > After duplication there are two people,
>
>
> One person.
>
>>
>> > each of whom must possess a singular perspective.
>
>
> Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective.
>
>>
>> > Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he
>> > would end up
>
>
> Yes, both would recall identical things.
>
>> > Do you dissent from this?.
>
>
> Only the part about "there are two people", there are two bodies but only
> one conscious person in that symmetrical room because if you swap their
> positions subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no
> difference so it's not much of a jump to conclude there is no difference
> between them.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: Two Mathematicians in a Bunker and Existence of Pi

[Craig Weinberg]

On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 07 Mar 2012, at 18:36, Pzomby wrote:
> > You state: “Quality is more 1p” but it is not exclusive to 1p.  Humans
> > observe and have  empathy for others qualitative conditions and
> > states.

>I agree.

That's still only 1p shared. An inanimate object has no empathy for
others qualitative conditions, but it does respect their mass,
density, velocity, etc...quantitative (or anti-qualitative) qualities.

Craig

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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Mar 8, 1:24 pm, John Clark  wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> > Can you transplant a particular flame from one candle to another?
>
> Can a particular flame exist from one nanosecond to the next?

I think that it can 'insist'. The continuity is figurative but real,
both through time and literally across space as 'energy'. The flame is
not an object but rather a relatively (to us) objective facet of an
intersubjective process which is experienced locally by the molecules
of wick, wax, and air surrounding them, the retinal cells of the eye
and brain of the observer, etc.

>
> > Can you cut a spark down the middle lengthwise and put half here and half
> > there?
>
> Certainly, a spark is made of matter, plasma to be specific, so put half
> the plasma here and the other half there.

The spark is a momentary fragmentation of matter sublimating across
space. You can't put half of 'it' somewhere because it is mostly
motion. It's like cutting a curveball in half and expecting to get a
perfect half of the curve.

>
> > >>  I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You
> > are a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows
> > and you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room,
> > thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input
>
>  > That's an assumption. A compass duplicated in this way would not be
>
> > receiving identical sensory input.
>
> That could only happen if the magnetic field in that room favored one
> direction over another, and in my thought experiment I'm talking about a
> room with a infinite number of symmetries, like a sphere.

By isolating it that way though, you are excluding the possibility of
consciousness being anchored to the temporal narrative of the cosmos
rather than a phenomenon of objects in space. To duplicate even a
compass this way requires now that the entire universe contain only
symmetrical objects (otherwise won't the compass will point to the
asymmetry?). Of course magnetism is only an example. There may be many
ways to access factual external orientation. A GPS. A radiotelescope,
etc. Consciousness may have sense built into it along those lines.

>
> > > Someone with an exact copy of my brain might not be able to read English
> > because they haven't had any history reading it. The brain may not encode
> > in English or Chinese but in neurotransmitters which don't know the
> > difference.
>
> The only difference between a native English speaker and a native Chinese
> speaker is the position and momentum of the atoms in their brain; as a
> matter of fact that's also the only difference between you and me.

That's an assumption. Since we don't see English or Chinese characters
arranged within the tissues of the brain being shuttled around from
region to region, and we see no homunculus or translator running i/o
between the optical form and the perceived meaning, we really have no
idea that the arrangement of the atoms is the cause. I think it's much
more likely is that it is the instantaneous and meaningless shadow of
a long-term meaningful experience. The poker game is not inside the
cards or their arrangement.

>
> > My thought experiments start with "if something is real, then it cannot
> > ever be truly identical to anything else in the cosmos
>
> Then your thought experiment starts out as Bullshit right out of the box

Ah, a scientific opinion if ever I heard one.

> because science tells us there is no difference between one electron and
> another, there are no scratches on electrons to tell one from another.

Just because we can't tell one electron from another doesn't mean that
there is no difference. You are applying macro-scaled presumptions
about matter onto the microcosm. Electrons don't have scratches
because they don't have surfaces. They are more primitive than that.
Electrons cause objects to have scratches, they don't scratch
themselves.

We can tell the difference between photons in the reflection on the
surface of a glass and photons passing through a glass. How do you
think that works exactly?

> And
> this is not just vague philosophy, the identical nature of things when they
> get very small is behind the idea of "exchange forces" one of the pillars
> of modern physics, and from that you can deduce that there must be two
> classes of particles, bosons like photons and fermions like electrons, and
> from there you can deduce The Pauli Exclusion Principle, and that is the
> basis of the periodic table of elements, and that is the basis of
> chemistry, and that is the basis of life. From just the fact that electrons
> are identical and a little high school algebra you can derive The Pauli
> Exclusion Principle and that principle is not only responsible for life it
> is the very reason matter is solid, it is the only reason your feet don't
> sink into the ground and you fall to the center of the earth. So don't tell
> me nothing can be identical!

All of tha

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[meekerdb]

On 3/8/2012 10:37 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman > wrote:


> "The 1-view from its own perspective" can NEVER be plural.


Why?

> After duplication there are two people, 



One person.

> each of whom must possess a singular perspective. 



Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective.

> Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he 
would end up


Yes, both would recall identical things.

> Do you dissent from this?.


Only the part about "there are two people", there are two bodies but only one conscious 
person in that symmetrical room because if you swap their positions subjectively there 
is no difference and objectively there is no difference so it's not much of a jump to 
conclude there is no difference between them.


But then there's only one room and one body, per Leibniz's identity of 
indiscernibles.

This is similar to Feynman's idea of why all electrons are identical: there is only one 
electron which appears multiple because it zig zags back and forth in time as well as 
space.  Unfortunately we don't know what statistics consciousness obeys.


Brent



 John K Clark



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Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Mar 2012, at 19:45, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


> For example, they [Dawkins and Stenger] never say that they  
*assume* the existence of a primary physical universe


Do they really have to state that they assume existence exists?


You mean that primary matter exists? Yes that is an hypothesis.

("Existence exists" is a much too much vague assertion).



It would be great if I could explain exactly why there is something  
rather than nothing but unfortunately I don't know how to do that,  
but a atheist does not need to,


I am not sure anybody needs that, no more than anybody needs to know  
facts about Jupiter's satellites.
I have no problem with those who say that they are not interested in  
such or such question.
Only with those who assert that it is a false problem, a crackpot  
field, and this by letting believe that science has solve or dissolve  
the question, when it is hardly the case.





it's not as if the God Hypothesis can provide even a hint of a answer.


There is no "God hypothesis" by many "God Hypotheses". Yes the theory  
"God = the primary physical universe" has failed on that question, but  
have you read Plotinus, or Tchouang-tseu. Or my favorite text: "The  
quastion to King Melinda". They are close to what a computer can guess  
about itself and what might be.







   > they dismiss the mind-body problem, they dismiss the mind  
problem, and the body problem.


it would be great if I could explain exactly what the nature of  
consciousness is, but unfortunately I don't know how to do that, but  
a atheist does not need to, it's not as if the God Hypothesis can  
provide even a hint of a answer.  And I didn't even know the body  
was a problem.


There is an easy body problem, and an hard body problem. The easy  
problem is what bodies do, and that is solved by the inference of  
sequences of deeper and deeper relations between numbers, and some  
hope to unfiy them. that's phsyics. The hard body problem is the  
question of its existence, its nature, ontological, or  
epistemological, and where it comes from.
With comp both problem can be handled, although practically the easy  
problem becomes very hard, but the hard problem is practically solved:  
matter is an epistemological reality, if we are machine. Of course you  
have to understand step 3 for progressing toward understanding this.






> This is just arrogant.

Arrogant??  Like any good scientist Dawkins is always quick to say  
"I don't know",


I am not sure. It is not my impression from my reading. I did like a  
lot "the selfish gene", but was rather disappointing by its other  
"philosophical book", where he lacks rigor in the large, and make  
believe that science give credits on his pseudo-religious opinion.



but theologians always know, they even know the trivial little likes  
and dislikes of a infinite being, although I've never understood how  
something a omnipotent being dislikes could continue to exist or  
even existed in the first place.


"I don't believe in the God you don't believe in".

Most european christian don't believe in it either, but still believe  
in Christian value related to their favorite legend. I can respect that.


Vindicating or fanatic atheists and fundamentalist religious people  
are ally in demolishing the moderate agnostics interested in the  
field. It seems to me. Eventually they care more on power than truth.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Mar 2012, at 18:40, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Mar 6, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other  
city? You told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance.  
He will tell you that you were wrong.


I was not wrong. When discussing the nature of identity care must be  
taken when using personal pronouns or confusion will run riot; I did  
not tell "him" that "he" will find "himself" in Moscow with a 100%  
chance, I said there is a 100% chance Bruno Marchal will be in  
Moscow and events proved I was 100% correct.


The experiment proves nothing about the 1-views. It proves (confirmed,  
actually) only the presence of Bruno Marchal's body.



The fact that Bruno Marchal is in Washington and knows nothing about  
Moscow is irrelevant and makes no difference to Bruno in Moscow  
whatsoever. Why do I say this? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.


You persist in ignoring the difference between the 1-view from the 1- 
view pov, which is what I usually mean by 1-views, and the 1-views  
that an outsider can attribute to other people.





> Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has  
been duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1- 
view perspective has not been duplicated.


Then when I said "you have been duplicated" there is something very  
important about "you", the most important part in fact, that is  
missing because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated.


Indeed.



What can it be, what is lacking in the copy that the original has?  
let's think, it can't be information because that can certainly be  
duplicated and it can't be matter because atoms are generic and we  
constantly replace our atoms with new ones anyway; so I think we  
both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm not yet ready  
to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace irrationality.


Why? What is lacking is simply the first person personal subjective  
perspective. But I am OK to call that a soul. Good idea. It fits with  
the arithmetical lexicon I gave for arithmetical interpretation of  
Plotinus. The soul's logic is given by "Bp & p" and obeys a logic of  
knowledge (S4).
You confirm my feeling that you are confusing science (G) and  
knowledge (S4Grz).





I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue:  
You are a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's  
law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a  
symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical  
sensory input and thus act identically. I now use a Star Trek brand  
transporter to instantly exchange your position with the original,  
or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just exchange the two  
brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original Bruno  
Marchal would notice that anything had happened, and objective  
outside observers would not notice anything had happened either.  
There would not even be a way to tell if the machine was actually  
working, I could even be lying about having a transporter. Who knows  
who cares?


OK. And?




Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or  
there was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people  
different then things would evolve, well, differently, but at the  
instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if  
subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no  
difference and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch  
had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable  
assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there are  
two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one  
intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view.


OK. And?

That would be like aa duplication W W, or M M, not W, M.

Do you agree with this principle: if today I can be sure that tomorrow  
I will be uncertain about the outcome of some experience, then I am  
today uncertain about the outcome of that future experience.


Let consider again the guy in Helsinki. He will be read and  
annihilate. the information will be sent in W and M, but here, I make  
precise that they will be reconstituted in exactly similar  
environment, so as to match your test. So in the boxes, they behave  
identically. They know that they have been reconstituted, because this  
is information is given by the style of the reconstitution boxes. Of  
course they don't know yet if it is in W and M. They can muse that  
they are at the two places at once, and there is certainly only "one  
consciousness",. But they know they will differentiate when opening  
the door and getting outside the boxes. They don't know what will be  
the outcome of the experience "opening the door". The guy in Helsinky  
knew this in advance, and can apply the principle above to say that he  
is uncertain today, before the split, what he will see when ope

Re: Two Mathematicians in a Bunker and Existence of Pi

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Mar 2012, at 18:36, Pzomby wrote:




On Mar 7, 5:29 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:





OK.
But it is not valid to infer from this, that mathematics is *about*
description.
On the contrary, mathematicians reason on "models" (realities,
structures), and they use description like all scientists.
mathematical logic is the science which study precisely the  
difference

between description (theories) and their interpretations (in from of
mathematical structure).
As you mention the notion of cardinal, a discovery here made by
logicians is that the notion of cardinal is relative. A set can  
have a

high cardinality in one model, and yet admit a bijection with N in
another model.



Yes, but even the symbols =, +, x, *, are notations that are
substitutes for words. Eg. Equals, addition or union, multiplication.
The operational notations are words used to describe the formulation
of the model.


Hmm... OK.
In logic they are symbol associated with axioms and rules, and they  
have (standard) semantics, for exemple the mathematical "meaning" of +  
is given by the set {(0,0,0) (0, 1, 1), (1,0, 1) (1,1,2)  (6,7,  
13), ..., (1, 23, 24), }.










“In common usage, an ordinal number is an adjective which describes
the numerical position of an object, e.g., first, second, third,
etc.”  http://mathworld.wolfram.com/OrdinalNumber.html



Are the “ordinal” numbers actually adjectives describing the
relational position in a sequence (first, second,…one-ness, two-ness
etc.)?


They can be used for that. But they can be much more than that.



Yes. Then it is Ok to use it for that.  eg. 1stness, 2ndness, 3rdness
in sport races gives a quality of feeling to the participants,
observers/bettors.


OK. But I would say the "quality" of being the first is more in the  
mind of the machine winning the competition, or in the mind of the  
machines members of the jury, than in the ordering relation itself.









Are numbers (ordinal) necessarily qualitative descriptions?


Perhaps. In the comp frame, I prefer to ascribe the qualities of
numbers, by the possible computational relation that they have with
respect to their most probable universal environment. This is more
akin with the human conception of quality as being a lived  
experience.

But what you say might make sense in some other contexts.



It is the “lived experience” that is reality as I understand.


OK. That is the reality of subjective experience, but we can bet there  
is something independent of that reality, and which might be  
responsible for that reality.





The condition of the universal environment is influenced by an event
at a point in time of the evolutionary process.  eg. Certain
qualitative conditions existed in Oct. 1066 in Britain. Also,
9/11/2001.  In nature: January in central Europe exudes certain
environmental qualitative conditions.


Once universal numbers are in relation with other one, many  
qualitative conditions can happen, assuming digital mechanism.









Numerals symbolize number position (as in particular instants in the
sequence of the continuum of time).


OK. But that's quantitative for me, or at least a "3p" type of  
notion.

Quality is more 1p, and can be handled at the meta-level by modal
logic, or by (often non standard) logics.

Bruno



Duration of time is quantitative.  Existing conditions in the duration
are qualitative.


I doubt this. I would bet that if time can be quantitative, and  
objectively measured by different observers, the duration notion is  
more qualitative, and subjective.





You state: “Quality is more 1p” but it is not exclusive to 1p.  Humans
observe and have  empathy for others qualitative conditions and
states.


I agree.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/3/8 John Clark 

> On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman  wrote:
>
> > "The 1-view from its own perspective" can NEVER be plural.
>
>
> Why?
>
>   > After duplication there are two people,
>
>
> One person.
>
>
>> > each of whom must possess a singular perspective.
>
>
> Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective.
>
>
>> > Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he
>> would end up
>
>
> Yes, both would recall identical things.
>
> > Do you dissent from this?.
>>
>
> Only the part about "there are two people", there are two bodies but only
> one conscious person
>

??

>From their own POV, they're not one person, each has a singular experience,
even if identical, they do not feel both bodies.



> in that symmetrical room because if you swap their positions subjectively
> there is no difference and objectively there is no difference so it's not
> much of a jump to conclude there is no difference between them.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Mar 2012, at 18:24, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/7/2012 5:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 06 Mar 2012, at 18:59, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Mar 5, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

...


>> God needs to be a person.

> In some tradition, and it is a mystery why you stick on those  
tradition, given that you criticize them so vigorously.


Because "God" is just a word


It is not *necessarily* just a word. There are common pattern in  
the use of that word.


But the common pattern is that "God" designates a person.  Those who  
have used it to mean some pervasive force or impersonal ground of  
being have generally done so to avoid persecution for being a- 
theists.  But I doubt that is a problem in Brussels.


Indeed. Some atheists persecutes or harass agnostic people, here.  
Since I used the word "theology" it is bit harder, because they  
pretend publicly to be open minded (which they are not). Some belongs  
to non transparent sort of sects.










and morons fools and some of the most evil people who have ever  
walked the Earth have mutilated that word far beyond any hope of  
repair.


That's your opinion.



Language evolves and like biological Evolution it almost never  
goes backwards and retraces it's steps, let me give a example: The  
word "gay" means happy and until just a few decades ago that's all  
it meant, but today if I use that word just to indicate that  
somebody is happy I am issuing a invitation to be misunderstood. I  
have a even better example, technically the word "pedophile" means  
a lover of children, well there is nothing wrong with that in fact  
it's a virtue, people should like children, but today 
it means more than that and its far too late for the word to be  
rehabilitated, so I would never dream of calling someone a  
"pedophile" unless I had rock solid evidence they were a monster.  
In the same way the word "God" has gone too far, it has much too  
much baggage to be rehabilitated now. So use another word, there  
are lots to choose from.


I follow often Plotinus, which "already" avoided bot the term "God"  
and the term "theology". I use "ONE" instead, and I have used the  
word "biology" and "psychology". But atheists (from some club) were  
not glad with the result, and critize the wholme field, so it  
motivated me to do the same thing than the student of Plotinus, to  
use the word that people use in the field. You make your point for  
everyday word like "gay" and "pedophile", but not for the technical  
field "theology".


I don't know of anyone besides you who considers "theology" a  
technical field or works in it as such.  My dictionary of philosophy  
defines "theology" as "the study of God and God's relation to the  
world."  It defines "God" as the "the highest ultimate being,  
assumed by theology on the basis of authority, revelation, or  
faith" [Dictionary of Philosophy, Dagobert Runes].


Good definition. They forget logic, though.

They also assume that we don't need faith to believe in a primary  
physical reality, which means that your dictionary take for granted  
Aristotle metaphysics. By not using the word theology, when doing  
theology, I would become an accomplice of those who, by mocking the  
field, let it in the hands of the political authorities, including the  
atheists one, which are less transparant.


I might be a neoplatonist believer, Brent, or a neoneoplatonist  
believer, where neoneoplatonism is neoplatonism reconsidered through  
comp and Church thesis. Plotinus chapter on "Number" announces already  
that type of move, like Proclos' notion of henads.




> some, like Richard Dawkins presents science as if it was a sort  
of alternative, which makes science into pseudo-science


I have no idea what your complaint with Richard Dawkins is, I've  
read all his books and think he's terrific.


My problem with people like Dawkins and Stenger, which I have read  
more recently, is that they oppose science to theology, but by  
doing that they avoid the theological question, which means that it  
is the field, and not the word, which makes problem fro them. It  
shows also that they have (unconscious, perhaps) theological  
interpretation of their field. For example, they never say that  
they *assume* the existence of a primary physical universe, they  
dismiss the mind-body problem, they dismiss the mind problem, and  
the body problem.


There is some truth in that.  Stenger sometimes muses that maybe  
consciousness doesn't really exist -


Brr...


and I think he is motivated to consider this because it's hard to  
fit into his preferred model of "atoms and the void".


Yes, that the problem with the physicalists. They hide or minimize  
data since 1500 years, when they don't fit with their intimate  
religious, I mean pseudo-religious, convictions.





They talk like if science as decided between Aristotle and Plato  
kind of theology. This is just arrogant.
in fact, books like Stenger's and Dawkins' one, fu

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[John Clark]

On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman  wrote:

> "The 1-view from its own perspective" can NEVER be plural.


Why?

  > After duplication there are two people,


One person.


> > each of whom must possess a singular perspective.


Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective.


> > Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he
> would end up


Yes, both would recall identical things.

> Do you dissent from this?.
>

Only the part about "there are two people", there are two bodies but only
one conscious person in that symmetrical room because if you swap their
positions subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no
difference so it's not much of a jump to conclude there is no difference
between them.

 John K Clark

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Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[John Clark]

On Wed, Mar 7, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> Can you transplant a particular flame from one candle to another?


Can a particular flame exist from one nanosecond to the next?

> Can you cut a spark down the middle lengthwise and put half here and half
> there?
>

Certainly, a spark is made of matter, plasma to be specific, so put half
the plasma here and the other half there.



> >>  I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You
> are a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows
> and you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room,
> thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input
>

 > That's an assumption. A compass duplicated in this way would not be
> receiving identical sensory input.


That could only happen if the magnetic field in that room favored one
direction over another, and in my thought experiment I'm talking about a
room with a infinite number of symmetries, like a sphere.


> > Someone with an exact copy of my brain might not be able to read English
> because they haven't had any history reading it. The brain may not encode
> in English or Chinese but in neurotransmitters which don't know the
> difference.


The only difference between a native English speaker and a native Chinese
speaker is the position and momentum of the atoms in their brain; as a
matter of fact that's also the only difference between you and me.

> My thought experiments start with "if something is real, then it cannot
> ever be truly identical to anything else in the cosmos
>

Then your thought experiment starts out as Bullshit right out of the box
because science tells us there is no difference between one electron and
another, there are no scratches on electrons to tell one from another. And
this is not just vague philosophy, the identical nature of things when they
get very small is behind the idea of "exchange forces" one of the pillars
of modern physics, and from that you can deduce that there must be two
classes of particles, bosons like photons and fermions like electrons, and
from there you can deduce The Pauli Exclusion Principle, and that is the
basis of the periodic table of elements, and that is the basis of
chemistry, and that is the basis of life. From just the fact that electrons
are identical and a little high school algebra you can derive The Pauli
Exclusion Principle and that principle is not only responsible for life it
is the very reason matter is solid, it is the only reason your feet don't
sink into the ground and you fall to the center of the earth. So don't tell
me nothing can be identical!

  John K Clark

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