Re: Autonomy?
On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience. No problem with that. I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but you, the first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there is something in the environment in Washington that makes a change to one of your sense organs that is missing in the environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a difference between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's meaningless to ask which one is really you. There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never been asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow. I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future first person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as your own 1) and 2) prediction illustrates. So first person indeterminacy is entirely the result of the fact that Washington and Moscow happen to be not identical, if they were there would be no differentiation of perspective regardless of how many brains and bodies there were. Indeed. That is why W and M are used to make clear the presence of the differentiation. So first person indeterminacy is functionally equivalent to the environment is changeable and unpredictable and the idea can bring no enlightenment into the nature of personal identity or consciousness. The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for their stability. The indeterminacy comes from the differentiation only between the identical first person (before going out of the boxes) when the copies discover where they are. In the two room case, with a one and a zero in some envelop in each room, the two rooms and the envelop does not evolve at at all. Your argument that it is the environment which evolve does not work, because it does not. That would be testable by a third person, when the first person indeterminacy is only something livable by the candidate themselves: there is no 3-indeterminacy in this setting at all. I can duplicate you in two closed little rooms. In step 6 you are duplicated on a chip. The unpredictable nature of the place where the reconstitution are done is irrelevant If the two closed rooms are identical then its irrelevant where the rooms are, but if the rooms are identical then the first person perspective that you're so concerned about (me too) has NOT been duplicated. Of course the two rooms contains a difference. With comp you know in advance that in the duplication experience, your 1-pov will remain unique Forget comp, from simple logic you know that your first person point of view will remain unique. I am glad you agree with this. that has not been always clear. If 2 things have the same first person point of view then there is only one first person point of view We agree on this since the start. and so it remains unique; and if 2 things have a different first person point of view then each one remains unique because it's different from anything else. OK I admit that's not very profound, but unlike most theories in philosophies tautologies do have the virtue of being true. And ... ? No matter what diary entry I come up with you keep saying it would not disprove your theory because of blah blah point of view blah blah, so I want you to tell me exactly what diary entry WOULD disprove your theory? I will feel to be in W. Confirmed by the guy in W, but disproved by the guy in M. I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if before the experiment the subject had written in his diary I will feel like I'm in Washington and only Washington and had written nothing else, and then after the experiment you had interviewed the subject in Moscow and he said I feel like I'm in Moscow and only Moscow then you would concede that your theory of first person indeterminacy is incorrect. This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscates that the guy who understand the point will never write I will feel to be in W and in only in W, as he knows that this will be disqualified by the guy in Moscow. The correct guy will predict W or M, never W only, nor M only. The fact that some idiotic predict that he will win the lottery does not lake false the probability that the he will win, which is very small. I could be wrong but I have a feeling if that had happened
Re: truth
Hi Guitar boy,
On 04 Jul 2012, at 16:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
Hello Everythinglisters,
First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions
from time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more musical
tendency.
It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do
stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11
If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like
with personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0,
with a kind of zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy
justification.
Well in Z_2 = {0, 1}, we do have a law with 1+1 = 0. (modular
arithmetic). But 1 is still different from 0. But I get your point.
And anybody still willing to assert this could post their bank
account details and pin numbers and be freed from arithmetic
dictatorship by having their account cleaned out by other everything
listers that DO believe in sums, successors etc. as 0 = whatever
they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't really matter, as
it's only some personal belief shared by a few control freaks.
Right. I think that people believing that 1+1 can be different of 2
are just imagining something else. It is not an arguent that a truth
is not absolute, but that the notation used to described it can have
other interpreations. In the Z_2 structure, which plays a key role in
many places: 2 = 0. But 2 does not represent the successor of of the
successor of zero, it represents the rest when we divide by the usual
number 2. It really means:
odd + odd = even (the rest of 1 + 1 divided by 2 = 0)
even + even = even (the rest of 2 + 2 divided by 2 = 0)
odd + even = odd (the rest of 1 + 2 divided by 2 = 1)
Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a
less than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details
here :)
Guitar is hardest, imo. You need good trained digits!
Looking forward to contributing from time to time.
You are welcome,
Bruno
On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote:
Bruno asked:
. Is that an absolute truth?
By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY
agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept
better expressions.
(Except for absolute truth - ha ha).
And Teilhard was a great master of words.
John M
On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:
Brent, thanks for the appreciation!
My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned.
We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever
WE accept is human.
Is that an absolute truth?
In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When
I listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems
to disagree.
Bruno
We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are
spiritual beings having a human experience.
(de Chardin).
What is Mother Nature accepting?
John M
On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain
peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more.
So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives.
John
Or less facetiously, (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of
Gennifer)=(One, me) and (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one
raindrop). So whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the
applicability of arithmetic to your model.
Brent
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Re: truth
On 05 Jul 2012, at 05:16, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, It seems obvious that what is true, as referenced below, is some kind of collection and that it's labeling can easily be seen to not be fixed a priori. We might think of it of a Kripke frame and the models have forced truths. The thing here is that we have to be careful that we don't box ourselves into thinking that the totality of all that exists is finite or even only countably infinite. If we are machine then the cardinality of reality is at least countably infinite and it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more. You might try to imagine an experimental set-up to test if the cardinal of reality (whatever ontology) is bigger than aleph_zero. It will succumbs to the dream argument (assuming comp). But that countable reality, as seen from inside, can also be proved to be bigger than anything nameable. But that reality is epistemological. It does not need to be reified (put in an ontology). Bruno On 7/4/2012 2:05 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote: The thread is about the possibility of an omnipotent being being able to manipulate what is true. On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 7:12 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Hello Everythinglisters, First post here, and seems fun to get lost reading the discussions from time to time, so here somebody contributing with a more musical tendency. It's funny how this game keeps cropping up where people want to do stuff like: 1 + 1 = 11 If people are sincere about pulling whatever sums they feel like with personal justification, then we might as well say 1 + 1 = 0, with a kind of zen logic, where everything = nothing as a fancy justification. And anybody still willing to assert this could post their bank account details and pin numbers and be freed from arithmetic dictatorship by having their account cleaned out by other everything listers that DO believe in sums, successors etc. as 0 = whatever they want, and the sum of their balance doesn't really matter, as it's only some personal belief shared by a few control freaks. Guitar and composition imho, have arithmetic overlap, albeit in a less than total sense, which is why I won't have to post my details here :) Looking forward to contributing from time to time. On Saturday, June 30, 2012 12:09:53 AM UTC+2, JohnM wrote: Bruno asked: . Is that an absolute truth? By no means. It is a word-flower, a semantic hint, something in MY agnosticism and I feel like a semantic messenger only. I accept better expressions. (Except for absolute truth - ha ha). And Teilhard was a great master of words. John M On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Jun 2012, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote: Brent, thanks for the appreciation! My point was simply that anybody's 'truth' is conditioned. We have no (approvable?) authority for an ABSOLUTE truth. Whatever WE accept is human. Is that an absolute truth? In my humble opinion, WE = human seems to me quite relative. When I listen to the jumping spiders or the Löbian machines, most seems to disagree. Bruno We are not human beings having a spiritual experience. We are spiritual beings having a human experience. (de Chardin). What is Mother Nature accepting? John M On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/28/2012 12:46 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent: I am the 3rd kind of the two: think not in binary, just in plain peasant logic, when 1 and 1 make 11, nothing more. So Bruno's absolute truth may have even more relatives. John Or less facetiously, (The father of Kirsten)+(The father of Gennifer)=(One, me) and (one raindrop)+(one raindrop)=(one raindrop). So whether successor(x)=(x+1) depends on the applicability of arithmetic to your model. Brent -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 5 July 2012 08:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The proof if by absurdo. Suppose there is an algorithm, or even just a God capable of predicting the specific outcome among 1) and 2). Suppose it is 1), then the guy in Moscow refutes it, and comp invites us to listen to him. If it is 2), then the guy in washington refutes it, and comp invites us to listen to him. Indeterminacy has not been assumed: it results from the trivial fact that I am copied in the same state in two different place so that I can't predict which differentation will occur from my first person perspective. This is where it may be more explicit - and hence clearer - to express the logic in terms of Hoyle's heuristic, in my view. To remind you, a unique first person locus is first assumed, all experiential content then being the consequence of a unique stochastic multiplexing of the entire class of sentient moments, from this singular perspective. The objective substrate, on which sentience may be supposed to supervene, is assumed to be deterministic, as is the experiential multiplex, whose role is to make explicit a means of conceiving an entire class as a serialisation. But this latter conceptualisation allows us to bring an *explicit indeterminism*into the picture, against what appears as an otherwise entirely deterministic background. An explicit stochastic multiplexing of moments mandates that all occasions of sentience must take their place in due course and in due measure, relativised to whatever personal histories may be recoverable from the internal logic of the deterministic substrate. There are several useful aspects of this way of thinking, I believe. Firstly, it takes seriously the singularity of first-personal location. Secondly, it makes explicit a generalised first-personal indeterminacy as a fundamental characteristic of experience. Thirdly, and importantly, it prises apart two distinct aspects of temporal experience: replaces and logically prior or next. Stochastic multiplexing of moments mediates the former aspect: this moment - the moment as given - replaces all others in experience. It is only in the context of the moment as given that logico-temporal ordering becomes relativised to a particular personal history, as mediated by the deterministic substrate.. Thus Bruno's, John's or David's occasions of experience become relativised to their particular reference (or relevance) class through, in effect, the selective memory of a more generalised stochastic process. In this way, each of us can speak meaningfully of my next expected moment, or my prior history by exclusive reference to the memory state defined within a given spatio-temporal location. It is curious at first to apply this heuristic to the UDA and similar scenarios, though ultimately simplifying, in my view. Firstly we must put aside any fundamental notion of past and future except as a logical implication from the perspective of a momentary localisation within a stochastic experiential multiplex. We must however continue to take personal history seriously - and not only our own - because any other attitude would be bad faith. From this perspective we see that John's description of the objective situation after copying is perfectly reasonable and true of the deterministic substrate, and indeed the class of all sentient moments considered as a whole. It ceases, however, to make any sense at all in the context of the present heuristic, in which first-personal experience is explicitly recovered from a unique perspective by the mutual replacement of singular givens. This heuristic provides a view of the first-person as a singular stream of consciousness in which all personal episodes emerge in due course, in due measure and in due relation. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: There is no sense to ask who is really me I'm glad to hear you say that. what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow. That depends entirely on something outside of you, namely Washington and Moscow, it depends on the probability of Washington producing a sense signal that Moscow does not produce, until then your environment is the same and so are you and so there is no differentiation (assuming quantum randomness can be ignored) and so there is only one Bruno Marchal. When the cities start to display their differences then things will change, especially you. So first person indeterminacy is functionally equivalent to the environment is changeable and unpredictable and the idea can bring no enlightenment into the nature of personal identity or consciousness. The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for their stability. If nothing can change then photons can not change their positions, so they can not enter your eye, so it would be equivalent to Bruno1 and Brono2 starring into two identical Black Holes, so there would be no difference between the two Bruno brains, so there would be no splitting of viewpoints, so there would be only one Bruno Marchal until something changed. In the two room case, with a one and a zero in some envelop in each room, the two rooms and the envelop does not evolve at at all. By definition It's not a environmental factor until it encounters you, as long as that zero or one stays in that envelope it's irrelevant, only when its opened does it become an environmental factor. If 2 things have the same first person point of view then there is only one first person point of view We agree on this since the start. Good. and so it remains unique; and if 2 things have a different first person point of view then each one remains unique because it's different from anything else. OK I admit that's not very profound, but unlike most theories in philosophies tautologies do have the virtue of being true. And ... ? And so there is nothing insightful about first person indeterminacy and it can not help us understand how the world works. I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if before the experiment the subject had written in his diary I will feel like I'm in Washington and only Washington and had written nothing else, and then after the experiment you had interviewed the subject in Moscow and he said I feel like I'm in Moscow and only Moscow then you would concede that your theory of first person indeterminacy is incorrect. This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscates that the guy who understand the point will never write I will feel to be in W and in only in W, as he knows that this will be disqualified by the guy in Moscow. The correct guy will predict W or M, never W only, nor M only.The fact that some idiotic predict that he will win the lottery does not lake false the probability that the he will win, which is very small. OK, you say that diary entry would not disprove your theory, so I repeat my request now for the third time, WHAT DIARY ENTRY WOULD DISPROVE YOUR THEORY? I remind you that you introduced the idea of diaries not me and if you can not answer my question because your theory predicts everything then it predicts nothing and it is not science, and the world already has enough metaphysical mush. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 05 Jul 2012, at 15:47, David Nyman wrote: On 5 July 2012 08:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The proof if by absurdo. Suppose there is an algorithm, or even just a God capable of predicting the specific outcome among 1) and 2). Suppose it is 1), then the guy in Moscow refutes it, and comp invites us to listen to him. If it is 2), then the guy in washington refutes it, and comp invites us to listen to him. Indeterminacy has not been assumed: it results from the trivial fact that I am copied in the same state in two different place so that I can't predict which differentation will occur from my first person perspective. This is where it may be more explicit - and hence clearer - to express the logic in terms of Hoyle's heuristic, in my view. To remind you, a unique first person locus is first assumed, Is that different from the unique first person that we have to attach to any universal machine? all experiential content then being the consequence of a unique stochastic multiplexing of the entire class of sentient moments, from this singular perspective. This seems like adding an ASSA on top of all RSSA. I fail to see the simplification, but if it helps you why not. Do you think we can make an experimental test showing a role to such an ASSA? The objective substrate, on which sentience may be supposed to supervene, is assumed to be deterministic, as is the experiential multiplex, whose role is to make explicit a means of conceiving an entire class as a serialisation. But this latter conceptualisation allows us to bring an explicit indeterminism into the picture, against what appears as an otherwise entirely deterministic background. But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background. An explicit stochastic multiplexing of moments mandates that all occasions of sentience must take their place in due course and in due measure, relativised to whatever personal histories may be recoverable from the internal logic of the deterministic substrate. But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it might be in conflict with computationalism. There are several useful aspects of this way of thinking, I believe. Firstly, it takes seriously the singularity of first- personal location. I try to assume the less, and it seems to me that for UDA this is explained by the fact that machine have singular self-referential memories. Then AUDA confirms this singular aspect with the use of the classical theory of knowledge. Secondly, it makes explicit a generalised first-personal indeterminacy as a fundamental characteristic of experience. I fail to see how this is needed, nor even if it makes thing simpler. It is already hard for most to understand an indeterminacy whose existence follows from deduction, so another one imposed on the top of it might seem making the picture even more complex. Thirdly, and importantly, it prises apart two distinct aspects of temporal experience: replaces and logically prior or next. Stochastic multiplexing of moments mediates the former aspect: this moment - the moment as given - replaces all others in experience. It is only in the context of the moment as given that logico- temporal ordering becomes relativised to a particular personal history, as mediated by the deterministic substrate.. Thus Bruno's, John's or David's occasions of experience become relativised to their particular reference (or relevance) class through, in effect, the selective memory of a more generalised stochastic process. You might have a correct intuition, and I can intuit something, but all what I do, is to derive the consequence of surviving with probability one in case of technically successful brain transplant. What is the relation between the new stochastic process and the global (on arithmetic) comp one. Perhaps the stochastic process you describe is the same as the comp one, applied to the virgin universal machine, more exactly to its first person pov. Total ammesy would lead any one to that state. But we don't have to assume it. Universal numbers exists, and their domain of indeterminacy contains all possible experiences, except that the probability of going amnesic and getting my personal memory back might be a statistically rare event (I dunno, some experience reports can be amazing on this point). In this way, each of us can speak meaningfully of my next expected moment, or my prior history by exclusive reference to the memory state defined within a given spatio-temporal location. But machines/numbers can talk of their next expected moment without invoking any stochastic process. Stochasticness appears because their relative consciousness is
Re: Autonomy?
On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience. No problem with that. I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but you, the first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there is something in the environment in Washington that makes a change to one of your sense organs that is missing in the environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a difference between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's meaningless to ask which one is really you. There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never been asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow. Both are 'seen'. The question is by whom. It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one person who does the seeing. It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and Washington was seen by Obama. I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future first person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as your own 1) and 2) prediction illustrates. But then there is not probability interpretation. You write, The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and refutation of this is isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli experience (throwing of a coin), both in the iterated and non iterated cases. But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit assumption that there is some X such that X is in Washington or X is in Moscow. If W=X1 is in Washington and M=X2 is in Moscow, then there is no probability interpretation of where X0 is. This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's interpretation of QM. If everything happens then what does it mean to say an event has a certain probability? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote: On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience. No problem with that. I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but you, the first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there is something in the environment in Washington that makes a change to one of your sense organs that is missing in the environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a difference between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's meaningless to ask which one is really you. There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never been asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow. Both are 'seen'. The question is by whom. Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that the answer is the inner god, alias the knower, alias Bp p, alias S4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT arithmetical. Unlike the machine, or the third person self which is arithmetical. It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one person who does the seeing. But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they are two of them. There is one person in Moscow, and one person in Washington, and those are the one we interview. We just continue to use the you and me, if they are used in the first person indexical sense, in the usual way. It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and Washington was seen by Obama. And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp implies both Brent will see one city, that they could not have predicted to live that one in particular. For each of them subjectively the experience is the same as having one in either city by throwing a coin. You can replace Brent by machine having enough ability to be able to distinguish Moscow from Washington, and you can prove easily that such machine has no technic to predict which location she (in the usual sense) will observe in his immediate future. I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future first person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as your own 1) and 2) prediction illustrates. But then there is not probability interpretation. ? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the and is an 1-pov or. It is the same as head or tail. You write, The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and refutation of this is isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli experience (throwing of a coin), both in the iterated and non iterated cases. But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit assumption that there is some X such that X is in Washington or X is in Moscow. That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7. And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8. (assuming comp) If W=X1 is in Washington and M=X2 is in Moscow, then there is no probability interpretation of where X0 is. Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, I cannot know if the guy who looks at the result is still me. But with comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication) teleportation. So we accept some local comp type of identity, and that it can be duplicated. So although you will be in Washington and Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and any of you, will feel as having been randomly selected (as the iteration makes clearer) among Washington and Moscow. Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be, as that would contradict the survival of the other. If you predict Moscow, you make the Brent in Washington into a zombie, or a non- Brent. Comp says both are Brent. you = the owner of the identity cart. Just don't forget to take it with you, before accepting a duplication experience. This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's interpretation of QM. If everything happens then what does it mean to say an event has a certain probability? But once you make the machine-observer relativization the theory explains why events have relative probabilities. For the same reason not all arithmetical propositions are true, not all physical propositions are true, and most factual truth are relative to context and self-reference. Everything does not happen, neither with comp, nor with Everett.
Re: Autonomy?
On 05 Jul 2012, at 18:15, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: There is no sense to ask who is really me I'm glad to hear you say that. what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow. That depends entirely on something outside of you, namely Washington and Moscow, it depends on the probability of Washington producing a sense signal that Moscow does not produce, until then your environment is the same and so are you and so there is no differentiation (assuming quantum randomness can be ignored) and so there is only one Bruno Marchal. When the cities start to display their differences then things will change, especially you. In that sense OK. But so the first person indeterminacy remains on what I will feel if I do the experience in practice. So first person indeterminacy is functionally equivalent to the environment is changeable and unpredictable and the idea can bring no enlightenment into the nature of personal identity or consciousness. The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for their stability. If nothing can change then photons can not change their positions, so they can not enter your eye, so it would be equivalent to Bruno1 and Brono2 starring into two identical Black Holes, so there would be no difference between the two Bruno brains, so there would be no splitting of viewpoints, so there would be only one Bruno Marchal until something changed. OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has been duplicated, and the changes you talk about is the experience of self-localization. This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I will feel next. There is no uncertainty in W and M which interfere with this uncertainty. In the two room case, with a one and a zero in some envelop in each room, the two rooms and the envelop does not evolve at at all. By definition It's not a environmental factor until it encounters you, as long as that zero or one stays in that envelope it's irrelevant, only when its opened does it become an environmental factor. If 2 things have the same first person point of view then there is only one first person point of view We agree on this since the start. Good. and so it remains unique; and if 2 things have a different first person point of view then each one remains unique because it's different from anything else. OK I admit that's not very profound, but unlike most theories in philosophies tautologies do have the virtue of being true. And ... ? And so there is nothing insightful about first person indeterminacy and it can not help us understand how the world works. That is a quick jump. Also I am not saying that the comp indeterminacy explains the world, at this stage three it makes things more complex. It is a consequence of comp that we can just not put under the rug. I am not solving a problem, I am formulating it. I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if before the experiment the subject had written in his diary I will feel like I'm in Washington and only Washington and had written nothing else, and then after the experiment you had interviewed the subject in Moscow and he said I feel like I'm in Moscow and only Moscow then you would concede that your theory of first person indeterminacy is incorrect. This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscates that the guy who understand the point will never write I will feel to be in W and in only in W, as he knows that this will be disqualified by the guy in Moscow. The correct guy will predict W or M, never W only, nor M only.The fact that some idiotic predict that he will win the lottery does not lake false the probability that the he will win, which is very small. OK, you say that diary entry would not disprove your theory, so I repeat my request now for the third time, WHAT DIARY ENTRY WOULD DISPROVE YOUR THEORY? The point is mathematical. Such diary entries would be trivial, like both diaries containing I am in Washington. Given it consists of statistics, it is clearer in repeating the experience, the theory would be disproved in the majority of the copies find an algorithm to predict their outcomes, or if the P(having be k times in W) does not fit with the Pascal triangle. Of course it is non sensical. I remind you that you introduced the idea of diaries not me and if you can not answer my question because your theory predicts everything The theory predicts that we don't have a predicting algorithm, just probabilities. It predicts P = 1/2. It would be refuted if the statistics of the first person experience violated the Pascal triangle, or the Gauss distribution. But it does not, for obvious mathematical
Re: Autonomy?
On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: *But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background. * Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I when talking in this way). But the point which I have consistently tried to put to you is more basic. This is that the relative indeterminacy of the relative first person perspective already, by that very formulation, assumes without justification (albeit rather inexplicitly) some specific relative localisation within what is, more properly considered, an indifferent ensemble (e.g. UD* or alternatively some cosmological SWE). Hoyle's way of thinking makes the indeterminate localisation of experience explicit and * absolute* at the outset: he just imagines, in effect, what would it be like if the ensemble of all possible occasions of sentience were unrolled stochastically in a sort of eternal recurrence. This gives, effectively, a relative-frequency interpretation of the probability of any particular occasion being presently given. *But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it might be in conflict with computationalism.* I don't see why you think so. The experiences associated with each duplication or transportation outcome are assumed to be present in the deterministic substrate in due measure, and hence to occur in the associated stream of consciousness in due course. That there is always some given occasion of experience is consequent on an absolute first-personal indeteminism; relativisation to an episode of a particular personal history is then dependent on whatever deterministic substrate is associated with the given occasion. Relative amnesia (or selective memory) effectively compartmentalises first-personal histories from each other and is consequently transparent to reconstitution delay. The above considerations seem so basic to our disagreement that rather than comment further on your other points, I will await your response to this. It is of course perfectly possible (not to say likely) that I am missing something basic here, so I am trying to be as explicit as possible. Let me know what, if anything, is still unclear. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 7/5/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote: On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience. No problem with that. I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but you, the first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there is something in the environment in Washington that makes a change to one of your sense organs that is missing in the environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a difference between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's meaningless to ask which one is really you. There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never been asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow. Both are 'seen'. The question is by whom. Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that the answer is the inner god, alias the knower, alias Bp p, alias S4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT arithmetical. Unlike the machine, or the third person self which is arithmetical. It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one person who does the seeing. But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they are two of them. There is one person in Moscow, and one person in Washington, and those are the one we interview. We just continue to use the you and me, if they are used in the first person indexical sense, in the usual way. It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and Washington was seen by Obama. And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp implies both Brent will see one city, that they could not have predicted to live that one in particular. For each of them subjectively the experience is the same as having one in either city by throwing a coin. You can replace Brent by machine having enough ability to be able to distinguish Moscow from Washington, and you can prove easily that such machine has no technic to predict which location she (in the usual sense) will observe in his immediate future. I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future first person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as your own 1) and 2) prediction illustrates. But then there is not probability interpretation. ? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the and is an 1-pov or. It is the same as head or tail. You write, The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and refutation of this is isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli experience (throwing of a coin), both in the iterated and non iterated cases. But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit assumption that there is some X such that X is in Washington or X is in Moscow. That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7. And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8. (assuming comp) If W=X1 is in Washington and M=X2 is in Moscow, then there is no probability interpretation of where X0 is. Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, I cannot know if the guy who looks at the result is still me. You can if there is only one Bruno Marchal and only one die. But if there are six Bruno's seeing six dice with spots 1 thru 6... But with comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication) teleportation. So we accept some local comp type of identity, and that it can be duplicated. So although you will be in Washington and Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and any of you, will feel as having been randomly selected (as the iteration makes clearer) among Washington and Moscow. Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be, as that would contradict the survival of the other. If you predict Moscow, you make the Brent in Washington into a zombie, or a non-Brent. Comp says both are Brent. Right. So when asked what is the probability Brent sees Washington the answer is 1. And the probability Brent sees Moscow is 1. The probability 1/2 only comes by equivocating on you. you = the owner of the identity cart. Just don't forget to take it with you, before accepting a duplication experience. This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's interpretation of QM. If everything happens then what does it mean to say an event has a certain probability? But
Re: Autonomy?
On 7/5/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has been duplicated, and the changes you talk about is the experience of self-localization. This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I will feel next. But that uncertainty could exist without the duplication - just the uncertainty of which city you would be teleported to. But in the duplication case, when you say, I am uncertain about the experience I will feel next. the second I, the I of the future, has an ambiguous reference. The uncertainty is in the ambiguity of this reference. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
