Re: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology
Well, its just an idea that fascinates me. Reading Gerhard t'Hooft in the 1990's sort of set it all in motion. Also Raphael Bousso, in their analysis oh the universe as hologram, etc. Are we the chuck of matter, or the reflection in the mirror? That kind of thing. -Original Message- From: Roger Clough To: spudboy100 ; everything-list Sent: Sat, Sep 14, 2013 12:09 pm Subject: Re: Re: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology Hi spudboy100 Sure. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough - Receiving the following content - From: spudboy100 Receiver: everything-list,rclough Time: 2013-09-14, 10:01:02 Subject: Re: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology >One idea I have been kicking around, is viewing through physics, that yes mind is bran, brain is mind, but not totally. More, precisely, the notion that the data, the pattern identity, the mind, the soul, personality, memory (whatever we wish to call it) is analogous to a computer network, where data and information, all information, gets written to some sort of media, a long, ways, off. Think of this as a read-write function of a storage area network. All server farms have remote sites to preserve data, for "disaster recovery." All large companies have this, and so do governments as well. I am guessing that this is a feature of the cosmos-or really, just, hoping that it is so. > >Mitch > >-Original Message- >From: Roger Clough >To: - Roger Clough >Sent: Sat, Sep 14, 2013 8:47 am >Subject: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology > > > >Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology > > >Since it is often based on laboratory experiments, parapsychology has a scientific basis. But these results >are smeared by proponents of the cult of materialism, which cannot accept the view that there is such a >thing as a mind (a Self). That alone makes materialism a joke. Materialism originated with the Enlightenment >primarily as a reaction against religion, replacing it with reason, as well as a misinterpretation or reinterpretation >of Descartes, by claiming that mind can interact with the body, which >Descartes maintained were two different >substances, by instead claiming that both mind and body are matter. That mind is matter is nonsensical. Leibniz >took the other tack, that of Idealism, in which both brain and mind were Mind, which has the philosophical support >of Kant and Plato. But the metaphysics of Leibniz are difficult especially in the face of the bad and >completely non-Cartesian philosophy materialisam because materialism, while it doesn't work for mind, DOES work very well for >Newtonian mechanics. Hence conventional science these days is swolidly materialistic and Leibniz's >platonism is liost to history. I will be posting more on this, but to begin with you might want to visit my Leibniz site, > >http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough > > > >Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] >See my Leibniz site at >http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough > >-- >You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Re: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology
Hi spudboy100 Sure. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough - Receiving the following content - From: spudboy100 Receiver: everything-list,rclough Time: 2013-09-14, 10:01:02 Subject: Re: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology >One idea I have been kicking around, is viewing through physics, that yes mind >is bran, brain is mind, but not totally. More, precisely, the notion that the >data, the pattern identity, the mind, the soul, personality, memory (whatever >we wish to call it) is analogous to a computer network, where data and >information, all information, gets written to some sort of media, a long, >ways, off. Think of this as a read-write function of a storage area network. >All server farms have remote sites to preserve data, for "disaster recovery." >All large companies have this, and so do governments as well. I am guessing >that this is a feature of the cosmos-or really, just, hoping that it is so. > >Mitch > >-Original Message- >From: Roger Clough >To: - Roger Clough >Sent: Sat, Sep 14, 2013 8:47 am >Subject: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology > > > >Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology > > >Since it is often based on laboratory experiments, parapsychology has a >scientific basis. But these results >are smeared by proponents of the cult of materialism, which cannot accept the >view that there is such a >thing as a mind (a Self). That alone makes materialism a joke. Materialism >originated with the Enlightenment >primarily as a reaction against religion, replacing it with reason, as well as >a misinterpretation or reinterpretation >of Descartes, by claiming that mind can interact with the body, which >Descartes maintained were two different >substances, by instead claiming that both mind and body are matter. That mind >is matter is nonsensical. Leibniz >took the other tack, that of Idealism, in which both brain and mind were Mind, >which has the philosophical support >of Kant and Plato. But the metaphysics of Leibniz are difficult especially in >the face of the bad and >completely non-Cartesian philosophy materialisam because materialism, while it >doesn't work for mind, DOES work very well for >Newtonian mechanics. Hence conventional science these days is swolidly >materialistic and Leibniz's >platonism is liost to history. I will be posting more on this, but to begin >with you might want to visit my Leibniz site, > >http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough > > > >Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] >See my Leibniz site at >http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough > >-- >You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >"Everything List" group. >To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology
One idea I have been kicking around, is viewing through physics, that yes mind is bran, brain is mind, but not totally. More, precisely, the notion that the data, the pattern identity, the mind, the soul, personality, memory (whatever we wish to call it) is analogous to a computer network, where data and information, all information, gets written to some sort of media, a long, ways, off. Think of this as a read-write function of a storage area network. All server farms have remote sites to preserve data, for "disaster recovery." All large companies have this, and so do governments as well. I am guessing that this is a feature of the cosmos-or really, just, hoping that it is so. Mitch -Original Message- From: Roger Clough To: - Roger Clough Sent: Sat, Sep 14, 2013 8:47 am Subject: Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology Since it is often based on laboratory experiments, parapsychology has a scientific basis. But these results are smeared by proponents of the cult of materialism, which cannot accept the view that there is such a thing as a mind (a Self). That alone makes materialism a joke. Materialism originated with the Enlightenment primarily as a reaction against religion, replacing it with reason, as well as a misinterpretation or reinterpretation of Descartes, by claiming that mind can interact with the body, which Descartes maintained were two different substances, by instead claiming that both mind and body are matter. That mind is matter is nonsensical. Leibniz took the other tack, that of Idealism, in which both brain and mind were Mind, which has the philosophical support of Kant and Plato. But the metaphysics of Leibniz are difficult especially in the face of the bad and completely non-Cartesian philosophy materialisam because materialism, while it doesn't work for mind, DOES work very well for Newtonian mechanics. Hence conventional science these days is swolidly materialistic and Leibniz's platonism is liost to history. I will be posting more on this, but to begin with you might want to visit my Leibniz site, http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology
Leibniz, Idealism and Parapsychology Since it is often based on laboratory experiments, parapsychology has a scientific basis. But these results are smeared by proponents of the cult of materialism, which cannot accept the view that there is such a thing as a mind (a Self). That alone makes materialism a joke. Materialism originated with the Enlightenment primarily as a reaction against religion, replacing it with reason, as well as a misinterpretation or reinterpretation of Descartes, by claiming that mind can interact with the body, which Descartes maintained were two different substances, by instead claiming that both mind and body are matter. That mind is matter is nonsensical. Leibniz took the other tack, that of Idealism, in which both brain and mind were Mind, which has the philosophical support of Kant and Plato. But the metaphysics of Leibniz are difficult especially in the face of the bad and completely non-Cartesian philosophy materialisam because materialism, while it doesn't work for mind, DOES work very well for Newtonian mechanics. Hence conventional science these days is swolidly materialistic and Leibniz's platonism is liost to history. I will be posting more on this, but to begin with you might want to visit my Leibniz site, http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unexpected Hanging
On Sat, Sep 14, 2013 at 11:53 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: >> >> >> On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg >>> wrote: >>> > Which reasoning is clearly false? >>> > >>> > Here's what I'm thinking: >>> > >>> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am not >>> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised about. >>> > By >>> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include being >>> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft contingencies >>> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. >>> >>> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no >>> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure >>> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door >>> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the >>> paradox still holds. >> >> >> I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If I say >> 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when', that >> is already a contradiction. > > Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this. > The judge lied. You convinced me! :) (with due credit to Alberto and > Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be > "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise > when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if > you do". > > My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5 > turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns > to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to > predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the > defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker > wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that > the attacker button is automatically pressed. I meant: automated so that the attacker button is pressed on turn 5. > Now the attacker (judge) > is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there > is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple > instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the > attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will > offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one > can do. > > I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better. I > am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily > attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are > equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as > Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability? > If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're > proposing? > > The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it. > It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the > answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming > that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural > firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural > firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the > symbols. Why not? > > Cheers, > Telmo. > >> Adding the conceit of precise times doesn't >> alter the fundamental contradiction that you can be surprised when someone's >> true prediction comes true. The week already includes every hour of every >> day of the week, so it can't be a surprise on that level, but if the judge >> doesn't specify a single time then it also has to be a surprise on another >> level. You just have to pick on which level you are talking about, or decide >> that one level automatically takes precedence over the other. >> >>> >>> > The condition of expectation >>> > isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference. >>> > Objectively, >>> > there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything. >>> >>> I would say that surprise in this context can be defined formally and >>> objectively. The moment someone knocks at the door, the prisoner must >>> have assigned a probability < 1 that he would be executed that day. >>> This is clearly not the case for Friday, where p=1. >> >> >> Even on Friday it can still be a surprise, a meta-surprise, when he finds >> out the judge lied, or knocks on the door an hour later. If we say that >> can't happen though, p=1 is still limited to Friday only if it's Thursday. >> It doesn't accumulate. On Wednesday it's still 50-50 for Thursday and Friday >> each. On Tuesday it's .33 for Wednesday-Friday each, so on Wednesday, when >> the knock comes, he is 66% surprised - unless there's something I'm missing. >> >>> >>> If we assume a >>> rational prisoner, we can replace it with an object. Some computer >>> running an algorithm. He
Re: Unexpected Hanging
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >> > Which reasoning is clearly false? >> > >> > Here's what I'm thinking: >> > >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am not >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised about. >> > By >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include being >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft contingencies >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. >> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the >> paradox still holds. > > > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If I say > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when', that > is already a contradiction. Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this. The judge lied. You convinced me! :) (with due credit to Alberto and Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if you do". My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5 turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge) is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one can do. I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better. I am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability? If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're proposing? The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it. It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the symbols. Why not? Cheers, Telmo. > Adding the conceit of precise times doesn't > alter the fundamental contradiction that you can be surprised when someone's > true prediction comes true. The week already includes every hour of every > day of the week, so it can't be a surprise on that level, but if the judge > doesn't specify a single time then it also has to be a surprise on another > level. You just have to pick on which level you are talking about, or decide > that one level automatically takes precedence over the other. > >> >> > The condition of expectation >> > isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference. >> > Objectively, >> > there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything. >> >> I would say that surprise in this context can be defined formally and >> objectively. The moment someone knocks at the door, the prisoner must >> have assigned a probability < 1 that he would be executed that day. >> This is clearly not the case for Friday, where p=1. > > > Even on Friday it can still be a surprise, a meta-surprise, when he finds > out the judge lied, or knocks on the door an hour later. If we say that > can't happen though, p=1 is still limited to Friday only if it's Thursday. > It doesn't accumulate. On Wednesday it's still 50-50 for Thursday and Friday > each. On Tuesday it's .33 for Wednesday-Friday each, so on Wednesday, when > the knock comes, he is 66% surprised - unless there's something I'm missing. > >> >> If we assume a >> rational prisoner, we can replace it with an object. Some computer >> running an algorithm. Here we can define the computer belief as some >> output it produces somehow. We can even make this problem fully >> abstract and get rid of the colourful story with hangings and judges. > > > That's a problem if you fall for the Pathetic Fallacy and assume that > compu
