Re: AUDA and pronouns

[meekerdb]

On 10/6/2013 10:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

Unfortunately, the thread about AUDA and its relation to pronouncs got
mixed up with another thread, and thus got delete on my computer.

Picking up from where we left off, I'm still trying to see the
relationship between Bp, Bp&p, 1-I, 3-I and the plain ordinary I
pronoun in English.

I understand Bp can be read as "I can prove p", and "Bp&p" as "I know
p". But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bp&p is entirely in
the verb, the pronoun "I" stays the same, AFAICT.

Also, switching viewpoints, one could equally say the Bp can be read
as "he can prove p", and Bp&p as "he knows p", so the person order of
the pronoun is also not relevant.


Notice though how different "I can prove the 4-color theorem." is from "The 4-color 
theorem is true."


Brent

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AUDA and pronouns

[Russell Standish]

Unfortunately, the thread about AUDA and its relation to pronouncs got
mixed up with another thread, and thus got delete on my computer.

Picking up from where we left off, I'm still trying to see the
relationship between Bp, Bp&p, 1-I, 3-I and the plain ordinary I
pronoun in English.

I understand Bp can be read as "I can prove p", and "Bp&p" as "I know
p". But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bp&p is entirely in
the verb, the pronoun "I" stays the same, AFAICT.

Also, switching viewpoints, one could equally say the Bp can be read
as "he can prove p", and Bp&p as "he knows p", so the person order of
the pronoun is also not relevant.

Cheers

-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Brent

>> This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is 
>> correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this 
>> is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person 
>> even from one second to the next.

I think Heraclitus meant that it is through change that some things remain the 
same. Thus the river stops being the river if it doesn't flow. Or the human 
body has an underlying form and structure that gets maintained as the 
constituent matter comes and goes. It is the abstract relationship between 
elements that constitutes identity rather than the elements themselves. I would 
think this reading of Heraclitus is more palatable to Bruno given he is a 
neo-patonist. I would have thought Bruno would want identity between successive 
steps of 'the program' to be maintained, otherwise, as you do, he would really 
be denying a role to an underlying form in the natural numbers from which 
'shadows of us' are derived.

In any case Bruno really asserts that identity is maintained in comp. This is 
the essence of the 'yes doctor' axiom which he violates in step 3.


>> I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a 
>> probability.

Well he would be right to. This is from Bruno's step 3 where he explicitly 
assigns probability:

"This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 
1-indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any 
noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a 
probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).”

All the best

Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 17:45:48 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


  

  
  
On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:



  

  On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark 
wrote:


  
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno
  Marchal 
  wrote:



  

  

  
> The M-guy
  is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been
  the H-guy)


  
   

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are
  not identical just as you are not identical with
  the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


  

  

  
  


This is true, but it's also something
  Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to the extent
  that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is
  happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the
  same person even from one second to the next. I thought that
  was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp,
  then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least
  in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence
  constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital
  states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could
  also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The
  computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not -
  however the point is only to show what is possible in
  principle. Or is "in principle" itself objectionable?)


  





JC should read this:
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret



I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning
a probability.



Brent


  

  


Arguing about which man is which or who
  thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you
  agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of
  this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? (I can accept
  it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is
  apparently doing it constantly.)

  


  
  -- 




  





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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[LizR]

On 7 October 2013 14:20, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 10/6/2013 5:24 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 7 October 2013 13:12, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>
>>  All you've done is fuzzy up "uncertainty reduction" so it can serve as
>> an explanation for anything.  That was my objection of Nietzsche's "will to
>> power": In a straightforward reading it's false.  After enough explication
>> it's turned into "accomplishing something you probably wanted to" and it
>> becomes a tautology.
>>
>
>  This sounds similar to the "All Christians are good" argument.
>
>  "All Christians are good!"
>  "What about the Inquisition?"
>  "Oh, they weren't REAL Christians."
>
>
> That's usually referred to as "the no true Scotsman" fallacy.
>

Hey, do you mind? *I'm* a true Scotsman!

Well, apart from being a woman.

And not coming from Scotland.

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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[meekerdb]

On 10/6/2013 5:24 PM, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 13:12, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> 
wrote:



All you've done is fuzzy up "uncertainty reduction" so it can serve as an
explanation for anything.  That was my objection of Nietzsche's "will to 
power": In
a straightforward reading it's false.  After enough explication it's turned 
into
"accomplishing something you probably wanted to" and it becomes a tautology.


This sounds similar to the "All Christians are good" argument.

"All Christians are good!"
"What about the Inquisition?"
"Oh, they weren't REAL Christians."


That's usually referred to as "the no true Scotsman" fallacy.

Brent

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[meekerdb]

On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> 
wrote:


On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

> The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not
identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to 
the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the 
time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. 
I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we 
exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come 
back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital 
states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may 
not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is "in 
principle" itself objectionable?)



JC should read this: 
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret


I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a 
probability.

Brent


Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question 
is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of this sort is at 
least a theoretical possibility? (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the 
multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.)


--


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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[LizR]

On 7 October 2013 13:26, LizR  wrote:

> On 7 October 2013 09:02, Alberto G. Corona  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> But there is something altruistic also (well the former is not so
>> egoistic at last) Sir Helmunt Hillary climbed the Everest not only for
>> himself, but for England. Because he wanted the flag of England to wave
>> above all nations. To contemplate your nation as powerful and respectable
>> by other nations is not only a uncertainty reducer for you but also for
>> generations to come that share your gene-meme legacy.
>>
>
> Excuse me, but I can't let that pass. His name was *Edmund* Hillary and
> he was a New Zealander!
>
> (Speaking of "uncertainty reduction"...!)

:-)

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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[LizR]

On 7 October 2013 09:02, Alberto G. Corona  wrote:

>
>
> But there is something altruistic also (well the former is not so egoistic
> at last) Sir Helmunt Hillary climbed the Everest not only for himself, but
> for England. Because he wanted the flag of England to wave above all
> nations. To contemplate your nation as powerful and respectable by other
> nations is not only a uncertainty reducer for you but also for generations
> to come that share your gene-meme legacy.
>

Excuse me, but I can't let that pass. His name was *Edmund* Hillary and he
was a New Zealander!

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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[LizR]

On 7 October 2013 13:12, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> All you've done is fuzzy up "uncertainty reduction" so it can serve as an
> explanation for anything.  That was my objection of Nietzsche's "will to
> power": In a straightforward reading it's false.  After enough explication
> it's turned into "accomplishing something you probably wanted to" and it
> becomes a tautology.
>

This sounds similar to the "All Christians are good" argument.

"All Christians are good!"
"What about the Inquisition?"
"Oh, they weren't REAL Christians."

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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[meekerdb]

On 10/6/2013 1:02 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




2013/10/6 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

On 10/6/2013 9:08 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics, 
often just
to get enough funding to survive.

Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the problem.

Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question!

/How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert itself 
in
beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must be an integral part 
of
research. /
/
/
/For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a more 
fundamental
question than knowledge itself./
---

I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily.  What they aim at, is 
like any
living being, and in fact, like any stable dynamic auto-regulated 
structure, is
*/ to reduce uncertainty/*.



Naah.  If that were true they'd never climb Mt. Everest or race motorcycles 
or
explore new territory.  People are complex, they want different things at 
different
times.  Sometimes it's comfort and security, sometimes it's adventure, 
sometimes its
companionship and sometimes it's competition, sometimes it's leisure, 
sometimes it's
strife.  Evolution just dictates that sometimes its sex and progeny.



Good, but some of those complexities  comes from the complex that is reducing 
uncertainty in so complex systems such are human societies. First, either evolution 
dictates nothing or it dictates everything, because societies are also a product o 
evolution. under a gene-meme multilevel selection process, where memes is in the top of 
the hierarchy.


To climb mount Everest has egoistic and altruistic aspects. The egoistic ones try to 
increase individual fitness, by fame , respect or money. All of them are individual 
uncertainty reducers, because they increase resources for survival and reproduction, 
that is, survive against the entropic noise of death and forgetting, and assure  the 
survival of the personal meme-gene legacy.


But there is something altruistic also (well the former is not so egoistic at last) Sir 
Helmunt Hillary climbed the Everest not only for himself, but for England. Because he 
wanted the flag of England to wave above all nations. To contemplate your nation as 
powerful and respectable by other nations is not only a uncertainty reducer for you but 
also for generations to come that share your gene-meme legacy.


All you've done is fuzzy up "uncertainty reduction" so it can serve as an explanation for 
anything.  That was my objection of Nietzsche's "will to power": In a straightforward 
reading it's false.  After enough explication it's turned into "accomplishing something 
you probably wanted to" and it becomes a tautology.


Brent

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Re: Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity

[LizR]

Thanks. I have a feeling I have already read this but will have a look.
(Admittedly I haven't finished the other one yet...)


On 5 October 2013 15:34, Russell Standish  wrote:

> We did talk about this paper about a year ago - maybe on foar.
>
> I agree its interesting, though.
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 10:47:39AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> > Here's another philosophical/computational paper by Scott Aaronson,
> > which I think is more interesting than the one on Knightian freedom.
> > It's also quite long (58pg). Section 4 is most relevant to AI and
> > Turing tests.
> >
> > arXiv:1108.1791v3 [cs.CC] 14 Aug 2011
> >
> > Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity
> > Scott Aaronson
> > *
> > Abstract
> > One might think that, once we know something is computable, how
> efficiently
> > it can be com- puted is a practical question with little further
> philosophical importa
> > nce. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong.
> > In particular, I argue that
> > computational complexity theory--the field that studies the
> > resources (such as time, space, and ra
> > ndomness) needed to solve computational problems--leads to new
> perspectives on the nature
> > of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the
> problem of logical omn
> > iscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the
> foundations of quantum mech
> > anics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several
> > other topics of philosophical int erest. I end by discussing aspects
> > of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosop hical
> > analysis.
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/pdf/1108.1791.pdf
> >
> > Brent
> >
> > --
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>
> 
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> Principal, High Performance Coders
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>
> 
>
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[LizR]

On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
>>
>
> The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you
> are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.
>

This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is
correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this
is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person
even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that
Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a
computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back
into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment
digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be
duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be
the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show
what is possible in principle. Or is "in principle" itself objectionable?)

Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless.
The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a
duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? (I can
accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently
doing it constantly.)

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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[Alberto G. Corona]

2013/10/6 meekerdb 

>  On 10/6/2013 9:08 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
>   Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics,
>> often just to get enough funding to survive.
>>
>>  Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the problem.
>>
>>   Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question!
>
>  *How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert
> itself in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must be an
> integral part of research. *
> *
> *
> *For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a more
> fundamental question than knowledge itself.*
>
>>  ---
>
>  I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily.  What they aim at,
> is like any living being, and in fact, like any stable dynamic
> auto-regulated structure, is * to reduce uncertainty*.
>
>
>
> Naah.  If that were true they'd never climb Mt. Everest or race
> motorcycles or explore new territory.  People are complex, they want
> different things at different times.  Sometimes it's comfort and security,
> sometimes it's adventure, sometimes its companionship and sometimes it's
> competition, sometimes it's leisure, sometimes it's strife.  Evolution just
> dictates that sometimes its sex and progeny.
>


Good, but some of those complexities  comes from the complex that is
reducing uncertainty in so complex systems such are human societies. First,
either evolution dictates nothing or it dictates everything, because
societies are also a product o evolution. under a gene-meme multilevel
selection process, where memes is in the top of the hierarchy.

To climb mount Everest has egoistic and altruistic aspects. The egoistic
ones try to increase individual fitness, by fame , respect or money. All of
them are individual uncertainty reducers, because they increase resources
for survival and reproduction, that is, survive against the entropic noise
of death and forgetting, and assure  the survival of the personal meme-gene
legacy.

But there is something altruistic also (well the former is not so egoistic
at last) Sir Helmunt Hillary climbed the Everest not only for himself, but
for England. Because he wanted the flag of England to wave above all
nations. To contemplate your nation as powerful and respectable by other
nations is not only a uncertainty reducer for you but also for generations
to come that share your gene-meme legacy.

So there is it.

>
> Brent
>
>
>  That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace
> conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social science
> psychology and entropy.
>
>
>   That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you wish)
> and faith. As I will explain:
>
>  To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of the
> world around in order to predict better the future.
>
>  But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or power,
> or love from other people, or commitment from tem, or respect, or common
> commintment to something or someone.
>
>  The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough, power
> is not enough, since neither of them work without a committed society that
> make use of this knowledge in an organized way, that respect the money
> value and other properties, that has fair mechanism for adquiring power and
> legitimacy, and more that that, a society with a  clear plan for our
> sibiling and generations to come.
>
>  Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument) there
> is no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all these
> requirements, and, more important, no people that had not these
> requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this natural seeking
> for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction mechanism around us.
>
>  Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction.
> Others rely more in other different in this equation. These different
> uncertainty reduction alternatives are one against the other. A strict
> hiearchi of power and legitimacy based on an enforced supernatural plan is
> a excellent uncertainty reduction for a stable society that does not need
> to change. In the other side, adquring knowledge is good, but that may
> challenge the structure, questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars,
> that can be pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor
> loyaltyes, the pacific disputes become violent almos by defintion.
>
>  A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from this
> starting point.
>
>
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Re: A challenge for Craig

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
>
> > On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> >>> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for   
> >>> God 
> >>> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has 
> >>> different qualia. This is a proof of comp, 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a   
> >> prothesis, only 
> >> because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and   
> >> not of 
> >> the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest   
> >> the person 
> >> if it emulates the correct level. 
> > 
> > But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical 
> > brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates 
> > the behaviour but not the qualia? 
> > The problem is that it would allow 
> > one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the 
> > qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. 
>
> I agree. 
>
> Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an   
> immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. 
> In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in   
> Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of   
> comp) are wrong. 
>
> Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish   
> between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it   
> would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the   
> difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8   
> (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). 
>
> I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- 
> zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less   
> conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to   
> behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is   
> just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which   
> typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the   
> roads). Also, they confuse "less conscious" with "blurred   
> consciousness",


Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If your 
battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in numerous 
ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the device 
becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at different 
times.

Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into 
episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking 
Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who 
Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. 
They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his 
character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of 
the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and 
someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on 
Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the 
qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. 

Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other 
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended 
experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested 
events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which 
relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with 
the larger now.)

Human psychology is not a monolith. Blindsight already *proves* that 'we 
can be a partial zombie' from our 1p perspective. I have tried to make my 
solution to the combination problem here: 
http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/ 

What it means is that it is a mistake to say "we can be a partial zombie" - 
rather the evidence of brain injuries and surgeries demonstrate that the 
extent to which we are who we expect ourselves to be, or that others expect 
a person to be, can be changed in many quantitative and qualitative ways. 
We may not be less conscious after a massive debilitating stroke, but what 
is conscious after that is less of us. This is because consciousness is not 
a function or a process, it is the sole source of presence. 

Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human 
civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical-verbal. We 
identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia 
as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', 
but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name 
public-facing reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - 
the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is 
quanta, or nu

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[John Clark]

On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
>

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

> The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)
>

The  H-guy turns into the W-guy, but they are not identical just as you are
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday


> > But the M-guy is not the W-guy
>

True, but the H-guy and the M-guy and the M-guy are all Bruno Marchal
because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.

>The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks,
>

Rhetorical tricks my ass! These are details of profound importance  simply
glossed over with the slapdash use of personal pronouns. And that's pretty
damn sloppy for a mathematician.

> and which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy,
>

The criticism some have with Quantum Mechanics is that what it says is very
very odd, but odd or not and love it or hate it what Quantum Mechanics says
is crystal clear and it gets the job done; in contrast when your ideas are
not opaque they are logically inconsistent.

>

> > Each time we talk about the prediction the "he" refer to the guy in
> Helsinki before the duplication,
>

If "he" refers to Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy then the correct
prediction  "he" would make is that "he" will see Helsinki and only
Helsinki; not that predictions, good or bad, have the slightest thing to do
with a feeling of continuity or feeling of self. And if you want to say
that Bruno Marchal the Helsinki guy is dead then fine, but then you must
also say that Bruno Marchal of yesterday is dead and personally I don't
want to torture the language more that I have to under these very odd
circumstances of self duplication.

> you fake misunderstanding
>

Why on earth would I, or anyone, pretend not to understand something when
they really did?

> of the most easy part of the reasoning.
>

If this is the clearest reasoning in your "proof" then I'm doubly glad I
didn't read anymore.

  John K Clark

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Re: The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[meekerdb]

On 10/6/2013 9:08 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics, often 
just to get
enough funding to survive.

Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the problem.

Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question!

/How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert itself in beliefs as 
a system that prevent further knowledge must be an integral part of research. /

/
/
/For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a more fundamental 
question than knowledge itself./


---

I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily.  What they aim at, is like any 
living being, and in fact, like any stable dynamic auto-regulated structure, is */ to 
reduce uncertainty/*.



Naah.  If that were true they'd never climb Mt. Everest or race motorcycles or explore new 
territory.  People are complex, they want different things at different times.  Sometimes 
it's comfort and security, sometimes it's adventure, sometimes its companionship and 
sometimes it's competition, sometimes it's leisure, sometimes it's strife.  Evolution just 
dictates that sometimes its sex and progeny.


Brent



That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace conclussions of 
evolution, game theory, computability, social science psychology and entropy.



 That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you wish) and faith. As I 
will explain:


To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of the world around in 
order to predict better the future.


But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or power, or love from 
other people, or commitment from tem, or respect, or common commintment to something or 
someone.


The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough, power is not enough, 
since neither of them work without a committed society that make use of this knowledge 
in an organized way, that respect the money value and other properties, that has fair 
mechanism for adquiring power and legitimacy, and more that that, a society with a 
 clear plan for our sibiling and generations to come.


Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument) there is no social 
vehicle for our genes if the society have all these requirements, and, more important, 
no people that had not these requirements ullfilled survived, so we have inherited this 
natural seeking for all these kinds of uncertainty reduction mechanism around us.


Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction. Others rely more in 
other different in this equation. These different uncertainty reduction alternatives are 
one against the other. A strict hiearchi of power and legitimacy based on an enforced 
supernatural plan is a excellent uncertainty reduction for a stable society that does 
not need to change. In the other side, adquring knowledge is good, but that may 
challenge the structure, questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that can be 
pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor loyaltyes, the pacific disputes 
become violent almos by defintion.


A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from this starting 
point.


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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[meekerdb]

On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:


> you have agreed that all "bruno marchal" are the original one (a case 
where
Leibniz identity rule fails,


If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most certainly has NOT 
failed.


I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not remember having 
been the W-guy, and reciprocally).


The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and which, btw,  can be 
done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people showed to you. Each time we talk 
about the prediction the "he" refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after 
the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at 
their individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done in Helsinki. We 
just look at diaries, and I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't 
try to understand.


There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the most easy part of 
the reasoning.

Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not interested in 
learning.


Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the indeterminancy is to be 
interpreted as a probability.  There's some good discussion here, 
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret 
especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.


Brent

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The ultimate reason of knowledge faith power and entrophy reduction, computabilty, evolution, the universe and everithing

[Alberto G. Corona]

>
> Some academies are just prostituted to rotten (sometime) politics, often
> just to get enough funding to survive.
>
> Money is not the problem. Black, obscure and grey money is the problem.
>
> Wait, this is indeed the most fundamental question!

*How knowledge interact with money and power in society and convert itself
in beliefs as a system that prevent further knowledge must be an integral
part of research. *
*
*
*For me this meta-knowledge about knowledge faith and power is a more
fundamental question than knowledge itself.*

> ---

I think that people don' t want knowledge primarily.  What they aim at, is
like any living being, and in fact, like any stable dynamic auto-regulated
structure, is * to reduce uncertainty*.

That fit with many considerations at different levels, and embrace
conclussions of evolution, game theory, computability, social science
psychology and entropy.


 That explain how knowledge interact with power (and money and you wish)
and faith. As I will explain:

To reduce uncertainty can be achieved adquiring pure knowledge of the world
around in order to predict better the future.

But it can also be achieved by adquiring for themselves money or power, or
love from other people, or commitment from tem, or respect, or common
commintment to something or someone.

The fact is that pure knowledge is not enoug. Money is not enough, power is
not enough, since neither of them work without a committed society that
make use of this knowledge in an organized way, that respect the money
value and other properties, that has fair mechanism for adquiring power and
legitimacy, and more that that, a society with a  clear plan for our
sibiling and generations to come.

Thinking materialistically (I´m not but for a matter of argument) there is
no social vehicle for our genes if the society have all these requirements,
and, more important, no people that had not these requirements ullfilled
survived, so we have inherited this natural seeking for all these kinds of
uncertainty reduction mechanism around us.

Some societies make enphasis in one kind of uncertainty reduction. Others
rely more in other different in this equation. These different uncertainty
reduction alternatives are one against the other. A strict hiearchi of
power and legitimacy based on an enforced supernatural plan is a excellent
uncertainty reduction for a stable society that does not need to change. In
the other side, adquring knowledge is good, but that may challenge the
structure, questionin legitimacies and creating civil wars, that can be
pacific or violent. When there is no common plans nor loyaltyes, the
pacific disputes become violent almos by defintion.

A lot of philosophy on all their branches can be extracted from this
starting point.

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Re: A challenge for Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for  
God

to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp,



Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a  
prothesis, only
because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and  
not of
the brain, body, or computer.  Then the prosthesis will manifest  
the person

if it emulates the correct level.


But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical
brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates
the behaviour but not the qualia?
The problem is that it would allow
one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the
qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain.


I agree.

Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an  
immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter.
In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in  
Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of  
comp) are wrong.


Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish  
between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it  
would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the  
difference.  People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8  
(which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear).


I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- 
zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less  
conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to  
behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is  
just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which  
typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the  
roads). Also, they confuse "less conscious" with "blurred  
consciousness", I think.

So I think we are in agreement.
(I usually use "functionalism" in Putnam's sense, but your's or  
Chalmers' use is more logical, yet more rarely used in the community  
of philosopher of mind, but that's a vocabulary issue).


Bruno





If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the  
consciousness

of a sleeping dreaming person, ...
OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not  
even sure
that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only because "I"  
from the
first person point of view is distributed in infinities of  
computations, and
I cannot exclude that the qualia (certainly stable lasting qualia)  
might

rely on that.






provided that brain physics
is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable.
Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement
brain contain a hypercomputer.



OK.

Bruno



--
Stathis Papaioannou

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Oct 2013, at 01:29, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 10:34:11AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Oct 2013, at 10:05, Russell Standish wrote:



I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp & p  
is

the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in
both cases, I would say the pronoun "I" refers to the same
entity.


G* proves that they are the same, but G does not. It is (in God's
eye) the same entity, but the machine is unable to know, or to prove
that, and that explains the difference of the perspective. 3-I has a
name/description, but the 1-I has no name.


What is the modal logic statement corresponding to I? This is most  
unclear.


B is the modal operator, which through the arithmetical  
interpretation, describes the machine, in the language of the machine,  
and uttered by the machine. If you want, the machine is TOTO, and says  
something like TOTO has two legs. It is third person reference.


In term of modal statement: Bp means "PA proves p", as is uttered by PA.

This is the standard theory of arithmetical self-reference. See  
Smoryinski book "modal logic and self-reference" or Boolos books.











English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between
3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have  
introduced,

with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are
pronouns?


Because 1-I and 3-I are variant of the pronoun "I". Natural language
use the same word, because we tend to confuse them.


Above, you stated that 1-I was Bp & p and 3-I was Bp. How do those
modal concepts relate to the English language pronoun I? Sorry to
press on this - I just want to know if there is something  
interesting here.


The english language, like most language, does not distinguish Bp and  
Bp & p.
It is normal, as the difference needed duplication (UDA), of Gödel's  
theorem (AUDA) to be realized as being quite different. Of course  
people working on the mind-body problem knows that it is different, as  
Bp will usually refer to a code or body, and the Bp & p will refer to  
personal feeling or consciousness.


Bp can work for "I have two legs"
Bp & p can work for "I am hungry"

You can also use "phantom limbs" to sibgle out the difference. the  
fact that english language does not mlake the difference, and that the  
diffrence is not entirely obvious, if that for a long time, people  
having pain in a ohantom limb where considered as crazy, and where not  
believed.








The duplication
experiences are the simplest tool for distinguishing them. The
Theatetus' definition, when applied to Gödel's beweisbar also
distinguish them, rather miraculously.


At this point in time, I do not see any connection between the UDA and
the AUDA. They seem to be based on entirely different sets of
propositions:

UDA:
 COMP (Yes doctor, etc)

AUDA:
 Theatetus and brethren, Sigma_1 restriction


I made the connection precise in "conscience & mécanisme", but I think  
that it is not necessary, as UDA shows only that physics has to be  
given by a statistic on computation, and AUDA use the classical theory  
of knowledge, and actually gives the physics from the math of the  
points of view.






If you are alluding to the distinction between communicable and
incommunicable statements, then I do understand the difference between
G and G*\G. But these don't seem to be pronouns...


G is the machine's logic of the machine's 3-I
G* is the true logic of the the machine's 3-I
Both G and G* talk about the same pronoun: the 3-I.
The start "*" does not change the reference of the pronouns, or points  
of view, unlike the intensional nuance (adding "Dt" and/or "& p")





Whether the G-G* distinction can be related to the FPI of the UDA, I'm
not sure.


It works, following the axiomatics given. You need to agree only that  
G does well describe the logic of 3-I (this is standard), and that the  
first person is a knower, and that knowledge obeys S4 (that is  
standard too). Then the theaetetus' definition applied on the 3-I  
gives a knower (S4Grz), and the other intensional gives the quantum  
structure that we need to proceed.




Plausibly so, I would say, but not definitively proved,
AFAICT, as they seem to be quite different theories.


In UDA I interview the reader (you).
In AUDA, I interview the machine, and its guardian angel, so to speak  
(the "* logics). You need only to understand Gödel's self-reference,  
and accept the traditional analytical definition of belief, knowledge,  
observation and in the qualia.


Best,

Bruno






Plotinus and most serious people approaching the mind body problem
saw the difference, but the 1-I is typically eliminated by the
Aristotelian theologian (like the atheists, the fundamentalists,
etc.).
It is almost the difference between the body and the soul. The first
does admit third person descriptions, the second has none (like
Truth).

Bruno







Cheers
--

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


> you have agreed that all "bruno marchal" are the original one (a  
case where Leibniz identity rule fails,


If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most  
certainly has NOT failed.


I was talking on the rule:

a = b
a = c
entails that b = c

The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy  (the W-guy  remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not  
remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).


The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and  
which, btw,  can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people  
showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the "he" refer  
to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after the duplication,  
we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at  
their individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done  
in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and I have made those things  
clear, but you talk like if you don't try to understand.


There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the  
most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not  
interested in learning.



Bruno




If the original and the copy are identical then exchanging there  
position will not make a observable difference to a outside observer  
nor to the original nor to the copy. So Leibniz would conclude that  
if objectively it makes no difference and subjectively it makes no  
difference then exchanging the position of the original and the copy  
just plain makes no difference.


> If in Helsinki [he] predicted {W & M} [blah blah]

SEE!  Bruno Marchal is incapable of expressing ideas without  
pronouns with no referent. Was "he" making a prediction about
the future of Bruno Marchal or about the future of Bruno Marchal the  
Helsinki Man? If it's about Bruno Marchal then the correct  
prediction would be Helsinki Moscow and Washington, if it's about  
Bruno Marchal the Helsinki Man the correct prediction can only be  
Helsinki. But who cares about predictions?


> the "bruno marchal" in W will see that his prediction failed, as  
[he] must admit that [he] is not seeing M.


But "he" must admit "he" is NOT the only Bruno Marchal because "he"  
HAS BEEN DUPLICATED!  Bruno Marchal admits that "he" has been  
duplicated but still insists on referring to "he" as if there were  
still only one, and that's what makes the whole thing incoherent.  
And what on earth does a prediction, correct or incorrect, have to  
do with a feeling of self anyway?


  >>> and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be  
predicted by the guy in Helsinki.


>> Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the  
precise question to ask "the guy in Helsinki" that has a  
indeterminate answer, and just as important please make clear  
exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the question to.


> The question is "what do [you] expect to live or feel, as a comp  
believer"


SEE!  Bruno Marchal just can't stop using those damn pronouns.

> More precisely, it concerns the seeing of the cities involved: do  
[you] expect W, M, both, etc.


SEE!  Bruno Marchal just can't stop using those damn pronouns.

> The question is used in the traditional sense of "you", before the  
duplication.


And that is exactly the problem, traditionally duplicating chambers  
do not exist so the poor little pronoun "you" doesn't have to worry  
about the complications such machines generate, but to really study  
this issue and move into the big leagues Bruno Marchal must worry  
about them.


> The guy reason in comp, and knows already many things: that he  
will survive (you have agreed on that), that he will not feel the  
split


OK, so far so good the use of "he" is  causing no problems.

> that he will see only city

WHO THE HELL IS "HE"??

  John K Clark






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