date:20131011

On 10 Oct 2013, at 20:35, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>>The question is will "he" turn into the Moscow Man or the  
Washington Man,

> Yes.

Thank you!

>> and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what  
information "he" receives.

 > Not at all.

What do you mean "not at all"?! The Helsinki Man has the neurons in  
his brain arranged in a certain way and the Moscow Man, being a  
exact copy, will have the neurons in his brain arranged in exactly  
the same manner and the two will evolve in exactly the same manner  
too UNLESS they receive different information, like one data stream  
coming from Helsinki and the other data stream coming from Moscow.  
Only then would they differentiate and only then would you be  
justified in giving them different names.

But if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit  
of information, then you agree with the first person indeterminacy.  
The bit of information reduces the uncertainty, so there was an  
indeterminacy.

> It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will have  
will confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for all  
possible "he's" relevant).

As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling  
of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or  
any other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor  
does it matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute.

? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes  
my point)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 10 Oct 2013, at 22:36, LizR wrote:

Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H  
man. I don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints,  
although as usual I may be missing something.


No I agree. Clark does understand the 1-indeterminacy, as he betrayed  
by saying that it is equivalent with throwing a coin.
Then the mystery is: why does Clark not pursue the reasoning and  
tackle the next step (step 4).





Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as  
Kermit suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question  
doesn't arise. But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea  
that the universe is analogue all the way down - with the problems  
that causes (like the "ultraviolety catastrophe") - and if it's  
digital at any level, this will work.


Indeed. Kermit, like Craig, are logically coherent (unlike Clark).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The I Concept, Analytically

On Friday, October 11, 2013 2:58:13 AM UTC-4, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>
> The vocable "I" becomes attached to each impulse that arises in a psychic 
> complex, no matter how mutually contradictory such impulses may appear to 
> be. From this process springs the idea of a multitude of "me"'s. 
>  
> The impulses in question are affective, so that the inferential "I" is 
> affective rather than intellectual. 
>  
> What is the origin of the vocable "I"? Every "living" phenomenon, every 
> sentient complex must necessarily have a centre, call it "heart" or "head". 
>  
> Such centre in itself is as phenomenal as the appearance of which it forms 
> the "heart" or "centre", but its necessary function is the organization and 
> care of the phenomenon which it controls. Emotions such as fear, greed, 
> love-hate arise on behalf of the phenomenon for which they constitute 
> protection and stimulate survival and perpetuation in the space-time 
> context of manifestation. Consequently the vocable "I", representing this 
> "centre", represents the physical body, and this representation is 
> responsible for the identification which constitutes bondage. 
>  
> This "centre", then, is the phenomenal basis of an I-concept or ego or 
> self, which is inferential and has no existence in the sense of being 
> capable of independent action as a thing-in-itself. On account of the 
> emotions of physical origin for which this I-concept assumes 
> responsibility, the whole complex has the appearance of an independent 
> entity which it is not-- since it is totally "lived" or "dreamed" by the 
> noumenality which is all that it is.
>  
> It is this "centre", and every impulse that arises in a psyche, to which 
> is attached the vocable "I", and this it is to which is attributed 
> responsibility for each thought that arises in consciousness and every 
> action of the apparent "individual". It is this, of course, to which the 
> term "ego" is applied, whose functioning is known as "volition". In fact, 
> however, it merely performs its own function in perfect ignorance of what 
> is assigned to its agency.
>  
> It was never I and never could it be I, for never could any "thing", any 
> object of consciousness, be I. There cannot be an objective "I" for, 
> so-being, it would have to become an object to itself and could no longer 
> be I. That is why "Is-ness" must be the absence of both object and subject, 
> whose integration in mutual absence is devoid of objective existence.
>

Nice post. Why can't is-ness be the reconciliation of both object and 
subject instead though? Not an absence, but the presence of the sense of 
absence from which all implicit and explicit experience is appreciated in 
solitude/solace/peace. The vocable "I" may be ignorant of its agency, but 
the noumenal privacy which dreams the I may not be ignorant, and it may not 
be fundamentally different from the representations of itself that it does 
experience. Greater, certainly, but not alienated from it absolutely. We 
need not doubt our own agency, even if the doubter is not identical in 
every way to the agency that it doubts. Human consciousness is multivalent 
and only semi-unanamous, but that doesn't mean that awareness itself is 
similarly fragmented split off from itself. Volition is not an illusion, it 
just has incomplete access to knowledge of itself. The is-ness of the 
objective world would not be very convincing if everyone walked around as 
omniscient immortals.

>  
> I could never be anything, I CANNOT EVEN BE I, for all being is 
> determined. 
>

Who could determine anything other than you/us/awareness?

> Nor could I ever be identified with anything objective, and "an I" is a 
> contradiction in terms. I am no "thing" whatever, not even "is-ness." 
>

I don't know about that. I am speaking to you know through these objective 
characters on your objective screen. Why make yourself a nothing? Nothing 
is what is not even "is-ness". Nothing is an idea that something has about 
the absence of everything. But there is no such thing as the absence of 
everything. There can be no "is-not-ness". In my estimation, you are the 
experience of every Homo sapien that has ever lived, every cell and 
molecule that has ever been, every mind who has every contributed to 
civilization, etc., plus you are an unrepeatable instantiation of pure 
uniqueness - a tendril extending from the Absolute improbability of 
awareness itself (primordial pansensitivity).

Thanks,
Craig

>

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Re: The I Concept, Analytically



On 11 Oct 2013, at 08:58, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

The vocable "I" becomes attached to each impulse that arises in a  
psychic complex, no matter how mutually contradictory such impulses  
may appear to be. From this process springs the idea of a multitude  
of "me"'s.


The impulses in question are affective, so that the inferential "I"  
is affective rather than intellectual.


What is the origin of the vocable "I"? Every "living" phenomenon,  
every sentient complex must necessarily have a centre, call it  
"heart" or "head".


Such centre in itself is as phenomenal as the appearance of which it  
forms the "heart" or "centre", but its necessary function is the  
organization and care of the phenomenon which it controls. Emotions  
such as fear, greed, love-hate arise on behalf of the phenomenon for  
which they constitute protection and stimulate survival and  
perpetuation in the space-time context of manifestation.  
Consequently the vocable "I", representing this "centre", represents  
the physical body, and this representation is responsible for the  
identification which constitutes bondage.


This "centre", then, is the phenomenal basis of an I-concept or ego  
or self, which is inferential and has no existence in the sense of  
being capable of independent action as a thing-in-itself. On account  
of the emotions of physical origin for which this I-concept assumes  
responsibility, the whole complex has the appearance of an  
independent entity which it is not-- since it is totally "lived" or  
"dreamed" by the noumenality which is all that it is.


It is this "centre", and every impulse that arises in a psyche, to  
which is attached the vocable "I", and this it is to which is  
attributed responsibility for each thought that arises in  
consciousness and every action of the apparent "individual". It is  
this, of course, to which the term "ego" is applied, whose  
functioning is known as "volition". In fact, however, it merely  
performs its own function in perfect ignorance of what is assigned  
to its agency.


It was never I and never could it be I, for never could any "thing",  
any object of consciousness, be I. There cannot be an objective "I"  
for, so-being, it would have to become an object to itself and could  
no longer be I. That is why "Is-ness" must be the absence of both  
object and subject, whose integration in mutual absence is devoid of  
objective existence.


I could never be anything, I CANNOT EVEN BE I, for all being is  
determined. Nor could I ever be identified with anything objective,  
and "an I" is a contradiction in terms. I am no "thing" whatever,  
not even "is-ness."


That is a not too bad description of the machines first person I. They  
agree with you, as far as "you" means something, which I am sure it  
does.


Amazingly this is provable by machine, once they accept to identify  
the 1-I with the knower, and to define the knower by true believer/ 
dreamer.


Bruno






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
> measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
> Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
> do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
> branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
> see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
> subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).

But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number of
elements. That is why I'm not sure that problems with assigning
measures to countably infinite sets (such as your example above re
even and square numbers) are really such a problem.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers



On Thursday, October 10, 2013 8:58:30 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html
>  
>
>
> > A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't 
> > understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A 
> mechanical 
> > description of a function is not the same thing as participating in an 
> > experience. 
>
> This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can 
> perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic sensibility, 
> it must have aesthetic sensibility. 
>
>
Not at all. That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying. The failure of 
digital mechanism to interface with aesthetic presence is not testable 
unless you yourself become a digital mechanism. There can never be a test 
of aesthetic sensibility because testing is by definition anesthetic. To 
test is to measure into a system of universal representation. Measurement 
is the removal of presence for the purpose of distribution as symbol. I can 
draw a picture of a robot correctly identifying a vegetable, but that 
doesn't mean that the drawing of the robot is doing anything. I can make a 
movie of the robot cartoon, or a sculpture, or an animated sculpture that 
has a sensor for iodine or magnesium which can be correlated to a higher 
probability of a particular vegetable, but that doesn't change anything at 
all. There is still no robot except in our experience and our expectations 
of its experience. The robot is not even a zombie, it is a puppet playing 
back recordings of our thoughts in a clever way.

Craig


> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives
the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that
is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of
either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those
into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or
is this too simplistic?)

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On Friday, October 11, 2013 12:25:45 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
>
>  So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a 
> measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?  
>
 
They aren't 'distinct'. The hypothesis is that every universe branch 
contains an *uncountable* infinity of fungible (identical and 
interchangeable) universes. While this seems extravagant, it actually kind 
of makes more sense than the idea of a universe "splitting" into two (where 
did the second universe come from?). Instead, uncountable infinities of 
universes are differentiated from one another. Quantum interference 
patterns arise because of the possibility of universes merging back into 
one another again.
 

> Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do 
> infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting 
> measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with 
> assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even 
> numbers that square numbers?). 
>
> The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets in 
great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable 
infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a problem for 
Bruno's computations - a point I've tried to argue with Bruno, but he 
bamboozles my sophomoric maths with his replies. To me it seems you can't 
count computations that go through a state, because for every function f 
that computes a certain function, there is also some function f1 that also 
computes f such that f1 = f + 1 - 1. But maybe that can be solved by 
counting only the functions with the least number of steps (?).
 

> And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives 
> from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?
>
> I don't know about Chris Fuchs, although isn't that just Copenhagen? It's 
clear that one would need strong reasons to favour MWI with its crazy 
proliferation of entities, which at first blush seems to run against 
Occam's razor. However Deutsch makes a damn good fist of explaining why we 
in fact have those reasons. For instance, when a quantum computer 
calculates a function based on a superposition of states, MWI can explain 
where these calculations are occurring - in other universes. The computer 
is exploiting the possibility of massive parallelism inherent in that 
infinity of universes. It is entirely unclear how these calculations occur 
in the standard interpretation. MWI also solves the problem of what happens 
to non-realized measurement states once a system decoheres. And of course 
it gets around the intractable difficulties of non-computable wave 
"collapse". So it's a case of choose your poison: infinite universes or 
conceptual incoherence. I'll take the former, even though in some ways I'd 
"like" the universe (or the multiverse) better if it wasn't that way.

Max Born was my great grandfather. I wonder what he would have made of 
Everett if he'd been a bit younger. When he died in 1970, it was still 
probably too out there for him to have seriously considered. 
 

> Brent
>
> On 10/10/2013 6:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
>  
> I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm 
> not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI 
> by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my 
> understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI, the reason for Born 
> probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a "single 
> branch". Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical, 
> fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite 
> universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The 
> appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication 
> of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?
>
> On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote: 
>>
>> Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum 
>> mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN PRESS. 
>>
>>  ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, 
>> emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The 
>> possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, 
>> in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the 
>> ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the 
>> Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch 
>> ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that 
>> Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. 
>> First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the 
>> theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not 
>> successful in showing that BI is rational. Whil

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

That is pretty much exactly my understanding. It does puzzle me that this 
argument about the supposed probability problem with MWI is still live, 
when that explanation seems perfectly coherent.

On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
>
> If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives 
> the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that 
> is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of 
> either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those 
> into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or 
> is this too simplistic?)
>
>

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number of 
irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an infinity as 
those between 0.1 and 1. So extrapolating to universes, the very low 
probability, white rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, 
but that does not make them equally as likely as the universes which behave 
as we would classically expect. 

On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
>
> If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives 
> the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that 
> is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of 
> either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those 
> into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or 
> is this too simplistic?)
>
>

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On 11 Oct 2013, at 13:09, Pierz wrote:




On Friday, October 11, 2013 12:25:45 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a  
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?


They aren't 'distinct'. The hypothesis is that every universe branch  
contains an *uncountable* infinity of fungible (identical and  
interchangeable) universes. While this seems extravagant, it  
actually kind of makes more sense than the idea of a universe  
"splitting" into two (where did the second universe come from?).  
Instead, uncountable infinities of universes are differentiated from  
one another. Quantum interference patterns arise because of the  
possibility of universes merging back into one another again.


With comp too, it is best to see one consciousness differentiating  
than actual splitting of "universes".






Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or  
do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch- 
counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any  
problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are  
there more even numbers that square numbers?).


The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets  
in great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these  
uncountable infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a  
problem for Bruno's computations - a point I've tried to argue with  
Bruno, but he bamboozles my sophomoric maths with his replies. To me  
it seems you can't count computations that go through a state,  
because for every function f that computes a certain function, there  
is also some function f1 that also computes f such that f1 = f + 1 -  
1. But maybe that can be solved by counting only the functions with  
the least number of steps (?).



You have to take all the programs, and all computations. Your relative  
1-indeterminacy bears on all computations going through your state.

Using little programs would beg the 1-p/3-p problem.
There is an uncountable set of such computations, as they dovetail on  
the reals. Just keep in mind that the UD is enough dumb to implement  
the infinite iterated self-duplication, which leads to uncountably  
many histories.


(Having said that, there are many ways to put probability and measure  
on any set, finite, enumerable, non enumerable, etc. Sometimes people  
just relinquish the "sigma-additivity" condition, and still get  
something very close to a measure).






And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule  
derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for  
example, Chris Fuchs?


I don't know about Chris Fuchs, although isn't that just Copenhagen?  
It's clear that one would need strong reasons to favour MWI with its  
crazy proliferation of entities, which at first blush seems to run  
against Occam's razor. However Deutsch makes a damn good fist of  
explaining why we in fact have those reasons. For instance, when a  
quantum computer calculates a function based on a superposition of  
states, MWI can explain where these calculations are occurring - in  
other universes. The computer is exploiting the possibility of  
massive parallelism inherent in that infinity of universes. It is  
entirely unclear how these calculations occur in the standard  
interpretation. MWI also solves the problem of what happens to non- 
realized measurement states once a system decoheres. And of course  
it gets around the intractable difficulties of non-computable wave  
"collapse". So it's a case of choose your poison: infinite universes  
or conceptual incoherence. I'll take the former, even though in some  
ways I'd "like" the universe (or the multiverse) better if it wasn't  
that way.


Max Born was my great grandfather. I wonder what he would have made  
of Everett if he'd been a bit younger. When he died in 1970, it was  
still probably too out there for him to have seriously considered.


That would have been nice to know. I really love the correspondence  
between Max Born and Albert Einstein. I think both would have accepted  
Everett, even if with some grimaces, like François Englert and many  
quantum cosmologists.


I disagree with the idea that Everett propose a new interpretation of  
QM. Everett proposes a new theory, which is just Copenhagen without  
the collapse.  Everett himself talk about a new formulation of QM, not  
a new interpretation. that is not so important, except when we begin  
to use logic, which forces to be precise on what is a theory, and what  
is an interpretation of a theory.


And Everett QM obeys Occam in the sense that he used less hypotheses.

Bruno




Brent

On 10/10/2013 6:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given  
that I'm not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular  
renditions of MWI by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing  
the point. But

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Richard Ruquist

Pierz: Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
fungible universes.
Richard: How do you know this? Who said so?
 Besides the branches must contain a finite number of identical universes
for probabilities to be realized.
 Dividing infinity by any number results in an infinity.


On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:11 PM, Pierz  wrote:

> I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm
> not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI
> by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my
> understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI, the reason for Born
> probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a "single
> branch". Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
> fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite
> universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The
> appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
> of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?
>
> On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:
>>
>> Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum
>> mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN PRESS.
>>
>> ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,
>> emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The
>> possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are,
>> in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the
>> ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the
>> Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch
>> ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that
>> Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows.
>> First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the
>> theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not
>> successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to
>> put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of
>> rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not
>> rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for
>> setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and
>> which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC,
>> and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue
>> that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the
>> probability problem in EQM persists.
>>
>> http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.**pdf 
>> Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May 2012)
>> ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’,
>> British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
>>  ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011
>> 78(5): 976-988
>> ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412,
>> (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
>> ‘Conﬁrmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2):
>> 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
>>
>> His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available in:
>> ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): Recent
>> Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems,
>> 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings),
>> Dordrecht: Springer
>>
>> I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI
>> probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by
>> members of this list. Previous discussions have not been personally
>> convincing.
>>
>> Richard
>>
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Richard Ruquist

Opps. I replied before reading the entire discussion


On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 9:08 AM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> Pierz: Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
> fungible universes.
> Richard: How do you know this? Who said so?
>  Besides the branches must contain a finite number of identical universes
> for probabilities to be realized.
>  Dividing infinity by any number results in an infinity.
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:11 PM, Pierz  wrote:
>
>> I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm
>> not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI
>> by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my
>> understanding of Deutsch's version of  MWI, the reason for Born
>> probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a "single
>> branch". Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical,
>> fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite
>> universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The
>> appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication
>> of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic?
>>
>> On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote:
>>>
>>> Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian
>>> quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science   IN
>>> PRESS.
>>>
>>> ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple,
>>> emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The
>>> possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are,
>>> in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the
>>> ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the
>>> Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch
>>> ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that
>>> Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows.
>>> First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the
>>> theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not
>>> successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to
>>> put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of
>>> rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not
>>> rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for
>>> setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and
>>> which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC,
>>> and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue
>>> that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the
>>> probability problem in EQM persists.
>>>
>>> http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.**pdf 
>>> Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May
>>> 2012)
>>> ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’,
>>> British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming
>>>  ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011
>>> 78(5): 976-988
>>> ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412,
>>> (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
>>> ‘Conﬁrmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2):
>>> 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann)
>>>
>>> His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available
>>> in:
>>> ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds):
>>> Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational
>>> Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association
>>> Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer
>>>
>>> I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI
>>> probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by
>>> members of this list. Previous discussions have not been personally
>>> convincing.
>>>
>>> Richard
>>>
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On 11 Oct 2013, at 13:16, Pierz wrote:

And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number of  
irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an  
infinity as those between 0.1 and 1.


It is the same cardinal (2^aleph_zero). But cardinality is not what  
count when searching a measure.



So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white  
rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that  
does not make them equally as likely as the universes which behave  
as we would classically expect.


That is what remain to be seen. But if comp is true, we know the  
measure has to exist, and the math gives some clues that it is indeed  
the case, from machines' (consistent and/or true) points of view.


Bruno




On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that  
gives the required probabilities. For example if the part of the  
multiverse that is involved in performing a quantum measurement with  
a 50-50 chance of either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to  
1, you can divide those into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do  
something like this in FOR? (Or is this too simplistic?)



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

2013-10-11 Thread Jason Resch




On Oct 11, 2013, at 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:



On 11 Oct 2013, at 13:16, Pierz wrote:

And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number  
of irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an  
infinity as those between 0.1 and 1.


It is the same cardinal (2^aleph_zero). But cardinality is not what  
count when searching a measure.



So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white  
rabbit universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that  
does not make them equally as likely as the universes which behave  
as we would classically expect.


That is what remain to be seen. But if comp is true, we know the  
measure has to exist, and the math gives some clues that it is  
indeed the case, from machines' (consistent and/or true) points of  
view.




Bruno,

Could the matter of the countably infinite number of programs be  
irrelevant from the first person perspective because any given mind  
contains/is aware of only a finite amount of information?


Say some mind contains a million bits of information. Then there is a  
finite number (2^100) of distinct combinations of content for that  
mind. These differations are all that matter from the first person  
view, and some may be more probable than others.


(But deciding the measures for each of those finite number of  
possibilities depends on infinite computations, and so would they be  
real numbers?)


Jason



Bruno




On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that  
gives the required probabilities. For example if the part of the  
multiverse that is involved in performing a quantum measurement  
with a 50-50 chance of either outcome is represented by the numbers  
0 to 1, you can divide those into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David  
do something like this in FOR? (Or is this too simplistic?)



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics


On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).

But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number of
elements.


I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form a continuum, which I 
don't think they do.  I QM an underlying continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in 
Bruno's theory.


Brent


That is why I'm not sure that problems with assigning
measures to countably infinite sets (such as your example above re
even and square numbers) are really such a problem.




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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On 10/11/2013 4:09 AM, Pierz wrote:

On Friday, October 11, 2013 12:25:45 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement.
How are
these universes distinct from one another?

They aren't 'distinct'. The hypothesis is that every universe branch contains an
*uncountable* infinity of fungible (identical and interchangeable) universes. While this
seems extravagant, it actually kind of makes more sense than the idea of a universe
"splitting" into two (where did the second universe come from?). Instead, uncountable
infinities of universes are differentiated from one another. Quantum interference
patterns arise because of the possibility of universes merging back into one another again.

Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do
infinitely
many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
produces the
right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to
infinite
countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).

The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets in great detail and
shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable infinities (as Russell points
out)), whereas it may be a problem for Bruno's computations - a point I've tried to
argue with Bruno, but he bamboozles my sophomoric maths with his replies. To me it seems
you can't count computations that go through a state, because for every function f that
computes a certain function, there is also some function f1 that also computes f such
that f1 = f + 1 - 1. But maybe that can be solved by counting only the functions with
the least number of steps (?).

And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives
from a
Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?

I don't know about Chris Fuchs, although isn't that just Copenhagen?

No, it's an interpretation of QM as personal probabilities, i.e. quantum Bayesianism. It
reifies information, not quantum states, c.f. http://arxiv.org/pdf/1207.2141.pdf or
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1301.3274.pdf It's might be compatible with Bruno's ideas where
Copenhagen certainly isn't.

It's clear that one would need strong reasons to favour MWI with its crazy proliferation
of entities, which at first blush seems to run against Occam's razor. However Deutsch
makes a damn good fist of explaining why we in fact have those reasons. For instance,
when a quantum computer calculates a function based on a superposition of states, MWI
can explain where these calculations are occurring - in other universes. The computer is
exploiting the possibility of massive parallelism inherent in that infinity of
universes. It is entirely unclear how these calculations occur in the standard
interpretation. MWI also solves the problem of what happens to non-realized measurement
states once a system decoheres. And of course it gets around the intractable
difficulties of non-computable wave "collapse". So it's a case of choose your poison:
infinite universes or conceptual incoherence. I'll take the former, even though in some
ways I'd "like" the universe (or the multiverse) better if it wasn't that way.

If you just read this list you have the impression that MWI is the consensus "true"
interpretation of QM; but it's still controversial (as are all other intepretations). I
highly recommend reading Scott Aaronson's arXiv:1108.1791v3 "Why Philosophers Should Care
About Computational Complexity". Section 8 is his discussion of Deutsch's argument based
on computation. He gives several reasons why Deutsch's argument, if not actually wrong,
may not mean what people think it means. Here's the concluding part:

One can sharpen the point as follows: if one took the parallel-universes
explanation of how a
quantum computer works too seriously (as many popular writers do!), then it would be
natural to

make further inferences about quantum computing that are flat-out wrong. For
example:

“Using only a thousand quantum bits (or qubits), a quantum computer could store
21000
classical bits.”

This is true only for a bizarre definition of the word “store”! The fundamental problem is
that,

when you measure a quantum computer’s state, you see only one of the possible
outcomes; the
rest disappear. Indeed, a celebrated result called Holevo’s Theorem [74] says that, using
n qubits,
there is no way to store more than n classical bits so that the bits can be reliably
retrieved later.
In other words: for at least one natural definition of “information-carrying capacity,”
qubits have

exactly the same capacity as bits.

To take another example:

“Unlike a classical computer, which can only factor numbers by trying the
divisors one
by one, a quantum computer could try all possible divisors in parallel.”

If quantum computers can harness vast numbe

Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics


On 10/11/2013 4:16 AM, Pierz wrote:
And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number of irrational numbers 
between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an infinity as those between 0.1 and 1.


No, the two are exactly the same uncountable infinity, because there is a 1-to-1 mapping 
between them.


So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white rabbit universes also 
occur an infinite number of times, but that does not make them equally as likely as the 
universes which behave as we would classically expect.


But computationalism only produces rational numbers.

Brent



On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:

If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives the
required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that is 
involved
in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of either outcome is
represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those into 0-0.5 and 0.5 
to 1.
Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or is this too plistic?)

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

I know I shouldn't be flattered to hear that Max Born's great grandson
endorses my view of quantum probability, but.

:D  :D  :D

On 12 October 2013 00:11, Pierz  wrote:

> That is pretty much exactly my understanding. It does puzzle me that this
> argument about the supposed probability problem with MWI is still live,
> when that explanation seems perfectly coherent.
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives
>> the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that
>> is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of
>> either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those
>> into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or
>> is this too simplistic?)
>>
>>

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

2013-10-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



On Oct 11, 2013, at 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> 
> 
> On Thursday, October 10, 2013 8:58:30 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>> 
>> On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
>> > http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html
>> >  
>> 
>> 
>> > A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't 
>> > understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A 
>> > mechanical 
>> > description of a function is not the same thing as participating in an 
>> > experience. 
>> 
>> This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can 
>> perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic sensibility, 
>> it must have aesthetic sensibility.
> 
> Not at all. That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying. The failure of 
> digital mechanism to interface with aesthetic presence is not testable unless 
> you yourself become a digital mechanism. There can never be a test of 
> aesthetic sensibility because testing is by definition anesthetic. To test is 
> to measure into a system of universal representation. Measurement is the 
> removal of presence for the purpose of distribution as symbol. I can draw a 
> picture of a robot correctly identifying a vegetable, but that doesn't mean 
> that the drawing of the robot is doing anything. I can make a movie of the 
> robot cartoon, or a sculpture, or an animated sculpture that has a sensor for 
> iodine or magnesium which can be correlated to a higher probability of a 
> particular vegetable, but that doesn't change anything at all. There is still 
> no robot except in our experience and our expectations of its experience. The 
> robot is not even a zombie, it is a puppet playing back recordings of our 
> thoughts in a clever way.

OK, so it would prove nothing to you if the supermarket computers did a better 
job than the checkout chicks. Why then did you cite this article?

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> >>So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
> >>measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
> >>Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
> >>do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
> >>branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
> >>see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
> >>subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).
> >But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number of
> >elements.
> 
> I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
> a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
> continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.
> 

UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

Cheers

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:09:20AM -0700, Pierz wrote:
> > The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets in 
> great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable 
> infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a problem for 

Interesting. I wasn't aware that Deutsch had done that. I was aware of
his critiques of measuring countable sets (such as in the infinity
hotel chapter of BoI), but not that he showed there was no such
problems with uncountable sets. Do you have a reference?

Of course, I take the position that "it will be alright on the night",
and give a plausible account of it in my solution of the White Rabbit
problem in my paper "Why Occams razor", but that has been criticised,
particularly by Bruno, that the measure issue is not so simple. I
don't feel confident enough in the maths of measure theory to say that
it isn't a problem, just that I can't see a problem in using
Solomonoff's measure. Hence my interest in Deutsch's take.

Cheers

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics


On 10/11/2013 2:46 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/11/2013 2:28 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 06:25:45PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?
Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or
do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
branch-counting measure produces the right proportion?  Do you not
see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable
subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?).

But infinite subsets in question will contain an uncountable number of
elements.

I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.


UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y).


Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on this 
space?

Brent


ISTM, this
metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?

Cheers



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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> > I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
> > a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
> > continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.
> >
>
> UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
> the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where
> n is
> the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
> metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
> is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?
>
> I always assumed the UD output bits - i.e. not a continuum, but a
countable infinity of symbols - but maybe I'm missing something?

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On 12 October 2013 11:12, LizR  wrote:

> On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
>> > I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
>> > a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
>> > continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.
>> >
>>
>> UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
>> the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n},
>> where n is
>> the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
>> metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
>> is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?
>>
>> I always assumed the UD output bits - i.e. not a continuum, but a
> countable infinity of symbols - but maybe I'm missing something?
>

Am I missing diagonalisation? i.e. Can the UD output be diagonalised?

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On Sat, Oct 12, 2013 at 11:14:32AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 12 October 2013 11:12, LizR  wrote:
> 
> > On 12 October 2013 10:46, Russell Standish  wrote:
> >
> >> On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:07:58AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> >> > I don't think being uncountable makes it any easier unless they form
> >> > a continuum, which I don't think they do.  I QM an underlying
> >> > continuum (spacetime) is assumed, but not in Bruno's theory.
> >> >
> >>
> >> UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
> >> the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n},
> >> where n is
> >> the number of leading bits in common between x and y). ISTM, this
> >> metric induces a natural measure over sets of program executions that
> >> is rather continuum like - but maybe I'm missing something?
> >>
> >> I always assumed the UD output bits - i.e. not a continuum, but a
> > countable infinity of symbols - but maybe I'm missing something?
> >
> 
> Am I missing diagonalisation? i.e. Can the UD output be diagonalised?
> 

The UD doesn't output anything. If it did, then certainly, the output
could not be an uncountable set due to the diagonalisation argument.

Rather UD* is like the internal view of the operation of the
dovetailer, like the sum of all possible experiences of the Helsinki
man being duplicated to Washington and Moscow that is being discussed
rather a lot lately.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> >UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
> >the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n 
> >is
> >the number of leading bits in common between x and y).
> 
> Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on 
> this space?
> 

1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.

The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
arbitrary sets of binary strings.

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On 12 October 2013 11:35, Russell Standish  wrote:

> The UD doesn't output anything. If it did, then certainly, the output
> could not be an uncountable set due to the diagonalisation argument.
>

Yes, I wasn't speaking very precisely. Obviously there is no output,
because where would it go? I meant the trace, which I assume is a record of
its operation, which itself exists in arithmetic (I think?)

>
> Rather UD* is like the internal view of the operation of the
> dovetailer, like the sum of all possible experiences of the Helsinki
> man being duplicated to Washington and Moscow that is being discussed
> rather a lot lately.
>
> Ah! Should read to the end :)
Thanks.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On Saturday, October 12, 2013 5:42:06 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 10/11/2013 4:16 AM, Pierz wrote:
>  
> And just to follow up on that, there are still an infinite number of 
> irrational numbers between 0 and 0.1. But not as large an infinity as 
> those between 0.1 and 1. 
>
>
> No, the two are exactly the same uncountable infinity, because there is a 
> 1-to-1 mapping between them.
>

My mathematical terminology may not be up to scratch. The measure is 
different.


>  So extrapolating to universes, the very low probability, white rabbit 
> universes also occur an infinite number of times, but that does not make 
> them equally as likely as the universes which behave as we would 
> classically expect. 
>  
>
> But computationalism only produces rational numbers.
>

We were talking MWI, where a measure is permitted because of the underlying 
physical continuum. It does seem that the measure problem is an open one 
for comp, as far as I can tell from Bruno's responses, but he seems 
confident it's not insurmountable. I'm not competent to judge.
 

>
> Brent
>
>  
> On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote: 
>>
>> If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives 
>> the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that 
>> is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of 
>> either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those 
>> into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or 
>> is this too plistic?) 
>>
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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

Haha. The flattery may be undone by learning that your view of quantum 
probability is also endorsed by Olivia Newton-John's nephew! :)

On Saturday, October 12, 2013 8:26:23 AM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
>
> I know I shouldn't be flattered to hear that Max Born's great grandson 
> endorses my view of quantum probability, but. 
>
> :D  :D  :D
>
> On 12 October 2013 00:11, Pierz > wrote:
>
>> That is pretty much exactly my understanding. It does puzzle me that this 
>> argument about the supposed probability problem with MWI is still live, 
>> when that explanation seems perfectly coherent.
>>
>> On Friday, October 11, 2013 10:04:40 PM UTC+11, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> If you subdivide a continuum, I assume you can do so in a way that gives 
>>> the required probabilities. For example if the part of the multiverse that 
>>> is involved in performing a quantum measurement with a 50-50 chance of 
>>> either outcome is represented by the numbers 0 to 1, you can divide those 
>>> into 0-0.5 and 0.5 to 1. Doesn't David do something like this in FOR? (Or 
>>> is this too simplistic?)
>>>
>>>

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers



On Friday, October 11, 2013 5:37:52 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Oct 11, 2013, at 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, October 10, 2013 8:58:30 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
>> > 
>> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html
>>  
>>
>>
>> > A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't 
>> > understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A 
>> mechanical 
>> > description of a function is not the same thing as participating in an 
>> > experience. 
>>
>> This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can 
>> perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic sensibility, 
>> it must have aesthetic sensibility. 
>>
>>
> Not at all. That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying. The failure 
> of digital mechanism to interface with aesthetic presence is not testable 
> unless you yourself become a digital mechanism. There can never be a test 
> of aesthetic sensibility because testing is by definition anesthetic. To 
> test is to measure into a system of universal representation. Measurement 
> is the removal of presence for the purpose of distribution as symbol. I can 
> draw a picture of a robot correctly identifying a vegetable, but that 
> doesn't mean that the drawing of the robot is doing anything. I can make a 
> movie of the robot cartoon, or a sculpture, or an animated sculpture that 
> has a sensor for iodine or magnesium which can be correlated to a higher 
> probability of a particular vegetable, but that doesn't change anything at 
> all. There is still no robot except in our experience and our expectations 
> of its experience. The robot is not even a zombie, it is a puppet playing 
> back recordings of our thoughts in a clever way.
>
>
> OK, so it would prove nothing to you if the supermarket computers did a 
> better job than the checkout chicks. Why then did you cite this article?
>

Because the article is consistent with my view that there is a fundamental 
difference between quantitative tasks and aesthetic awareness. If there 
were no difference, then I would expect that the problems that supermarket 
computers would have would not be related to its unconsciousness, but to 
unreliability or even willfulness developing. Why isn't the story 
"Automated cashiers have begun throwing temper tantrums at some locations 
which are contagious to certain smart phones that now become upset in 
sympathy...we had anticipated this, but not so soon, yadda yadda"? I think 
it's pretty clear why. For the same reason that all machines will always 
fall short of authentic personality and sensitivity.

Craig

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics


On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y).

Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on this 
space?


1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.

The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
arbitrary sets of binary strings.



Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given state of the UD, the 
last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit output by the 2nd program,...up to the last 
prog that the UD has started.  Right?


Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics


On 10/11/2013 4:05 PM, Pierz wrote:
It does seem that the measure problem is an open one for comp, as far as I can tell from 
Bruno's responses, but he seems confident it's not insurmountable.


Bruno's so confident that he argues that there must be a measure (because he's assumed 
comp is true and his argument from comp is valid).  :-)


Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> 
> Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given
> state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
> output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
> started.  Right?
> 

Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.

Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz did
also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a clear,
crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.

Cheers

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On Saturday, October 12, 2013 9:07:57 AM UTC+11, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:09:20AM -0700, Pierz wrote: 
> > > The former. Deutsch goes into the problem of infinite countable sets 
> in 
> > great detail and shows how this is *not* a problem for these uncountable 
> > infinities (as Russell points out)), whereas it may be a problem for 
>
> Interesting. I wasn't aware that Deutsch had done that. I was aware of 
> his critiques of measuring countable sets (such as in the infinity 
> hotel chapter of BoI), but not that he showed there was no such 
> problems with uncountable sets. Do you have a reference? 
>
> Of course, I take the position that "it will be alright on the night", 
> and give a plausible account of it in my solution of the White Rabbit 
> problem in my paper "Why Occams razor", but that has been criticised, 
> particularly by Bruno, that the measure issue is not so simple. I 
> don't feel confident enough in the maths of measure theory to say that 
> it isn't a problem, just that I can't see a problem in using 
> Solomonoff's measure. Hence my interest in Deutsch's take. 
>
> Cheers 
>

Sorry to disappoint you. I was referring rather to his arguments in BoI 
that the measure problem is not an issue for MWI because of the underlying 
relationships between the universes (on page 179-180 for instance). It 
wasn't actually about uncountable infinities versus countable ones :(

>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics



On Saturday, October 12, 2013 10:08:05 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>  
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
> the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where n 
> is
> the number of leading bits in common between x and y).
>
>  Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on 
> this space?
>
>
>  1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
> apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
> relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
> these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.
>
> The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
> supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
> set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
> prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
> considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
> arbitrary sets of binary strings.
>
>
>  
> Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given state 
> of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit output by the 
> 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has started.  Right?
>
> Brent
>

But Russell just said there *is* no output. There are only machine states 
(computation X is at step Y and so on). I thought the UD* was the entire 
history of computational states the the UD passes through from the moment 
it starts up to ... well, forever. 

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On 12 October 2013 12:06, Pierz  wrote:

> Haha. The flattery may be undone by learning that your view of quantum
> probability is also endorsed by Olivia Newton-John's nephew! :)
>

OMG!!!

:D :D :D

It's electrifying!

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics


On 10/11/2013 4:45 PM, Pierz wrote:



On Saturday, October 12, 2013 10:08:05 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote:

On 10/11/2013 3:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 03:08:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

UD* (trace of the universal dovetailer) is a continuum, AFAICT. It has
the cardinality of the reals, and a natural metric (d(x,y) = 2^{-n}, where 
n is
the number of leading bits in common between x and y).

Hmm? So 1000 is the same distance from 10 and 111?  What's the measure on 
this space?


1000... and 101... are 0.25 apart. 1000.. and 111... are 0.5
apart. (the ... refers to an infinite number of bits that are not
relevant to the computation). So the answer to your question is that
these these three strings are not the same distance from each other.

The measure over a set of these things would be something like the
supremum over the distance between any two pairs drawn from the
set. Of course, that assumes that only sets defined by finite length
prefixes, and countable unions and intersections thereof are
considered. My maths chops aren't quite up to generalising this for
arbitrary sets of binary strings.



Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given state 
of the UD,
the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit output by the 2nd 
program,...up to
the last prog that the UD has started.  Right?

Brent


But Russell just said there *is* no output.


I just meant last printed onto the tape.

Brent

There are only machine states (computation X is at step Y and so on). I thought the UD* 
was the entire history of computational states the the UD passes through from the moment 
it starts up to ... well, forever.

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means. I took it to be, at a given
state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
started. Right?

Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.

Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz did
also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a clear,
crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.

Even if we have the complete record of everything the UD has done up to some point I don't
see how we can define the kind of measure we need over that, because the measure has to be
over all threads of computation corresponding to a particular classical state.

Brent

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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> >>Maybe I'm not clear on what UD* means.  I took it to be, at a given
> >>state of the UD, the last bit output by the 1st prog, the last bit
> >>output by the 2nd program,...up to the last prog that the UD has
> >>started.  Right?
> >>
> >Its not the output, because the UD doesn't actually output
> >anything. Rather its an internal view of the states the machines
> >emulated by the UD pass through, rather like what the Helsinki man
> >experiences when being duplicated to Moscow and Washington.
> >
> >Its a subtle point, and I fell into the same trap you did (and Liz did
> >also, this morning) a few years ago. I'm not sure anyone has a clear,
> >crisp mathematical explanation of what UD* is - I certainly don't.
> 
> Even if we have the complete record of everything the UD has done up
> to some point I don't see how we can define the kind of measure we
> need over that, because the measure has to be over all threads of
> computation corresponding to a particular classical state.
> 

And these correspond to a countable union of sets of strings sharing
the same prefix, which is just the Solomonoff-Levin measure.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics

On 10/11/2013 7:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 05:46:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/11/2013 4:36 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 04:08:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

Even if we have the complete record of everything the UD has done up
to some point I don't see how we can define the kind of measure we
need over that, because the measure has to be over all threads of
computation corresponding to a particular classical state.

And these correspond to a countable union of sets of strings sharing
the same prefix, which is just the Solomonoff-Levin measure.

But there are infinitely more threads going thru (near) this state which have not yet been
computed. So the threads counted up to some point are of zero measure. ?

Brent

Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers

2013-10-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Saturday, October 12, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2013 5:37:52 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Oct 11, 2013, at 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, October 10, 2013 8:58:30 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>> On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>> > http://online.wsj.com/article/**SB1000142405270230349250457911**
>>> 5310362925246.html
>>>
>>>
>>> > A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't
>>> > understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A
>>> mechanical
>>> > description of a function is not the same thing as participating in an
>>> > experience.
>>>
>>> This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can
>>> perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic sensibility,
>>> it must have aesthetic sensibility.
>>>
>>>
>> Not at all. That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying. The failure
>> of digital mechanism to interface with aesthetic presence is not testable
>> unless you yourself become a digital mechanism. There can never be a test
>> of aesthetic sensibility because testing is by definition anesthetic. To
>> test is to measure into a system of universal representation. Measurement
>> is the removal of presence for the purpose of distribution as symbol. I can
>> draw a picture of a robot correctly identifying a vegetable, but that
>> doesn't mean that the drawing of the robot is doing anything. I can make a
>> movie of the robot cartoon, or a sculpture, or an animated sculpture that
>> has a sensor for iodine or magnesium which can be correlated to a higher
>> probability of a particular vegetable, but that doesn't change anything at
>> all. There is still no robot except in our experience and our expectations
>> of its experience. The robot is not even a zombie, it is a puppet playing
>> back recordings of our thoughts in a clever way.
>>
>>
>> OK, so it would prove nothing to you if the supermarket computers did a
>> better job than the checkout chicks. Why then did you cite this article?
>>
>
> Because the article is consistent with my view that there is a fundamental
> difference between quantitative tasks and aesthetic awareness. If there
> were no difference, then I would expect that the problems that supermarket
> computers would have would not be related to its unconsciousness, but to
> unreliability or even willfulness developing. Why isn't the story
> "Automated cashiers have begun throwing temper tantrums at some locations
> which are contagious to certain smart phones that now become upset in
> sympathy...we had anticipated this, but not so soon, yadda yadda"? I think
> it's pretty clear why. For the same reason that all machines will always
> fall short of authentic personality and sensitivity.
>

So you would just say that computers lack authentic personality and
sensitivity, no matter what they did.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers



On Friday, October 11, 2013 11:32:49 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 12, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 11, 2013 5:37:52 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Oct 11, 2013, at 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, October 10, 2013 8:58:30 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
 > http://online.wsj.com/article/**SB1000142405270230349250457911**
 5310362925246.html
  


 > A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't 
 > understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A 
 mechanical 
 > description of a function is not the same thing as participating in 
 an 
 > experience. 

 This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can 
 perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic sensibility, 
 it must have aesthetic sensibility. 


>>> Not at all. That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying. The failure 
>>> of digital mechanism to interface with aesthetic presence is not testable 
>>> unless you yourself become a digital mechanism. There can never be a test 
>>> of aesthetic sensibility because testing is by definition anesthetic. To 
>>> test is to measure into a system of universal representation. Measurement 
>>> is the removal of presence for the purpose of distribution as symbol. I can 
>>> draw a picture of a robot correctly identifying a vegetable, but that 
>>> doesn't mean that the drawing of the robot is doing anything. I can make a 
>>> movie of the robot cartoon, or a sculpture, or an animated sculpture that 
>>> has a sensor for iodine or magnesium which can be correlated to a higher 
>>> probability of a particular vegetable, but that doesn't change anything at 
>>> all. There is still no robot except in our experience and our expectations 
>>> of its experience. The robot is not even a zombie, it is a puppet playing 
>>> back recordings of our thoughts in a clever way.
>>>  
>>>
>>> OK, so it would prove nothing to you if the supermarket computers did a 
>>> better job than the checkout chicks. Why then did you cite this article?
>>>
>>
>> Because the article is consistent with my view that there is a 
>> fundamental difference between quantitative tasks and aesthetic awareness. 
>> If there were no difference, then I would expect that the problems that 
>> supermarket computers would have would not be related to its 
>> unconsciousness, but to unreliability or even willfulness developing. Why 
>> isn't the story "Automated cashiers have begun throwing temper tantrums at 
>> some locations which are contagious to certain smart phones that now become 
>> upset in sympathy...we had anticipated this, but not so soon, yadda yadda"? 
>> I think it's pretty clear why. For the same reason that all machines will 
>> always fall short of authentic personality and sensitivity.
>>
>
> So you would just say that computers lack authentic personality and 
> sensitivity, no matter what they did.
>

Beyond question, yes. I wouldn't just say it, I would bet my life on it, 
because I understand it completely.

 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

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Re: The I Concept, Analytically


Hey Craig, thanks for the feedback. Please refer to below:
On Friday, October 11, 2013 5:10:39 AM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, October 11, 2013 2:58:13 AM UTC-4, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>>
>> The vocable "I" becomes attached to each impulse that arises in a psychic 
>> complex, no matter how mutually contradictory such impulses may appear to 
>> be. From this process springs the idea of a multitude of "me"'s. 
>>  
>> The impulses in question are affective, so that the inferential "I" is 
>> affective rather than intellectual. 
>>  
>> What is the origin of the vocable "I"? Every "living" phenomenon, every 
>> sentient complex must necessarily have a centre, call it "heart" or "head". 
>>  
>> Such centre in itself is as phenomenal as the appearance of which it 
>> forms the "heart" or "centre", but its necessary function is the 
>> organization and care of the phenomenon which it controls. Emotions such as 
>> fear, greed, love-hate arise on behalf of the phenomenon for which they 
>> constitute protection and stimulate survival and perpetuation in the 
>> space-time context of manifestation. Consequently the vocable "I", 
>> representing this "centre", represents the physical body, and this 
>> representation is responsible for the identification which constitutes 
>> bondage. 
>>  
>> This "centre", then, is the phenomenal basis of an I-concept or ego or 
>> self, which is inferential and has no existence in the sense of being 
>> capable of independent action as a thing-in-itself. On account of the 
>> emotions of physical origin for which this I-concept assumes 
>> responsibility, the whole complex has the appearance of an independent 
>> entity which it is not-- since it is totally "lived" or "dreamed" by the 
>> noumenality which is all that it is.
>>  
>> It is this "centre", and every impulse that arises in a psyche, to which 
>> is attached the vocable "I", and this it is to which is attributed 
>> responsibility for each thought that arises in consciousness and every 
>> action of the apparent "individual". It is this, of course, to which the 
>> term "ego" is applied, whose functioning is known as "volition". In fact, 
>> however, it merely performs its own function in perfect ignorance of what 
>> is assigned to its agency.
>>  
>> It was never I and never could it be I, for never could any "thing", any 
>> object of consciousness, be I. There cannot be an objective "I" for, 
>> so-being, it would have to become an object to itself and could no longer 
>> be I. That is why "Is-ness" must be the absence of both object and subject, 
>> whose integration in mutual absence is devoid of objective existence.
>>
>
> Nice post. Why can't is-ness be the reconciliation of both object and 
> subject instead though? Not an absence, but the presence of the sense of 
> absence from which all implicit and explicit experience is appreciated in 
> solitude/solace/peace. The vocable "I" may be ignorant of its agency, but 
> the noumenal privacy which dreams the I may not be ignorant, and it may not 
> be fundamentally different from the representations of itself that it does 
> experience. Greater, certainly, but not alienated from it absolutely. We 
> need not doubt our own agency, even if the doubter is not identical in 
> every way to the agency that it doubts. Human consciousness is multivalent 
> and only semi-unanamous, but that doesn't mean that awareness itself is 
> similarly fragmented split off from itself. Volition is not an illusion, it 
> just has incomplete access to knowledge of itself. The is-ness of the 
> objective world would not be very convincing if everyone walked around as 
> omniscient immortals.
>  
>
>>  
>>
> First of all, let me say that I am no fan of determinism, even when it is 
clothed up in the fancy reasoning that Bruno provides. I do believe in 
irreducible agency and volition, and I don't think (a la John Clark) that 
all states of affairs can be exhausted by simple repetition of double sided 
tautologies... nature proves amply that binary thinking is bad thinking, 
and I always hate (but also love, because John is such a good reasoner, 
given his assumptions) to see arguments that get cashed out in terms of a 
basic set of binary values.I think there are more choices than 
random/determinate, but we probably can't distinguish or frame them, just 
like prehistoric planaria couldn't distinguish between more/less light.  I 
think the thing I'm trying to say is that the reconciliation of subject and 
object is something like when you bring together the picture of something 
and its negative... when you superimpose those things you get 'nothing'... 
now, that doesn't necessarily mean a blank or an absence... actually, that 
reconciliation is the biggest fullness of plenum you can conceive, because 
you have brought two (by definition) contradictories together that they add 
up precisely to 'no thing' -- no distinguishable thing, anyway, the thing 
you are le

Re: The I Concept, Analytically



On Friday, October 11, 2013 2:58:13 AM UTC-4, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>
> The vocable "I" becomes attached to each impulse that arises in a psychic 
> complex, no matter how mutually contradictory such impulses may appear to 
> be. From this process springs the idea of a multitude of "me"'s. 
>  
> The impulses in question are affective, so that the inferential "I" is 
> affective rather than intellectual. 
>  
> What is the origin of the vocable "I"? Every "living" phenomenon, every 
> sentient complex must necessarily have a centre, call it "heart" or "head". 
>  
> Such centre in itself is as phenomenal as the appearance of which it forms 
> the "heart" or "centre", but its necessary function is the organization and 
> care of the phenomenon which it controls. Emotions such as fear, greed, 
> love-hate arise on behalf of the phenomenon for which they constitute 
> protection and stimulate survival and perpetuation in the space-time 
> context of manifestation. Consequently the vocable "I", representing this 
> "centre", represents the physical body, and this representation is 
> responsible for the identification which constitutes bondage. 
>  
> This "centre", then, is the phenomenal basis of an I-concept or ego or 
> self, which is inferential and has no existence in the sense of being 
> capable of independent action as a thing-in-itself. On account of the 
> emotions of physical origin for which this I-concept assumes 
> responsibility, the whole complex has the appearance of an independent 
> entity which it is not-- since it is totally "lived" or "dreamed" by the 
> noumenality which is all that it is.
>  
> It is this "centre", and every impulse that arises in a psyche, to which 
> is attached the vocable "I", and this it is to which is attributed 
> responsibility for each thought that arises in consciousness and every 
> action of the apparent "individual". It is this, of course, to which the 
> term "ego" is applied, whose functioning is known as "volition". In fact, 
> however, it merely performs its own function in perfect ignorance of what 
> is assigned to its agency.
>  
> It was never I and never could it be I, for never could any "thing", any 
> object of consciousness, be I. There cannot be an objective "I" for, 
> so-being, it would have to become an object to itself and could no longer 
> be I. That is why "Is-ness" must be the absence of both object and subject, 
> whose integration in mutual absence is devoid of objective existence.
>  
> I could never be anything, I CANNOT EVEN BE I, for all being is 
> determined. Nor could I ever be identified with anything objective, and "an 
> I" is a contradiction in terms. I am no "thing" whatever, not even 
> "is-ness." 
>  
>

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Re: The I Concept, Analytically



On Friday, October 11, 2013 5:18:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Oct 2013, at 08:58, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>
> The vocable "I" becomes attached to each impulse that arises in a psychic 
> complex, no matter how mutually contradictory such impulses may appear to 
> be. From this process springs the idea of a multitude of "me"'s. 
>  
> The impulses in question are affective, so that the inferential "I" is 
> affective rather than intellectual. 
>  
> What is the origin of the vocable "I"? Every "living" phenomenon, every 
> sentient complex must necessarily have a centre, call it "heart" or "head". 
>  
> Such centre in itself is as phenomenal as the appearance of which it forms 
> the "heart" or "centre", but its necessary function is the organization and 
> care of the phenomenon which it controls. Emotions such as fear, greed, 
> love-hate arise on behalf of the phenomenon for which they constitute 
> protection and stimulate survival and perpetuation in the space-time 
> context of manifestation. Consequently the vocable "I", representing this 
> "centre", represents the physical body, and this representation is 
> responsible for the identification which constitutes bondage. 
>  
> This "centre", then, is the phenomenal basis of an I-concept or ego or 
> self, which is inferential and has no existence in the sense of being 
> capable of independent action as a thing-in-itself. On account of the 
> emotions of physical origin for which this I-concept assumes 
> responsibility, the whole complex has the appearance of an independent 
> entity which it is not-- since it is totally "lived" or "dreamed" by the 
> noumenality which is all that it is.
>  
> It is this "centre", and every impulse that arises in a psyche, to which 
> is attached the vocable "I", and this it is to which is attributed 
> responsibility for each thought that arises in consciousness and every 
> action of the apparent "individual". It is this, of course, to which the 
> term "ego" is applied, whose functioning is known as "volition". In fact, 
> however, it merely performs its own function in perfect ignorance of what 
> is assigned to its agency.
>  
> It was never I and never could it be I, for never could any "thing", any 
> object of consciousness, be I. There cannot be an objective "I" for, 
> so-being, it would have to become an object to itself and could no longer 
> be I. That is why "Is-ness" must be the absence of both object and subject, 
> whose integration in mutual absence is devoid of objective existence.
>  
> I could never be anything, I CANNOT EVEN BE I, for all being is 
> determined. Nor could I ever be identified with anything objective, and "an 
> I" is a contradiction in terms. I am no "thing" whatever, not even 
> "is-ness." 
>
>
> That is a not too bad description of the machines first person I. They 
> agree with you, as far as "you" means something, which I am sure it does.
>
> Amazingly this is provable by machine, once they accept to identify the 
> 1-I with the knower, and to define the knower by true believer/dreamer.
>
> Bruno
>
> And who is the knower? God, my brain breaks/brakes so many times reading 
> this shit, in this mailing list... who is interested in doing the proving? 
> Who wants to prove, and why? Is it merely a spontaneous fact? If so, what 
> of my internal states that seem so far removed from mathematical proof? 
>

Sometimes, Bruno, I get the feeling as though you are a chef at a 
restaurant with a wonderful menu, but whenever anyone orders an item on it, 
all you can do is give them exactly the same picture of the item they 
ordered from the menu, but never the real thing!!! 
By the way, I do think your restaurant in terms of philosophical and 
intellectual satisfaction is one of the best in town! 

>
>  
>
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: The I Concept, Analytically


On 10/11/2013 9:44 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Sometimes, Bruno, I get the feeling as though you are a chef at a restaurant with a 
wonderful menu, but whenever anyone orders an item on it, all you can do is give them 
exactly the same picture of the item they ordered from the menu, but never the real 
thing!!!
By the way, I do think your restaurant in terms of philosophical and intellectual 
satisfaction is one of the best in town!


Metaphysics is a restaurant where they give you a 30,000 page menu and no food.
--- Robert Pirsig

Brent

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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?