RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

>>That's nonsense, 

The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care less 
about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who adopt the 
same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I think you've just 
discovered that there are. And that they are publishing these ideas in 
respected and peer reviewed journals.

Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of 
subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said.

>> and contrary to observed fact. 

I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the 
angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question?


>> David Deutsch does not reject probability... 

Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ 
amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we 
should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin.

>>or could you please show a quote where he does.

Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey. I've kindly 
described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace argue, I've 
supplied papers which you've refused to read. if you disagree you need display 
the same generosity and explain to me what you think they are arguing and how 
that is different. Waving your hands in the air demanding more and more to 
unceremoniously and uncritically ditch is no-ones idea of fun.

All the best

Chris.

Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you" has 
been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it another 
way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees spin down), 
which by then will be two different people.






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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

In the MWI you *do* see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of "you"
has been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it
another way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees
spin down), which by then will be two different people.

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RE: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating

[Chris de Morsella]

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark

 

 > There are many reasons why nuclear power is dead in the water. 

 

>>I think the main reason is that reactors got too big too fast and their
design has been frozen for nearly half a century. They found a nuclear
reactor design that worked well in submarines and figured if they just
scaled it up a few hundred times it would work well in commercial power
plants too, but it didn't work out quite that way. Freeman Dyson said the
real problem is that reactor design isn't fun anymore because nobody is
allowed to build even a small one if it is significantly (or even slightly)
different from what has already been built, so the most creative people go
into areas other than nuclear power.  

I agree with you there. The GE Mark II design (which is unfortunately quite
common) is the spawn of that bad engineering. Remember however that was the
era when they were toying around with atomic airplanes and of course the
Orion project, so it fits right in with the mindset prevailing during the
initial pre-Cuban phase of the Cold War. 

In addition I think the early experiments at Oak Ridge with LFTR were
side-lined because it did not fit well with the requirements of the Cold
War. The LFTR fuel cycle does not support (i.e. help scale up) the military
need for highly enriched U-235. 

>the sector would have never existed without massive government subsidies

 

>>Neither would wind farms or big solar energy power plants. And what do you
make of the government putting a huge tariff on Chinese solar cells to
protect domestic producers which makes photovoltaics much more expensive in
the USA? 

 

There is no comparison. The nuclear sector has enjoyed direct and indirect
subsidies of a scale that dwarfs the sum total of all subsidies ever given
to wind + solar + geothermal + tidal + wave. I purposely leave out ethanol &
biodiesel, which has always been a welfare program for Big Ag (the EROI of
corn ethanol for example is less than one; it is actually an energy sink -
you get less than it took to make it)

 

Topically just in the news - and which very clearly makes my point -- Last
Wednesday, the Obama administration announced $8.3 billion in public loan
assistance to three nuclear power producers. That is a huge and brand new
subsidy on top of the fifty or more years of subsidy that has preceded it.
For comparison the loan guarantee to the bankrupt solar PV company Solyndra
was in grand total $535 million; this is less than one fifteenth the amount
of this brand new loan guarantee to the nuclear welfare queen. The
right-wing blogosphere could not stop shouting about the Solyndra loan
guarantee for years (and they still harp on it); I do not hear a peep of
protest from these same fiscal conservatives about this new massive subsidy
of nuclear. 

 

If Solar PV had enjoyed even a fifth of the subisdies that nuclear has
enjoyed we would already be living in a Solar era.

 

> the lead time to bring working LFTR reactors to market and to build out
enough of them to begin to make an impact on the global (or some important
regional) energy market is long and should be measured in decades at least.
Decades from today is as soon as the first LFTRs could begin to come online.

 

>>That would certainly be true if there is no sense of urgency to get the
job done, but we got to the moon in less than 9 years once we decided we
really really wanted to go there. There is no scientific reason it would
take decades to get a LFTR online, but there are political reasons.

 

How many Apollo V rockets did we build for all that dough? It would take
many trillions of dollars to retool our energy systems; again there is no
comparison between the moonshot Cold War race and deploying a radically
different electric energy generation infrastructure. The logistics alone
mushroom out; these things take time and nine years is far too optimistic -
IMO. There is more to it than just the science/engineering of LFTR and
politics, there is also the economic dimension. capital allocation, scale
out of the required industrial base and resource constraints that are also
at play. 

 

 

> Decades from today is as soon as the first LFTRs could begin to come
online. By that time - they will need to compete with solar PV and the per
unit costs for PV that are achieved over the next two or three decades.

 

>>Finding a good inexpensive solar cell is not enough, even more important
is finding a cheap and reliable way to store vast amounts of electrical
energy. And because solar energy is so dilute environmentalists will whine
about the huge amounts of land required. And some applications are just not
going to work, you'll never see a solar powered 747 or fighter jet.

 

Dilute sources of power actually match quite well with how power is actually
consumed for the most part. Most electric power is consumed by the vast
number of dispersed (dilute) small

Re: Block Universes

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 25 February 2014 00:35, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:
> Stathis,
>
> You've of course hit on the crux in your explanation, though perhaps
> unknowingly so.
>
> You state "The me, yesterday is not me, now...".
>
> Yes, I agree completely. You, yourself have just stated the selection
> mechanism is the 'NOW' which you mention. It is the now that you are in that
> selects which version of Stathis you are on the basis of what time it is in
> that now. The Stathis that corresponds to that time is the Stathis that you
> are right now at that time.
>
> That is what I've been telling you, that you are the Stathis version of
> yourself that you are because that is the only one that exists in this NOW
> in which you exist.
>
> That in itself demonstrates there is a now, a present moment, which selects
> the actual version of yourself that you are at this particular time. And if
> there is a particular now, then time MUST flow...
>
> You, yourself demonstrate my point...

The point was that I, now am no more privileged in time compared to
other versions of myself than I am privileged in space compared to
other people.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Block Universes

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 25 February 2014 00:26, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:
> Stathis,
>
> 1. This disproves what it sets out to prove. It assumes a RUNNING computer
> which assumes a flowing time. This example can't be taken seriously. If
> anything it's a proof that time has to flow to give the appearance of time
> flowing, which is the correct understanding...

No, what it shows is that the running time is not relevant to the
appearance of continuity. The computer can be restarted after a second
or after a billion years in the Andromeda galaxy, and it makes no
subjective difference. This is how the separate frames in a block
universe "join up".

> 2. I assume in this context you don't mean 'multiverse' but 'many worlds'
> and that your use of 'multiverse' was a typo?
>
> If so I have some questions I like to ask to clarify how you understand MWI,
> particularly in the block universe context you previously mentioned.

I meant multiverse, not specifically the MWI of QM.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

Because you did not, and you use the twin argument arguing that relativity
does not explain it, where clearly it does, p-time is of absolutely no use
for that.


2014-02-25 2:12 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>
> I just answered those exact two questions of yours. Why are asking the
> same two questions again?
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:22:04 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> I just did,... your p-time is unnecessary, does not explain anything...
>> your answer to my post, proves that you don't understand relativity at
>> all... so I think there is not much left to discuss...
>>
>> If you could just explain what your p-time is supposed to solve and
>> answer this question: is there a truth fact about simultaneity in p-time of
>> two distant events ? Yes/No (a yes or a no is all I ask, nothing more).
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-25 0:18 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> Ah, and I had hopes for you for a moment there, but those hopes have just
>> been dashed...
>>
>> Sadly it's you who don't understand the perfectly valid points I'm
>> making
>>
>> In any case even if you were correct, and you most certainly aren't, and
>> relativity did explain all of that, that still would NOT establish any
>> inconsistency between relativity and P-time which was your original claim
>> which you have been unable to back up.
>>
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:11:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 23:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> Ah, at last a couple of meaningful questions!
>>
>>  Actually relativity does NOT explain how the twins can have different
>> clock times in the same present moment AND compare and agree on them in
>> spite of what you say. I'll explain why...
>>
>>
>> Relativity perfectly explains it... it is simply because they compare
>> their proper time at the *same spacetime coordinate*.
>>
>>
>> Of course one can place a coordinate clock at their meeting place and
>> that can be used to define a standard time for the event of their meeting.
>> But that is just cheating because that clock simply ignores the real fact
>> or their real actual different ages.
>>
>>
>> WTF ?
>>
>>
>> It's operationally no different than one twin just resetting his clock to
>> the other's clock and them claiming that's somehow the REAL time.
>>
>>
>> 
>>
>> I leave it there, that's just another proof, if I needed one more, that
>> you just don't understand what you're talking about.
>>
>>  Quentin
>>
>>
>> It isn't, because it is completely arbitrary just like the coordinate
>> clock, and it ignores the real fact that their ACTUAL clocks which are
>> their ages are different. Basically it ignores the whole fact of the trip
>> which is what you claim it explains.
>>
>> P-time is different because it is not arbitrary. Instead it is an
>> absolute background to ALL relativistic events, and it is real and actual,
>> because all observers agree they are actually alive in a present moment
>> because it is the basic empirical observation of their existence, just as
>> you and I experience that. And as empirical observations are the basis of
>> all scientific knowledge the empirical observation of existing in a present
>> moment that we all have must also be accepted.
>>
>> And to answer your last question, yes there is an absolute simultaneity
>> of any two distant events in P-time. As I've explained to Jesse, and
>> demonstrated with numerous examples, the clock times that correlate to to
>> the same past P-times are not always directly observable, but they can
>> always be calculated if we have knowledge of the relativistic frames of any
>> two observers.
>>
>> I will be happy to respond further to any questions you may have
>>
>> Best,
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:45:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Just first, explain what p-time is supposed to solve in the first place
>> that relativity doesn't. (if you come back again with the possibility for
>> the twins to meet up, relativity doesn't need p-time for that, so you
>> should find a real problem p-time solve that relativity alone can't).
>>
>> Then answer the following:
>>
>> Is there an objective fact about the simultaneity of two distant event in
>> p-time ? Yes/No
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 19:11 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your
>> contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains
>> unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part.
>>
>> Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your
>> original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it...
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>> <
>>
>> ...
>
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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-25 1:05 GMT+01:00 chris peck :

> Hi Quentin
>
>
>
> *>>As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus,
> only the interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. *
>
> Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin
> down pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion
> of a thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:
>
> *"What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following
> premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with
> certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up,
> and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down."*
>
> That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.


>
> *>> One reason for MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... *
>
> No, MWI was devised in response to the measurement problem but in
> abandoning wave function collapse Everett ends up with a theory which is
> very parsimonious but entirely deterministic. How to then account for
> probability in a determinist framework has become the Achilles heel of MWI
> not its raison d'être.
>
> Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of
> probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch,
> Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective
> uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action
> principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but
> you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the
> other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical
> problems.
>
> The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist framework,
> or any TofE really, is still an open question. And to argue that must
> reject MWI if they reject Brunos probability sums is plain wrong. Im happy
> to find myself in the company of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves.
>

David Deutsch does not reject probability... or could you please show a
quote where he does.

>
>
> *>> your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up...
> which should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one.*
>
> See above.
>

Well what I see does not seem to make sense.

Regards,
Quentin

>
> All the best
>
> Chris.
>
> --
> From: da...@davidnyman.com
> Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +
>
> Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
> On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck  wrote:
>
> *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
> in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
> me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
> retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.*
>
> Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is
> any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the
> person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should
> assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity
> criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and
> won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what
> Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I
> think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments
> would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.
> Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.
>
>
> Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to
> you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful
> way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to
> be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a
> heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation
> onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this
> perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random
> selection from the class of all possible observer moments.
>
> Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define.
>
> If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get
> a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable
> than being me or you.
>
>
> But how would "you" remember that?
>
>
>
> I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a
> notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states.
>
> I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a
> universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer
> ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)).
>
> But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic
> an

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 16:54, chris peck  wrote:

> Hi Liz
>
> *>> I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to
> have anything added.*
>
> I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability.
>
>
>
>
> *>>Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by
> an experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a
> non-branching universe, they will regard the proportion of times a
> measurement comes out one way (spin up say) as the probability of that
> result occurring. If they assume an MWI perspective, however, the
> probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the proportion of experimenters
> who will be found in the spin-up branch.Is there something wrong with that?*
>
> It doesn't really address the issue. It doesn't address the question 'what
> can I expect to see'. Of course, I can say this set of future mes will
> inhabit a spin up branch and this set of future mes will inhabit a spin
> down branch. So, this proportion of future mes will see spin up and this
> portion will see spin down.
>
> Asked what I (present me) can expect to see: well I can expect to see spin
> up and spin down Asked to assign a probability to seeing either result
> I assign 1 to both.
>

You should assign 1 to seeing both in your "multiversal form" - you will
split. This is basically a misuse of the term probability because it's a
deterministic outcome (but appears probabilistic).

>
> Theirs is a method of calculating frequencies of me seeing ups and downs
> but not probabilities of seeing up or down.
>

So what's wrong with that?

As I said our "expectation of probability" in the MWI is based on what
happens after the measurement. There is no actual probability from the MWI
perspective, only certainty. We only think there is if we don't take an MWI
view (similar to the 1p vs 3p distinction in comp).

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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

>> I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have 
>> anything added.

I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability.

>>Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an 
>>experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching 
>>universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out 
>>one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they 
>>assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a 
>>measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up 
>>branch.

Is there something wrong with that?

It doesn't really address the issue. It doesn't address the question 'what can 
I expect to see'. Of course, I can say this set of future mes will inhabit a 
spin up branch and this set of future mes will inhabit a spin down branch. So, 
this proportion of future mes will see spin up and this portion will see spin 
down.

Asked what I (present me) can expect to see: well I can expect to see spin up 
and spin down Asked to assign a probability to seeing either result I 
assign 1 to both.

Theirs is a method of calculating frequencies of me seeing ups and downs but 
not probabilities of seeing up or down.

All the best

Chris.

Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 13:30:48 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck  wrote:




Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of 
probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, Wallace, 
Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective uncertainty 
altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action principle. In 
otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but you should act as 
if there was some objective bias towards one or the other. The approach comes 
complete with its own set of philosophical problems.


I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have 
anything added.

Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an 
experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching 
universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out one 
way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they assume 
an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the 
proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up branch.


Is there something wrong with that?






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Re: Block Universes

[Jesse Mazer]

On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 6:53 PM, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:

> Jesse,
>
> Well, I thought I was expressing your own model, but apparently not.
>
> However IF, and a big if, I understand you correctly then I do agree that "if
> two events have the same space and time coordinates in a single inertial
> frame, they must also satisfy the operational definition of "same point in
> spacetime" I gave earlier? And I would agree this means that the two events
> happened at the same p-time?"
>
> I'm assuming this means we agree that the meeting twins do meet in the
> same space and time coordinates of the inertial frame in which they meet,
> though obviously NOT in the same time coordinates of their own proper
> comoving frames?
>

Depends what you mean by that. Say that in the original inertial frame we
first use to analyze the problem (which may not be the rest frame of either
Alice or Bob), the event of Alice turning 30 has the same space and time
coordinates as the event of Bob turning 40, i.e. these two events happen at
the same point in spacetime. Then the event of Alice turning 30 could be at
a time coordinate of t=30 in her own comoving rest frame, but in her
comoving frame the event of Bob turning 40 would ALSO be at t=30 (and both
events would have identical space coordinates in this frame). And the event
of Bob turning 40 could be at a time coordinate of t'=40 in his own
comoving rest frame, but in his comoving frame the event of Alice turning
30 would ALSO be at t'=40 (and again the space coordinates would be the
identical). So no matter what frame we use, these two events--Alice turning
30, and Bob turning 40--are assigned the same time-coordinates AS ONE
ANOTHER in that specific frame, but the actual time coordinate common to
both events can differ from one frame to another (in Alice's frame they had
a common time coordinate of t=30, while in Bob's frame they had a common
time coordinate of t'=40). Is the latter all you meant by "NOT in the same
time coordinates of their own proper comoving frames", or would you
actually disagree with my claim that if these two events have the same
space and time coordinates as one another in some frame, they must still
have the same space and time coordinates as one another in any other frame
as well?

Also, would you agree that crossing through identical space and time
coordinates implies satisfying the operational definitions I gave even if
they don't actually stop and come to rest relative to each other, but just
cross paths briefly while moving at a large relative velocity? That they
would still satisfy the operational definition of crossing through the
"same point in spacetime" in the sense that if they were sending continuous
signals to one another, the time for the signal to be reflected and return
would approach zero as they approached the space and time coordinate that
both their paths cross through? I can give an example if this scenario
isn't clear.

Jesse

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Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 12:30:21PM +1300, LizR wrote:
> On 25 February 2014 12:20, John Mikes  wrote:
> 
> > Liz, I will sign up for your 101 chemistry class.
> >
> 
> Sadly not my strong point, as I'm sure you realise. I just know that car
> exhausts produce CO2 and water vapour (plus a bit of lead etc) so I'm
> guessing one can in theory reconstitute these substances back into petrol,
> using a suitable amount of energy, catalysts etc. (If plants can do it, I
> figure we should be able to. Surely human ingenuity can match plants' ?!
> Maybe not...)

Actually, principle, we should be able to surpass plants in
efficiency. Plants are only about 10% efficient, IIRC, and the best
artificial photosynthetic cell to date is only about half that.

Cheers

-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

I just answered those exact two questions of yours. Why are asking the same 
two questions again?

Edgar

On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:22:04 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> I just did,... your p-time is unnecessary, does not explain anything... 
> your answer to my post, proves that you don't understand relativity at 
> all... so I think there is not much left to discuss... 
>
> If you could just explain what your p-time is supposed to solve and answer 
> this question: is there a truth fact about simultaneity in p-time of two 
> distant events ? Yes/No (a yes or a no is all I ask, nothing more).
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-25 0:18 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
> Quentin,
>
> Ah, and I had hopes for you for a moment there, but those hopes have just 
> been dashed...
>
> Sadly it's you who don't understand the perfectly valid points I'm 
> making
>
> In any case even if you were correct, and you most certainly aren't, and 
> relativity did explain all of that, that still would NOT establish any 
> inconsistency between relativity and P-time which was your original claim 
> which you have been unable to back up.
>
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:11:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 23:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
>
> Quentin,
>
> Ah, at last a couple of meaningful questions!
>
>  Actually relativity does NOT explain how the twins can have different 
> clock times in the same present moment AND compare and agree on them in 
> spite of what you say. I'll explain why...
>
>
> Relativity perfectly explains it... it is simply because they compare 
> their proper time at the *same spacetime coordinate*. 
>
>
> Of course one can place a coordinate clock at their meeting place and that 
> can be used to define a standard time for the event of their meeting. But 
> that is just cheating because that clock simply ignores the real fact or 
> their real actual different ages. 
>
>
> WTF ?
>  
>
> It's operationally no different than one twin just resetting his clock to 
> the other's clock and them claiming that's somehow the REAL time. 
>
>
> 
>
> I leave it there, that's just another proof, if I needed one more, that 
> you just don't understand what you're talking about.
>
>  Quentin
>  
>
> It isn't, because it is completely arbitrary just like the coordinate 
> clock, and it ignores the real fact that their ACTUAL clocks which are 
> their ages are different. Basically it ignores the whole fact of the trip 
> which is what you claim it explains.
>
> P-time is different because it is not arbitrary. Instead it is an absolute 
> background to ALL relativistic events, and it is real and actual, because 
> all observers agree they are actually alive in a present moment because it 
> is the basic empirical observation of their existence, just as you and I 
> experience that. And as empirical observations are the basis of all 
> scientific knowledge the empirical observation of existing in a present 
> moment that we all have must also be accepted.
>
> And to answer your last question, yes there is an absolute simultaneity of 
> any two distant events in P-time. As I've explained to Jesse, and 
> demonstrated with numerous examples, the clock times that correlate to to 
> the same past P-times are not always directly observable, but they can 
> always be calculated if we have knowledge of the relativistic frames of any 
> two observers.
>
> I will be happy to respond further to any questions you may have
>
> Best,
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:45:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Just first, explain what p-time is supposed to solve in the first place 
> that relativity doesn't. (if you come back again with the possibility for 
> the twins to meet up, relativity doesn't need p-time for that, so you 
> should find a real problem p-time solve that relativity alone can't).
>
> Then answer the following:
>
> Is there an objective fact about the simultaneity of two distant event in 
> p-time ? Yes/No
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 19:11 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Quentin,
>
> Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your 
> contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains 
> unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part.
>
> Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your 
> original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it...
>
> Edgar
>
> <
>
> ...

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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck  wrote:

> Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of
> probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch,
> Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective
> uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action
> principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but
> you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the
> other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical
> problems.
>

I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have
anything added.

Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an
experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching
universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out
one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they
assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a
measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up
branch.

Is there something wrong with that?

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RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin


>>As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus, only the 
>>interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. 

Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down 
pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a 
thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

"What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down."

>> One reason for MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... 

No, MWI was devised in response to the measurement problem but in abandoning 
wave function collapse Everett ends up with a theory which is very parsimonious 
but entirely deterministic. How to then account for probability in a 
determinist framework has become the Achilles heel of MWI not its raison 
d'être. 

Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of 
probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, Wallace, 
Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective uncertainty 
altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action principle. In 
otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but you should act as 
if there was some objective bias towards one or the other. The approach comes 
complete with its own set of philosophical problems.

The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist framework, or any 
TofE really, is still an open question. And to argue that must reject MWI if 
they reject Brunos probability sums is plain wrong. Im happy to find myself in 
the company of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves.

>> your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up... which 
>> should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one.

See above.

All the best

Chris.

From: da...@davidnyman.com
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal  wrote:



On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck  wrote:

 
>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the 
>>MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each 
>>branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as 
>>though I only experienced one outcome.


 
Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any 
disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person 
duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each 
outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. 
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But 
I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that 
each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p 
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the 
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.

 
Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you 
on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of 
tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole 
fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for 
collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the 
perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the 
situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the 
class of all possible observer moments.

Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define.
If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a 
computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than 
being me or you.


But how would "you" remember that? 


I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a 
notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states.
I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal 
(self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer ([]p & <>p), 
and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)).


But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and 
is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will 
select among all "observer moment".


Well, perhaps "eventually" it will select all of them, if we can give some 
relevant sense to eventually in this context. And I suppose Hoyle's point is 
that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its order 
must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the momen

Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Jesse,

Well, I thought I was expressing your own model, but apparently not.

However IF, and a big if, I understand you correctly then I do agree that "if 
two events have the same space and time coordinates in a single inertial 
frame, they must also satisfy the operational definition of "same point in 
spacetime" I gave earlier? And I would agree this means that the two events 
happened at the same p-time?"

I'm assuming this means we agree that the meeting twins do meet in the same 
space and time coordinates of the inertial frame in which they meet, though 
obviously NOT in the same time coordinates of their own proper comoving 
frames?

In any case they clearly meet in the same point of spacetime by your 
operational definition, and thus clearly in the same p-time. Nevertheless 
by their own agreed upon different ages they meet at different times on 
their own proper comoving clocks, and meeting at a single coordinate clock 
doesn't change their real age clock differences.

So after all this genuflection I don't see we are anywhere different than 
where we started though you may claim we are?

And two caveats:
 
1. My agreement is subject to withdrawal if it turns out I didn't 
understand you correctly.
2. Those two events can still be the shaking hands and comparing clocks of 
twins with two actual DIFFERENT CLOK TIME AGES. In other words the fact 
that there can be an arbitrary clock time at the meeting point that both 
twins agree to use as the 'real' time of that meeting is completely 
arbitrary. It is no different operationally that either twin resetting his 
clock to the clock of the other and both twins agreeing that's the time 
they will use from then on. It makes no difference whatsoever to the actual 
age clocks of the twins which remain different permanently and agreed upon 
by both twins. 

Coordinate time does not explain the age differences of the twins. It 
ignores them. But it does provide a completely arbitrary 'SAME' time for 
the meeting, and that does correspond to a single agreed upon P-time. 
However that single agreed clock/coordinate time has no relevance to 
determining the clock times that correspond to the same P-time of the twins 
DURING the trip, because it does not refer to the trip in any way 
whatsoever.

Edgar








On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:35:07 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 7:24 AM, Edgar L. Owen 
> > wrote:
>
> Jesse,
>
> Let me make sure I understand what you are saying.
>
> You say we can drop an arbitrary coordinate system onto spacetime, and 
> then we can place an originally synchronized clock at every grid 
> intersection. Is that correct?
>
>
> It depends whether we are talking about inertial frames or arbitrary 
> non-inertial coordinate systems. In non-inertial coordinate systems, the 
> only requirement is that the coordinate be "smooth"--no sudden 
> discontinuities in the coordinates assigned to infinitesimally-close points 
> in spacetime. Beyond that, not only are you free to drop an 
> arbitrarily-shaped rubbery coordinate "grid" with clocks at each 
> intersection, but you're also free to define "synchronization" any way you 
> want, you don't need to follow any standard procedure for deciding what 
> point on each clock's worldline is the one where it be set to read zero, 
> you can do this any way you like (again provided that the resulting 
> simultaneity surfaces are smooth, with no discontinuous "jumps"). And 
> there's also no requirement that the coordinate clock times actually 
> correspond to the proper times along their worldline--you could have a 
> coordinate clock that was designed to alternately run faster or slower than 
> a normal clock moving right alongside them, for example.
>
> But the example I gave with Alice/Bob/Arlene/Bart involved an inertial 
> coordinate system, not any non-inertial ones. In this case the rules for 
> constructing a coordinate system are more strict--you have to use a 
> Cartesian grid of straight rulers that are all inertial and at rest 
> relative to one another, and then you have to use the "Einstein 
> synchronization convention" to define what it means for clocks at different 
> grid intersections to be synchronized with one another--the most common 
> definition of this convention is that if you send a light signal from clock 
> A when it reads tA1, it reflects off clock B when it reads tB, and the 
> reflected light returns back to clock A when it reads tA2, then tB should 
> be exactly halfway between tA1 and tA2 (i.e. tB = (tA2 - tA1)/2 ). Another 
> equivalent definition is that if you set off a flash of light from a ruler 
> marking that's exactly halfway between the markings that A and B are 
> attached to, then both clocks should show the same reading when the light 
> from the flash reaches them. The Einstein synchronization convention 
> ensures that each inertial frame will measure the speed of light to be the 
> same in all directions.
>
>  
>
>
> And that

Re: Block Universes

[LizR]

Welcome to the club, Quentin.

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Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 12:20, John Mikes  wrote:

> Liz, I will sign up for your 101 chemistry class.
>

Sadly not my strong point, as I'm sure you realise. I just know that car
exhausts produce CO2 and water vapour (plus a bit of lead etc) so I'm
guessing one can in theory reconstitute these substances back into petrol,
using a suitable amount of energy, catalysts etc. (If plants can do it, I
figure we should be able to. Surely human ingenuity can match plants' ?!
Maybe not...)

>
> CO2 + 2H2O make CH4 PLUS 2 oxygen molecules. Use a multiple of such to
> make your 'petrol' (lesser ratio of H to C and even absorbing a little
> portion of the O2) yet the surplus of O2 is still generated.
> What I am driving at are CH3-CH2...CH2.CH3 types with occasional  -OH (
> -CO-?) groups included).  The Germans applied a better format in WWI (!)
> for their 'Watergas' fuel, stopping at CO and H2 - (still worrying about
> the excessive O2).
> Nitrogen cann catalytically 'eat up' some of it into nitrous oxides etc.
> (from the air again) but the proportions are still odd. Not that I would
> call 'impossible'.
>
> Believe me, since Woehler (1828) who synthesized urea (NH2-CO-NH2) and the
> WWII (!) German rush for butadien-based synth. rubbers, everything was
> given a thought.
>
> Your idea is excellent, it will reap huge appreciation from Brent (who is
> also FOR solar).
>

Well, if you have a working fusion reactor burning up 4 million tons of
mass per second, it seems a shame not to use it.


> I would be, too, had I better news of the delicacy, endurance and
> maintenance of the soalr panels - and the hazard of occasional wind-blown
> coverage (abrasions, breaks  included). Of course not as in-flight 474s.
>

The plastic ones should be simple to replace I believe. I read about them
some years ago in Sci American. The point about the 747s was to use the
petrol obtained from the air, of course, assuming that's possible - not
that they should be powered by solar panels in flight!

>
> John M
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 4:21 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
>> Solar cells are getting cheaper and easier to use (e.g. flexible plastic
>> ones). It should be possible to stick them anywhere you want, e.g. on
>> buildings or cars. This would mean at least some solar power could be
>> harvested using existing infrastructure. As usual the technology is there,
>> or almost there, but this needs political or commercial will to achieve.
>>
>> Personally I'd like to see a solar farm that uses the energy it receives
>> from the Sun to power machinery that sucks CO2 and water from the air and
>> turns them into petrol. (Then you really *could* run a 747 on solar
>> power :)
>>
>>  --
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Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

I just did,... your p-time is unnecessary, does not explain anything...
your answer to my post, proves that you don't understand relativity at
all... so I think there is not much left to discuss...

If you could just explain what your p-time is supposed to solve and answer
this question: is there a truth fact about simultaneity in p-time of two
distant events ? Yes/No (a yes or a no is all I ask, nothing more).

Quentin


2014-02-25 0:18 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>
> Ah, and I had hopes for you for a moment there, but those hopes have just
> been dashed...
>
> Sadly it's you who don't understand the perfectly valid points I'm
> making
>
> In any case even if you were correct, and you most certainly aren't, and
> relativity did explain all of that, that still would NOT establish any
> inconsistency between relativity and P-time which was your original claim
> which you have been unable to back up.
>
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:11:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 23:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> Ah, at last a couple of meaningful questions!
>>
>>  Actually relativity does NOT explain how the twins can have different
>> clock times in the same present moment AND compare and agree on them in
>> spite of what you say. I'll explain why...
>>
>>
>> Relativity perfectly explains it... it is simply because they compare
>> their proper time at the *same spacetime coordinate*.
>>
>>
>> Of course one can place a coordinate clock at their meeting place and
>> that can be used to define a standard time for the event of their meeting.
>> But that is just cheating because that clock simply ignores the real fact
>> or their real actual different ages.
>>
>>
>> WTF ?
>>
>>
>> It's operationally no different than one twin just resetting his clock to
>> the other's clock and them claiming that's somehow the REAL time.
>>
>>
>> 
>>
>> I leave it there, that's just another proof, if I needed one more, that
>> you just don't understand what you're talking about.
>>
>>  Quentin
>>
>>
>> It isn't, because it is completely arbitrary just like the coordinate
>> clock, and it ignores the real fact that their ACTUAL clocks which are
>> their ages are different. Basically it ignores the whole fact of the trip
>> which is what you claim it explains.
>>
>> P-time is different because it is not arbitrary. Instead it is an
>> absolute background to ALL relativistic events, and it is real and actual,
>> because all observers agree they are actually alive in a present moment
>> because it is the basic empirical observation of their existence, just as
>> you and I experience that. And as empirical observations are the basis of
>> all scientific knowledge the empirical observation of existing in a present
>> moment that we all have must also be accepted.
>>
>> And to answer your last question, yes there is an absolute simultaneity
>> of any two distant events in P-time. As I've explained to Jesse, and
>> demonstrated with numerous examples, the clock times that correlate to to
>> the same past P-times are not always directly observable, but they can
>> always be calculated if we have knowledge of the relativistic frames of any
>> two observers.
>>
>> I will be happy to respond further to any questions you may have
>>
>> Best,
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:45:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Just first, explain what p-time is supposed to solve in the first place
>> that relativity doesn't. (if you come back again with the possibility for
>> the twins to meet up, relativity doesn't need p-time for that, so you
>> should find a real problem p-time solve that relativity alone can't).
>>
>> Then answer the following:
>>
>> Is there an objective fact about the simultaneity of two distant event in
>> p-time ? Yes/No
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 19:11 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your
>> contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains
>> unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part.
>>
>> Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your
>> original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it...
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:59:10 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>  Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're
>> mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a
>> circus.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement
>> exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another
>> poster was using, rather than actual theory.
>>
>> Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a
>> very long time!
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC

Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating

[John Mikes]

Liz, I will sign up for your 101 chemistry class.

CO2 + 2H2O make CH4 PLUS 2 oxygen molecules. Use a multiple of such to make
your 'petrol' (lesser ratio of H to C and even absorbing a little portion
of the O2) yet the surplus of O2 is still generated.
What I am driving at are CH3-CH2...CH2.CH3 types with occasional  -OH (
-CO-?) groups included).  The Germans applied a better format in WWI (!)
for their 'Watergas' fuel, stopping at CO and H2 - (still worrying about
the excessive O2).
Nitrogen cann catalytically 'eat up' some of it into nitrous oxides etc.
(from the air again) but the proportions are still odd. Not that I would
call 'impossible'.

Believe me, since Woehler (1828) who synthesized urea (NH2-CO-NH2) and the
WWII (!) German rush for butadien-based synth. rubbers, everything was
given a thought.

Your idea is excellent, it will reap huge appreciation from Brent (who is
also FOR solar).
I would be, too, had I better news of the delicacy, endurance and
maintenance of the soalr panels - and the hazard of occasional wind-blown
coverage (abrasions, breaks  included). Of course not as in-flight 474s.

John M




On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 4:21 PM, LizR  wrote:

> Solar cells are getting cheaper and easier to use (e.g. flexible plastic
> ones). It should be possible to stick them anywhere you want, e.g. on
> buildings or cars. This would mean at least some solar power could be
> harvested using existing infrastructure. As usual the technology is there,
> or almost there, but this needs political or commercial will to achieve.
>
> Personally I'd like to see a solar farm that uses the energy it receives
> from the Sun to power machinery that sucks CO2 and water from the air and
> turns them into petrol. (Then you really *could* run a 747 on solar power
> :)
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>

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Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

Ah, and I had hopes for you for a moment there, but those hopes have just 
been dashed...

Sadly it's you who don't understand the perfectly valid points I'm 
making

In any case even if you were correct, and you most certainly aren't, and 
relativity did explain all of that, that still would NOT establish any 
inconsistency between relativity and P-time which was your original claim 
which you have been unable to back up.


Edgar


On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:11:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 23:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
>
> Quentin,
>
> Ah, at last a couple of meaningful questions!
>
>  Actually relativity does NOT explain how the twins can have different 
> clock times in the same present moment AND compare and agree on them in 
> spite of what you say. I'll explain why...
>
>
> Relativity perfectly explains it... it is simply because they compare 
> their proper time at the *same spacetime coordinate*. 
>
>
> Of course one can place a coordinate clock at their meeting place and that 
> can be used to define a standard time for the event of their meeting. But 
> that is just cheating because that clock simply ignores the real fact or 
> their real actual different ages. 
>
>
> WTF ?
>  
>
> It's operationally no different than one twin just resetting his clock to 
> the other's clock and them claiming that's somehow the REAL time. 
>
>
> 
>
> I leave it there, that's just another proof, if I needed one more, that 
> you just don't understand what you're talking about.
>
>  Quentin
>  
>
> It isn't, because it is completely arbitrary just like the coordinate 
> clock, and it ignores the real fact that their ACTUAL clocks which are 
> their ages are different. Basically it ignores the whole fact of the trip 
> which is what you claim it explains.
>
> P-time is different because it is not arbitrary. Instead it is an absolute 
> background to ALL relativistic events, and it is real and actual, because 
> all observers agree they are actually alive in a present moment because it 
> is the basic empirical observation of their existence, just as you and I 
> experience that. And as empirical observations are the basis of all 
> scientific knowledge the empirical observation of existing in a present 
> moment that we all have must also be accepted.
>
> And to answer your last question, yes there is an absolute simultaneity of 
> any two distant events in P-time. As I've explained to Jesse, and 
> demonstrated with numerous examples, the clock times that correlate to to 
> the same past P-times are not always directly observable, but they can 
> always be calculated if we have knowledge of the relativistic frames of any 
> two observers.
>
> I will be happy to respond further to any questions you may have
>
> Best,
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:45:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Just first, explain what p-time is supposed to solve in the first place 
> that relativity doesn't. (if you come back again with the possibility for 
> the twins to meet up, relativity doesn't need p-time for that, so you 
> should find a real problem p-time solve that relativity alone can't).
>
> Then answer the following:
>
> Is there an objective fact about the simultaneity of two distant event in 
> p-time ? Yes/No
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 19:11 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Quentin,
>
> Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your 
> contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains 
> unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part.
>
> Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your 
> original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it...
>
> Edgar
>
>  
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:59:10 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>  Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're 
> mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a 
> circus.
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Quentin,
>
> The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement 
> exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another 
> poster was using, rather than actual theory.
>
> Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a 
> very long time!
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> For your p
>
> ...

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Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-24 23:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

>
> Quentin,
>
> Ah, at last a couple of meaningful questions!
>
> Actually relativity does NOT explain how the twins can have different
> clock times in the same present moment AND compare and agree on them in
> spite of what you say. I'll explain why...
>

Relativity perfectly explains it... it is simply because they compare their
proper time at the *same spacetime coordinate*.

>
> Of course one can place a coordinate clock at their meeting place and that
> can be used to define a standard time for the event of their meeting. But
> that is just cheating because that clock simply ignores the real fact or
> their real actual different ages.
>

WTF ?


> It's operationally no different than one twin just resetting his clock to
> the other's clock and them claiming that's somehow the REAL time.
>



I leave it there, that's just another proof, if I needed one more, that you
just don't understand what you're talking about.

Quentin


> It isn't, because it is completely arbitrary just like the coordinate
> clock, and it ignores the real fact that their ACTUAL clocks which are
> their ages are different. Basically it ignores the whole fact of the trip
> which is what you claim it explains.
>
> P-time is different because it is not arbitrary. Instead it is an absolute
> background to ALL relativistic events, and it is real and actual, because
> all observers agree they are actually alive in a present moment because it
> is the basic empirical observation of their existence, just as you and I
> experience that. And as empirical observations are the basis of all
> scientific knowledge the empirical observation of existing in a present
> moment that we all have must also be accepted.
>
> And to answer your last question, yes there is an absolute simultaneity of
> any two distant events in P-time. As I've explained to Jesse, and
> demonstrated with numerous examples, the clock times that correlate to to
> the same past P-times are not always directly observable, but they can
> always be calculated if we have knowledge of the relativistic frames of any
> two observers.
>
> I will be happy to respond further to any questions you may have
>
> Best,
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:45:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Just first, explain what p-time is supposed to solve in the first place
>> that relativity doesn't. (if you come back again with the possibility for
>> the twins to meet up, relativity doesn't need p-time for that, so you
>> should find a real problem p-time solve that relativity alone can't).
>>
>> Then answer the following:
>>
>> Is there an objective fact about the simultaneity of two distant event in
>> p-time ? Yes/No
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 19:11 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your
>> contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains
>> unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part.
>>
>> Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your
>> original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it...
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:59:10 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>  Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're
>> mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a
>> circus.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement
>> exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another
>> poster was using, rather than actual theory.
>>
>> Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a
>> very long time!
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself:
>>
>> "If as you say, the ""same point in time" in relativity just MEANS that
>> two events are assigned the same time coordinate" then the twins are NOT
>> at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have
>> different time coordinates in their coordinate systems."
>>
>> if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t.
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :
>>
>> ahahah
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and
>> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried
>> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own
>> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>>
>> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe
>> it
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view
>> of p-time and 

Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Liz,

The point you are missing is that because time is clearly a 4th dimension, 
that does NOT mean that we have to somehow be at every point in our lives 
at once. That's as nutty as assuming we have to be at every point in space 
that we ever visited or will visit at once. Ooops, I forgot you DO believe 
that!

What I mean is that being at only ONE point in time, and only at ONE point 
in space at once is completely compatible with a 4 dimensional universe. So 
relativity does not imply or require a block universe as you imagine.

In fact relativity actually requires everything to be at one and only one 
point in both space and time, as I've pointed out on a number of occasions. 
Thus relativity itself FALSIFIES a block universe, not to mention the 
numerous intractable internal contradictions in block universe theory I've 
pointed out.

Thus block universe theory is NOT required by relativity, it is FALSIFIED 
by relativity.

Not understanding that doesn't make block universe theory right my dear!

Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 4:09:03 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> The point Edgar seems to be missing vis-a-vis block universes is that, 
> whether correct or not, they explain our experience of time. Otherwise 
> Einstein, Weyl, Minkowski etc would have dismissed the idea of space-time 
> out of hand, instead of embracing it as a replacement for the Newtonian 
> paradigm of space and time as separate dimensions (Newtonian physics also 
> posited a block universe, of course, but this was at the time merely an 
> ontological assumption - it took Special Relativity to produce testable 
> consequences).
>
> Not being able to grasp an idea, or not being able to correctly visualise 
> its implications, doesn't make it wrong.
>
>

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Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Ghibbsa,

I apologize, but I'm a little unsure as to what you are actually asking of 
me here, but I'll try to answer.

First P-time and relativity are NOT causally isolated. A proper 
interpretation of relativity actually implies the necessity of P-time. i've 
demonstrated why. Please read to my proximate reply to Quentin for an 
explanation of some of it.

So because they are causally connected, there could be an inconsistency, 
which would be fatal, but there isn't any such consistency that has arisen 
even after many have tried to find one.

Edgar

 

On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:48:10 PM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 5:14:20 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
>  
> Edgar
>
>  
> Well, I can put hand on heart I have no personal investment in your theory 
> being wrong. Or right. But more right than wrong because I do minimally 
> know you, so have that much surplus with me at least. 
>  
> But I have tried to gently point out some questions. They are big Edgar, 
> because the do impact on logic. That you are using. 
>  
> For example, nothing is inconsistent with anything, if it is laid in a 
> causally isolated layer directly beneath or above. Is there a necesseary 
> causal input from the perspective of Relativity in terms of P-time? Does 
> P-time have necessary implication within itself for a relativistic nature 
> that must occupy the level above. 
>  
> This is another way of restating what I raised with you. This time closer 
> teo the context you are using at this moment in your debate. The question 
> then becomes reversed as "how could it be possible for an inconsistency to 
> exist on these terms". Unleshs there's an answer, the relevance of this 
> consistency is about as much as the fact me lying here in my bath is 
> entirely consistent with the Planet Neptune
>  
> It's up to you what you do with issue. I won't push it. I don't know what 
> you most want to get out of this process. Maybe the issue isn't at all 
> helpful. I don't want to be the way,
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> To address one of your points.
>
> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
> falsified.
>
>  
> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
> to worry. 
>  
>
> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks 
> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise 
> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES 
> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it 
> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the 
> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed 
> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can 
> explain that.
>
> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all 
> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as 
> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By 
> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and 
> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>
> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>
> Edgar
>
>  
> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you 
> have a go at answering? 
>  
> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to 
> you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you 
> answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, 
> no bother either way  my end. 
>  
> I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do 
> things. It's certainly an idea to adm
>
> ...

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Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

Ah, at last a couple of meaningful questions!

Actually relativity does NOT explain how the twins can have different clock 
times in the same present moment AND compare and agree on them in spite of 
what you say. I'll explain why...

Of course one can place a coordinate clock at their meeting place and that 
can be used to define a standard time for the event of their meeting. But 
that is just cheating because that clock simply ignores the real fact or 
their real actual different ages. It's operationally no different than one 
twin just resetting his clock to the other's clock and them claiming that's 
somehow the REAL time. It isn't, because it is completely arbitrary just 
like the coordinate clock, and it ignores the real fact that their ACTUAL 
clocks which are their ages are different. Basically it ignores the whole 
fact of the trip which is what you claim it explains.

P-time is different because it is not arbitrary. Instead it is an absolute 
background to ALL relativistic events, and it is real and actual, because 
all observers agree they are actually alive in a present moment because it 
is the basic empirical observation of their existence, just as you and I 
experience that. And as empirical observations are the basis of all 
scientific knowledge the empirical observation of existing in a present 
moment that we all have must also be accepted.

And to answer your last question, yes there is an absolute simultaneity of 
any two distant events in P-time. As I've explained to Jesse, and 
demonstrated with numerous examples, the clock times that correlate to to 
the same past P-times are not always directly observable, but they can 
always be calculated if we have knowledge of the relativistic frames of any 
two observers.

I will be happy to respond further to any questions you may have

Best,
Edgar

On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:45:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Just first, explain what p-time is supposed to solve in the first place 
> that relativity doesn't. (if you come back again with the possibility for 
> the twins to meet up, relativity doesn't need p-time for that, so you 
> should find a real problem p-time solve that relativity alone can't).
>
> Then answer the following:
>
> Is there an objective fact about the simultaneity of two distant event in 
> p-time ? Yes/No
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 19:11 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
> Quentin,
>
> Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your 
> contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains 
> unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part.
>
> Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your 
> original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it...
>
> Edgar
>
>  
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:59:10 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're 
> mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a 
> circus.
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Quentin,
>
> The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement 
> exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another 
> poster was using, rather than actual theory.
>
> Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a 
> very long time!
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself:
>
> "If as you say, the ""same point in time" in relativity just MEANS that 
> two events are assigned the same time coordinate" then the twins are NOT 
> at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have 
> different time coordinates in their coordinate systems."
>
> if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t.
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :
>
> ahahah
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>  
> Quentin,
>
> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and 
> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried 
> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own 
> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>
> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe 
> it
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view 
> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still 
> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... 
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmai

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[LizR]

And a nice manifold of red wine. (After a few of those it may be "p-time"
of course...)


On 25 February 2014 11:06, LizR  wrote:

> On 25 February 2014 11:02,  wrote:
>
>>  Pasta with meatballs and the meat balls are higher dimensional energy
>> fields and the tomato sauce is the rolling tide of higgs singlets reacting
>> with all.
>>
>> And spaghetti for the strings, sprinkled with little qubits of pepper.
>
>

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 11:02,  wrote:

> Pasta with meatballs and the meat balls are higher dimensional energy
> fields and the tomato sauce is the rolling tide of higgs singlets reacting
> with all.
>
> And spaghetti for the strings, sprinkled with little qubits of pepper.

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Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[LizR]

On 24 February 2014 07:57, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> About [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B), let me ask you a more precise exercise.
>
>
>> Convince yourself that this formula is true in all worlds, of all Kripke
>> multiverses, with any illumination.
>> Hint: you might try a reductio ad absurdum. try to build a multiverse in
>> which that law would be violated.
>>
>
> [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B)
>
> OK. For a disconnected universe this is t -> (t -> t) or t -> t which is
> true.
>
> And for a Leibniz universe, I'm fairly sure this is also true.
>
> So that leaves {alpha R alpha} and {alpha R beta} and  so on, for any
> number of universes + relations.
>
> Maybe I can come back on this one.
>
>
> Sure. Me too. (I will myself be plausibly slowed down, as I have two weeks
> of teaching, take your time, just try to not forget what you learn, by
> having good summary, that you can read from time to time).
>

Well, does an illuminated Kripke universe effectively act as a Leibniz
universe? If so this is definitely true (OK I try to jump in quickly
here...)

>
> You do good work, but I am not sure if you have good notes. That is not
> grave, but not helpful to you.
>

Yes, I know - about the notes, I mean. (Maybe I just need to search the
list for []p to find some...)


> Never hesitate to ask for any definition or recall.
>
> Thank you, don't worry I will :)


> The modal logic part is not the real thing. The "real thing" will be the
> interview of universal and Löbian machines, and some modal logics will just
> sum up infinite conversations we can have with them, notably on predictions
> and physics.
>
> Yes, that is where it all happens! But I feel like I am quite a way from
that.

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[spudboy100]

Pasta with meatballs and the meat balls are higher dimensional energy fields 
and the tomato sauce is the rolling tide of higgs singlets reacting with all. 


-Original Message-
From: Quentin Anciaux 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Feb 24, 2014 12:57 pm
Subject: Re: CTM Attack and Redemption


I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated with 
pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state of the 
universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by 
definition even before we might know what all of those actual pastas are or 
exactly how they taste like.



However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one thing 
we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it 
always continues to output the current observable information state of the 
universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to falsifiability).


My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while 
yours does not.



Quentin





2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

Bruno,


As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes the 
actual information states of the observable universe. It is what computes what 
science observes and measures, whatever that may be.


Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical 
justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is no 
reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable universe.


My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the 
universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by 
definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations are 
or exactly how they work.


However we can say many things about my computational universe. For example, 
one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete 
because it always continues to output the current observable information state 
of the universe with no problems whatsoever.


My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect 
while yours does not.


Edgar


On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:




On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Craig,


I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer 
product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my 
computational reality.





But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. Does your 
computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) 
universal machine or numbers?


Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics 
capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a 
computation.




You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. 
If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be 
improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so 
p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes 
name of "comp").


Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.


Bruno









:-)












Edgar






On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,


Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?


Computational Theory of Mind. 

Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. 
Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I 
suspect that is neither.

Craig
 




Edgar


On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
This might be a more concise way of making my argument:

It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, 
mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered.

My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience 
with technological devices, is that "everything which is counted must first be 
encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that 

1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 
2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, 
nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be 
pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.

My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers 
encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of 
arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must 
encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an 
ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is 
not relevant to the machine?

Failing a satisfa

Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 01:57, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> MWI cannot be falsified in the Popperian sense because all scientific
> experiments are necessarily limited to one world. Yet MWI is central to
> asking the doctor. But there is no scientific experiment that verifies MWI.
>

Indeed, there is no experiment that verifies MWI (or anything else... :)

However a suggested falsification from Deutsch is if there is some limit to
how much information a quantum computer can handle. If it can handle 500
qubits then according to the MWI that is 2^500 universes being involved in
the calculation. Penrose would probably say that the superposition of 500
qubits would collapse the wavefunction (something to do with the difference
between superposed worlds exceeding some gravitational threshold, I
believe).

So that's a falsification test which may become technologically feasible at
some point.

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Re: Digital Neurology

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 05:53,  wrote:

> Now, 24 years later, there has been no improvement in our understanding,
> no progress whatsoever in these fundamental issues of consciousness. I
> think that I may actually have stumbled on the real improvement, but it's
> going to take a long time before people realize that computation is not the
> center of the universe.
>
> Craig
>

I would be interested to know what it is, if it can be explained simply
enough that a dummy like me can get what you're saying.

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[LizR]

2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>>
>> The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the
>> post he is responding to.
>>
>> For some reason my irony meter just exploded.

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[LizR]

On 25 February 2014 06:57, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect
> while yours does not.
>
> Tch. You've got a sauce.

PS bless your noodly appendages!

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Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:32:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological 
 changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what 
 you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question 
 of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?'
>>>
>>>
>>> But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can 
>>> we?
>>>
>>
>> Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress 
>> of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it 
>> works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. 
>> The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. 
>> Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very 
>> important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to 
>> anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they 
>> got into a projection on a screen.
>>
>
> Er, no I don't agree that it's like that at all, if I've managed to puzzle 
> out your drift. I wasn't asking "why primitive sense" because that's a 
> posit of your theory. I was asking how the desire to move your hand turns 
> into the neurological changes which move them in terms of that posit. 
>

The desire to move your hand doesn't 'turn into' anything. Think of your 
desire as an earthquake causing ripples in various parts of the world 
simultaneously, on all different scales. The molecules are changing 
polarity, the ion gates are closing, the neurons are firing, the muscle 
fibers are contracting, the arm is moving - they are all the same event, 
only expressed within different sized frames of 'here' and 'now'. 

Where there are neurons, there is no person. Where there is a person, there 
can be neurons in a figurative sense, derived through understanding and 
instrumental extension, but at the level of a personal experience, a 
'neuron' is *really* an ability to feel or touch something. I am saying 
that is the ontological reality of what it is. The neuron is an outsider's 
view which reveals details that the insider view cannot, but I suggest that 
the view which reconciles them both is metaphenomenal rather than 
meta-mechanical (arithmetic).
 

> How. This is a question whose answer must lie *within* the theory, hence 
> be derivable from it. I'm asking how your theory can frame these questions 
> in such a way that they are capable of being answered. Or are you implying 
> that the only right way to frame the problem is in such a way that no 
> questions of this kind can ever be answered?
>

Yes. There is no way to ask how you begin the chain of physical changes 
which moves your arm, or how you know how to do that. It is primitive. You 
can only experience it directly. A computation does not have that. It can 
never know how to initiate any physical or phenomenal change, any more than 
"a ripple" can initiate rippling in a lake.
 

>
>  
>>
>>>  The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same 
>>> question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a 
>>> theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might 
>>> experience translate to function? 
>>>
>>
>> It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks 
>> like a function from your distance.
>>
>
> Yes, but how or why does it look like that.? 
>

Because that's how sense organizes itself to invite opportunities for 
richer qualities of experience. Mathematics can show us precisely why the 
relations which are used in nature make that kind of sense, but it is 
meaningless outside of a context which is worth making sense of. Counting 
what can never be encountered is a moot point ontologically.
 

> That's what my question means. I think this is what Bruno is getting at 
> when he says that genuine problems should be invariant to the terms in 
> which they are described. I find that you have an unfortunate tendency to 
> assume that you have avoided the need to address a question just because 
> you change the words you use to describe it. I don't think that helps 
> either your understanding or your ability to convey it to me.
>

I don't avoid the need to address a question, I explain that the question 
is coming from somewhere that evaporates as soon as you accept the 
consequences of the original premise. How comes from sense, so it makes no 
sense to ask how sense makes itself.
 

>
> From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like 
>> mathematics.
>>  
>>
>>> Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can 
>>> this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is 
>>> unfai

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[LizR]

Bless your noddly appendages.


On 25 February 2014 06:57, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated
> with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state
> of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is
> correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual
> pastas are or exactly how they taste like.
>
> However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one
> thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete
> because it always continues to output the current observable information
> state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to
> falsifiability).
>
> My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect
> while yours does not.
>
> Quentin
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes
>> the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what
>> computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be.
>>
>> Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical
>> justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is
>> no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable
>> universe.
>>
>> My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the
>> universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by
>> definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations
>> are or exactly how they work.
>>
>> However we can say many things about my computational universe. For
>> example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and
>> logically complete because it always continues to output the current
>> observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever.
>>
>> My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this
>> respect while yours does not.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some
>>> consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it
>>> from my computational reality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. Does
>>> your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any
>>> (Turing) universal machine or numbers?
>>>
>>> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any
>>> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical
>>> implementation of a computation.
>>>
>>>
>>> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and
>>> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that
>>> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale
>>> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems
>>> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").
>>>
>>> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> :-)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?
>

 Computational Theory of Mind.

 Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree.
 Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when
 I suspect that is neither.

 Craig


>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
>>
>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the
>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are
>> encountered.
>>
>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as
>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is 
>> counted
>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that
>>
>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter,
>> and
>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic
>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be
>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.
>>
>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how
>> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the
>> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know 

Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating

[LizR]

Solar cells are getting cheaper and easier to use (e.g. flexible plastic
ones). It should be possible to stick them anywhere you want, e.g. on
buildings or cars. This would mean at least some solar power could be
harvested using existing infrastructure. As usual the technology is there,
or almost there, but this needs political or commercial will to achieve.

Personally I'd like to see a solar farm that uses the energy it receives
from the Sun to power machinery that sucks CO2 and water from the air and
turns them into petrol. (Then you really *could* run a 747 on solar power :)

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Re: Block Universes

[LizR]

The point Edgar seems to be missing vis-a-vis block universes is that,
whether correct or not, they explain our experience of time. Otherwise
Einstein, Weyl, Minkowski etc would have dismissed the idea of space-time
out of hand, instead of embracing it as a replacement for the Newtonian
paradigm of space and time as separate dimensions (Newtonian physics also
posited a block universe, of course, but this was at the time merely an
ontological assumption - it took Special Relativity to produce testable
consequences).

Not being able to grasp an idea, or not being able to correctly visualise
its implications, doesn't make it wrong.

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:11:47 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 20:24 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg 
> >:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg :
>>>
>>>

 On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:

> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why 
>> the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me 
>> here 
>> has been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the 
>> way 
>> that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the 
>> world 
>> was right?"
>
>
> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world 
> turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have 
> to 
> agree that you were wrong and the world was right?" 
>

 It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world 
 already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that 
 transcends consciousness and can duplicate it.
  

> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in 
> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any 
> significant 
> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective 
> consequences for the patient. 
>

 Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be 
 functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal 
 experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the 
 transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be 
 impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' 
 to 
 us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring 
 to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically.
  

> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. 
> Is that incorrect?  On that assumption, I asked you to consider, 
> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution 
> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, 
> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt?
>

 Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake 
 pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that 
 mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? 
 Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being 
 a 
 Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, 
 you 
 can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a 
 bit of modification without it being devalued significantly.


>>> So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a 
>>> functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will 
>>> be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is 
>>> changed... that's what you mean ?
>>>
>>> So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process 
>>> and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would 
>>> that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ?
>>>
>>
>> If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct 
>> tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct 
>> tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce?
>>
>
> Yes, if I  "can't tell them apart" then by definition I "can't tell them 
> apart"...
>
> You still didn't answer the question...
>

The answer is that one person not being able to tell them apart at some 
particular moment doesn't mean anything. 

I don't know how much clearer I can make it:
 













 

>
>> Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which 
>> can be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of 
>> bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself 
>> which conjures something to be contained. 
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>  
>>>
 Craig
  

>  
> David
>
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>

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 20:15,  wrote:

MHO the stage for bickering comes after a lot of this goes down.
> Prematurally, you've got a virtual cast iron guar antee, however long this
> runs, it's endings will the familiar territory, in line with all the other
> instances you participated with whoever to do the same before


I don't doubt it. Fortunately I seem to be close to running out of gas.

David

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Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological
>>> changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what
>>> you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question
>>> of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?'
>>
>>
>> But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can
>> we?
>>
>
> Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress
> of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it
> works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation.
> The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons.
> Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very
> important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to
> anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they
> got into a projection on a screen.
>

Er, no I don't agree that it's like that at all, if I've managed to puzzle
out your drift. I wasn't asking "why primitive sense" because that's a
posit of your theory. I was asking how the desire to move your hand turns
into the neurological changes which move them in terms of that posit. How.
This is a question whose answer must lie *within* the theory, hence be
derivable from it. I'm asking how your theory can frame these questions in
such a way that they are capable of being answered. Or are you implying
that the only right way to frame the problem is in such a way that no
questions of this kind can ever be answered?


>
>>  The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same
>> question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a
>> theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might
>> experience translate to function?
>>
>
> It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks
> like a function from your distance.
>

Yes, but how or why does it look like that.? That's what my question means.
I think this is what Bruno is getting at when he says that genuine problems
should be invariant to the terms in which they are described. I find that
you have an unfortunate tendency to assume that you have avoided the need
to address a question just because you change the words you use to describe
it. I don't think that helps either your understanding or your ability to
convey it to me.

>From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like
> mathematics.
>
>
>> Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this
>> be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is
>> unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is
>> precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally
>> sweep consciousness under the rug.
>>
>
> No, no, it's not unfair at all. I'm not ducking the question and saying
> 'we can't know the answer to this mystery because blah blah sacred
> ineffable', I am saying that the question cannot be asked because it can
> only be asked within sense to begin with. If you can ask what sense is,
> your asking is already a first hand demonstration of what it is. It can
> have no better description, nor could it ever require one. All that is
> required is for us to stop doubting what we already experience directly.
>

We cannot doubt it. Uniquely so, in fact.


>  We can doubt whether what we experience is this kind of an experience or
> that kind, whether it is more 'real' or more like a dream, but we cannot
> doubt that there is an experience in which there is a feeling of direct
> participation - a sense which includes the possibility of a sense of motive.
>

I agree. As indeed did Descartes.


>
>
>> But I have been under the strong impression that you see the
>> sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this
>> puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics.
>>
>
> Yes, I think it is the frame of the puzzle. If we start from sense, then
> every piece falls into place eventually. If we start from non-sense, then
> we can never find the piece of the puzzle which is the puzzle itself.
>

I understand that feeling and share it. It's very common (though curiously,
not universal) and perhaps it is not eliminable as long as we insist on
understanding the puzzle exclusively from within the frame of sense. I know
it seems as if once we step outside that frame, even conceptually, we can
never step back in. It seems impossible, like lifting oneself by one's own
bootstraps. But understanding the world in its fullness inevitably seems to
involve believing six impossible things before breakfast. This step is not
by any stretch the most impossible, especially if we can find ways of
accurately modelling the reference to s

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 7:55:35 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 19:02, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the 
 question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here 
 has 
 been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way 
 that 
 it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was 
 right?"
>>>
>>>
>>> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned 
>>> out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree 
>>> that you were wrong and the world was right?" 
>>>
>>
>> It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world 
>> already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that 
>> transcends consciousness and can duplicate it.
>>  
>>
>>> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in 
>>> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant 
>>> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective 
>>> consequences for the patient. 
>>>
>>
>> Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally 
>> substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of 
>> the patient,
>>
>
> OK, we're getting somewhere. Doesn't that imply that the function is 
> providing an adequate substitute for the "original" subjective components 
> it is emulating? 
>  
>
>>  but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal 
>> experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way.
>>
>
> Oops, I spoke too soon. Transpersonal and subpersonal experiences? You 
> seem to be saying something like "Let's be very careful about any such 
> substitution because although it may seem to make no ordinary sort of 
> personal difference to you or anyone else, to any arbitrary level of 
> detail, there may still be other non-ordinary types of personal differences 
> and the consequence of that will be ..." well, what?
>
> The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but 
>> it makes absolutely no difference
>>
>
> ... To your tenacious grip on your theory?
>  
>
>>  and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be 
>> generated mechanically.
>>
>
> How is it a Red Herring? You just conceded that an appropriate level of 
> functional substitution would make no difference to the subjective state of 
> the patient. 
>
>  
>>
>>> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is 
>>> that incorrect?  On that assumption, I asked you to consider, 
>>> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution 
>>> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, 
>>> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt?
>>>
>>
>> Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake 
>> pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, 
>>
>  does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and 
>> duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls 
>> stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts?
>>
>
> Hm..so if I had a piece of my brain substituted that made no subjective or 
> objective difference you might concede that I was still the original David 
> Nyman, just slightly foxed. However at what point would you say that too 
> much of me had been replaced and I was no longer acceptable as the 
> original, no matter how much I protested to the contrary? How much would be 
> too much?
>  
>
>> If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if 
>> you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it 
>> being devalued significantly. 
>>
>
> If your brain is constantly replaced atom by atom and molecule by 
> molecule, as indeed we are told it is, is it thereby any less your brain? 
> Ah, but your theory has it that this is merely the tip of an iceberg and 
> what is really occurring is an integral part of a never-ending story told 
> in entirely other terms. You know what? Every other theory has it that way 
> too, when you come to think of it. Stuff happens for deep and possibly 
> unfathomable reasons and it ain't about to tell us everything about itself.
>
> But despite this, we appear to be able to understand and intervene rather 
> effectively in the exterior form of such happenings and we try to explain 
> this ability, and its consequences, with the fewest possibly extraneous 
> assumptions. And as far as I can see the idea that any fundamental 
> distinction between copy and original is germane to any such explanation is 
> extraneous to the nth degree. Indeed the most effective explanations we 
> 

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-24 20:24 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg :

>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg :
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
 On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

 No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why
> the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me 
> here
> has been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way
> that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world
> was right?"


 You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world
 turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to
 agree that you were wrong and the world was right?"

>>>
>>> It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world
>>> already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that
>>> transcends consciousness and can duplicate it.
>>>
>>>
 IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in
 principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant
 part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective
 consequences for the patient.

>>>
>>> Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be
>>> functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal
>>> experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the
>>> transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be
>>> impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to
>>> us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring
>>> to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically.
>>>
>>>
 In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is
 that incorrect?  On that assumption, I asked you to consider,
 hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution
 without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur,
 wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt?

>>>
>>> Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake
>>> pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that
>>> mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape?
>>> Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a
>>> Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you
>>> can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a
>>> bit of modification without it being devalued significantly.
>>>
>>>
>> So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a
>> functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will
>> be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is
>> changed... that's what you mean ?
>>
>> So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process
>> and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would
>> that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ?
>>
>
> If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct
> tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct
> tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce?
>

Yes, if I  "can't tell them apart" then by definition I "can't tell them
apart"...

You still didn't answer the question...

>
> Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which
> can be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of
> bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself
> which conjures something to be contained.
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>

 David

>>>  --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>>>
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
>> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_ou

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 19:02, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the
>>> question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has
>>> been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way that
>>> it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was
>>> right?"
>>
>>
>> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned
>> out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree
>> that you were wrong and the world was right?"
>>
>
> It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world
> already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that
> transcends consciousness and can duplicate it.
>
>
>> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in
>> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant
>> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective
>> consequences for the patient.
>>
>
> Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally
> substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of
> the patient,
>

OK, we're getting somewhere. Doesn't that imply that the function is
providing an adequate substitute for the "original" subjective components
it is emulating?


>  but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal
> experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way.
>

Oops, I spoke too soon. Transpersonal and subpersonal experiences? You seem
to be saying something like "Let's be very careful about any such
substitution because although it may seem to make no ordinary sort of
personal difference to you or anyone else, to any arbitrary level of
detail, there may still be other non-ordinary types of personal differences
and the consequence of that will be ..." well, what?

The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it
> makes absolutely no difference
>

... To your tenacious grip on your theory?


>  and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be
> generated mechanically.
>

How is it a Red Herring? You just conceded that an appropriate level of
functional substitution would make no difference to the subjective state of
the patient.


>
>> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is
>> that incorrect?  On that assumption, I asked you to consider,
>> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution
>> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur,
>> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt?
>>
>
> Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal
> on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape,
>
 does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and
> duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls
> stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts?
>

Hm..so if I had a piece of my brain substituted that made no subjective or
objective difference you might concede that I was still the original David
Nyman, just slightly foxed. However at what point would you say that too
much of me had been replaced and I was no longer acceptable as the
original, no matter how much I protested to the contrary? How much would be
too much?


> If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you
> start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being
> devalued significantly.
>

If your brain is constantly replaced atom by atom and molecule by molecule,
as indeed we are told it is, is it thereby any less your brain? Ah, but
your theory has it that this is merely the tip of an iceberg and what is
really occurring is an integral part of a never-ending story told in
entirely other terms. You know what? Every other theory has it that way
too, when you come to think of it. Stuff happens for deep and possibly
unfathomable reasons and it ain't about to tell us everything about itself.

But despite this, we appear to be able to understand and intervene rather
effectively in the exterior form of such happenings and we try to explain
this ability, and its consequences, with the fewest possibly extraneous
assumptions. And as far as I can see the idea that any fundamental
distinction between copy and original is germane to any such explanation is
extraneous to the nth degree. Indeed the most effective explanations we
have developed to date appear to contradict it directly both in principle
and in practice. For good measure, I am still unable to fathom what
necessary connection it has with the problems of consciousness. But I guess
I'm probably just missing the point as usual.

David

>  --
> You received this 

Re: Block Universes

[Jesse Mazer]

On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 7:24 AM, Edgar L. Owen  wrote:

> Jesse,
>
> Let me make sure I understand what you are saying.
>
> You say we can drop an arbitrary coordinate system onto spacetime, and
> then we can place an originally synchronized clock at every grid
> intersection. Is that correct?
>

It depends whether we are talking about inertial frames or arbitrary
non-inertial coordinate systems. In non-inertial coordinate systems, the
only requirement is that the coordinate be "smooth"--no sudden
discontinuities in the coordinates assigned to infinitesimally-close points
in spacetime. Beyond that, not only are you free to drop an
arbitrarily-shaped rubbery coordinate "grid" with clocks at each
intersection, but you're also free to define "synchronization" any way you
want, you don't need to follow any standard procedure for deciding what
point on each clock's worldline is the one where it be set to read zero,
you can do this any way you like (again provided that the resulting
simultaneity surfaces are smooth, with no discontinuous "jumps"). And
there's also no requirement that the coordinate clock times actually
correspond to the proper times along their worldline--you could have a
coordinate clock that was designed to alternately run faster or slower than
a normal clock moving right alongside them, for example.

But the example I gave with Alice/Bob/Arlene/Bart involved an inertial
coordinate system, not any non-inertial ones. In this case the rules for
constructing a coordinate system are more strict--you have to use a
Cartesian grid of straight rulers that are all inertial and at rest
relative to one another, and then you have to use the "Einstein
synchronization convention" to define what it means for clocks at different
grid intersections to be synchronized with one another--the most common
definition of this convention is that if you send a light signal from clock
A when it reads tA1, it reflects off clock B when it reads tB, and the
reflected light returns back to clock A when it reads tA2, then tB should
be exactly halfway between tA1 and tA2 (i.e. tB = (tA2 - tA1)/2 ). Another
equivalent definition is that if you set off a flash of light from a ruler
marking that's exactly halfway between the markings that A and B are
attached to, then both clocks should show the same reading when the light
from the flash reaches them. The Einstein synchronization convention
ensures that each inertial frame will measure the speed of light to be the
same in all directions.



>
> And that those clocks read what is called the coordinate times of those
> grid intersections, and this gives us in some sense a measure of the actual
> time coordinate of that spatial coordinate?
>

Yes, or more specifically they give a time coordinate for any EVENT that
happens at a given spatial coordinate. For example, if a firework goes off
at position x,y,z, then the time coordinate of the firework exploding would
be defined by the reading t on the coordinate clock at x,y,z as the
firework was exploding right next to it (so a photo of this location at
that moment would show both the exploding firework and the clock there
reading t).


>
> One clarification before I agree. The clocks on this grid that are in
> gravitational fields will be running slower than the clocks that are not?
> And we can compare the clocks across the grid to determine which are
> running slower and which faster? Is that correctly part of the model?
>


In the case of inertial frames, these spacetimes are defined only in the
flat spacetime of special relativity, where there is no gravity (since
gravity involves spacetime curvature). In the real world there may be no
perfectly flat regions of spacetime, but many regions in space that are
limited in spatial and temporal extent may be extremely good approximations
to flat spacetime.

In general relativity where spacetime is curved, there isn't really any
objective coordinate-independent way to compare the rates of clocks at
different points in space, all you can do is compare how fast each clock is
ticking relative to coordinate time in some coordinate system (and as I
said above, the rate of coordinate clocks in arbitrary non-inertial
coordinate systems can in principle be anything, although of course you're
free to construct a coordinate system where coordinate time at each grid
intersection does actually correspond to proper time of a clock at that
intersection). I discussed the problem of defining the relative rate of
different clocks in GR in the second half of my post at
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/jFX-wTm_E_Q/SX19ccLeij0J(starting
with the paragraph that begins "Not
a well-defined assumption.")


>
> If so I agree. It's my understanding of relativity theory, and my theory
> starts by accepting every part of relativity theory and adding to it rather
> than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with
> relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified.
>

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg 
> >:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the 
 question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here 
 has 
 been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way 
 that 
 it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was 
 right?"
>>>
>>>
>>> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned 
>>> out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree 
>>> that you were wrong and the world was right?" 
>>>
>>
>> It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world 
>> already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that 
>> transcends consciousness and can duplicate it.
>>  
>>
>>> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in 
>>> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant 
>>> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective 
>>> consequences for the patient. 
>>>
>>
>> Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally 
>> substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of 
>> the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and 
>> subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some 
>> way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, 
>> but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question 
>> of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically.
>>  
>>
>>> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is 
>>> that incorrect?  On that assumption, I asked you to consider, 
>>> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution 
>>> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, 
>>> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt?
>>>
>>
>> Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake 
>> pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that 
>> mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? 
>> Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a 
>> Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you 
>> can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a 
>> bit of modification without it being devalued significantly.
>>
>>
> So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a 
> functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will 
> be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is 
> changed... that's what you mean ?
>
> So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process 
> and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would 
> that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ?
>

If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct 
tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct 
tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce?

Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which can 
be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of 
bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself 
which conjures something to be contained. 

Craig
 

>
> Quentin
>  
>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>  
>>> David
>>>
>>  -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com
>> .
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>
>
>
>
> -- 
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy 
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
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to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:21:59 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> This seems crazy to me at least, as it seems to assume that reality was 
> somehow created so people could "appreciate it and participate in it".
>

That would be crazy, but no, you are forgetting that nothing that I am 
talking about applies in any way to people. The hypothesis is about the 
relation of sense-motive, form-function, and matter-energy. No biology or 
human life is necessary.


> To me that seems a few orders of magnitude less likely than e.g. P-time!
>
> I would turn this around and say that humans were created of the same 
> logical structure as a pre-existing human independent universe, and that is 
> why they CAN appreciate and participate. That, to my mind, is a much more 
> logical approach.
>

Obviously, sure. That's not what I mean though. I'm looking at 'logical 
structure' as being a meaningless term in the absence of some appreciation 
of logical form and participation in logical function. Logic has to make 
sense, but sense does not have to make logic or come from logic.
 

>
> And the fact that GR may be counter intuitive certainly does NOT imply any 
> other counter intuitive theory is somehow correct. I'm sure you'd agree 
> with that.
>

It doesn't imply any particular counter intuitive theory is correct, but it 
proves that being counter-intuitive is not a strike against it. To the 
contrary, counter-intuitive can sometimes be an indication of accessing a 
deeper and more far reaching level of sense making.
 

>
> And I'm surprised you consider GEOcentric astronomy somehow "ordinary 
> thinking". Perhaps you are still stuck in one of your block universe 
> incarnations from the early Middle Ages?
>

Geocentric astronomy was the ordinary thinking for most of human history, 
was it not? If it weren't for some counter-intuitive theories, it still 
would be the norm.

Craig
 

>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:52:17 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 10:56:08 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> It's hard to understand how your view is self consistent. You still seem 
>>> to be assuming some unstated observer, which you deny, by claiming pattern 
>>> recognition, aesthetics, appreciation, participation must somehow precede 
>>> any ontological formulation. These are all aspects of how mind views 
>>> reality, rather than fundamental reality itself.
>>>
>>
>> You are assuming that reality is something other than an aesthetic 
>> quality which is appreciated and participated in. They are no just aspects 
>> of how mind views reality, they are what creates the possibility of 
>> 'aspects' and 'views' to begin with. Forget about fundamental reality. 
>> Realism is a measure of correspondence among fictions. Reality is the 
>> subset of sense which records experience and organizes those records.
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> For me at least, you need to clarify your thesis and try to state the 
>>> whole more simply and completely. As it is it seems fragmentary and 
>>> inconsistent, or at least backwards to ordinary thinking...
>>>
>>
>> It is backwards to ordinary thinking, yes - like Heliocentric astronomy, 
>> general relativity, etc.
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:08:52 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> How do you define "experiential phenomena" without invoking an 
> observer to experience them? 
>

 The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic 
 phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a 
 particular 
 kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of 
 that 
 experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from 
 behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself.
  

> Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to 
> experience it?
>

 No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it 
 ambiguous. All experiences may have some degree of distinction between 
 interior and exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might 
 constellate into a more formal narrative of observation.
  

>
> In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational 
> alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up 
> the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in 
> terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological 
> EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which 
> constitutes the universe.
>
> But I suspect your definition is something quite different?
>

 Actually not so different, except that by using informat

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Quentin Anciaux]

2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg :

>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the
>>> question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has
>>> been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way that
>>> it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was
>>> right?"
>>
>>
>> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned
>> out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree
>> that you were wrong and the world was right?"
>>
>
> It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world
> already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that
> transcends consciousness and can duplicate it.
>
>
>> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in
>> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant
>> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective
>> consequences for the patient.
>>
>
> Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally
> substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of
> the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and
> subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some
> way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally,
> but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question
> of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically.
>
>
>> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is
>> that incorrect?  On that assumption, I asked you to consider,
>> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution
>> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur,
>> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt?
>>
>
> Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal
> on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that
> a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it
> mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls
> if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you can
> never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of
> modification without it being devalued significantly.
>
>
So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a
functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will
be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is
changed... that's what you mean ?

So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process
and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would
that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ?

Quentin


> Craig
>
>
>>
>> David
>>
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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
> No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the 
>> question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has 
>> been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way that 
>> it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was 
>> right?"
>
>
> You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned 
> out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree 
> that you were wrong and the world was right?" 
>

It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world 
already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that 
transcends consciousness and can duplicate it.
 

> IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in 
> principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant 
> part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective 
> consequences for the patient. 
>

Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally 
substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of 
the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and 
subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some 
way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, 
but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question 
of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically.
 

> In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is 
> that incorrect?  On that assumption, I asked you to consider, 
> hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution 
> without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, 
> wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt?
>

Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal 
on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that 
a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it 
mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls 
if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you can 
never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of 
modification without it being devalued significantly.

Craig
 

>
> David
>

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Re: Block Universes

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 5:14:20 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
> Edgar
>
 
Well, I can put hand on heart I have no personal investment in your theory 
being wrong. Or right. But more right than wrong because I do minimally 
know you, so have that much surplus with me at least. 
 
But I have tried to gently point out some questions. They are big Edgar, 
because the do impact on logic. That you are using. 
 
For example, nothing is inconsistent with anything, if it is laid in a 
causally isolated layer directly beneath or above. Is there a necesseary 
causal input from the perspective of Relativity in terms of P-time? Does 
P-time have necessary implication within itself for a relativistic nature 
that must occupy the level above. 
 
This is another way of restating what I raised with you. This time closer 
teo the context you are using at this moment in your debate. The question 
then becomes reversed as "how could it be possible for an inconsistency to 
exist on these terms". Unleshs there's an answer, the relevance of this 
consistency is about as much as the fact me lying here in my bath is 
entirely consistent with the Planet Neptune
 
It's up to you what you do with issue. I won't push it. I don't know what 
you most want to get out of this process. Maybe the issue isn't at all 
helpful. I don't want to be the way, 

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Re: Block Universes

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 5:14:20 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
>  
> Edgar
>
 
Well, I can put hand on heart I have no personal investment in your theory 
being wrong. Or right. But more right than wrong because I do minimally 
know you, so have that much surplus with me at least. 
 
But I have tried to gently point out some questions. They are big Edgar, 
because the do impact on logic. That you are using. 
 
For example, nothing is inconsistent with anything, if it is laid in a 
causally isolated layer directly beneath or above. Is there a necesseary 
causal input from the perspective of Relativity in terms of P-time? Does 
P-time have necessary implication within itself for a relativistic nature 
that must occupy the level above. 
 
This is another way of restating what I raised with you. This time closer 
teo the context you are using at this moment in your debate. The question 
then becomes reversed as "how could it be possible for an inconsistency to 
exist on these terms". Unleshs there's an answer, the relevance of this 
consistency is about as much as the fact me lying here in my bath is 
entirely consistent with the Planet Neptune
 
It's up to you what you do with issue. I won't push it. I don't know what 
you most want to get out of this process. Maybe the issue isn't at all 
helpful. I don't want to be the way,

>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Ghibbsa,
>>>
>>> To address one of your points.
>>>
>>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
>>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
>>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
>>> falsified.
>>>
>>  
>> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
>> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
>> to worry. 
>>  
>>
>>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
>>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
>>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks 
> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise 
> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES 
> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it 
> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the 
> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed 
> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can 
> explain that.
>
> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it 
> all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other 
> mysteries 
> as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum 
> events. 
> By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and 
> QT, 
> and explains the source of quantum randomness.
>
> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>
> Edgar
>
  
 Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't 
 you have a go at answering? 
  
 I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put 
 to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe 
 you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to 
 do, no bother either way  my end. 
  
 I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do 
 things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to 
 aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? 
 How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as 
 possible, 
 involving the least reflection of yourself? 
  
 For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of 
 discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?
  
 Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I 
 asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that 
 back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then 
 did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays 
 and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute 
 scale, 
>

Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

Just first, explain what p-time is supposed to solve in the first place
that relativity doesn't. (if you come back again with the possibility for
the twins to meet up, relativity doesn't need p-time for that, so you
should find a real problem p-time solve that relativity alone can't).

Then answer the following:

Is there an objective fact about the simultaneity of two distant event in
p-time ? Yes/No

Quentin


2014-02-24 19:11 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>
> Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your
> contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains
> unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part.
>
> Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your
> original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it...
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:59:10 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're
>> mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a
>> circus.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement
>> exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another
>> poster was using, rather than actual theory.
>>
>> Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a
>> very long time!
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself:
>>
>> "If as you say, the ""same point in time" in relativity just MEANS that
>> two events are assigned the same time coordinate" then the twins are NOT
>> at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have
>> different time coordinates in their coordinate systems."
>>
>> if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t.
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :
>>
>> ahahah
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and
>> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried
>> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own
>> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>>
>> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe
>> it
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view
>> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still
>> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate...
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with
>> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way
>> that it is.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> To address one of your points.
>>
>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and
>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is
>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory
>> falsified.
>>
>>
>> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and
>> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not
>> to worry.
>>
>>
>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a
>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly
>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen
>> wrote: To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
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>



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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating

[John Clark]

On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 2:25 PM, Chris de Morsella wrote:

 > There are many reasons why nuclear power is dead in the water.
>

I think the main reason is that reactors got too big too fast and their
design has been frozen for nearly half a century. They found a nuclear
reactor design that worked well in submarines and figured if they just
scaled it up a few hundred times it would work well in commercial power
plants too, but it didn't work out quite that way. Freeman Dyson said the
real problem is that reactor design isn't fun anymore because nobody is
allowed to build even a small one if it is significantly (or even slightly)
different from what has already been built, so the most creative people go
into areas other than nuclear power.

>the sector would have never existed without massive government subsidies
>

Neither would wind farms or big solar energy power plants. And what do you
make of the government putting a huge tariff on Chinese solar cells to
protect domestic producers which makes photovoltaics much more expensive in
the USA?

> the lead time to bring working LFTR reactors to market and to build out
> enough of them to begin to make an impact on the global (or some important
> regional) energy market is long and should be measured in decades at least.
> Decades from today is as soon as the first LFTRs could begin to come online.
>

That would certainly be true if there is no sense of urgency to get the job
done, but we got to the moon in less than 9 years once we decided we really
really wanted to go there. There is no scientific reason it would take
decades to get a LFTR online, but there are political reasons.

> Decades from today is as soon as the first LFTRs could begin to come
> online. By that time - they will need to compete with solar PV and the per
> unit costs for PV that are achieved over the next two or three decades.
>

Finding a good inexpensive solar cell is not enough, even more important is
finding a cheap and reliable way to store vast amounts of electrical
energy. And because solar energy is so dilute environmentalists will whine
about the huge amounts of land required. And some applications are just not
going to work, you'll never see a solar powered 747 or fighter jet.

> The reason they are not getting built has less to do with political
> activists and a more to do with the negative economic profile
>

James Hansen is one of the world's leading environmentalists and has done
more to raise the alarm about climate change than anybody else, he started
to do so in 1988. Hansen has recently changed his mind and is now in favor
of nuclear power because he figures it causes less environmental impact
than anything else, or at least anything else that wasn't moonbeams and
could actually make a dent in satiating the worldwide energy demand.

  John K Clark

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 17:41, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

Yes, it would be possible to have part of your brain removed and not be
> aware of any difference also - my point though is, 'so what?' You can be
> dead and not know the difference either, presumably.


Are you making some distinction here between noticing a difference and
there being a difference?  Help me out a little, Craig. Ambiguity may be
satisfying in some contexts, but it isn't working for me here.

David

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

Again you confirm my contention, and confirm your inability to state any 
inconsistency between P-time and relativity whatsoever.

You can blubber forever and that will remain the same...

Edgar

On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:05:01 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> blablabla... genius.
>
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the 
>> post he is responding to.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated 
>>> with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state 
>>> of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is 
>>> correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual 
>>> pastas are or exactly how they taste like.
>>>
>>> However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one 
>>> thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete 
>>> because it always continues to output the current observable information 
>>> state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to 
>>> falsifiability).
>>>
>>> My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect 
>>> while yours does not.
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>>
>>> Bruno,

 As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what 
 computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is 
 what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be.

 Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical 
 justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there 
 is 
 no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable 
 universe.

 My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of 
 the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is 
 correct 
 by definition even before we might know what all of those actual 
 computations are or exactly how they work.

 However we can say many things about my computational universe. For 
 example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and 
 logically complete because it always continues to output the current 
 observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever.

 My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this 
 respect while yours does not.

 Edgar


 On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some 
> consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it 
> from my computational reality.
>
>
>
> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. 
> Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or 
> any 
> (Turing) universal machine or numbers?
>
> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any 
> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical 
> implementation of a computation.
>
>
> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 
> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that 
> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale 
> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it 
> seems 
> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").
>
> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> :-)
>
>
>
>
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?
>>>
>>
>> Computational Theory of Mind. 
>>
>> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I 
>> agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and 
>> natural, when I suspect that is neither.
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 This might be a more concise way of making my argument:

 It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe 
 the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations 
 are 
 encountered.

 My hypothesis, d

Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your 
contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains 
unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part.

Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your 
original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it...

Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:59:10 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're 
> mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a 
> circus.
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
> Quentin,
>
> The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement 
> exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another 
> poster was using, rather than actual theory.
>
> Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a 
> very long time!
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself:
>
> "If as you say, the ""same point in time" in relativity just MEANS that 
> two events are assigned the same time coordinate" then the twins are NOT 
> at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have 
> different time coordinates in their coordinate systems."
>
> if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t.
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :
>
> ahahah
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>  
> Quentin,
>
> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and 
> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried 
> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own 
> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>
> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe 
> it
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view 
> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still 
> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... 
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> To address one of your points.
>
> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
> falsified.
>
>  
> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
> to worry. 
>  
>
> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen 
> wrote:http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the
> question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has
> been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way that
> it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was
> right?"


You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like "If the world turned
out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree
that you were wrong and the world was right?" IOW I thought I was asking a
question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a
definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be
functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient.
In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is
that incorrect?  On that assumption, I asked you to consider,
hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution
without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur,
wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt?

David

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Quentin Anciaux]

blablabla... genius.




2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>
> The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the
> post he is responding to.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated
>> with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state
>> of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is
>> correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual
>> pastas are or exactly how they taste like.
>>
>> However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one
>> thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete
>> because it always continues to output the current observable information
>> state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to
>> falsifiability).
>>
>> My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect
>> while yours does not.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Bruno,
>>>
>>> As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes
>>> the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what
>>> computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be.
>>>
>>> Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical
>>> justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is
>>> no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable
>>> universe.
>>>
>>> My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the
>>> universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by
>>> definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations
>>> are or exactly how they work.
>>>
>>> However we can say many things about my computational universe. For
>>> example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and
>>> logically complete because it always continues to output the current
>>> observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever.
>>>
>>> My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this
>>> respect while yours does not.
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>

 On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Craig,

 I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some
 consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it
 from my computational reality.



 But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term.
 Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any
 (Turing) universal machine or numbers?

 Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any
 mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical
 implementation of a computation.


 You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and
 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that
 artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale
 different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems
 to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").

 Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.

 Bruno




 :-)





 Edgar




 On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?
>>
>
> Computational Theory of Mind.
>
> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree.
> Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, 
> when
> I suspect that is neither.
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
>>>
>>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the
>>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are
>>> encountered.
>>>
>>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as
>>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is 
>>> counted
>>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that
>>>
>>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter,
>>> and
>>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic
>>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
>>> 3. In consideration of 

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:38:40 AM UTC, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:22:36 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 23 February 2014 19:55, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:35:33 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
 On 23 February 2014 14:55, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
>
> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the 
> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are 
> encountered.
>
> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as 
> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is 
> counted 
> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that 
>
> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, 
> and 
> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic 
> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be 
> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.
>
> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how 
> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the 
> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual 
> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware 
> substrate, 
> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself 
> from data which is not relevant to the machine?
>
> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind 
> computation, I conclude that:
>
> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical 
> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical 
> inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii 
> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level 
> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental 
> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and 
> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy 
> directly.
> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical 
> explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom.
> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can 
> be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the 
> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 
> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, 
> rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP 
> as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, 
> theoretical platform of sense.
>

 I'm beginning to get the impression in points 9 and 10 that you are 
 wavering a little in your blanket rejection of CTM. 

>>>
>>> No, I've always held that the contents of CTM are still redeemable if we 
>>> turn them inside out.
>>>  
>>>
 My contention is that CTM  already "rehabilitates" and "redeems" its 
 mathematical science in the sense you suggest as a consequence of its 
 explicit reliance on the invariance of consciousness to some assumed level 
 of functional substitutability. 

>>>
>>> That's not the sense that I suggest. I'm claiming that CTM can only be 
>>> rehabilitated by recognizing that function can never be a substitute for 
>>> consciousness, and that in fact all functions supervene on more primitive 
>>> levels of sensitivity.
>>>  
>>>
 This already entails that CTM - as must be true of any theory that 
 doesn't effectively junk the whole notion as supernumerary - incorporates 
 consciousness into its schema as a transcendentally original assumption 
 *at 
 the outset*. Hence it eludes the jaws of petito principii by seeking not 
 to 
 *explain* but to *exploit* this assumption, at the appropriately justified 
 level of explanation.

>>>
>>> Then it is not a theory of mind, it is a theory of mental elaboration - 
>>> which I am not opposed to, as long as mental elaboration is not conflated 
>>> with additional capacities of sensation. We can, for instance, look through 
>>> a camera which will transduce infra-red radiation to a visible color 
>>> (usually phosphor green or black-body-like spectrum). CTM could be used, 
>>> IMO, to develop this kind of transduced extension of sense, but it cannot 
>>> be used to provide additional visual sense (like being able to actually

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the 
post he is responding to.

Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated 
> with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state 
> of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is 
> correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual 
> pastas are or exactly how they taste like.
>
> However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one 
> thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete 
> because it always continues to output the current observable information 
> state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to 
> falsifiability).
>
> My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect 
> while yours does not.
>
> Quentin
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes 
>> the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what 
>> computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be.
>>
>> Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical 
>> justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is 
>> no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable 
>> universe.
>>
>> My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the 
>> universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by 
>> definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations 
>> are or exactly how they work.
>>
>> However we can say many things about my computational universe. For 
>> example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and 
>> logically complete because it always continues to output the current 
>> observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever.
>>
>> My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this 
>> respect while yours does not.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some 
>>> consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it 
>>> from my computational reality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. Does 
>>> your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any 
>>> (Turing) universal machine or numbers?
>>>
>>> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any 
>>> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical 
>>> implementation of a computation.
>>>
>>>
>>> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 
>>> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that 
>>> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale 
>>> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems 
>>> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").
>>>
>>> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> :-)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?
>

 Computational Theory of Mind. 

 Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. 
 Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, 
 when 
 I suspect that is neither.

 Craig
  

>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
>>
>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the 
>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are 
>> encountered.
>>
>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as 
>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is 
>> counted 
>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that 
>>
>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, 
>> and 
>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic 
>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be 
>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.
>>
>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functi

Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

écris donc en français et on en discute...


2014-02-24 18:58 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>
> Certainly you clearly CAN'T understand very much of anything, certainly
> not my theory. You demonstrate your lack of comprehension by being unable
> to even spell "misunderstood" correctly!
> :-)
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:53:12 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Yeah yeah... you're a misundestood genius... poor guy.
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> As I expected you can't show us anything to make your point, and just
>> revert to hot air...
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:39:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> ahahah
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and
>> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried
>> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own
>> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>>
>> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe
>> it
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view
>> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still
>> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate...
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with
>> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way
>> that it is.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> To address one of your points.
>>
>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and
>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is
>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory
>> falsified.
>>
>>
>> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and
>> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not
>> to worry.
>>
>>
>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a
>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly
>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks
>> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise
>> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES
>> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it
>> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the
>> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed
>> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can
>> explain that.
>>
>> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all
>> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as
>> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By
>> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and
>> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>>
>> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you
>> have a go at answering?
>>
>> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to
>> you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you
>> answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do,
>> no bother either way  my end.
>>
>> I've seen you reference that piece
>>
>> ...
>
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-- 
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Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're
mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a
circus.

Quentin


2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>
> The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement
> exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another
> poster was using, rather than actual theory.
>
> Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a
> very long time!
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself:
>>
>> "If as you say, the ""same point in time" in relativity just MEANS that
>> two events are assigned the same time coordinate" then the twins are NOT
>> at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have
>> different time coordinates in their coordinate systems."
>>
>> if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t.
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :
>>
>> ahahah
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and
>> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried
>> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own
>> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>>
>> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe
>> it
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view
>> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still
>> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate...
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with
>> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way
>> that it is.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> To address one of your points.
>>
>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and
>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is
>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory
>> falsified.
>>
>>
>> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and
>> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not
>> to worry.
>>
>>
>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a
>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly
>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks
>> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise
>> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES
>> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it
>> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the
>> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed
>> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can
>> explain that.
>>
>> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all
>> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as
>> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By
>> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and
>> explains the source of quantum randomn
>>
>> ...
>
>  --
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-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

Certainly you clearly CAN'T understand very much of anything, certainly not 
my theory. You demonstrate your lack of comprehension by being unable to 
even spell "misunderstood" correctly!
:-)

Edgar

On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:53:12 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Yeah yeah... you're a misundestood genius... poor guy.
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
> Quentin,
>
> As I expected you can't show us anything to make your point, and just 
> revert to hot air...
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:39:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> ahahah
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Quentin,
>
> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and 
> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried 
> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own 
> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>
> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe 
> it
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view 
> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still 
> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... 
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> To address one of your points.
>
> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
> falsified.
>
>  
> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
> to worry. 
>  
>
> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks 
> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise 
> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES 
> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it 
> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the 
> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed 
> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can 
> explain that.
>
> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all 
> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as 
> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By 
> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and 
> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>
> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>
> Edgar
>
>  
> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you 
> have a go at answering? 
>  
> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to 
> you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you 
> answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, 
> no bother either way  my end. 
>  
> I've seen you reference that piece 
>
> ...

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Quentin Anciaux]

I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated with
pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state of the
universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by
definition even before we might know what all of those actual pastas are or
exactly how they taste like.

However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one
thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete
because it always continues to output the current observable information
state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to
falsifiability).

My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect
while yours does not.

Quentin



2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Bruno,
>
> As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes
> the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what
> computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be.
>
> Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical
> justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is
> no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable
> universe.
>
> My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the
> universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by
> definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations
> are or exactly how they work.
>
> However we can say many things about my computational universe. For
> example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and
> logically complete because it always continues to output the current
> observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever.
>
> My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this
> respect while yours does not.
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some
>> consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it
>> from my computational reality.
>>
>>
>>
>> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. Does
>> your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any
>> (Turing) universal machine or numbers?
>>
>> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any
>> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical
>> implementation of a computation.
>>
>>
>> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and
>> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that
>> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale
>> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems
>> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").
>>
>> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> :-)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Craig,

 Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?

>>>
>>> Computational Theory of Mind.
>>>
>>> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree.
>>> Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when
>>> I suspect that is neither.
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>

 Edgar


 On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
>
> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the
> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are
> encountered.
>
> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as
> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is 
> counted
> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that
>
> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter,
> and
> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic
> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be
> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.
>
> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how
> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the
> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual
> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware 
> substrate,
> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself
> from data which is not relevant to the machine?
>

Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement 
exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another 
poster was using, rather than actual theory.

Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a 
very long time!

Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself:
>
> "If as you say, the ""same point in time" in relativity just MEANS that 
> two events are assigned the same time coordinate" then the twins are NOT 
> at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have 
> different time coordinates in their coordinate systems."
>
> if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t.
>
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux 
> >:
>
> ahahah
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
> Quentin,
>
> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and 
> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried 
> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own 
> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>
> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe 
> it
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view 
> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still 
> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... 
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> To address one of your points.
>
> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
> falsified.
>
>  
> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
> to worry. 
>  
>
> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks 
> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise 
> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES 
> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it 
> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the 
> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed 
> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can 
> explain that.
>
> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all 
> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as 
> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By 
> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and 
> explains the source of quantum randomn
>
> ...

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Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

Yeah yeah... you're a misundestood genius... poor guy.


2014-02-24 18:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>
> As I expected you can't show us anything to make your point, and just
> revert to hot air...
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:39:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> ahahah
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Quentin,
>>
>> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and
>> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried
>> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own
>> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>>
>> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe
>> it
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view
>> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still
>> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate...
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with
>> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way
>> that it is.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> To address one of your points.
>>
>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and
>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is
>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory
>> falsified.
>>
>>
>> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and
>> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not
>> to worry.
>>
>>
>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a
>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly
>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks
>> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise
>> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES
>> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it
>> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the
>> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed
>> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can
>> explain that.
>>
>> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all
>> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as
>> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By
>> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and
>> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>>
>> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you
>> have a go at answering?
>>
>> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to
>> you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you
>> answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do,
>> no bother either way  my end.
>>
>> I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do
>> things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to
>> aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking?
>> How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible,
>> involving the least reflection of yourself?
>>
>> For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of
>> discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?
>>
>> Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked,
>> the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end
>> logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when
>> she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overla
>>
>> ...
>
>  --
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-- 
All those moments will be lost

Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

As I expected you can't show us anything to make your point, and just 
revert to hot air...

Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:39:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> ahahah
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
> Quentin,
>
> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and 
> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried 
> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own 
> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>
> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe 
> it
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view 
> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still 
> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... 
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> To address one of your points.
>
> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
> falsified.
>
>  
> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
> to worry. 
>  
>
> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks 
> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise 
> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES 
> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it 
> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the 
> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed 
> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can 
> explain that.
>
> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all 
> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as 
> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By 
> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and 
> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>
> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>
> Edgar
>
>  
> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you 
> have a go at answering? 
>  
> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to 
> you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you 
> answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, 
> no bother either way  my end. 
>  
> I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do 
> things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to 
> aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? 
> How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, 
> involving the least reflection of yourself? 
>  
> For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of 
> discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?
>  
> Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, 
> the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end 
> logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when 
> she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overla
>
> ...

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Edgar L. Owen]

Bruno,

PS: I have no idea what you are asking in the following question. If you 
make it clear I'll try to respond

"You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 
1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that 
artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale 
different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems 
to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp")."

Edgar

On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer 
> product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my 
> computational reality.
>
>
>
> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. Does 
> your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any 
> (Turing) universal machine or numbers?
>
> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any 
> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical 
> implementation of a computation.
>
>
> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 
> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that 
> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale 
> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems 
> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").
>
> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> :-)
>
>
>
>
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?
>>>
>>
>> Computational Theory of Mind. 
>>
>> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. 
>> Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when 
>> I suspect that is neither.
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 This might be a more concise way of making my argument:

 It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the 
 method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are 
 encountered.

 My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as 
 experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is 
 counted 
 must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that 

 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 
 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic 
 re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be 
 pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.

 My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how 
 numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the 
 whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual 
 machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware 
 substrate, 
 but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself 
 from data which is not relevant to the machine?

 Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind 
 computation, I conclude that:

 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical 
 theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical 
 inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii 
 fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level 
 mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental 
 phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and 
 should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy 
 directly.
 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical 
 explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom.
 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be 
 redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the 
 foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 
 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, 
 rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP 
 as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, 
 theoretical platform of sense.

>>>
> -- 
> You received this

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Edgar L. Owen]

Bruno,

As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes 
the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what 
computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be.

Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical 
justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is 
no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable 
universe.

My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the 
universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by 
definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations 
are or exactly how they work.

However we can say many things about my computational universe. For 
example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and 
logically complete because it always continues to output the current 
observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever.

My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this 
respect while yours does not.

Edgar

On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer 
> product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my 
> computational reality.
>
>
>
> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. Does 
> your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any 
> (Turing) universal machine or numbers?
>
> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any 
> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical 
> implementation of a computation.
>
>
> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 
> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that 
> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale 
> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems 
> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").
>
> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> :-)
>
>
>
>
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?
>>>
>>
>> Computational Theory of Mind. 
>>
>> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. 
>> Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when 
>> I suspect that is neither.
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 This might be a more concise way of making my argument:

 It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the 
 method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are 
 encountered.

 My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as 
 experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is 
 counted 
 must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that 

 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 
 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic 
 re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be 
 pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.

 My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how 
 numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the 
 whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual 
 machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware 
 substrate, 
 but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself 
 from data which is not relevant to the machine?

 Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind 
 computation, I conclude that:

 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical 
 theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical 
 inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii 
 fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level 
 mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental 
 phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and 
 should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy 
 directly.
 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity

Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself:

"If as you say, the ""same point in time" in relativity just MEANS that two
events are assigned the same time coordinate" then the twins are NOT at the
same point in time because the two events of their meeting have different
time coordinates in their coordinate systems."

if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t.



2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux :

> ahahah
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>
> Quentin,
>>
>> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and
>> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried
>> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own
>> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>>
>> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe
>> it
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your
>>> view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You
>>> still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime
>>> coordinate...
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>>
>>> Ghibbsa,
>>>
>>> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with
>>> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way
>>> that it is.
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Ghibbsa,
>>>
>>> To address one of your points.
>>>
>>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and
>>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is
>>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory
>>> falsified.
>>>
>>>
>>> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and
>>> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not
>>> to worry.
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a
>>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly
>>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Ghibbsa,
>>>
>>> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks
>>> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise
>>> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES
>>> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it
>>> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the
>>> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed
>>> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can
>>> explain that.
>>>
>>> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all
>>> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as
>>> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By
>>> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and
>>> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>>>
>>> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't
>>> you have a go at answering?
>>>
>>> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put
>>> to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe
>>> you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to
>>> do, no bother either way  my end.
>>>
>>> I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do
>>> things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to
>>> aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking?
>>> How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible,
>>> involving the least reflection of yourself?
>>>
>>> For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of
>>> discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?
>>>
>>> Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I
>>> asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that
>>> back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then
>>> did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays
>>> and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale,
>>> and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in
>>> the opposite direction that was perfect?
>>>
>>> p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:16:26 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 16:59, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct 
>>> entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted 
>>> purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person 
>>> associated with that brain.
>>>
>>
>> No, I never said that at all. People have a whole hemisphere of their 
>> brain surgically removed and it doesn't affect their human capacities 
>> nearly to the extent that we might guess, and it doesn't affect their 
>> consciousness itself at all (they still wake up being themselves).
>>
>
> Well, removed is one thing and substituted is another. So to be clear, in 
> your theory would it be possible for me to have part of my brain 
> substituted digitally and not be aware of any difference?
>

Yes, it would be possible to have part of your brain removed and not be 
aware of any difference also - my point though is, 'so what?' You can be 
dead and not know the difference either, presumably.
 

>
>  
>>
>>>  Suppose such a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines 
>>> discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third 
>>> party could tell the difference. Wouldn't that directly contradict your 
>>> theory? If not, why not?
>>>
>>
>> If a doctor amputates a patient's leg, but then put the foot back on the 
>> end of the wooden leg, and the foot worked so that neither the patient or 
>> anyone else could tell the difference, wouldn't that directly contradict 
>> the theory that wooden legs can't support real feet?
>>
>
> Well, the patient would notice that they no longer had any sensation 
> between their hip and their foot, I suppose, so no, it wouldn't contradict 
> that theory. For this to be an adequate analogy, no relevant aspect of the 
> patient's pre-operative functional capabilities would be different. But my 
> question is reasonable, isn't it? Perhaps you could just try to answer my 
> it directly without the use of analogies.
>
> David
>

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Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

ahahah


2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Quentin,
>
> I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and
> relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried
> repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own
> admission) and hasn't succeeded so far
>
> You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe
> it
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view
>> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still
>> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate...
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with
>> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way
>> that it is.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> To address one of your points.
>>
>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and
>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is
>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory
>> falsified.
>>
>>
>> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and
>> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not
>> to worry.
>>
>>
>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a
>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly
>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks
>> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise
>> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES
>> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it
>> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the
>> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed
>> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can
>> explain that.
>>
>> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all
>> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as
>> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By
>> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and
>> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>>
>> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you
>> have a go at answering?
>>
>> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to
>> you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you
>> answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do,
>> no bother either way  my end.
>>
>> I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do
>> things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to
>> aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking?
>> How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible,
>> involving the least reflection of yourself?
>>
>> For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of
>> discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?
>>
>> Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked,
>> the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end
>> logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when
>> she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite
>> speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all
>> the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the
>> opposite direction that was perfect?
>>
>> p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world.
>> About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually
>> regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It
>> might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that
>> sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single
>> drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why
>> not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of
>> magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at
>> such an early st

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:16:26 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 16:59, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>> You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct 
>>> entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted 
>>> purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person 
>>> associated with that brain.
>>>
>>
>> No, I never said that at all. People have a whole hemisphere of their 
>> brain surgically removed and it doesn't affect their human capacities 
>> nearly to the extent that we might guess, and it doesn't affect their 
>> consciousness itself at all (they still wake up being themselves).
>>
>
> Well, removed is one thing and substituted is another. So to be clear, in 
> your theory would it be possible for me to have part of my brain 
> substituted digitally and not be aware of any difference?
>
>  
>>
>>>  Suppose such a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines 
>>> discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third 
>>> party could tell the difference. Wouldn't that directly contradict your 
>>> theory? If not, why not?
>>>
>>
>> If a doctor amputates a patient's leg, but then put the foot back on the 
>> end of the wooden leg, and the foot worked so that neither the patient or 
>> anyone else could tell the difference, wouldn't that directly contradict 
>> the theory that wooden legs can't support real feet?
>>
>
> Well, the patient would notice that they no longer had any sensation 
> between their hip and their foot, I suppose, so no, it wouldn't contradict 
> that theory. 
>

No, they patient couldn't notice any difference. That's the conceit of the 
scenario - just as the conceit of your scenario is "a substitution of part 
of my brain, along the lines discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and 
neither I nor any third party could tell the difference". I'm mirroring 
back to you the terms of your question so that you might see why the 
question is loaded.

For this to be an adequate analogy, no relevant aspect of the patient's 
> pre-operative functional capabilities would be different. 
>

Right. I am saying it wouldn't. Some how the wooden leg just feels like a 
real leg - maybe they have a brain injury in which the feeling of their 
right leg is mirrored on their left.

 

> But my question is reasonable, isn't it? Perhaps you could just try to 
> answer my it directly without the use of analogies.
>

No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the 
question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has 
been some variation of this same "But if the world didn't work the way that 
it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was 
right?"

Craig
 

>
> David
>

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Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Quentin,

I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and 
relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried 
repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own 
admission) and hasn't succeeded so far

You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe 
it

Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view 
> of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still 
> haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... 
>
> Quentin
>
>
> 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen >:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
> that it is.
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> To address one of your points.
>
> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
> falsified.
>
>  
> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
> to worry. 
>  
>
> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks 
> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise 
> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES 
> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it 
> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the 
> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed 
> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can 
> explain that.
>
> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all 
> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as 
> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By 
> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and 
> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>
> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>
> Edgar
>
>  
> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you 
> have a go at answering? 
>  
> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to 
> you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you 
> answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, 
> no bother either way  my end. 
>  
> I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do 
> things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to 
> aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? 
> How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, 
> involving the least reflection of yourself? 
>  
> For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of 
> discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?
>  
> Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, 
> the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end 
> logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when 
> she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite 
> speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all 
> the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the 
> opposite direction that was perfect? 
>  
> p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. 
> About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually 
> regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It 
> might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that 
> sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single 
> drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why 
> not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of 
> magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at 
> such an early stage as you envisage p-time
>  
> But I'm interested to see otherwise. You
>
> ...

-- 
You received this message

Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

O Bruno, Bruno!

First you snip my post you respond to so no one can tell that my quote 
applied to a very specific example given by Stathis which you snipped out, 
and NOT to what your quote implies it referred to.

Second you once again repeat the charge I haven't explained what I mean by 
computation, and simultaneously accuse me of using "a non-standard notion 
of computation". Please, you are contradicting yourself here, since how do 
you know it's non-standard if you admit you don't know what it is?

And I have explained what I mean by computation, and by a computational 
universe on multiple occasions, several times in direct response to you 
asking that question.

And I do use computation in a standard way as analogous to how computers 
compute results which is essentially how Turing used it.

All in all, your continued repeated posts seem intellectually dishonest, 
I'm sorry to say...

Edgar

On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:52:43 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:26, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> It assumes a RUNNING computer which assumes a flowing time.
>
>
> Not at all. you can hope that there is a physical universe capable of 
> running a computation, but a computation is a mathematical, even 
> arithmetical notion.
>
> The existence of any ending computations, and of all finite pieces of non 
> ending computations, can be  proved in quite tiny theory. 
>
> The notion of running a computer does not need to assume a flowing time. 
> You need to assume no more than the laws of addition and multiplication and 
> classical logic.
>
> I am afraid you are using a highly non standard notion of computation, and 
> I remind you that I asked regularly what you mean by "computation". It is 
> clearly not the standard notion, which is a mathematical notion not 
> involving anything physical, notably, time.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion

[Edgar L. Owen]

Craig,

This seems crazy to me at least, as it seems to assume that reality was 
somehow created so people could "appreciate it and participate in it".

To me that seems a few orders of magnitude less likely than e.g. P-time!

I would turn this around and say that humans were created of the same 
logical structure as a pre-existing human independent universe, and that is 
why they CAN appreciate and participate. That, to my mind, is a much more 
logical approach.

And the fact that GR may be counter intuitive certainly does NOT imply any 
other counter intuitive theory is somehow correct. I'm sure you'd agree 
with that.

And I'm surprised you consider GEOcentric astronomy somehow "ordinary 
thinking". Perhaps you are still stuck in one of your block universe 
incarnations from the early Middle Ages?

Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:52:17 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 10:56:08 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> It's hard to understand how your view is self consistent. You still seem 
>> to be assuming some unstated observer, which you deny, by claiming pattern 
>> recognition, aesthetics, appreciation, participation must somehow precede 
>> any ontological formulation. These are all aspects of how mind views 
>> reality, rather than fundamental reality itself.
>>
>
> You are assuming that reality is something other than an aesthetic quality 
> which is appreciated and participated in. They are no just aspects of how 
> mind views reality, they are what creates the possibility of 'aspects' and 
> 'views' to begin with. Forget about fundamental reality. Realism is a 
> measure of correspondence among fictions. Reality is the subset of sense 
> which records experience and organizes those records.
>
>  
>
>>
>> For me at least, you need to clarify your thesis and try to state the 
>> whole more simply and completely. As it is it seems fragmentary and 
>> inconsistent, or at least backwards to ordinary thinking...
>>
>
> It is backwards to ordinary thinking, yes - like Heliocentric astronomy, 
> general relativity, etc.
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:08:52 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Craig,

 How do you define "experiential phenomena" without invoking an observer 
 to experience them? 

>>>
>>> The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic 
>>> phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a particular 
>>> kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of that 
>>> experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from 
>>> behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself.
>>>  
>>>
 Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to 
 experience it?

>>>
>>> No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it 
>>> ambiguous. All experiences may have some degree of distinction between 
>>> interior and exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might 
>>> constellate into a more formal narrative of observation.
>>>  
>>>

 In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational 
 alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up 
 the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in 
 terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological 
 EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which 
 constitutes the universe.

 But I suspect your definition is something quite different?

>>>
>>> Actually not so different, except that by using information forms as 
>>> fundamental, you are choosing the third person, object view (forms and 
>>> functions = patterns) without acknowledging the pattern recognition (= 
>>> appreciation and participation) that must ontologically precede any 
>>> particular formations. Computation is automation and unconsciousness. Forms 
>>> and functions are like cliches or masks for the underlying sense experience.
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
 Edgar

 On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience 
>> if you mean a human experience.
>>
>
> No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, 
> just experiential phenomena.
>  
>
>> The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and 
>> intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe 
>> before humans came along.
>>
>
> I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or 
> anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but th

Re: Block Universes

[Quentin Anciaux]

Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view
of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still
haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate...

Quentin


2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen :

> Ghibbsa,
>
> Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with
> relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way
> that it is.
>
> Edgar
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Ghibbsa,
>>>
>>> To address one of your points.
>>>
>>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and
>>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is
>>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory
>>> falsified.
>>>
>>
>> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and
>> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not
>> to worry.
>>
>>
>>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a
>>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly
>>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks
> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise
> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES
> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it
> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the
> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed
> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can
> explain that.
>
> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it
> all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries
> as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum 
> events.
> By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT,
> and explains the source of quantum randomness.
>
> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>
> Edgar
>

 Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't
 you have a go at answering?

 I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put
 to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe
 you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to
 do, no bother either way  my end.

 I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do
 things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to
 aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking?
 How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible,
 involving the least reflection of yourself?

 For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of
 discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?

 Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I
 asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that
 back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then
 did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays
 and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale,
 and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in
 the opposite direction that was perfect?

 p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world.
 About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually
 regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It
 might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that
 sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single
 drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why
 not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of
 magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at
 such an early stage as you envisage p-time

 But I'm interested to see otherwise. You clearly have a good
 culturally-empirical mind

>>>  --
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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 16:59, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct
>> entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted
>> purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person
>> associated with that brain.
>>
>
> No, I never said that at all. People have a whole hemisphere of their
> brain surgically removed and it doesn't affect their human capacities
> nearly to the extent that we might guess, and it doesn't affect their
> consciousness itself at all (they still wake up being themselves).
>

Well, removed is one thing and substituted is another. So to be clear, in
your theory would it be possible for me to have part of my brain
substituted digitally and not be aware of any difference?


>
>>  Suppose such a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines
>> discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third
>> party could tell the difference. Wouldn't that directly contradict your
>> theory? If not, why not?
>>
>
> If a doctor amputates a patient's leg, but then put the foot back on the
> end of the wooden leg, and the foot worked so that neither the patient or
> anyone else could tell the difference, wouldn't that directly contradict
> the theory that wooden legs can't support real feet?
>

Well, the patient would notice that they no longer had any sensation
between their hip and their foot, I suppose, so no, it wouldn't contradict
that theory. For this to be an adequate analogy, no relevant aspect of the
patient's pre-operative functional capabilities would be different. But my
question is reasonable, isn't it? Perhaps you could just try to answer my
it directly without the use of analogies.

David

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Re: Block Universes

[Edgar L. Owen]

Ghibbsa,

Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with 
relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way 
that it is.

Edgar

On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Ghibbsa,
>>
>> To address one of your points.
>>
>> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
>> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
>> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
>> falsified.
>>
>  
> To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
> been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
> to worry. 
>  
>
>> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
>> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
>> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>>
>> Edgar
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Ghibbsa,

 Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks 
 nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise 
 are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES 
 reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it 
 clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the 
 twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed 
 upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can 
 explain that.

 Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all 
 clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as 
 well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. 
 By 
 doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, 
 and 
 explains the source of quantum randomness.

 So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.

 Edgar

>>>  
>>> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't 
>>> you have a go at answering? 
>>>  
>>> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put 
>>> to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe 
>>> you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to 
>>> do, no bother either way  my end. 
>>>  
>>> I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do 
>>> things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to 
>>> aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? 
>>> How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, 
>>> involving the least reflection of yourself? 
>>>  
>>> For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of 
>>> discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?
>>>  
>>> Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I 
>>> asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that 
>>> back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then 
>>> did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays 
>>> and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, 
>>> and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in 
>>> the opposite direction that was perfect? 
>>>  
>>> p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. 
>>> About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually 
>>> regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It 
>>> might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that 
>>> sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single 
>>> drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why 
>>> not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of 
>>> magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at 
>>> such an early stage as you envisage p-time
>>>  
>>> But I'm interested to see otherwise. You clearly have a good 
>>> culturally-empirical mind
>>>
>>

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:03:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Feb 2014, at 15:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
>
> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the 
> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are 
> encountered.
>
> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as 
> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is counted 
> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that 
>
> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 
> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic 
> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be 
> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.
>
> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how 
> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the 
> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual 
> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, 
> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself 
> from data which is not relevant to the machine?
>
> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind 
> computation, I conclude that:
>
>
> Your questions above are answered in computer science. 
>

What makes the answers applicable beyond computer science?
 

> I think you should study it. I cannot imagine that you grasp the notion of 
> UD, and still ask how "numbers can encounter something". 
>
> Then a  notion like "encounter" seems to assume many vague things. But 
> then you say it is just sense.
>

What does 'encounter' assume?
 

>  
>
> I don't see a theory. 
>

We have to go beyond theory to see sense, just as we have to wake up to 
some degree to know that we were dreaming.
 

>
>
>
>
> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory 
> of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry 
> to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
>
>
> ?
>

Arithmetic does not examine its own origin, it assumes them from the start.
 

>
>
>
> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, 
> as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental 
> phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena 
> which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and 
> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy 
> directly.
> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical 
> explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom.
>
>
> You should be able to give the axioms, without using any special terms.
>

If I am suggesting a solution that has not existed before, what term could 
I use to refer to it that is not 'special'?
 

>
> I will believe that you have a theory, when what you predict is invariant 
> for the terming used.
>

Not sure what you mean.
 

>
>
>
> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be 
> redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the 
> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 
>
>
> We grasp number easily. We don't grasp sense,
>

We don't need to grasp sense, we are sense, our lives are sensed. Numbers 
are not easily grasp, and the vast majority of people alive today and in 
human history have been almost mathematically illiterate.
 

> and humans are known to fight on this since day one.
> You have to find axioms on which you can agree with others, or you going 
> to just talk with yourself.
>

That would seem to contradict the universality of mechanism. How is a 
machine talking to itself different from agreeing to talk about the same 
things with others? It seems like an argument for conformity for the sake 
of conformity. Others can find ways to agree with me too, you know...unless 
I am a machine that is made specially different.
 

>
>
>
> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather 
> than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a 
> perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, 
> theoretical platform of sense.
>
>
> That is quite imprecise.
>

It's too compressed as a sentence, I agree. All I'm trying to say is that 
machines can tell the truth about some aspects of subjectivity and other 
parts of the cosmos also, but not because they have any subjective 
experience.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> -- 
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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Craig,

I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some  
consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to  
distinguish it from my computational reality.



But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term.  
Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer  
or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers?


Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any  
mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical  
implementation of a computation.



You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1- 
person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that  
artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale  
different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it  
seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp").


Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together.

Bruno





:-)






Edgar




On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,

Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?

Computational Theory of Mind.

Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I  
agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and  
natural, when I suspect that is neither.


Craig


Edgar


On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
This might be a more concise way of making my argument:

It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the  
method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are  
encountered.


My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as  
experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is  
counted must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose  
that


1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter,  
and
2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re- 
acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre- 
mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.


My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how  
numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from  
the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an  
actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a  
hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data?  
How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the  
machine?


Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism  
behind computation, I conclude that:


4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical  
theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical  
inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii  
fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro  
level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro  
level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and  
should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the  
fallacy directly.
8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans- 
theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters  
is the sole axiom.
9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can  
be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to  
reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense- 
subordinate.
10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation,  
rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds  
from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an  
impersonal, theoretical platform of sense.


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 16:42, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:38, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion
>> between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or
>> perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most
>> cognitive scientists.
>
>
> All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit posit
> of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists),
>
>
> ?
> What is CTM?
>

Just what you said it was - the computational theory of mind. I'm agreeing
with you. I just meant to say that it's implicitly assumed in much of
science and not only by cognitive scientists. I didn't mean to be
controversial!


>
> In a sense comp is very weak (= very general, assume less), it assumes no
> bound for the level and the scope of the digital substitution, but it is
> strong in making explicit a bet on consciousness invariance (the
> "theological aspect" , the belief in a form of technological reincarnation).
>

Yes.


> directly entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital
> substitution that,
>
>
> ?  This is confusing. If it entails something, that something is stronger.
>

Sorry, your use of certain terms, as a logician, is much more precise than
mine. I probably should have said something more like "leads us to the
conclusion that.etc" instead of "entails". I just meant that I agree
with the argument, as presented in the UDA, that the assumption of the
invariance of consciousness to digital substitution is incompatible with
the localisation of mind in a primitive physical universe. Which, as you
say is a formulation of a problem rather than a solution.

Sorry for any confusion.

David


> Comp assumes less, but is still strong in itself. As it assumes CT
> (although it is formally dispensable), and it assumes the brain
> replacement.
>
> I am no more sure what you mean by CTM. If M is for mind, then it is comp.
> If M is for matter, then it is (very plausibly up to vocabulary plays)
> inconsistent with comp.
>
> Some people believe in notion of computation not related to Church thesis,
> but none succeed to define them properly, or there are different notion
> than computation, like provability, and their opposition to Church thesis
> is a confusion of level. So if CTM is "computational theory of mind" , it
> means that it is computationalism (taking into account the consequences or
> not).
>
> In that sense CTM -> comp  (but some will disagree, as CT is not so well
> understood, I think).
>
> Usually, computational theory of mind still divide on representational
> theory, and non representational theories, comp is a priori neutral, but
> any choice of substitution level, entails a representation level, AUDA is
> partially representational, []p is representational, but []p & p is not.
>
>
> notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a primitive
> physical universe.
>
>
> OK. That is a problem to solve.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:57, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Thanks Bruno...

As an advocate of a computational reality, I certainly believe that  
part of that universe (subsets) is computational minds, though I  
suspect we'd disagree about most of the rest


You are welcome, but may be David meant some nuances. The problem is  
that many "definition" of CTM are done in the frame of the  
Aristotelian idea that there is a primitive physical universe, which,  
actually is not sensical with mechanism, comp or CTM "well understood".


Bruno






Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:53:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:16, Edgar L. Owen wrote:



Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?



It is Computationalist Theory of Mind. It is another name of  
computationalism or comp, although usually comp refers explicitly to  
the very weak (logically) version of it.
Usually CTM assumes that the brain is the "organ of consciousness'  
and that neurons are the main items handling information, but comp  
assumes only a level of digital substitution, which can be as low as  
we want, and works for a general notion of brains, which can any  
portion of the physical universe we would have to copy to have the  
consciousness invariance. Comp can have a level so low that we might  
need the copy of the whole universe, at the level of strings  
described with 10^(10^10) decimals, for example (and that is usually  
not allowed implicitly in common forms of CTM).

So, if you want COMP -> CTM.
I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the  
confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does  
sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a  
common theory used by most cognitive scientists.


Bruno





Edgar


On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
This might be a more concise way of making my argument:

It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe  
the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which  
computations are encountered.


My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as  
experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is  
counted must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I  
propose that


1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter,  
and
2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re- 
acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be  
pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.


My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of  
how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated  
from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that  
an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a  
hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data?  
How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the  
machine?


Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism  
behind computation, I conclude that:


4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical  
theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical  
inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii  
fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro  
level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro  
level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid,  
and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the  
fallacy directly.
8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans- 
theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters  
is the sole axiom.
9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science  
can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to  
reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense- 
subordinate.
10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation,  
rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds  
from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an  
impersonal, theoretical platform of sense.


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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:43:28 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 16:01, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:21:15 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>> Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a 
 living person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and 
 expecting 
 it to become a living person.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely. 
>>> ISTM that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's 
>>> brain, that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a 
>>> functional equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that 
>>> function cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion?
>>>
>>
>> Easily. If there is a reflection of the sun coming off a puddle of water, 
>> and you can see that reflection on the wall as an interplay of light and 
>> shadow, you can analyze that reflection mathematically and then recreate 
>> the pattern of light using any number of methods (photography, lasers, 
>> lenses and mirrors, etc). It can be demonstrated conclusively that dropping 
>> a pebble in the puddle changes the reflection on the wall in the same way 
>> that adding a mathematical description of a dropped pebble will change the 
>> synthetic projection on the wall.
>>
>> Why then can't we say that lenses or photography create water?
>>
>> Well, if we didn't know for a fact that the only the original pattern is 
>> related to something we call water and the sun, then we could say - we 
>> would have to say that logically lenses do create water, and that water can 
>> only be an image.
>>
>> Since we cannot deny our own experience, except by using our capacity to 
>> understand and represent some aspect of our experience to logically 
>> abstract a concept of experiential absence, then we should realize that 
>> there is no possibility for any description within consciousness (such as 
>> brains encountered by our body's examination of other bodies) to supersede 
>> consciousness itself. Any mathematical description of what our brain does 
>> or what our mind thinks that it does will always be superseded and 
>> diagonalized by awareness itself. It's not a higher dimension, it is the 
>> container of dimensionality itself.
>>
>
> You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct 
> entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted 
> purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person 
> associated with that brain.
>

No, I never said that at all. People have a whole hemisphere of their brain 
surgically removed and it doesn't affect their human capacities nearly to 
the extent that we might guess, and it doesn't affect their consciousness 
itself at all (they still wake up being themselves).
 

> Suppose such a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines discussed 
> in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third party could 
> tell the difference. Wouldn't that directly contradict your theory? If not, 
> why not?
>

If a doctor amputates a patient's leg, but then put the foot back on the 
end of the wooden leg, and the foot worked so that neither the patient or 
anyone else could tell the difference, wouldn't that directly contradict 
the theory that wooden legs can't support real feet?

Craig
 

>
> David
>
>
>>>
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Re: Digital Neurology

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 4:03:06 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:23:39 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 24 February 2014 14:22,  wrote:
>>
>> I think you said something like "I may have stumble [an explanation]",,,"
>>
>>
>> Oh, well that definitely wasn't me, then.
>>
>> David
>>
>  
> It possibly was you but you were talking about what you refer to again 
> here: "To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility 
> of) a novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the 
> world-problem in general that eventually made me ..,." 
>
 
 No it wasn't that. I stumbled on the line again and can see why I thought 
it was you. Pasted below. It was craig but the colour of his sign-off got 
changed making it look like it was you
 
 

Now, 24 years later, there has been no improvement in our understanding, no 
> progress whatsoever in these fundamental issues of consciousness. I think 
> that I may actually have stumbled on the real improvement, but it's going 
> to take a long time before people realize that computation is not the 
> center of the universe.
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> David
>>
>

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Re: Block Universes

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:26, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


It assumes a RUNNING computer which assumes a flowing time.


Not at all. you can hope that there is a physical universe capable of  
running a computation, but a computation is a mathematical, even  
arithmetical notion.


The existence of any ending computations, and of all finite pieces of  
non ending computations, can be  proved in quite tiny theory.


The notion of running a computer does not need to assume a flowing  
time. You need to assume no more than the laws of addition and  
multiplication and classical logic.


I am afraid you are using a highly non standard notion of computation,  
and I remind you that I asked regularly what you mean by  
"computation". It is clearly not the standard notion, which is a  
mathematical notion not involving anything physical, notably, time.


Bruno




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Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 10:56:08 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> It's hard to understand how your view is self consistent. You still seem 
> to be assuming some unstated observer, which you deny, by claiming pattern 
> recognition, aesthetics, appreciation, participation must somehow precede 
> any ontological formulation. These are all aspects of how mind views 
> reality, rather than fundamental reality itself.
>

You are assuming that reality is something other than an aesthetic quality 
which is appreciated and participated in. They are no just aspects of how 
mind views reality, they are what creates the possibility of 'aspects' and 
'views' to begin with. Forget about fundamental reality. Realism is a 
measure of correspondence among fictions. Reality is the subset of sense 
which records experience and organizes those records.

 

>
> For me at least, you need to clarify your thesis and try to state the 
> whole more simply and completely. As it is it seems fragmentary and 
> inconsistent, or at least backwards to ordinary thinking...
>

It is backwards to ordinary thinking, yes - like Heliocentric astronomy, 
general relativity, etc.

Craig
 

>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:08:52 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> How do you define "experiential phenomena" without invoking an observer 
>>> to experience them? 
>>>
>>
>> The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic 
>> phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a particular 
>> kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of that 
>> experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from 
>> behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself.
>>  
>>
>>> Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to 
>>> experience it?
>>>
>>
>> No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it 
>> ambiguous. All experiences may have some degree of distinction between 
>> interior and exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might 
>> constellate into a more formal narrative of observation.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational 
>>> alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up 
>>> the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in 
>>> terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological 
>>> EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which 
>>> constitutes the universe.
>>>
>>> But I suspect your definition is something quite different?
>>>
>>
>> Actually not so different, except that by using information forms as 
>> fundamental, you are choosing the third person, object view (forms and 
>> functions = patterns) without acknowledging the pattern recognition (= 
>> appreciation and participation) that must ontologically precede any 
>> particular formations. Computation is automation and unconsciousness. Forms 
>> and functions are like cliches or masks for the underlying sense experience.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience 
> if you mean a human experience.
>

 No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, just 
 experiential phenomena.
  

> The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and 
> intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe 
> before humans came along.
>

 I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or 
 anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but the 
 accusation that there are such beliefs out there is very popular. I'm 
 talking about physics and ontology, it has nothing to do with biology or 
 Homo sapiens.

 Craig

  

>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:39:45 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> Can there be any motion or relation without an experience in which a 
>> sense of motion or relation is literally encountered?
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:37:46 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> All,
>>>
>>> Here's one more theory from my book on Reality:
>>>
>>> All forms of mass and energy are just different forms of relative 
>>> motion. They actually have to be different forms of the same thing for 
>>> there to be mass-energy conservation, and different forms of relative 
>>> motion are what they are.
>>>
>>> Rest mass in this theory is just vibrational motion. It is relative 
>>> motion, but

Re: Block Universes

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Ghibbsa,
>
> To address one of your points.
>
> My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and 
> adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is 
> inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory 
> falsified.
>
 
To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and 
been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading  but otherwise not 
to worry. 
 

> I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a 
> necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly 
> assumes, though without stating that assumption.
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>>
>>> Ghibbsa,
>>>
>>> Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks 
>>> nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise 
>>> are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES 
>>> reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it 
>>> clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the 
>>> twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed 
>>> upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can 
>>> explain that.
>>>
>>> Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all 
>>> clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as 
>>> well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By 
>>> doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and 
>>> explains the source of quantum randomness.
>>>
>>> So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things.
>>>
>>> Edgar
>>>
>>  
>> Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you 
>> have a go at answering? 
>>  
>> I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to 
>> you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you 
>> answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, 
>> no bother either way  my end. 
>>  
>> I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do 
>> things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to 
>> aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? 
>> How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, 
>> involving the least reflection of yourself? 
>>  
>> For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of 
>> discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you?
>>  
>> Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, 
>> the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end 
>> logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when 
>> she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite 
>> speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all 
>> the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the 
>> opposite direction that was perfect? 
>>  
>> p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. 
>> About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually 
>> regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It 
>> might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that 
>> sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single 
>> drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why 
>> not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of 
>> magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at 
>> such an early stage as you envisage p-time
>>  
>> But I'm interested to see otherwise. You clearly have a good 
>> culturally-empirical mind
>>
>

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 16:01, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:21:15 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>> Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a
>>> living person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting
>>> it to become a living person.
>>
>>
>> I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely.
>> ISTM that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's
>> brain, that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a
>> functional equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that
>> function cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion?
>>
>
> Easily. If there is a reflection of the sun coming off a puddle of water,
> and you can see that reflection on the wall as an interplay of light and
> shadow, you can analyze that reflection mathematically and then recreate
> the pattern of light using any number of methods (photography, lasers,
> lenses and mirrors, etc). It can be demonstrated conclusively that dropping
> a pebble in the puddle changes the reflection on the wall in the same way
> that adding a mathematical description of a dropped pebble will change the
> synthetic projection on the wall.
>
> Why then can't we say that lenses or photography create water?
>
> Well, if we didn't know for a fact that the only the original pattern is
> related to something we call water and the sun, then we could say - we
> would have to say that logically lenses do create water, and that water can
> only be an image.
>
> Since we cannot deny our own experience, except by using our capacity to
> understand and represent some aspect of our experience to logically
> abstract a concept of experiential absence, then we should realize that
> there is no possibility for any description within consciousness (such as
> brains encountered by our body's examination of other bodies) to supersede
> consciousness itself. Any mathematical description of what our brain does
> or what our mind thinks that it does will always be superseded and
> diagonalized by awareness itself. It's not a higher dimension, it is the
> container of dimensionality itself.
>

You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct
entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted
purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person
associated with that brain. Suppose such a substitution of part of my
brain, along the lines discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and
neither I nor any third party could tell the difference. Wouldn't that
directly contradict your theory? If not, why not?

David


>>
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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:38, David Nyman wrote:


On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the  
confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does  
sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a  
common theory used by most cognitive scientists.


All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit  
posit of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists),


?
What is CTM?

In a sense comp is very weak (= very general, assume less), it assumes  
no bound for the level and the scope of the digital substitution, but  
it is strong in making explicit a bet on consciousness invariance (the  
"theological aspect" , the belief in a form of technological  
reincarnation).





directly entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital  
substitution that,


?  This is confusing. If it entails something, that something is  
stronger.


Comp assumes less, but is still strong in itself. As it assumes CT  
(although it is formally dispensable), and it assumes the brain  
replacement.


I am no more sure what you mean by CTM. If M is for mind, then it is  
comp. If M is for matter, then it is (very plausibly up to vocabulary  
plays) inconsistent with comp.


Some people believe in notion of computation not related to Church  
thesis, but none succeed to define them properly, or there are  
different notion than computation, like provability, and their  
opposition to Church thesis is a confusion of level. So if CTM is  
"computational theory of mind" , it means that it is computationalism  
(taking into account the consequences or not).


In that sense CTM -> comp  (but some will disagree, as CT is not so  
well understood, I think).


Usually, computational theory of mind still divide on representational  
theory, and non representational theories, comp is a priori neutral,  
but any choice of substitution level, entails a representation level,  
AUDA is partially representational, []p is representational, but []p &  
p is not.



notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a primitive  
physical universe.


OK. That is a problem to solve.

Bruno






David



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck  wrote:
>
> *>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures
>> in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of
>> me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me,
>> retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.*
>>
>> Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is
>> any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the
>> person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should
>> assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity
>> criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and
>> won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what
>> Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I
>> think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments
>> would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated.
>> Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.
>
>
> Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to
> you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful
> way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to
> be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a
> heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation
> onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this
> perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random
> selection from the class of all possible observer moments.
>
> Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define.
>
> If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get
> a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable
> than being me or you.
>

But how would "you" remember that?


>
> I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense, without a
> notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states.
>
> I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a
> universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an observer
> ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)).
>
> But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic
> and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian
> number) will select among all "observer moment".
>

Well, perhaps "eventually" it will select all of them, if we can give some
relevant sense to eventually in this context. And I suppose Hoyle's point
is that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its
order must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the
moments themselves. Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is
somehow preserved at the frog level, at the price of breaking the
simultaneity of the momentary views.


> The "hypostatic" universal person is more like a universal baby, which can
> split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its first
> person perspective it is like it has still to go through the histories to
> get the right relative statistics on his most probable universal neighbors.
>

Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic? ISTM that
"going through the histories" is a notion that splits in the 3p and 1p
views. I suppose this is equivalent to conceiving observer moments as
self-ordering monads in terms of which any random serialisation over the
entire class must eventually preserve the right relative statistics.
"Eventually" here relies on a similar opacity to delays in continuation as
you argue in the UDA, plus the reliance on prior relativisation to some
specific spatial-temporal orientation, to get a 1p notion of temporal
order. But perhaps this formulation of a discrete observer moment is
incompatible with comp?

Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't get it, it is an indexical
> internal point of view.
>

Perhaps it gets it "eventually", in the sense I outline above?


>
> The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then just
> non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent
> way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities
> symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and
> every 3p continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously.
>
> That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of
> probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent
> continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be
> duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one
> to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher "probability"
> of continuation associated with the larger class, even though ea

Re: Turning the tables on the doctor

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological 
>> changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what 
>> you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question 
>> of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?'
>
>
> But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can we?
>

Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of 
having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it 
works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. 
The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. 
Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very 
important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to 
anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they 
got into a projection on a screen.
 

> The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same 
> question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a 
> theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might 
> experience translate to function? 
>

It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks 
like a function from your distance. From a greater, absolute distance, both 
of our functions looks like mathematics.
 

> Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this 
> be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is 
> unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is 
> precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally 
> sweep consciousness under the rug. 
>

No, no, it's not unfair at all. I'm not ducking the question and saying 'we 
can't know the answer to this mystery because blah blah sacred ineffable', 
I am saying that the question cannot be asked because it can only be asked 
within sense to begin with. If you can ask what sense is, your asking is 
already a first hand demonstration of what it is. It can have no better 
description, nor could it ever require one. All that is required is for us 
to stop doubting what we already experience directly. We can doubt whether 
what we experience is this kind of an experience or that kind, whether it 
is more 'real' or more like a dream, but we cannot doubt that there is an 
experience in which there is a feeling of direct participation - a sense 
which includes the possibility of a sense of motive.
 

> But I have been under the strong impression that you see the 
> sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this 
> puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics.
>

Yes, I think it is the frame of the puzzle. If we start from sense, then 
every piece falls into place eventually. If we start from non-sense, then 
we can never find the piece of the puzzle which is the puzzle itself.
 

>
> To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a 
> novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the 
> world-problem in general that eventually made me waver from my prior 
> attachment to a sensory-motive approach.
>

I don't think that you had a sensory-motive approach, I think you probably 
had an idealist-theoretic approach...the idea of experience as a 
pseudo-substance rather than ordinary sense/sense-making.
 

> In the end, as I tried to frame counter-arguments in the debate and turned 
> the thing over and over in my mind, I found that this possibility of 
> resolution carried more immediate persuasive heft for me than my worries 
> about the precise metaphysical relation of the various elements of the 
> schema. After all, we cannot expect to be able to explain everything at 
> once. 
>

We can if the explanation is felt directly rather than symbolized and 
communicated.
 

> And also it seemed to me that we were not that far away from being able to 
> test at least some of this conjecture in "yes doctor" mode, by direct 
> interface with digital prostheses and the like (hence my posting of that 
> link). That would be rather persuasive wouldn't it? 
>

Nothing is persuasive until someone is transplanted into a synthetic brain 
and returns to tell the tale.
 

> We shouldn't have to wait interminably for some unfortunate AI "doll" to 
> become capable of protesting its heartfelt feelings to our unsympathetic 
> ear; we could directly experience the computational simulation of real 
> consciousness for ourselves and let that be the criterion. No?
>

As long as there is enough of us left to live and participate as a person, 
we can compensate to some extent for the shortfall of a prosthetic limb. We 
triangulate the gap and our perception can fill-in to a surprising degree. 
Only if our entire brain is amputated and replaced successfully wi

Re: Digital Neurology

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:23:39 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 14:22, > wrote:
>
> I think you said something like "I may have stumble [an explanation]",,,"
>
>
> Oh, well that definitely wasn't me, then.
>
> David
>
 
It possibly was you but you were talking about what you refer to again 
here: "To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility 
of) a novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the 
world-problem in general that eventually made me ..,." 

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:21:15 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg 
> > wrote:
>
> Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a 
>> living person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting 
>> it to become a living person.
>
>
> I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely. 
> ISTM that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's 
> brain, that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a 
> functional equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that 
> function cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion?
>

Easily. If there is a reflection of the sun coming off a puddle of water, 
and you can see that reflection on the wall as an interplay of light and 
shadow, you can analyze that reflection mathematically and then recreate 
the pattern of light using any number of methods (photography, lasers, 
lenses and mirrors, etc). It can be demonstrated conclusively that dropping 
a pebble in the puddle changes the reflection on the wall in the same way 
that adding a mathematical description of a dropped pebble will change the 
synthetic projection on the wall.

Why then can't we say that lenses or photography create water?

Well, if we didn't know for a fact that the only the original pattern is 
related to something we call water and the sun, then we could say - we 
would have to say that logically lenses do create water, and that water can 
only be an image.

Since we cannot deny our own experience, except by using our capacity to 
understand and represent some aspect of our experience to logically 
abstract a concept of experiential absence, then we should realize that 
there is no possibility for any description within consciousness (such as 
brains encountered by our body's examination of other bodies) to supersede 
consciousness itself. Any mathematical description of what our brain does 
or what our mind thinks that it does will always be superseded and 
diagonalized by awareness itself. It's not a higher dimension, it is the 
container of dimensionality itself.

Craig


> David
>
>
>

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Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion

[Edgar L. Owen]

Craig,

It's hard to understand how your view is self consistent. You still seem to 
be assuming some unstated observer, which you deny, by claiming pattern 
recognition, aesthetics, appreciation, participation must somehow precede 
any ontological formulation. These are all aspects of how mind views 
reality, rather than fundamental reality itself.

For me at least, you need to clarify your thesis and try to state the whole 
more simply and completely. As it is it seems fragmentary and inconsistent, 
or at least backwards to ordinary thinking...

Edgar



On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:08:52 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> How do you define "experiential phenomena" without invoking an observer 
>> to experience them? 
>>
>
> The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic 
> phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a particular 
> kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of that 
> experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from 
> behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself.
>  
>
>> Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to 
>> experience it?
>>
>
> No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it ambiguous. 
> All experiences may have some degree of distinction between interior and 
> exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might constellate into a 
> more formal narrative of observation.
>  
>
>>
>> In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational alteration 
>> of any information form (information forms being what makes up the 
>> universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in terms 
>> of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological EXperience 
>> then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which constitutes the 
>> universe.
>>
>> But I suspect your definition is something quite different?
>>
>
> Actually not so different, except that by using information forms as 
> fundamental, you are choosing the third person, object view (forms and 
> functions = patterns) without acknowledging the pattern recognition (= 
> appreciation and participation) that must ontologically precede any 
> particular formations. Computation is automation and unconsciousness. Forms 
> and functions are like cliches or masks for the underlying sense experience.
>
> Craig
>
>
>> Edgar
>>
>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Craig,

 Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience if 
 you mean a human experience.

>>>
>>> No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, just 
>>> experiential phenomena.
>>>  
>>>
 The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and 
 intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe 
 before humans came along.

>>>
>>> I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or 
>>> anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but the 
>>> accusation that there are such beliefs out there is very popular. I'm 
>>> talking about physics and ontology, it has nothing to do with biology or 
>>> Homo sapiens.
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>  
>>>

 Edgar



 On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:39:45 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Can there be any motion or relation without an experience in which a 
> sense of motion or relation is literally encountered?
>
>
> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:37:46 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> All,
>>
>> Here's one more theory from my book on Reality:
>>
>> All forms of mass and energy are just different forms of relative 
>> motion. They actually have to be different forms of the same thing for 
>> there to be mass-energy conservation, and different forms of relative 
>> motion are what they are.
>>
>> Rest mass in this theory is just vibrational motion. It is relative 
>> motion, but since this relative motion is so spatially confined, it 
>> appears 
>> the same to all external observers. It is equally relative to all 
>> observers, thus it appears absolute in having the same value relative to 
>> all observers. Thus rest mass is the same to all observers, even though 
>> it 
>> is actually relative motion.
>>
>> This is somewhat similar to string theory's notion of particles as 
>> vibrating strings. But in my theory the vibration itself is not the 
>> particle and there is no need for extra dimensions. In my theory, the 
>> vibration takes place in ordinary 3D space and represents only the mass 
>> of 
>> the particle. Only in 3D space is it interconvertible to other

Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck   
wrote:


>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible  
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,  
the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always  
seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one  
outcome.


Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there  
is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering  
what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability  
he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on  
what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone  
into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that  
where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each  
duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show  
that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the  
stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't  
manage that.


Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall  
proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole  
analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of  
this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around  
here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the  
notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective  
of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the  
situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection  
from the class of all possible observer moments.



Well, the "just" might be not that easy to define.

If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to  
get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more  
probable than being me or you.


I am not sure that the notion of "observer moment" makes sense,  
without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative  
states.


I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a  
universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p & p), an  
observer ([]p & <>p), and a feeler ([]p & <>p & p)).


But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in  
arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential  
correct löbian number) will select among all "observer moment".


The "hypostatic" universal person is more like a universal baby, which  
can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from  
its first person perspective it is like it has still to go through the  
histories to get the right relative statistics on his most probable  
universal neighbors. Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't  
get it, it is an indexical internal point of view.







The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then  
just non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us  
a consistent way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog)  
probabilities symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will  
confront each and every 3p continuation from a unique 1p  
perspective, just not simultaneously.


That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of  
probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent  
continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be  
duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room  
and one to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher  
"probability" of continuation associated with the larger class, even  
though each continuation is individually certain in a different  
underlying sense. This is just to say that subjective uncertainty  
(or the expectation of probabilistic outcomes) is a function of  
incomplete knowledge at any given point in the sequence.


OK.




I know that Bruno quarrels with Hoyle's idea as being superfluous  
to, or possibly even incompatible with, comp


I think about it. I try to make sense of it. That might have sense,  
but then it remains to look at it in arithmetic.
 I mean the relations between a person and the universal person "in  
her" is complex, and the splitting between []p and []p & p is part of  
it.





but personally I still find it a neat heuristic for pumping one's  
intuition on the indeterminacy of first-personal expectations.


OK.
It is just that I expect platonism to be counter-intuitive and so  
intuition pump must be handled with care. But you know that. I just  
try to understand the point.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:04, chris peck wrote:


Hi Liz

>>  Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be  
sent to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send  
you to A or B with equal probability based on some "quantum coin  
flip". But by accident it duplicates you, and sends you to both.  
This effectively conflates the comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you  
can't easily disentangle them in this thought experiment.


An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a  
determined result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to  
uncertainty from 1p.


OK.



Thats the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision.  
You get 1p uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty.


That's the interest. And it is what you say above, so I don't follow  
you here.






By introducing a 'quantum coin flip' you're loading the dice towards  
uncertainty.


Well, not with Everett MWI. You get 3p certainty (the Shroedinger wave  
evolves deterministically) and from it Everett explains the 1p  
uncertainty, in a manner similar to the comp FPI.






So I can't really say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.


The "equivalence" comes from the fact that Everett explains the  
quantum indeterminacy by a form of first person (that he called  
subjective") mechanist indeterminacy interpreting superposition as  
actual relative multiplication/duplication, or differentiation.


This restores all what Einstein likes in physics: 3p determinacy and  
3p locality.


Then my point is that if we take that move seriously, without  
reification of neither mind nor matter, we have to push that move on a  
part of the arithmetical reality /truth.


Then I have done this, and we get indeed an intuitionist logic/ 
mathematics for the mind, and a quantum logic/mathematics for matter.  
To be short.


I explain a bit of modal logic with the goal of showing how that  
happens, and has to happen, in case computationalism is true.





>>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible  
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,  
the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always  
seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one  
outcome.


Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there  
is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering  
what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability  
he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on  
what identity criterion gets imposed.


It depends only on the difference between 1p and 3p, and the identity- 
theory based on personal memory and of course personality feature,  
which is the one defined by the acceptance of the artificial digital  
brain.


All the rest follows, and indeed, we could use simple proving machine,  
with quite elementary induction and inductive inference ability, to  
formalize this easily. This is done eventually in the translation of  
UDA in arithmetic, which I am currently explaining.








Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with  
again.


The uncertainty is invariant for all the identity theories as far as  
they are consistent with the idea of surviving with a digital body or  
brain, or "generalized brain".





But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just  
recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome,


... one outcome that they were unable to predict. Only those having  
written "W v M" win, all the others prediction failed.


You don't need to know who you are, in the 1p sense, to be able to  
open a door and distinguish Washington from Moscow, and write the  
result in a diary.





I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability  
assignments would be asymmetric


I can be OK. If W and M represents the place where my 3p body will be  
reconstituted, then with the step 3 protocol, we already know that  
P("W & M") = 1.


Now we are polite and attribute two different, and incompatible, 1p  
experience to each of the copies, so if W and M represent place where  
I will survive, then again P('"W & M") = 1. That is the 3-1 view : the  
experiencer will be conscious in Washington and he will be conscious  
in Moscow.
All this is already known from comp. And in step 3, we ask a different  
question, which is what do you expect to live from the 1p view (which  
is equal to the 1-1-1-1-1-... view) when pushing on the button.


So, if W and M represent the result of the outcome of "pushing the  
button, opening the door, and writing in the diary the outcome, then  
we already know, assuming comp of course, that in no situation can the  
guy open the door and see both cities at once, so that P("W & M") = 0.  
Similarly, P("W") ≠ 1, P("M") ≠ 1, and P("W v M") = 1.







from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he  
doesn't manage that.


What is wrong with a

Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion
> between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or
> perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most
> cognitive scientists.


All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit posit
of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists), directly
entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital substitution
that, notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a primitive
physical universe.

David

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Re: Digital Neurology

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 14:22,  wrote:

I think you said something like "I may have stumble [an explanation]",,,"


Oh, well that definitely wasn't me, then.

David

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Re: Digital Neurology

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:15:53 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:19:09 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 24 February 2014 13:13,  wrote:
>>
>> Well, so long as you understood the sort of thing I was suggesting you 
>>> had said, I think you'd probably know if you had said it, so I guess I got 
>>> you mixed up. Sorry about that.
>>
>>
>> But I've no idea what you are suggesting I had said. Could you give me 
>> the gist of it?
>>
>> Dvaid 
>>
>  
> that last one got sent by accident
>
 

> Sure . I was only browsing mind you which is why I may have it wrong, and 
> why I can't remember where it was. 
>
 
I thought I saw you make what looked like a signing off  remark at the end 
of a discussion, which I thought had been about consciousness. I
 
I think you said something like "I may have stumble [an explanation]",,,"
 
I thought the object was consciousness, and I thought the context was 
material, as in what kind biological structure might something like 
consciousness be brought into existence. 
 
Appreciated that's an awful lot of I thought in play there
 

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Re: CTM Attack and Redemption

[David Nyman]

On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a living
> person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting it to
> become a living person.


I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely. ISTM
that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's brain,
that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a functional
equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that function
cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion?

David

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Re: Digital Neurology

[ghibbsa]

On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:19:09 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 24 February 2014 13:13, > wrote:
>
> Well, so long as you understood the sort of thing I was suggesting you had 
>> said, I think you'd probably know if you had said it, so I guess I got you 
>> mixed up. Sorry about that.
>
>
> But I've no idea what you are suggesting I had said. Could you give me the 
> gist of it?
>
> Dvaid 
>
 
Sure

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