Re: A riddle for John Clark
John,
You agreed already that a conscious uploaded mind in a process that forks
and diverges is from the uploaded mind's point of view, an experience
indistinguishable from fundamental randomness.
If it is indistinguishable from randomness, then would you also agree that
the experience of going through a process fork, as with an experience
involving fundamental randomness, cannot be predicted by any means? If not,
pleas explain.
Jason
On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 8:46 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com
wrote:
@ Bruno
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to
the next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
I can give you arguments but I can't understand them for you. You have to
do that bit. I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless you try a bit
harder.
--
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
*[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is
a flat out logical contradiction.**[Bruno] Where? *
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then
you ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values
altering. Thats just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which is not Leibnizian. Let
Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is
irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is
irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to
a same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy
and the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different
guy. Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional
notion. The math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately
related to pure simple extensional relation between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false
according to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself
to have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not
in the pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first
person experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to
accept that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does
the difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context.
I never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I
said, it we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree
that we cannot use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you are
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that you will
see only one city.
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the
subjective, first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above.
That's obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the
first person point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of
being in W and in M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with
certainty in either W or in M (as both copies confirms after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the
experience to live Washington and not in Moscow.
The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is the one having the experience
to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that
they each got one bit of information.
Bruno
--
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Re: David Deutsch and Constructor Theory
On 26 Jul 2015, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 7/26/2015 4:16 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: David Deutsch has some things to say which are relevant to discussions of computationalism. http://edge.org/conversation/constructor-theory One of the first rather unexpected yields of this theory has been a new foundation for information theory. There's a notorious problem with defining information within physics, namely that on the one hand information is purely abstract, and the original theory of computation as developed by Alan Turing and others regarded computers and the information they manipulate purely abstractly as mathematical objects. Many mathematicians to this day don't realize that information is physical and that there is no such thing as an abstract computer. Only a physical object can compute things. But what does it mean to be a physical object. It's only having a complex of relations to other objects that exhibit certain regularities. Is a computer simulation of a stone a physical object? No, because you can't kick it and it can't kick back. But a simulation of you in the computer can simulate kicking the simulated stone and the simulated you can experience the simulated kick back. So if there's a whole world simulated in the computer it doesn't need any interpretation or reference to the computer substrate - it's a physics that is abstract from the computer point of view, but from within the the simulation it's concrete. Excellent point Brent. And it is what makes elegant the comp explanation, when we get the point that RA's semantic emulate a universal dovetailer, and so arithmetic emulates all emulations possible, on all input possible on all (Turing) oracle possible. Of course, by the FPI, that leads to the measure problem, for which the (ideally sound) universal machines themselves, when introspective enough to know that they are universal (the Löbian machines), provide the logic of the measure one, on which we get the Goldblatt quantum modal quantizations, which gives quantum logic whre the UDA says it should be, confirming that it might be interesting to pursue the interview (at the least). Bruno Brent And later: Several strands led towards this. I was lucky enough to be placed in more than one of them. The main thing was that starting with Turing and then Rolf Landauer (who was a lone voice in the 1960s saying that computation is physics—because the theory of computation to this day is regarded by mathematicians as being about abstractions rather than as being about physics), Landauer realized that the concept of a purely abstract computer doesn't make sense, and the theory of computation has to be a theory of what physical objects can do to information. Landauer focused on what restrictions the laws of physics imposed on what kinds of computation can be done. The notion of a purely abstract computer doesn't make sense! I find myself to be sympathetic with this view. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: David Deutsch and Constructor Theory
On 26 Jul 2015, at 21:05, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: I understand the need and curiosity to finally know what is true. In science that never happen. On the most interesting thing we need even to remain forever undecided. That is why, if we are rational enough, we develop faith. This is what draws the brightest people to science and math. They like uncovering, in a Platonic manner, and testing it, in an Aristotelian manner. Yes, but the test never prove anything, except when it is negative, which actually proves nothing but suggest we revise the beliefs / theories. We must not confuse the serach of truth, with the search of benefice for humans. For myself, the benefit to our species (maybe all others?) should never be lost. Well, as a fellow human, I can relate with the idea of maximizing the chance of survival, and the quality of lives, of our species (which implies some taking care of some other species as well, of course). But that has nothing to do with sciences. if tomorrow we get evidences that GOD is a cuttlefish, or that it follows from an hypothesis we want to keep, we have to learn to live, and survive with that. The human benfits are important, but should not been used as a *truth* criterium. Perhaps, this is maddening to the extremely bright people like yourself? No, but it is politics. politics is very important, like food and drugs, but the human goal should be separated from politics, like religion must be separated to. At least a priori. For me, at the end of the day, we must never forget who we are, But who are we? Humans? Mammals?, Animals?, Earth life forms?, Organic machines?, Löbian Numbers?, Universal Numbers? and where we are at, right now. I am at thinking I might do a cup of coffee. I speak of all human needs, including the existential. The Löbian machine needs are infinite. Satisfying all its needs is an infinite tasks. politically, I am in favor of harm reduction, and case by case solutions as much as possible, because we have differentiate a lot, in the ocean and out of the ocean, and we are very different. Because the task is so enormous, people have a hard time dealing with it at all, and move forward with their research. I sympathize completely. I suspect that evolution may be the program pushing many in this direction, or it may just be my particular neurosis, or, both could be the same. The subuniversal numbers things seems somehow intriguing. Possibly, related to your observations, Steinhart, during an older interview, said that he likes doing maths for a sense of calmness and beauty. Like all drugs, it has to be consumed with some moderation, and if you search the truth, a warning is that math can contain a lot of chimera and daemon leading you ... well, possibly far from truth. Then sometimes to get truth, you need to explore a vaster territory and admit bizarre relations among the numbers, like complex multiplication or 1+2+3+... = -1/12, and even to give names to infinities. The problem, already in arithmetic, is that the numbers needs to invent more than numbers to understand themselves, but that very process, although it simplifies things locally, makes the whole thing quite more complex. In arithmetic, life is running forward all the time. Yes, sub-universality is an interesting notion. It has led john Case and students to study an interesting notion of succinctness. Note that there are no universal sub-universal machine, which explains why the notion is better described as sub-creative (Post creative set = Turing universal machine, universal with respect to computability). Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sun, Jul 26, 2015 12:26 pm Subject: Re: David Deutsch and Constructor Theory On 26 Jul 2015, at 14:48, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Heh! I have read Deutsches thesis on Constructor Theory a few times and I cannot really grasp it, intellectually, except as a spin-off of Von Newmann's cellular automata. That looks more like a critics of Wolfram. Deutch found the universal Turing machine, or if you prefer the Quantum computer. It has been foreseen by others, notably and famously by Feynman, and I can understand the appeal for the physicalist. So it is more a quantum cellular automata. Progress in that direction might help for the testing of the computationalist hypothesis. Save, that it applies at a cosmological level, rather then a mathematical sense, or on a Conway's Life computer screen. I don't know philosophically, if it means anything beneficial to humans, or, I wonder if this applies to physics as well? We must not confuse the serach of truth, with the search of benefice for humans. Now Platonist believe that the search of justice requires the search of
Re: David Deutsch and Constructor Theory
On 27 Jul 2015, at 02:36, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 at 06:26:05PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am a computationalist, myself, (a.k.a Digitalist), and like this sort of thing, but, ...meh! I don't see how this work informs us? Deutsch seems to be not aware that if computationalism is true, then the existence of the quantum computer around us must be justified in arithmetic, or from the two SK equation above. Then by using the Löbian machine, you can not only explain the qubits from the bits, but you can distinguish those having incommunicable but undoubtable qualitative 1p-attributes from those 100% 3p sharable. Comp + self- reference explains both quanta and qualia, using no more than the two simple assumption Kxy = y, and Sxyz = xz(yz). I suspect Deutsch is aware of it, but deliberately argues the contrarian view. It remains to be seen if he can do so consistently. He has to, if he want to save physicalism. But normally, that is impossible for him, as he does assume computationalism, at least in his book FOR, and his papers on QM. Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
John, The vulgarity and the insults hides hardly that you are doing the C13 confusion again. Oh, sorry, by C13, I mean your YCT1PAT3P, of course. You really begin to look like this little guy, except it is adorable (I am less sure for you, to be honest): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsqt2ywSqTQ Hmm... taking the risk to annoy a bit Quentin, I will still comment this: If it's important then provide it. Obviously the definition of you as being somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki is not getting the job done, so lets have some extra verbiage in that definition so it could be logically said you will see only one city. you refer to the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W and M. But, in Helsinki, the question is about what you expect to live as next first person experience. And here computationalism provides the solution: it can only be one experience among W and M. Not both, as a computer in one room cannot get the information of another computer in another room without being connected to it. You are in W and you are in M, but that say nothing about the subjective first person experience, which is what we are looking about in step 3. To get it, we can interview both copies. You have agreed that their subjective experiences, being in M and being in W, have become incompatible. so the next possible experiences, when in Helsinki, can only be either W or M. Usually, we can confuse 3-you and 1-you, as it looks like there is a bijection between them, but that is not the case after the duplication (nor before, actually). Each 3-you is in both places (W M), but each 1-you feels to be in either W, or M, satisfying both W v M. Now, what you do, is, instead of listening to the 1-you, you ask yourself where those 1-you are, but this gives the 3-1 view, not the 1- view asked (or the 1-1-view, or the 1-1-1-view ...). You see, C13 again and again and again and again ... The question is not on the 3-you, not even on the 1-you, but to the 1-you, in Helsinki, about what he expects to live as next experience. This makes the only way to verify it into interviewing *all* copies. In this case, a child can see that they all agrees with the W v M prediction, and they all refute the W M prediction. Bruno On 27 Jul 2015, at 00:22, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: you always denotes the guy who remember pushing the button at Helsinki. That is actually a pretty good definition of you in that it's similar to the intuitive feeling we have for the pronoun that we get from everyday life; it would be even better if Bruno used it consistently. You say that often, but never show the inconsistency Bullshit!. Obviously I agree that one person can not have a first person experience with 2 different cities at the safe time, but 2 people certainly can. But two people is not a person. That is usually the case, but people duplicating machines are not usual. There is no unique first person attached to it, unless you introduce telepathy Again with the idiot telepathy! that is contradicted directly by the two persons whose diaries Again with the idiot diaries! The only way out is for Bruno to add some verbiage to the definition of you. Then maybe Bruno could logically say you will only see one city even though John Clark will see 2, although I'm not entirely sure what that extra verbiage would be. That verbiage is the important distinction between the first person account of experience, and a third person If it's important then provide it. Obviously the definition of you as being somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki is not getting the job done, so lets have some extra verbiage in that definition so it could be logically said you will see only one city. You have agreed that you don't die in the process, John Clark has agreed that Bruno Marchal will not die in the process, and you will not die in the process either, at least not under the old definition of you; but under the new improved definition of you with the extra verbiage (which nobody has seen yet) it is unknown if you will survive. 1) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, open the door, and observe the city of Washington. 2) you live your life up until you arrive at Helsinki and push the button, open the door, and observe the city of Moscow. Both can see that P(W M) was 0 in Helsinki, Both can see that the symbol P in the above is ambiguous. The probability of who seeing what? And both can also see that the probability of Bruno Marchal clearing up that ambiguity without introducing person pronouns with their own ambiguity or using the instead of a is zero. Some could even say that P(W M) is not even zero, but a non- sensical question Yes some could
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:
@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous,
that is a flat out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers
Helsinki then you ought to be able replace one for the other
without truth values altering. Thats just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which is not Leibnizian.
Let Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is
irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is
irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities
equal to a same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M
guy and the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are
different guy. Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or
intensional notion. The math exemplifies this in all details, and all
this ultimately related to pure simple extensional relation between
numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false
according to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect
myself to have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The
problem is not in the pronom, but in the undersanding that the
question bears on first person experiences, and not on third person
localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have
to accept that those phrases mean something different, otherwise
where does the difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole
context. I never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here,
but even if I said, it we are in a modal, intensional context, where
John and me agree that we cannot use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you
are contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that
you will see only one city.
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of
view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the
subjective, first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated
above. That's obvious as the question is about what you expect to live
from the first person point of view, and you don't expect to have the
experience of being in W and in M, but, as we assume comp, you expect
to live with certainty in either W or in M (as both copies confirms
after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's
misunderstanding comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the
experience to live Washington and not in Moscow.
The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is the one having the
experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that
they each got one bit of information.
Bruno
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the
duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he
(at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because
although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still
just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and
make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will
not; it can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon
as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they
had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.
That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both
copies are the Helsinki guy.
After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened
there are 2 bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they
are identical, when the door is opened they see different things
and thus diverge. They both remain the Helsinki guy because they
have equally vivid memories of being a guy in Helsinki, but they are
no longer each other because they diverged as soon as the door was
opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, but
please explain how it is
Re: David Deutsch and Constructor Theory
Short responses- But that has nothing to do with sciences. if tomorrow we get evidences that GOD is a cuttlefish, or that it follows from an hypothesis we want to keep, we have to learn to live, and survive with that. I think it would be fascinating if something like this is true. It's an optimistic cuttlefish we'd have to get to know. This is learning, this is by my values, quite good. But who are we? Humans? Mammals?, Animals?, Earth life forms?, Organic machines?, Löbian Numbers?, Universal Numbers? Any and all and possibly much more? All of your answers sound like new opportunities for us. The Löbian machine needs are infinite. Satisfying all its needs is an infinite tasks. politically, I am in favor of harm reduction Surely the noblest of meta goals? Yes, sub-universality is an interesting notion. It has led john Case and students to study an interesting notion of succinctness. It reminds me, somehow of Rudy Rucker's love affair with Sub-d's or subdimensions, that he postulates exist below Planck Lengths. Finally: Faith in math or physics is akin to confidence, merely. It's a faith one may infer, or tests that can be run to support a conclusion. -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Jul 27, 2015 12:16 pm Subject: Re: David Deutsch and Constructor Theory On 26 Jul 2015, at 21:05, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: I understand the need and curiosity to finally know what is true. In science that never happen. On the most interesting thing we need even to remain forever undecided. That is why, if we are rational enough, we develop faith. F This is what draws the brightest people to science and math. They like uncovering, in a Platonic manner, and testing it, in an Aristotelian manner. Yes, but the test never prove anything, except when it is negative, which actually proves nothing but suggest we revise the beliefs / theories. We must not confuse the serach of truth, with the search of benefice for humans. For myself, the benefit to our species (maybe all others?) should never be lost. Well, as a fellow human, I can relate with the idea of maximizing the chance of survival, and the quality of lives, of our species (which implies some taking care of some other species as well, of course). But that has nothing to do with sciences. if tomorrow we get evidences that GOD is a cuttlefish, or that it follows from an hypothesis we want to keep, we have to learn to live, and survive with that. The human benfits are important, but should not been used as a *truth* criterium. Perhaps, this is maddening to the extremely bright people like yourself? No, but it is politics. politics is very important, like food and drugs, but the human goal should be separated from politics, like religion must be separated to. At least a priori. For me, at the end of the day, we must never forget who we are, But who are we? Humans? Mammals?, Animals?, Earth life forms?, Organic machines?, Löbian Numbers?, Universal Numbers? and where we are at, right now. I am at thinking I might do a cup of coffee. I speak of all human needs, including the existential. The Löbian machine needs are infinite. Satisfying all its needs is an infinite tasks. politically, I am in favor of harm reduction, and case by case solutions as much as possible, because we have differentiate a lot, in the ocean and out of the ocean, and we are very different. Because the task is so enormous, people have a hard time dealing with it at all, and move forward with their research. I sympathize completely. I suspect that evolution may be the program pushing many in this direction, or it may just be my particular neurosis, or, both could be the same. The subuniversal numbers things seems somehow intriguing. Possibly, related to your observations, Steinhart, during an older interview, said that he likes doing maths for a sense of calmness and beauty. Like all drugs, it has to be consumed with some moderation, and if you search the truth, a warning is that math can contain a lot of chimera and daemon leading you ... well, possibly far from truth. Then sometimes to get truth, you need to explore a vaster territory and admit bizarre relations among the numbers, like complex multiplication or 1+2+3+... = -1/12, and even to give names to infinities. The problem, already in arithmetic,
Re: First person plural
On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 1:24 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: you refer to the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W and M. Ok good, this time Bruno Marchal correctly wrote W *AND* M. But, in Helsinki, the question is about what you [ the guy in Helsinki, and its copies which are in W* and* M ] expect to live Then obviously you would expect to live in W* and* M , provided that you was rational, if not then all bets are off as to what you would expect. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. as next first person experience. Bruno forgot a s, if should be next first person experience *s* And here computationalism provides the solution: it can only be one experience among W and M. What does the pronoun it in the above refer to? I suspect the answer is one experience among W and M in which case I agree, one experience among W and M can only be one experience among W and M . a computer in one room cannot get the information of another computer in another room without being connected to it. If 2 computers are the same and start running the same program at the same time then they don't need to be connected and exchange information in order to be synchronized. That's why talk about telepathy is ridiculous. You are in W and you are in M, but that say nothing about the subjective first person experience, which is what we are looking about in step 3. That is true, step 3 is indeed about looking for the subjective person experience after the duplication has occurred, and that is exactly why I refuse to read step 4. There is no such thing as *THE *future first person experience , there is only *a* future first person experience You have agreed that their subjective experiences, being in M and being in W, have become incompatible. They are incompatible with each other but neither is incompatible with the Helsinki Man (aka you). a child can see that they all agrees with the W v M prediction Then get that child to fix step 3 for you, after the kid has corrected your errors then I'll read step 4. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: A riddle for John Clark
@ Bruno
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the Chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to the
next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
look, I can supply you with arguments but I can't understand them for you. You
have to do that bit. Personally, I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless
you try a bit harder.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat
out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats
just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal identity
is not a Leibnizian notion.That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which
is not Leibnizian. Let Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to a
same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy and
the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different guy.
Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional notion. The
math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately related to pure
simple extensional relation between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according
to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself to
have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not in the
pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first person
experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the
difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context. I
never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I said, it
we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree that we cannot
use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you are
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that you will see
only one city.
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the subjective,
first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above. That's
obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the first person
point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of being in W and in
M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with certainty in either W or in
M (as both copies confirms after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the experience to
live Washington and not in Moscow.The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is
the one having the experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that they
each got one bit of information.
Bruno
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM,
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber
is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was
RE: A riddle for John Clark
@ Bruno
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to the
next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
I can give you arguments but I can't understand them for you. You have to do
that bit. I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless you try a bit harder.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:@ Bruno
[John]Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat
out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] Where?
The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats
just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal identity
is not a Leibnizian notion.That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which
is not Leibnizian. Let Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to a
same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy and
the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different guy.
Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional notion. The
math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately related to pure
simple extensional relation between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.
{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according
to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself to
have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not in the
pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first person
experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the
difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context. I
never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I said, it
we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree that we cannot
use the Leibniz identity rule.
you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you are
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that you will see
only one city.
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the subjective,
first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above. That's
obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the first person
point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of being in W and in
M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with certainty in either W or in
M (as both copies confirms after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the experience to
live Washington and not in Moscow.The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is
the one having the experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that they
each got one bit of information.
Bruno
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM,
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber
is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was
opened the 2 bodies were no
Re: David Deutsch and Constructor Theory
David Deutsch Wrote:: Many mathematicians to this day don't realize that information is physical and that there is no such thing as an abstract computer. Only a physical object can compute things. Bruno Marchal Wrote: That approach makes mysterious mind, matter, and the relation between. The relationship between mind and brain is no more and no less mysterious than the relationship between nouns verbs and adjectives. mathematicians does not need the assumption of physicalness to define and reason about information. Not even about quantum information, Then the real mystery is why mathematicians haven't become billionaires by starting computer hardware companies with zero manufacturing costs. Did Landuer realized that the concept of purely abstract natural numbers doesn't make sense? Yes, in fact he went further, Landuer used his physical brain to deduce that sense itself doesn't make sense without physics. I'm not certain his deduction was correct but it very well might be. Also, QM assumes the natural numbers. The more general theory of waves, eve just trigonometry assumes the natural numbers. But was that assumption correct? I don't know. There are a infinite number of natural numbers but nobody has ever seen a infinite number of anything and nobody has even come close. The theory of natural numbers does not assume a physical reality. If the natural numbers are a human invention then they are the result the physical reality inside the human skull. Landauer focused on what restrictions the laws of physics imposed on what kinds of computation can be done. Can be done relatively to some resource. You can't calculate what 2+X is if you're lacking information on the value of X. Deutsch is trying to reformulate physics in such a was as to say for example energy is conserved because information is lacking at a certain space under certain circumstances. That why he's so optimistic, he thinks all problems can be solved with enough information. He even says that evil is the result of a lack of information; I'm not sure I'd go that far but it sound interesting and I wish him luck. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
