Re: Gödel's Philosophy
Ah nice - your interpretation makes perfect sense. And in that case, I guess it is 100%. How "complete" is your agreement with Gödel? On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 12:08:37 PM UTC+10, Jason wrote: > > I interpreted the higher beings in the sense of "multiple realizability", > as Turing wrote in his 1950 paper, > > "The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical > will help us to rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often > attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and that > the nervous system also is electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not > electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we > see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of > course electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so > that it is not surprising that we find it in both these connections. In the > nervous system chemical phenomena are at least as important as electrical. > In certain computers the storage system is mainly acoustic. The feature of > using electricity is thus seen to be only a very superficial similarity. If > we wish to find such similarities we should took rather for mathematical > analogies of function." > > > So aliens or beings on other worlds, or in other universes, need not be > made of the same particles, or same elements/chemicals as we, if it is the > functions/patterns/mathematical relations that determine consciousness. > > I read the formal rights in the same way you did, that ethics/politics is > an objective, rather than subjective science. > > Jason > > > On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz > > wrote: > >> OK, I think it's 100%. I'm just not sure what it means that the higher >> beings are connected by analogy not composition, and "formal rights >> comprise a real science" (unless he means there is something objectively >> knowable about ethics). That said, the higher beings thing sounds like >> something I *would* agree with, if I understood it... ;) >> >> On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 11:16:09 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote: >>> >>> Which of the 14 points did you not agree with? >>> >>> As for his ontological proof, I think that was more something he did for >>> fun, to see if he could impart some rigor to Anselm's argument. >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the drivel of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something about that specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in 87.5% agreement with him... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com . >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Gödel's Philosophy
I interpreted the higher beings in the sense of "multiple realizability", as Turing wrote in his 1950 paper, "The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical will help us to rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and that the nervous system also is electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of course electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so that it is not surprising that we find it in both these connections. In the nervous system chemical phenomena are at least as important as electrical. In certain computers the storage system is mainly acoustic. The feature of using electricity is thus seen to be only a very superficial similarity. If we wish to find such similarities we should took rather for mathematical analogies of function." So aliens or beings on other worlds, or in other universes, need not be made of the same particles, or same elements/chemicals as we, if it is the functions/patterns/mathematical relations that determine consciousness. I read the formal rights in the same way you did, that ethics/politics is an objective, rather than subjective science. Jason On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz wrote: > OK, I think it's 100%. I'm just not sure what it means that the higher > beings are connected by analogy not composition, and "formal rights > comprise a real science" (unless he means there is something objectively > knowable about ethics). That said, the higher beings thing sounds like > something I *would* agree with, if I understood it... ;) > > On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 11:16:09 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote: >> >> Which of the 14 points did you not agree with? >> >> As for his ontological proof, I think that was more something he did for >> fun, to see if he could impart some rigor to Anselm's argument. >> >> Jason >> >> On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Pierz wrote: >> >>> It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the >>> drivel of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something about >>> that specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in 87.5% agreement >>> with him... >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Gödel's Philosophy
OK, I think it's 100%. I'm just not sure what it means that the higher beings are connected by analogy not composition, and "formal rights comprise a real science" (unless he means there is something objectively knowable about ethics). That said, the higher beings thing sounds like something I *would* agree with, if I understood it... ;) On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 11:16:09 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote: > > Which of the 14 points did you not agree with? > > As for his ontological proof, I think that was more something he did for > fun, to see if he could impart some rigor to Anselm's argument. > > Jason > > On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Pierz > > wrote: > >> It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the drivel >> of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something about that >> specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in 87.5% agreement with >> him... >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com . >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Gödel's Philosophy
Which of the 14 points did you not agree with? As for his ontological proof, I think that was more something he did for fun, to see if he could impart some rigor to Anselm's argument. Jason On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Pierz wrote: > It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the drivel > of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something about that > specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in 87.5% agreement with > him... > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What day is it?
On 11/09/2015 5:00 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Sep 2015, at 01:20, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 10/09/2015 7:42 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/9/2015 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Sep 2015, at 07:55, Quentin Anciaux wrote: As for Bruce, could you then be honest, and simply say you don't believe in the many world interpretation and don't want to explore it... yes we're talking mostly metaphysics on this list, if you dislike it, I wonder what you're doing here. Indeed the point is notably that we can reason about this, that is doing science, so that we never disagree except about the choice of the assumptions. Now, I disagree with Bruce, and I guess many philosophers and scientists, except Deutsch (on this), but I do think that QM (without collapse) is a theory of many worlds (in a perhaps admittedly more abstract than usual notion of world). If we define a physical world by a set of events close for interaction, But can computationalism give a coherent account of this? Doesn't the UD imply at every set of events will have many (countably many?) causal histories and infinitely many causal futures. then the "many-world" is a consequence of the linearity of the wave evolution together with the linearity of the tensor product. But they are only "many" FAPP. Decoherence suppresses cross terms in the density matrix, but it doesn't make them zero - and I don't think it's even provable that there is a unique basis in which it diagonalized FAPP. And of course we have no theory of quantum spacetime. QM assumes a continuous spacetime, so QM is not the last word and if computationalism only reproduces QM it will fail when QM fails. I think it is clear that Bruno does not understand either QM or the MWI. MWI is not a consequence of the linearity of the wave function. It is when you define a world by the maximal consistent extension close for the local observable interactions. That is not a consequence of linearity. Linearity gives superpositions. You only escape from the superpositions to distinct non-interacting worlds by imposing some non-linearity somewhere. In MWI this is hidden in the trace over environmental states. But this is just as much a non-linear collapse as in any other collapse model. Superposition is the consequence of linearity, OK. And if the computations done can interfere, they have an equivalent physical reality, and determined alternate accessible realities, but if entangling oneself with them, we loss or make very hard the ability to see the interference. Just because you can't see it it does not follow that it is not there. and superposition implies interactions between outcomes. ? I would say interference between the outcomes. Many-worlds requires decoherence in a preferred basis, I would say that classical macroscopic brain or universal machine requires a classical-enough base, which benefits of that decoherence, although with quantum computing we can exploit the ignorance by changing the base (which is still rather mysterious from the comp pov). There is no such thing as a "classical" basis for Hilbert space. Quantum computing is irrelevant here. with actual zeroing of the off-diagonal terms in the density matrix. Indeed, this latter step is just the standard "collapse" postulate in a different guise. So, far from eliminating "collapse", MWI relies on it as much as any other interpretation of QM. Not at all. There is no physical collapse, just an epistemological differentiation when one get entangled in the other's business. You appear to be referring to Everett's original 'relative state' interpretation, in which there was only ever one world -- the other parts of the wave function played no role. But this was soon realized to be unworkable. You really should read up on modern versions of MWI. I recommend Shlosshauer, Rev. Mod. Phys. 76 (2004) 1267. Or http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312059 or his book on the subject. Bruce The real difference between interpretations is whether this "collapse" is a physical process or merely an epistemological one. In the MWI, actually in Everett theory, there is only the SWE. Sating "there is no collapse", means, for a logician, that we don't add the collapse postulate (unlike many textbook). So the collapse is necessarily an epistemological, even indexical, and relative, notion. In MWI, which reifies the wave function Which is indeed an error, at least with the mind-body problem in mind, but physicists do this very often. and the elements of the superposition, the collapse is definitely physical. ? So it is, after all, no different in this respect from the von Neumann Copenhagen interpretation. I have a problem. In Everett theory there is no postulation of collapse. The collapse is explained by the postluation of universal machine, or at least good approximation of universal machine. Copenhague: - SWE - Collapse - Dualist theory of mind
Re: What day is it?
On Thursday, September 10, 2015, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/9/2015 7:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 9, 2015, Brent Meeker > wrote: > >> >> >> On 9/8/2015 8:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett >> wrote: >> >>> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett >>> wrote: >>> On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett < >> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >> >>> On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett < >>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >>> On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I will ask you the same question as I did Brent: do you conclude from the fact that when you toss a coin it comes up either as head or tails that the world does not split into two parallel versions of you, one of which sees heads and the other tails? I would conclude that a coin toss does not provide any evidence for multiple worlds or a split. The only evidence we have from this data is that the outcome of the toss is uncertain. There is no evidence there for any split of anything. >>> >>> It is not evidence FOR a split but is it evidence AGAINST a split? >>> >>> >>> It is evidence that the assumption of a split is not necessary in >>> order to understand everyday happenings. So, by the application of >>> Occam's >>> Razor, no split happens. >>> >> >> So you agree that we would still observe the probabilities we do if >> we lived in a deterministic world in whaich all possibilities are >> realised? >> >> No, because not all possibilities happen in this world. If all >> possibilities were realized in this world, then there would be no >> uncertainty, no probabilities. Possibility and actuality would be the >> same >> thing. All the horses would win the Melbourne cup; and we don't live in >> such a world. >> > > Obviously, not all possibilities happen in this world, but they might > happen in parallel worlds that don't interact with each other. The > argument > is that probabilities emerge from this, since you don't know which world > you will find yourself in. You bet on the favourite in the race because > you > think you are more likely to end up in a world in which the favourite > wins. > > In other words, probabilities can make perfect sense in a single > deterministic world. This was understood a long time ago with the > development of statistical mechanics. The idea that "all possibilities > happen in parallel worlds" does not actually make a lot of sense. There is > no current physical theory that implies this (without the addition of a > lot > of unevidenced assumptions). So probabilities do not emerge from this, > they > come from quite simple assumptions of randomness and ignorance. > > Probability in the MWI of quantum mechanics is problematic. Regardless > of claims to be able to derive the Born Rule in Everettian models, all > attempts fail because they are circular -- they need the Born rule in > order > to have non-interacting worlds, so you cannot then use these independent > worlds to derive the Born rule. Gleason's theorem is no help -- it suffers > from all the same problems as the Deutsch-Wallace approach. > You don't seem to be disputing that we would still experience a probabilistic world even if all possibilities were actually realised, even though you do dispute that we in fact live in such a world. I'm not sure if you are disputing that, to give a simple model case, if a coin was tossed and the world split in two, with one version of you seeing heads and the other tails, the probability of each outcome is 1/2. Whether or not all possibilities are realized, they are not in evidence, so their relevance to the question of probabilities is questionable. Your simple model case of a coin toss causing a world split is just a made-up example to give the result you want, so again its relevance is dubious. There is no sensible physical theory in which the world splits on classical coin tosses. >>> >>> If you can't imagine a world split, consider a virtual reality in which >>> the program forks every time a coin is tossed,
Gödel's Philosophy
It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the drivel of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something about that specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in 87.5% agreement with him... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A scary theory about IS
Excellent historical analysis, Smitra. Thanks. I was a contemporary witness during my adult years (40s to 70s) and vouch for your ideas. Bruno, however, picked prohibitionism as the main (sole?) culprit what does not match my conclusions. It was part of it, for sure. I found as main culprit the dissatisfaction of the overwhelming majority of people with their lives as slaves in a capitalistic system to work for less than what they may have produced. Also the 'ownership' claim of Nature, including her products, beyond the effort the claimant has put into getting them, plus an ownership of the so called law-enforcement forces to suppress any opposition - making the advanced society an *economical inequality* of haves and have-nots, the latter being forced to work FOR the former for their mere survival. Governments are exponents of the rich and powerful and force the have-nots into their armies to die in wars for the interest of the wealthy. It is called patriotism. The exploited slaves (dead, injured casualties of wars) of the system are called heros. Just to vent off John Mikes On Mon, Sep 7, 2015 at 1:36 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 31 Aug 2015, at 16:52, smitra wrote: > > The real problem i.m.o. is that big powers tend to have a big inertia, it >> takes them a long time to see that the World has changed and that they need >> to focus on other issues than they currently are engaged with. In some >> cases that can lead to escalation of a pointless conflict that has its >> roots in past issues that are no longer relevant, as is the case with the >> war on drugs. And that then can cause a lot of harm. >> >> But I think the general issue is this huge inertia. So, when Gorbachov >> was in power and he was ready to deal seriously with the West, it took us a >> very long time to engage with him. A point on which we never engaged with >> the Soviets in a constructive way was Afghanistan. >> >> The Soviets were willing to withdraw from Afghanistan, even before >> Gorbachov came to power, but on certain conditions like leaving behind a >> stable government. We never wanted to engage with the Soviets on that, >> because of pur mondset that the root of all evil was communism, and the >> Soviets were just talking bullshit about our allies there, the Jihadists. >> >> Them posing a threat to the World? that to us was just ridiculous. We >> knew for sure that with the Soviets gone out of Afghanistan, their >> communist puppet government dismantled, the Afghan population would be able >> to form a democratic state. We were so sure about this that we never >> critically analyzed all the hidden assumptions made here. >> >> It later turned out that we were wrong and that the Soviets were right, >> not in their general approach but about seeing the threat of Jihadism that >> we helped to fuel. Also they were right about the dangers of having failed >> states. Our ideology at the time was that a failed state would quickly get >> itself organized into a flourishing democracy if you could only keep the >> evil communists out. >> >> Another fallout of this was that Gorbachov's political position was >> weakened in the Soviet Union, which made his nationalist opposition who >> were critical of the West politically stronger. When Yeltsin took over he >> had to deal with an economically weak Russia while in the background there >> were forces lurking who were extremely critical of the West. In any country >> you'll have the opposition that tends to question the government's policy >> especially if things are not going well economically and especially when >> there has been a recent radical change. In the years after the collapse of >> communism that move was democratization, liberalization of the economy etc. >> etc. >> >> It's easy for us to say that the Russians who were critical at the time >> were stupid, just look at the opposition in the US against a universal >> health care system. Now, if we could turn back the clock and had dealt with >> Afghanistan differently, then the outcome of that might not just have >> prevented the rise of international Jihadism, you would also have had the >> pro-Western reformists in Russia to be in a politically far stronger >> position. Likely you would not have had Putin in power today, or Putin may >> not have become that anti-Western (he wasn't when came into power). >> >> Another thing is that we would have improved the UN Security Council >> System to deal with complex problems. As it currently functions, the UNSC >> is a panel of prosecutors who are the World's policemen, prosecutor, jury >> and judge at the same time without a requirement for members to recuse >> themselves when they are involved. >> >> The system works fine in emergency situations, like when Iraq invaded >> Kuwait, just like a police can intervene effectively when there is a bank >> robbery going on. But when the emergency situation is dealt with, we all >> know that you need a proper justice system to deal wi
Re: What day is it?
On 10 Sep 2015, at 01:20, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 10/09/2015 7:42 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/9/2015 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Sep 2015, at 07:55, Quentin Anciaux wrote: As for Bruce, could you then be honest, and simply say you don't believe in the many world interpretation and don't want to explore it... yes we're talking mostly metaphysics on this list, if you dislike it, I wonder what you're doing here. Indeed the point is notably that we can reason about this, that is doing science, so that we never disagree except about the choice of the assumptions. Now, I disagree with Bruce, and I guess many philosophers and scientists, except Deutsch (on this), but I do think that QM (without collapse) is a theory of many worlds (in a perhaps admittedly more abstract than usual notion of world). If we define a physical world by a set of events close for interaction, But can computationalism give a coherent account of this? Doesn't the UD imply at every set of events will have many (countably many?) causal histories and infinitely many causal futures. then the "many-world" is a consequence of the linearity of the wave evolution together with the linearity of the tensor product. But they are only "many" FAPP. Decoherence suppresses cross terms in the density matrix, but it doesn't make them zero - and I don't think it's even provable that there is a unique basis in which it diagonalized FAPP. And of course we have no theory of quantum spacetime. QM assumes a continuous spacetime, so QM is not the last word and if computationalism only reproduces QM it will fail when QM fails. I think it is clear that Bruno does not understand either QM or the MWI. MWI is not a consequence of the linearity of the wave function. It is when you define a world by the maximal consistent extension close for the local observable interactions. Superposition is the consequence of linearity, OK. And if the computations done can interfere, they have an equivalent physical reality, and determined alternate accessible realities, but if entangling oneself with them, we loss or make very hard the ability to see the interference. and superposition implies interactions between outcomes. ? I would say interference between the outcomes. Many-worlds requires decoherence in a preferred basis, I would say that classical macroscopic brain or universal machine requires a classical-enough base, which benefits of that decoherence, although with quantum computing we can exploit the ignorance by changing the base (which is still rather mysterious from the comp pov). with actual zeroing of the off-diagonal terms in the density matrix. Indeed, this latter step is just the standard "collapse" postulate in a different guise. So, far from eliminating "collapse", MWI relies on it as much as any other interpretation of QM. Not at all. There is no physical collapse, just an epistemological differentiation when one get entangled in the other's business. The real difference between interpretations is whether this "collapse" is a physical process or merely an epistemological one. In the MWI, actually in Everett theory, there is only the SWE. Sating "there is no collapse", means, for a logician, that we don't add the collapse postulate (unlike many textbook). So the collapse is necessarily an epistemological, even indexical, and relative, notion. In MWI, which reifies the wave function Which is indeed an error, at least with the mind-body problem in mind, but physicists do this very often. and the elements of the superposition, the collapse is definitely physical. ? So it is, after all, no different in this respect from the von Neumann Copenhagen interpretation. I have a problem. In Everett theory there is no postulation of collapse. The collapse is explained by the postluation of universal machine, or at least good approximation of universal machine. Copenhague: - SWE - Collapse - Dualist theory of mind and matter Everett: - SWE - COMP And what I try to explain is that COMP ->. [](COMP -> SWE) & (COMP -> SWE), so "my" theory is just - COMP Formally it is just any theory which is Turing universal, and observation is defined by the logic of self-reference (of rcher entities living there) and the intensional variants. This is not supposed to compete with physics, but to supply the qualia, and the range of non communicable, but true, realities. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.googl
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I will answer your next post if it contains something new. Then I guess it contained something new. > > >> >> >> >> that can be emulated in arithmetic as all computations can be emulated >> > > > >> > Bullshit. > > > > No, it is a theorem in computer science. > Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. > > computations, emulation are used in the original mathematical sense of > Turing. > Turing reduced a computer to it's essentials so we can understand how they work, no computer is simpler than a Turing Machine, but even a Turing Machine needs a tape made of matter and a read head that be changed by the physical tape and a write head that can make chances to that physical tape. > > Those are arithmetical notion. A rithmetical notions don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. > > > The notion of physical computation is a different notion, > Yes they are different, lots of people have made physical computations but *NOBODY* has ever made a non-physical computation and there is zero evidence anybody ever could, although I can't prove nobody ever will. >> >> There are levels in physical stuff like physical computer hardware, but >> there are no levels in computations! > > > > > What? This is just wrong. In arithmetic you do have a simulation of a > fortran program elumating an algol program emulating a quantum computer > emulating the game of life emulating ... There are arbitrary long chain of > such simulation, > And at the end of that long chain the answer you get when 2 is added to 2 is still 4, the exact same 4 you'd get if it was just calculated in your head; it's not a simulated 4 it's just 4 and it has all the properties of any other 4. But simulated water does NOT have all the properties of physical water and I'm still waiting for you to explain why not if arithmetic really is more fundamental than matter as you claim. > > > I have given the definition already, reread them, or buy a book in > computer science. > Definitions don't make calculations and neither do books , physical microprocessor chips do. >> >> Why can't a simulated water program get the computer wet? > > > > > Because you can't create primitive matter, > A good answer or at least I can't think of a better one. If it's true then primitive matter must be more fundamental than arithmetic because it has something that numbers don't and can do things that numbers can't. > > > > But Arithmetic can simulate water making wet a computer. > Yes, but a computer can't simulate all wet computers, it can't create a wet computer made of real physical matter. OK now I'm going to do something I shouldn't and argue against what I just said. A simulated-simulated computer could go up a level and make a simulated computer wet, after all neither involve physics (except that both are running programs on the same physical computer). Some might say that what looks like hardware to somebody on one level would look like software to somebody on a higher level, but I don't think things are quite as clear cut as that; a conscious simulated computer might create and start up a simulated-simulated computer but it can't know what that simulated-simulated computer will come up with anymore than we can know what our programs will end up doing. So the simulated computer and the simulated-simulated computer influence each other and there is no strict top to bottom ordering as far as cause and effect is concerned. And yet no computer program running on a real physical computer can make that real physical computer wet. But maybe I'm wrong about that , a program could make a physical computer wet if it were running on the right hardware, say a computer with water balloons inside set to burst if the simulated computer performed action X. Some would say that would be cheating and it would be UNLESS our entire universe is a computer simulation, then to somebody in that level of higher reality than our own both the physical microprocessor and the physical water balloons would just be lines of program code. Of course the guy at that higher level would be pondering the same math vs physics question that we are and wondering if he wasn't a simulation too at an even higher level of reality. You keep saying you don't believe in fundamental primitive matter but the only way you could be right about that is if there is a infinite (and not just astronomical) number of levels above our own level each simulating the one below; because if there are only a finite number then the one at the very top would have to play by different rules and just accept the existence of matter as a brute fact that numbers can never explain or reproduce. >> >> if arithmetic really is more fundamental than physics I have >> grave difficulties in understanding why that arithmetic produced water >> sho
Re: What day is it?
On 09 Sep 2015, at 23:42, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/9/2015 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Sep 2015, at 07:55, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-09-09 7:39 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker : On 9/8/2015 8:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I will ask you the same question as I did Brent: do you conclude from the fact that when you toss a coin it comes up either as head or tails that the world does not split into two parallel versions of you, one of which sees heads and the other tails? I would conclude that a coin toss does not provide any evidence for multiple worlds or a split. The only evidence we have from this data is that the outcome of the toss is uncertain. There is no evidence there for any split of anything. It is not evidence FOR a split but is it evidence AGAINST a split? It is evidence that the assumption of a split is not necessary in order to understand everyday happenings. So, by the application of Occam's Razor, no split happens. So you agree that we would still observe the probabilities we do if we lived in a deterministic world in whaich all possibilities are realised? No, because not all possibilities happen in this world. If all possibilities were realized in this world, then there would be no uncertainty, no probabilities. Possibility and actuality would be the same thing. All the horses would win the Melbourne cup; and we don't live in such a world. Obviously, not all possibilities happen in this world, but they might happen in parallel worlds that don't interact with each other. The argument is that probabilities emerge from this, since you don't know which world you will find yourself in. You bet on the favourite in the race because you think you are more likely to end up in a world in which the favourite wins. In other words, probabilities can make perfect sense in a single deterministic world. This was understood a long time ago with the development of statistical mechanics. The idea that "all possibilities happen in parallel worlds" does not actually make a lot of sense. There is no current physical theory that implies this (without the addition of a lot of unevidenced assumptions). So probabilities do not emerge from this, they come from quite simple assumptions of randomness and ignorance. Probability in the MWI of quantum mechanics is problematic. Regardless of claims to be able to derive the Born Rule in Everettian models, all attempts fail because they are circular -- they need the Born rule in order to have non-interacting worlds, so you cannot then use these independent worlds to derive the Born rule. Gleason's theorem is no help -- it suffers from all the same problems as the Deutsch- Wallace approach. You don't seem to be disputing that we would still experience a probabilistic world even if all possibilities were actually realised, even though you do dispute that we in fact live in such a world. I'm not sure if you are disputing that, to give a simple model case, if a coin was tossed and the world split in two, with one version of you seeing heads and the other tails, the probability of each outcome is 1/2. Whether or not all possibilities are realized, they are not in evidence, so their relevance to the question of probabilities is questionable. Your simple model case of a coin toss causing a world split is just a made-up example to give the result you want, so again its relevance is dubious. There is no sensible physical theory in which the world splits on classical coin tosses. If you can't imagine a world split, consider a virtual reality in which the program forks every time a coin is tossed, one fork seeing heads and the other tails. You are an observer in this world and you have this information, so you know for certain that "all possibilities are realised" when the coin is tossed. What would you say about your expectation of seeing heads? I presume you mean that the world is duplicated on each toss, with one branch showing each outcome. We are back to the dreaded "person duplication" problem. My opinion on this is that on such a duplication, two new persons are created, so the probability that the origi
