On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > I will answer your next post if it contains something new.
Then I guess it contained something new. > > >> >> >> >> that can be emulated in arithmetic as all computations can be emulated >> > > > >> > Bullshit. > > > > No, it is a theorem in computer science. > Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. > > computations, emulation are used in the original mathematical sense of > Turing. > Turing reduced a computer to it's essentials so we can understand how they work, no computer is simpler than a Turing Machine, but even a Turing Machine needs a tape made of matter and a read head that be changed by the physical tape and a write head that can make chances to that physical tape. > > Those are arithmetical notion. A rithmetical notions don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. > > > The notion of physical computation is a different notion, > Yes they are different, lots of people have made physical computations but *NOBODY* has ever made a non-physical computation and there is zero evidence anybody ever could, although I can't prove nobody ever will. >> >> There are levels in physical stuff like physical computer hardware, but >> there are no levels in computations! > > > > > What? This is just wrong. In arithmetic you do have a simulation of a > fortran program elumating an algol program emulating a quantum computer > emulating the game of life emulating ... There are arbitrary long chain of > such simulation, > And at the end of that long chain the answer you get when 2 is added to 2 is still 4, the exact same 4 you'd get if it was just calculated in your head; it's not a simulated 4 it's just 4 and it has all the properties of any other 4. But simulated water does NOT have all the properties of physical water and I'm still waiting for you to explain why not if arithmetic really is more fundamental than matter as you claim. > > > I have given the definition already, reread them, or buy a book in > computer science. > Definitions don't make calculations and neither do books , physical microprocessor chips do. >> >> Why can't a simulated water program get the computer wet? > > > > > Because you can't create primitive matter, > A good answer or at least I can't think of a better one. If it's true then primitive matter must be more fundamental than arithmetic because it has something that numbers don't and can do things that numbers can't. > > > > But Arithmetic can simulate water making wet a computer. > Yes, but a computer can't simulate all wet computers, it can't create a wet computer made of real physical matter. OK now I'm going to do something I shouldn't and argue against what I just said. A simulated-simulated computer could go up a level and make a simulated computer wet, after all neither involve physics (except that both are running programs on the same physical computer). Some might say that what looks like hardware to somebody on one level would look like software to somebody on a higher level, but I don't think things are quite as clear cut as that; a conscious simulated computer might create and start up a simulated-simulated computer but it can't know what that simulated-simulated computer will come up with anymore than we can know what our programs will end up doing. So the simulated computer and the simulated-simulated computer influence each other and there is no strict top to bottom ordering as far as cause and effect is concerned. And yet no computer program running on a real physical computer can make that real physical computer wet. But maybe I'm wrong about that , a program could make a physical computer wet if it were running on the right hardware, say a computer with water balloons inside set to burst if the simulated computer performed action X. Some would say that would be cheating and it would be UNLESS our entire universe is a computer simulation, then to somebody in that level of higher reality than our own both the physical microprocessor and the physical water balloons would just be lines of program code. Of course the guy at that higher level would be pondering the same math vs physics question that we are and wondering if he wasn't a simulation too at an even higher level of reality. You keep saying you don't believe in fundamental primitive matter but the only way you could be right about that is if there is a infinite (and not just astronomical) number of levels above our own level each simulating the one below; because if there are only a finite number then the one at the very top would have to play by different rules and just accept the existence of matter as a brute fact that numbers can never explain or reproduce. >> >> if arithmetic really is more fundamental than physics I have >> grave difficulties in understanding why that arithmetic produced water >> should be lacking any attribute the physical water has, like the ability to >> quench my thirst. > > > > > It does not, except if you assume the existence of some primitive water, > I don't assume anything but I do know 4 things for certain: 1) Simulated water can *not* quench my thirst. 2) Physical water *can* quench my thirst. 3) You can not explain facts 1 and 2 if numbers are more fundamental than physics unless there are an infinite number of simulated realities above us. 4) A simpler explanation is we don't live in a computer simulation and physics is more fundamental than arithmetic. >> >> why don't you just emulate that hardware in arithmetic? > > > > > That is not enough, > That is what I suspect too, the laws of arithmetic just aren't good enough to make matter because they're lacking something and that is the laws of physics. > > > it must be emulated the right infinity of times > I sometimes suspect that too. Either there are an infinite number of stages above our own or matter must be something very special and can do things that arithmetic could never do. >> >> I see nothing >> above >> performing any calculations, you're just writing first grade arithmetic >> problems in a different notation, and your physical brain caused you to >> write the above rather than 2+3= 2+1 or 4+0= 5. > > > > > Proof? > Proofs don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. I want an *EXAMPLE*, I want a example of a calculation made without the use of matter that obeys the laws of Physics. > > > to prove this, you need to assume primary physical matter, > And to prove the nonexistence of primary physical matter you must assume that we are living in a computer simulation and there are an infinite (and not just an astronomically large) number of nested simulations above our own. >> >> If you use a more common notation and write 2+2 =4 those ASCII characters >> are not performing a calculation either, they're just reporting to me a >> calculation that your physical brain has already made. > > > > > No, we assimed the RA axioms, > > and then I can only give you a representation of the computation > Axioms don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. >> >> If calculations can really be done in RA then there is absolutely >> positively >> no reason you can't start the RA >> Computer Hardware Company >> and >> >> become >> a trillionaire >> . >> > > > > You are ridiculous. Computations can be done in RA. > The computations were made in 3 pounds of grey goo inside a box made of bone sitting on your shoulders and then the result of those computations were written on a physical paper in the notation of RA. RA didn't calculate anything, zero zilch, nada, goose egg. > > > usually I debate with person which claim that it can only be done in RA, > not in a physical universe, which can only approximate the computations > done in RA. > That would be a strange debate. Do you find a lot of people who think 2 + 2 is only approximately 4? > > > Computation is defined in arithmetic. > Definitions don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. > > >> >> >> >> This does not need any matter, like the existence of a prime number >> bigger than 1000^(1000^(1000^1000)) does not require matter. >> > > >> > But calculating that prime number most certainly *DOES* require matter. > > > > But that prime number existence does not depend on its computation, > I think maybe it does depend on the physical possibility of it being computed in the universe, although I could be wrong. > >> >> if the computational resources of the entire universe are insufficient >> to produce that prime number even in theory then I'm not entirely certain >> it would be meaningful to say it exists. > > > > > Then you bet on ultrafinitism, > Maybe but not necessarily, perhaps the computational resources of the entire universe is infinite, I just don't know. >> >> >> I am unable to answer a gibberish question about the future . > > > i > t is not gibberish, and the guy can make a prediction, like it will be > either W or M. "How many inches long is half a piece of string?" is a gibberish question, and "what one and only one city will you see after you becomes two?" is another gibberish question. Actually they're not questions at all, they're just gibberish. You need more than a question mark to write a question. >> >> >> If both are John Clark, and Bruno Marchal said they were, then obviously >> John Clark is NOT in only one place. > > > > > Sure, but the question is not were John Clark will be, but where he will > feel to be, > Then I guess you agree with my statement above because you say "sure" and if the personal pronoun "he" refers to John Clark then how does replacing the proper noun "John Clark" with the personal pronoun "he" alter the meaning of the sentence? And if where John Clark is doesn't mean where John Clark feels to be then what does it mean? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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