Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 9:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 15 Jul 2016, at 10:10, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker >> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/14/2016 4:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> >> On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >>> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark >>> wrote: On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > Thanks for illustrating what I just said. What you just said was: " Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this game is not to play it " And then I just said: "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that Telmo Menezes is not sane." >>> >>> >>> >>> It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane >>> people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of >>> playing the game (sooner or later). >>> >>> It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of >>> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your >>> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the >>> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny). >>> >>> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus >>> operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this >>> mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited >>> intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be >>> forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing >>> Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith. >>> >>> Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider >>> this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely >>> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion >>> has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist. >>> >>> I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go: >>> >>> "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never >>> heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12." >>> >>> This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious >>> people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that >>> your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas >>> of your interlocutor. >>> >>> You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score >>> internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to >>> you. >>> >> Rather accurate description I'm afraid. >> >> I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is >> Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some >> primary >> matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism >> (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to >> anything >> else simpler). >> >> I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of >> "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only >> matter/force >> exists, but only matter/force exists. >> >> Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot >> and >> the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to >> some >> point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I >> think >> Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he >> needs >> to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in >> a >> scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too >> bad >> he >> never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he >> dismissed >> logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which >> might >> explain this. >> >> Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be >> physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some >> oracle). >> >> When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what >> is >> primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up >> to >> the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the >> fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term >> of >> the >> (infinities of) computations (measure). > > > > Explanation is easy. Prediction is hard. >
Re: Holiday Exercise
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 3:33 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 15/07/2016 8:31 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Bruce Kellett >> wrote: >>> >>> On 15/07/2016 11:03 am, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> >>> Although I think JKC has a point about pronouns, I don't see what it has >>> to >>> do with Bruno's theory. He just proposes this as an illustration of >>> first-person-indetermancy as implicit in Everett's interpretation of QM. >>> It has problems with probability, but so does Everett's QM - what does >>> probability refer to when everything happens. The question of which JKC >>> just gets mapped to which world. >>> >>> >>> Exactly. I have made this point before. The first six or seven steps of >>> Bruno's argument are not really necessary. It is only when he moves the >>> Universal Dovetailer into platonia in step 8 that anything new actually >>> happens. >> >> I don't think the argument would pack the same punch without the >> previous steps. It's easy to dismiss the move to platonia without >> them. With them it is not so easy -- unless you resort to linguistic >> tricks like confusing 1p and 3p on purpose. > > > It is easy to dismiss the move to platonia at any time. Confusing 1p and 3p > is not relevant here. Confusing 1p and 3p is a trick used by several people to refute the initial steps of Bruno's argument, on the grounds of the supposed ambiguity of the pronouns. How do you dismiss the move to platonia while assuming computationalism? >>> He could have started there and argued for the reversal of physics >>> and computationalism directly. The duplication of persons is just a >>> distracting irrelevance to the main argument, >> >> The duplication machines are an excellent device to expose materialist >> self-contraditions (if you do not assume dualism). > > > Materialism or physicalism? > I don't think I am trying to defend the idea > that matter excludes the mental. Besides, where is the self-contradiction in > materialism (or physicalism)? Both entail that mind is an emergent phenomena on the complex interactions of physical particles. But then you are left, in my view, with two scenarios: - The complex interactions perform a computation, and that is what mind is. But then, the computation is necessarily finite and can be repeated. Unless you believe that this is the only universe there is and that it is finite in time, any such computation is bound to be repeated with p=1, so we reach a contradiction: mind cannot be local and associated to a specific piece of matter after all; - The complex interactions do something else than a computation. But then what do they do? All emergent phenomena that we know about can be traced back to some fundamental building blocks, but what are the building blocks in the case of consciousness? It's a magical step. >> I don't see how >> these contradictions would be exposed by outright proposing the move >> to platonia. This feels like an attempt to "put Bruno in his place" by >> forcing him to defang his argument. > > > If you propose the UD in platonia and derive physics from computations > through conscious persons, the "contradictions of materialism", if there are > such, become irrelevant. No, because the point is to show that computationalism and materialism are incompatible. >>> and depends so heavily on a >>> particular theory of personal identity as to be essentially useless. >> >> Would you mind restating Bruno's theory of personal identity in your >> own words (so that we can agree that we are on the same page) and the >> present a conflicting theory? I think this is the way forward. >> Otherwise it's just subtle ad hominen: "you are ignorant about the >> topic of personal identity!" > > > People on this list seem to be very quick to interpret a lack of > philosophical insight into anything (theories of personal identity here) as > an ad hominem, whereas it is often a simple statement of fact. It's an ad hominem if you do not cite the alternative theory that you are alluding to, so that we can go verify by ourselves and then come back with objections or change our minds. > Bruno himself > is always criticizing his critics for a lack of understanding of modal > logics and computer science. Yes, but he then goes on to explain these topics. Why don't you do the same and explain yours? > I find the commenters on this list to be, in > general, philosophically naive. Perhaps, but the majority are not (or were not) philosophy-adverse. Some are, but that's not me. > The theory of personal identity behind the duplication protocols is not > clearly spelled out, but it is basically a psychological theory, that places > heavy emphasis on personal memories, though no doubt does give some import > to things like character, values, beliefs, desires, intentions and so forth. I would say that, if you assume comp, then all of those things are encoded in the memories somehow. > There are several alternative theories of personal i
Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On 15 Jul 2016, at 10:10, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/14/2016 4:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes > wrote: Thanks for illustrating what I just said. What you just said was: " Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this game is not to play it " And then I just said: "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that Telmo Menezes is not sane." It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of playing the game (sooner or later). It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the acronym. Yes yes it's super funny). This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith. Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist. I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go: "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12." This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas of your interlocutor. You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to you. Rather accurate description I'm afraid. I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some primary matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to anything else simpler). I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only matter/force exists, but only matter/force exists. Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he needs to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which might explain this. Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some oracle). When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term of the (infinities of) computations (measure). Explanation is easy. Prediction is hard. I think it really depends. For example, it is very easy to predict that the sun will rise in the morning, but it took humanity a lot of time to come up with a good explanation of why this is the case. Or they came up with a lot of explanations and we only count as "good" those that give good predictions - like the shadow of the Sun on the Moon is a circle. Right, but the problem with laughing at them is that our current super-serious scientific theories might be the target of similar laughter by our descendants 1K years from now -- if we manage to survive that long, of course. A more modern set of examples: - Neural correlates are easy to find, explaining how the brain actually works is super-hard; - Epidemiological studies keep predicting all sorts of things about nutritional habits, Maybe I didn't express myself precisely enough. Prediction that is accurate All of the examples that I gave you are
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 15 Jul 2016, at 15:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 15/07/2016 8:31 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 15/07/2016 11:03 am, Brent Meeker wrote: Although I think JKC has a point about pronouns, I don't see what it has to do with Bruno's theory. He just proposes this as an illustration of first-person-indetermancy as implicit in Everett's interpretation of QM. It has problems with probability, but so does Everett's QM - what does probability refer to when everything happens. The question of which JKC just gets mapped to which world. Exactly. I have made this point before. The first six or seven steps of Bruno's argument are not really necessary. It is only when he moves the Universal Dovetailer into platonia in step 8 that anything new actually happens. I don't think the argument would pack the same punch without the previous steps. It's easy to dismiss the move to platonia without them. With them it is not so easy -- unless you resort to linguistic tricks like confusing 1p and 3p on purpose. It is easy to dismiss the move to platonia at any time. read the apers or my posts. There is no "move in Platonia". There is only "arithmetical realism", the belief that 2+2=4. That is assumed in all physical theories. Confusing 1p and 3p is not relevant here. Then you are changing the topic. He could have started there and argued for the reversal of physics and computationalism directly. The duplication of persons is just a distracting irrelevance to the main argument, The duplication machines are an excellent device to expose materialist self-contraditions (if you do not assume dualism). Materialism or physicalism? I don't think I am trying to defend the idea that matter excludes the mental. Besides, where is the self- contradiction in materialism (or physicalism)? Step 7 (with Occam), or step 8 (with a much weaker Occam). I don't see how these contradictions would be exposed by outright proposing the move to platonia. This feels like an attempt to "put Bruno in his place" by forcing him to defang his argument. If you propose the UD in platonia The UD existence is a theorem in Peano Arithmetic. Or a metatheorem about Robinson Arithmetic. and derive physics from computations through conscious persons, the "contradictions of materialism", if there are such, become irrelevant. How could the theorem becomes irrelevant. UDA is the proof that materialism needs non Turing emulable/recoverable magic in the brain to make sense, and thus contradict computationalism. (recoverable = FPI recoverable). and depends so heavily on a particular theory of personal identity as to be essentially useless. Would you mind restating Bruno's theory of personal identity in your own words (so that we can agree that we are on the same page) and the present a conflicting theory? I think this is the way forward. Otherwise it's just subtle ad hominen: "you are ignorant about the topic of personal identity!" People on this list seem to be very quick to interpret a lack of philosophical insight into anything (theories of personal identity here) as an ad hominem, whereas it is often a simple statement of fact. All I see is that you pursue the confusion between 1p and 3p, but taking the definition, agreed by everyone, even JKC, we get the result directly, when taking the fundamental difference between the 1p and the 3p view. Do you agree that both the W-guy and the M-guy (in the step 3 protocol) get both one bit of information? Bruno himself is always criticizing his critics for a lack of understanding of modal logics and computer science. When I criticize attempt to refute AUDA (the translation of UDA in arithmetic, or the interview of the Löbian machine). But here we are in UDA, which does not presuppose modal logics nor many computer science, just an intuition on computation, that is a passive understanding of how a computer works. I got UDA by a reflexion in molecular biology. I realize later that the main thing already exiosts in arithmetic, and that computer science brought an exact biology and psychology, and theology, in arithmetic. You, on the contrary do the constant philosophical error consisting in a invocation of some "real thing" or "reality", well a God, in the theoretical sense of the antic greeks. I find the commenters on this list to be, in general, philosophically naive. That is the move: I lost the argument, so I will content myself with insulting the audience. The theory of personal identity behind the duplication protocols is not clearly spelled out, It is. Even JKC agrees on it. What is clearly spelled out, but that you want to dismiss, is the obvious fact that both the H and M guy got one bit of information, from each of such personal view attained in that protocol. but it is basically a psychological th
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 15 Jul 2016, at 04:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 15/07/2016 12:38 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jul 2016, at 02:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 13/07/2016 11:36 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jul 2016, at 13:49, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 11/07/2016 9:31 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Holiday Exercise: A guy undergoes the Washington Moscow duplication, starting again from Helsinki. Then in Moscow, but not in Washington, he (the one in Moscow of course) undergoes a similar Sidney-Beijing duplication. I write P(H->M) the probability in H to get M. In Helsinki, he tries to evaluate his chance to get Sidney. With one reasoning, he (the H-guy) thinks that P(H-M) = 1/2, and that P(M-S) = 1/2, and so conclude (multiplication of independent probability) that P(H-S) = 1/2 * 1/2 = 1/4. But with another reasoning, he thinks that the duplications give globally a triplication, leading eventually to a copy in W, a copy in S and a copy in B, and so, directly conclude P(H- S) = 1/3. So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ? Neither. The probability that the guy starting from Helsinki gets to Sydney is unity. Try to convince the guy who gets to Beijing, or the one who stayed in Washington. He knows that the probability evaluated in Helsinki was not P(Sidney) = 1. We start with John Clark in Helsinki, so P(JC ~ H) = 1. By construction, after the duplication and so on, P(JC ~ W) = P(JC ~ S) = P(JC ~ B) = 1. (I use '~' as a shorthand for 'in' or 'sees'.) In the 3-1 view, that is correct. There is no such thing as "the 3-1 view" distinct from the first person view. That is just a piece of jargon that you made up to cover the fact that you have assumed a distinction where none exists. Of course there is. In the 3-1 view, we can say JC survived, and feel unique, in both cities. But when the question is about the 1-view expected by the H-guy, the answer is unambiguously "in W or in M, as I know in advance that both copies will fell unique and like getting one bit of information". But in my posts I insist that "W", "M" denotes the experience of opening the door or the reconstitution box, and writting in the personal diary which cities is seen. In that case, obviously, P(W), P(S) and P(B) cannot be all equal to one as W, S and B are incompatible event. These are not incompatible events: there are three physical bodies, one in each city. These are incompatible *experience*. These are incompatible for describing the 1-views. It is obvious that all copies will say "one city". And, well, the question was about that unique city that all 1- views will confirm as being "only one city". You seem to eliminate the 1-views, and be on the eliminativist slope. Your definition of personal identity depends only on memories (backed up by personal diaries if necessary). Exact. With this definition, and the protocol described, the bodies in W, S, and B are all the same person. That is ambiguous. They are all THE same person AS THE H-GUY, but of course the HM-guy and the WM guy have become different from each other, despite being both THE H-guy. Identity in modal context does not obey Leibniz identity rule. So it is JC who sees W, JC who sees S, and JC who sees B. Yes, but not at once, as seeing (from the 1p view) W and seeing S, and seeing B, are INCOMPATIBLE 1p experiences. They are all the same person, so the correct prediction is that JC will see all three cities. In the 3-1 view. But that would be obviously contradicted by all the 1- views, which was what we were predicting. If you now introduce a difference between the copies, then they become different persons, and the correct prediction would be that JC (who sees H) will see no further cities because he no longer exists. The H-guy knows that both the W and M guys will be version of the H- guy having survived two teleportation experiences, and that those experiences will be incompatible *experiences*. JC in Helsinki knows the protocol, so he can easily see that these are the correct probabilities. So, as I said, the probability that the guy starting from Helsinki gets to Sydney is unity. Any other interpretation of this scenario involves an implicit appeal to dualism -- there is "one true JC" that goes through these duplications, and he can only ever end up in just one place. Not at all. By comp we agree that they are all the true JC, and that they all see, taken together, all cities. But the question is about the personal events lived by the H-guy after he will push the button, and that makes the events (1p-events) incompatible. As I said above, the events are not incompatible. You are relying on an intuition formed in a world without person duplication. We duplicate since we are amoebas. The sexual reproduction has just add some shuffling in evolution. And, if I introduced those duplication, it was for people understanding that a 3-1
