Re: Is math real?

2017-08-31 Thread Brent Meeker



On 8/31/2017 2:20 AM, David Nyman wrote:



On 29 Aug 2017 04:39, "Brent Meeker" > wrote:




On 8/28/2017 10:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 28 Aug 2017, at 02:44, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 8/27/2017 10:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 August 2017 at 21:51, Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 8/25/2017 9:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Aug 2017, at 20:57, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 8/24/2017 1:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Aug 2017, at 20:43, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 8/23/2017 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I am not someone proposing any new
theory. I am someone showing that the
current materialist metaphysics just
can't work with the Mechanist hypothesis.


Refresh my understanding.  What it the
mechanist hyposthesis? Is it the same as
computationalism?


Yes.

Computationalism = Digital Mechanism =
Mechanism = (Yes-Doctor + Church's Thesis)




Or is it the same as yes-doctor plus
reifying arithmetic?


No, it is (yes-doctor + Church's Thesis).

I do not add since long "Arithmetical Realism"
because many people tend to put to much into
it, and is actually redundant with Church's
thesis. To just understand Church's thesis
automatically assume we believe in some
"essentially undecidable theory", and this is
equiavalent with believing in the right amount
of arithmetic.
I will write a post on the detailed starting
point of the mathematics needed to derive
physics from "machine's theology".





>From your use, these all seem slightly
different to me.  It would be helpful to
some firm definitions - not just usage.


I use them as completely equivalent, although
in the literature they are usually stronger.
Putnam's functionalism is a version of Digital
Mechanism which assumes a substitition level
rather high, where my version just ask for the
existence of a substitution level. My version
is the weaker form possible, and Maudlin, in
his Olympia paper, suggests that if we define
mechanism in this way, it becomes trivial, a
bit like Diderot defined "rationalism" by
Descartes' Mechanism.

So a firm definition of Mechanism (in my weak
sense) is

1) Church's Thesis (a function from N to N is
computable iff it exists a combinator which
computes it)

    (There are many variants of this. You can
replace also "combinator" by "game of life
pattern", or "fortran program" or "c++
program", or "quantum computer" etc.). Note
that this asks for "Arithmetical realism" which
is only the believe that the RA axioms makes
"absolute sense", which means basically that
not only 17 is prime, but that this is true
independently of me, you, or anyone, or
anything physical. All mathematicians are
arithmetical realist. The fight on realism is
in Analysis or set theory, not arithmetic,
especially without induction axiom like with
RA. Even a quasi ultra-finitist like Nelson
agrees with RA.


2) Yes-Doctor (= my consciousness is invariant
for a digital physical brain transplant made at
some level of description of my (generalized)
brain.

It asserts the existence of that substitution
level, and is equivalent with accepting that we
can use classical teleportation as a mean of
travel (UDA step 1).

Important Remark: that definition does not ask
for surviving without a physical brain/machine.
That is indeed the object of the UDA reasoning:
showing that we cannot invoke God, or
Primary-Matter to block the immaterialist

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-08-31 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 1:52 PM, Terren Suydam 
wrote:

​> ​
> Let's dumb it down and forget about prediction and rationality for the
> moment. Let's say instead of making two copies, we're just dealing with a
> teleporter that destroys you in Helsinki and duplicates you in Barcelona.
> Let's just focus on what your inner experience is like as you progress
> through the duplicator. You enter the duplicator - in Helsinki let's say
> the duplication chamber is red, and you notice this. Then the duplication
> happens and you open your eyes and the walls are now blue, since the
> chamber in Barcelona is of course blue. Do you have any problem with any of
> this?
>

​No, all the pronouns are crystal clear because no duplication was
involved, ​

​there was only one John Clark ​before and only one John Clark after. But I
don't see the point of the
teleporter
​, an airplane going from Helsinki to ​
Barcelona
​ would produce the same result.

John K Clark​

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-08-31 Thread David Nyman
On 31 Aug 2017 18:52, "Terren Suydam"  wrote:


On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 7:19 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Aug 30, 2017  Terren Suydam  wrote:
>
>
>> ​>
 ​>> ​
 ​
 All that's necessary is to imagine or simulate the first person
 perspective of the one who gets duplicated.

>>>
>>> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> Which ​ONE
>>>
>>> ​"*THE​*
>>> first person perspective
>>> ​" is ​
>>> Terren Suydam
>>> ​ referring to ​
>>>
>>> ​"*THE​*
>>>  first person perspective
>>> ​" in Moscow or
>>> ​"*THE​*
>>>  first person perspective
>>> ​"  in Washington or
>>> ​
>>> ​"*THE​*
>>>  first person perspective
>>> ​" in Helsinki?
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> The one about to enter the duplication machine. What happens when you
>> simulate that person's first-person experience?
>>
>
> ​If he's about to enter the machine but hasn't yet done so then you're
> simulating the Helsinki man. The simulation shows that IF the Helsinki man
> is rational (and he might not be especially on matters like this, in fact
> most people aren't as this list proves) then the Helsinki man expects that
> very soon TWO people will remember being the Helsinki man but neither of
> them will be in Helsinki. What else do you want to know, what else is there
> to predict? ​
>
> ​
>
> John K Clark​
>
>
Let's dumb it down and forget about prediction and rationality for the
moment. Let's say instead of making two copies, we're just dealing with a
teleporter that destroys you in Helsinki and duplicates you in Barcelona.
Let's just focus on what your inner experience is like as you progress
through the duplicator.

You enter the duplicator - in Helsinki let's say the duplication chamber is
red, and you notice this. Then the duplication happens and you open your
eyes and the walls are now blue, since the chamber in Barcelona is of
course blue.

Do you have any problem with any of this?


And so, you too cross the event horizon.


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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-08-31 Thread Terren Suydam
On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 7:19 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Aug 30, 2017  Terren Suydam  wrote:
>
>
>> ​>
 ​>> ​
 ​
 All that's necessary is to imagine or simulate the first person
 perspective of the one who gets duplicated.

>>>
>>> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> Which ​ONE
>>>
>>> ​"*THE​*
>>> first person perspective
>>> ​" is ​
>>> Terren Suydam
>>> ​ referring to ​
>>>
>>> ​"*THE​*
>>>  first person perspective
>>> ​" in Moscow or
>>> ​"*THE​*
>>>  first person perspective
>>> ​"  in Washington or
>>> ​
>>> ​"*THE​*
>>>  first person perspective
>>> ​" in Helsinki?
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> The one about to enter the duplication machine. What happens when you
>> simulate that person's first-person experience?
>>
>
> ​If he's about to enter the machine but hasn't yet done so then you're
> simulating the Helsinki man. The simulation shows that IF the Helsinki man
> is rational (and he might not be especially on matters like this, in fact
> most people aren't as this list proves) then the Helsinki man expects that
> very soon TWO people will remember being the Helsinki man but neither of
> them will be in Helsinki. What else do you want to know, what else is there
> to predict? ​
>
> ​
>
> John K Clark​
>
>
Let's dumb it down and forget about prediction and rationality for the
moment. Let's say instead of making two copies, we're just dealing with a
teleporter that destroys you in Helsinki and duplicates you in Barcelona.
Let's just focus on what your inner experience is like as you progress
through the duplicator.

You enter the duplicator - in Helsinki let's say the duplication chamber is
red, and you notice this. Then the duplication happens and you open your
eyes and the walls are now blue, since the chamber in Barcelona is of
course blue.

Do you have any problem with any of this?

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-08-31 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 4:05 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> *"What one and only one city will YOU see after YOU have been duplicated
>> and become two?"*
>
>
> ​> ​
> That question is gibberish, because it lacks the key precision needed.
>

​BULLSHIT! Stripped of its meaningless pronouns and homemade baby talk
​that is exactly precisely the "question" Bruno Marchal is asking; and yes
it is gibberish and that's why it is not a question its just words with a
question mark at the end.

John K Clark




>
>
>
>
>
> IS,... drum roll ​please
>
>
> ​*"​*
> *The "helsinki man" has become 2, and the question was on its first person
> experience possible, so the only way to get the answer is to ask each
> copy.​"*
>
> And the reader is free to attach any meaning one wishes or no meaning at
> all to the pronoun "its".
>
>
> No, only on the first person state accessible.
>
> For more see my post of 27/08/2017. You are just systematically deforming
> the question, and then talk like it was gibbersih, but this applies only to
> your own rephrasing of the question.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> And apparently Bruno also gives the reader freedom to give any answer they
> wish to the original question because despite all the verbiage generated
> over the years Bruno has never
> ​once ​
> provided a
> ​n​
> answer
> ​to it​
> .
>
> ​
> Or maybe I'm wrong, maybe Bruno did answer
> ​the question​
>  and I just misunderstood him, maybe Bruno meant that the name of the one
> and only one city
> ​ was​
>
> ​
> Thehelsinkimanhasbecome2andthequestionwasonitsfirstpersonexp
> eriencepossiblesotheonlywaytogettheansweristoaskeachcopy.
> ​
>
> ​
> If
> ​ ​
> that was the intended meaning
> ​ ​
> I'd appreciate it if Bruno would provide
> ​ ​
> the latitude and longitude
> ​ ​
> coordinates because I'm having difficulty finding a city by that name on
> my globe.
>
>
> ​ ​
> John K Clark
>
>>
>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-08-31 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> If he's about to enter the machine but hasn't yet done so then you're
>> simulating the Helsinki man. The simulation shows that IF the Helsinki man
>> is rational (and he might not be especially on matters like this, in fact
>> most people aren't as this list proves)
>
>
> ​> ​
> Lies. Only you have a problem with this.
>

​And everybody known science is a popularity ​contest and truth is whatever
gets the most votes.


​>> ​
>> then the Helsinki man expects that very soon TWO people will remember
>> being the Helsinki man
>
>
> ​> ​
> In the third person description. But that is not the question asked.
>

​Perhaps not but John Clark doesn't know because nobody, absolutely nobody
has clearly articulated exactly what the question is, in fact they can't
even clearly say approximately what the question is; nor can they explain
why they are surprised that you can't make a prediction, or do anything
else for that matter, IF YOU DON'T EXIST.

but neither of them will be in Helsinki.
>
>
> ​>​
> Both of them will be the Helsinki person, by the definition of personal
> identity we have agree on.
>

​Ok I agree. So if each of them is the Helsinki person, and if each sees a
different city, and if 1+1 is still equal to 2 ,then you tell me, how many
cities did the Helsinki person end up seeing? It sure seems like two to
me.  I know what you're going to say, in the peepee but not the poopoo.


> ​> ​
> And both will confirm that they have obtained one bit of information.
>

​What bit of information was that? I can't think of any information they
have obtained that everybody else didn't already have long before the
duplication.

What else do you want to know, what else is there to predict?
>
>
> ​
>
Where you will find yourself after pushing on the button.
>

​As usual Bruno Marchal is hiding behind pronouns to cover up fuzzy
thinking. If John Clark knew what "yourself" meant in a question about the
future and a man about to enter a yourself duplicating machine then John
Clark could provide an answer.  ​



>  If you are OK with P(coffee)
> ​ [...]​
>

​To hell with your damn coffee!​



> ​> ​
> you cannot write in your diary
> ​ [...]​
>

​To hell with your damn diary!​


​John K Clark​




>
>

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Re: Is math real?

2017-08-31 Thread David Nyman
On 29 Aug 2017 04:39, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 8/28/2017 10:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 28 Aug 2017, at 02:44, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 8/27/2017 10:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 August 2017 at 21:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 8/25/2017 9:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 24 Aug 2017, at 20:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On 8/24/2017 1:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>

 On 23 Aug 2017, at 20:43, Brent Meeker wrote:


>
> On 8/23/2017 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I am not someone proposing any new theory. I am someone showing that
>> the current materialist metaphysics just can't work with the Mechanist
>> hypothesis.
>>
>
> Refresh my understanding.  What it the mechanist hyposthesis? Is it
> the same as computationalism?
>

 Yes.

 Computationalism = Digital Mechanism = Mechanism = (Yes-Doctor +
 Church's Thesis)




 Or is it the same as yes-doctor plus reifying arithmetic?
>

 No, it is (yes-doctor + Church's Thesis).

 I do not add since long "Arithmetical Realism" because many people tend
 to put to much into it, and is actually redundant with Church's thesis. To
 just understand Church's thesis automatically assume we believe in some
 "essentially undecidable theory", and this is equiavalent with believing in
 the right amount of arithmetic.
 I will write a post on the detailed starting point of the mathematics
 needed to derive physics from "machine's theology".





 >From your use, these all seem slightly different to me.  It would be
> helpful to some firm definitions - not just usage.
>

 I use them as completely equivalent, although in the literature they
 are usually stronger. Putnam's functionalism is a version of Digital
 Mechanism which assumes a substitition level rather high, where my version
 just ask for the existence of a substitution level. My version is the
 weaker form possible, and Maudlin, in his Olympia paper, suggests that if
 we define mechanism in this way, it becomes trivial, a bit like Diderot
 defined "rationalism" by Descartes' Mechanism.

 So a firm definition of Mechanism (in my weak sense) is

 1) Church's Thesis (a function from N to N is computable iff it exists
 a combinator which computes it)

 (There are many variants of this. You can replace also "combinator"
 by "game of life pattern", or "fortran program" or "c++ program", or
 "quantum computer" etc.). Note that this asks for "Arithmetical realism"
 which is only the believe that the RA axioms makes "absolute sense", which
 means basically that not only 17 is prime, but that this is true
 independently of me, you, or anyone, or anything physical. All
 mathematicians are arithmetical realist. The fight on realism is in
 Analysis or set theory, not arithmetic, especially without induction axiom
 like with RA. Even a quasi ultra-finitist like Nelson agrees with RA.


 2) Yes-Doctor (= my consciousness is invariant for a digital physical
 brain transplant made at some level of description of my (generalized)
 brain.

 It asserts the existence of that substitution level, and is equivalent
 with accepting that we can use classical teleportation as a mean of travel
 (UDA step 1).

 Important Remark: that definition does not ask for surviving without a
 physical brain/machine. That is indeed the object of the UDA reasoning:
 showing that we cannot invoke God, or Primary-Matter to block the
 immaterialist consequence of Digital Mechanism.

>>>
>>> That's where I think some imprecision sneaks in.  Yes-doctor was
>>> originally presented as substituting some digitally simulated nuerons in
>>> the brain.  But then it was generalized to the whole brain.  But we think
>>> with more than our brain.  Our body contributes hormones and afferent and
>>> efferent nerve impluses. And the environment provides stimulation to those
>>> nerves and an arena within which we act.  All that is taken for granted in
>>> answering "yes doctor" or teletransporting.  So it appears to me that you
>>> implicitly suppose all of this is also digitally replaced.
>>>
>>
>> The reasoning does not depend on the substitution level.
>>
>> My version of mechanism is much weaker than all the others. I assume only
>> the existence of a substitution level (such that your conscious experience
>> would remain invariant for a digital substitution made at that level).
>>
>> If you want, you can take the Heinsenberg matrix of the whole observable
>> physical reality, at the level of the (super)-strings, with
>> 10^(10^(10^1000)) decimals exact for the complex numbers and real numbers
>> involved. The thought experience become harder to imagine, but eventually,
>> it is "the real experience" of the step 7

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-08-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Aug 2017, at 17:23, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>> ​The ​thought experiment ​asks the question ​"what one  
and only one city will YOU see after YOU have been duplicated and  
become two?", so of course the meaning of the personal pronoun in  
the question is relevant!


​> ​Lie by omission. Cf my post of the 27 August 2017.

​​​OK let's look that up. So ​according ​to Bruno Marchal  
the correct answer to the question:


​"What one and only one city will YOU see after YOU have been  
duplicated and become two?"


That question is gibberish, because it lacks the key precision needed.






IS,... drum roll ​please

​"​The "helsinki man" has become 2, and the question was on its  
first person experience possible, so the only way to get the answer  
is to ask each copy.​"


And the reader is free to attach any meaning one wishes or no  
meaning at all to the pronoun "its".


No, only on the first person state accessible.

For more see my post of 27/08/2017. You are just systematically  
deforming the question, and then talk like it was gibbersih, but this  
applies only to your own rephrasing of the question.


Bruno




And apparently Bruno also gives the reader freedom to give any  
answer they wish to the original question because despite all the  
verbiage generated over the years Bruno has never ​once ​provided  
a​n​ answer ​to it​.


​Or maybe I'm wrong, maybe Bruno did answer ​the question​ and  
I just misunderstood him, maybe Bruno meant that the name of the one  
and only one city​ was​
​ 
Thehelsinkimanhasbecome2andthequestionwasonitsfirstpersonexperiencepossiblesotheonlywaytogettheansweristoaskeachcopy 
. ​


​If​ ​that was the intended meaning​ ​I'd appreciate it if  
Bruno would provide​ ​the latitude and longitude​ ​ 
coordinates because I'm having difficulty finding a city by that  
name on my globe.


 ​ ​John K Clark


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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-08-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 Aug 2017, at 01:19, John Clark wrote:


On Wed, Aug 30, 2017  Terren Suydam  wrote:

​>​>> ​ ​All that's necessary is to imagine or simulate the  
first person perspective of the one who gets duplicated.


​​>> ​Which ​ONE ​"THE​ first person perspective​"  
is ​Terren Suydam​ referring to ​ ​"THE​ first person  
perspective​" in Moscow or ​"THE​ first person perspective​"   
in Washington or​ ​"THE​ first person perspective​" in  
Helsinki?


​> ​The one about to enter the duplication machine. What happens  
when you simulate that person's first-person experience?


​If he's about to enter the machine but hasn't yet done so then  
you're simulating the Helsinki man. The simulation shows that IF the  
Helsinki man is rational (and he might not be especially on matters  
like this, in fact most people aren't as this list proves)


Lies. Only you have a problem with this. Note that you repeat a  
question by (again) throwing out the precision needed.




then the Helsinki man expects that very soon TWO people will  
remember being the Helsinki man


In the third person description. But that is not the question asked.



but neither of them will be in Helsinki.


Both of them will be the Helsinki person, by the definition of  
personal identity we have agree on. And both will confirm that they  
have obtained one bit of information.





What else do you want to know, what else is there to predict? ​ ​


Where you will find yourself after pushing on the button.  If you are  
OK with P(coffee) = 1, you have to accept P(seeing one city) = 1, and  
you cannot write in your diary which one. So W v M is the best  
expectation, and for reason of numerical identity: P(W) = P(M) = 1/2.


Bruno





John K Clark​





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