date:20180114

On 1/14/2018 8:24 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Sunday, January 14, 2018 at 9:25:40 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 1:40 AM, Brent Meeker >wrote:

>> 
I think that would be true if, as in your example, the
observer were freely falling into the Black Hole, but if I
was hovering just outside the Event Horizon in a super
powerful spaceship I could observe the Black Hole
evaporating in just a few minutes

> 
That seems doubtful since Hawking radiation has its peak
wavelength on the order of the diameter of the black hole and
originates in the vicinity, i.e. within a few radii of the
black hole, not "at the event horizon".

Most Hawking radiation originates where the tidal forces are the
greatest, and that would be at the Event Horizon. The closer I
hover above the Event Horizon the slower my clock will tick, so if
I hover close enough I can watch the entire Black Hole evaporate
away in just a few minutes by my clock even though for you back on
Earth that would take a billion trillion years or so. The thing
that causes Black Hole evaporation is Hawking radiation, so if I
observe one I'm going to have to observe the other, although
"observe" may not be the right word, "incinerate" might be better.

John K Clark

Where the Hawking occurs is a tad funny. For a distant observer the 
radiation will appear to occur at about 4GM/c^2 from the horizon that 
has a radius of 2GM/c^2. This does correspond to the wavelength of the 
radiation and so forth. However, if you are on an accelerated frame 
stationary with respect to the horizon the radiation occurs closer to 
the horzion. In the limit you reach Planck acceleration ~ 10^{51}m/s^2 
the radiation occurs a Planck length above the horizon. So what is 
going on?

So how do you see it if you're free-falling in?  Do you see it as blue 
shifted as you approach the BH at increasing speed, but it diminishes in 
the region between 4GM/c^2 and 2GM/c^2 as you fall toward the event horizon?

Brent

If you observe an object fall towards a black hole it will by the 
tortoise coordinate appear to hover just above the horizon. Conversely 
the quantum fields and ultimately quantum bits from that object will 
appear outside the black hole. In effect they appear at two places at 
the same time! What we think of as an event in spacetime as a unique 
specifier of the state of a system is an approximation. With quantum 
field theory there has been a lot of stuff to remove nonlocality, such 
as Wightman conditions of commutators of observables. Quantum 
nonlocality plays a subtle role and in high energy experimental 
physics its physical influence is considered negligible. However, the 
time dilation physics of a black hole amplifies these nonlocal 
influences so they can no longer be ignored.

LC
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Re: Inside Black Holes

On Sunday, January 14, 2018 at 1:00:48 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/14/2018 5:30 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Saturday, January 13, 2018 at 6:30:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/13/2018 2:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 13, 2018 at 2:59:00 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>> Classically, the radiation isn't "trapped"; it goes to the singularity 
>>> (what the QM does? dunno).  The inflowing radiation is just that starlight 
>>> that falls on the event horizon...which is not particularly bright.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> I'm referring to the INTERIOR of the BH. 
>>
>>
>> So am I.
>>
>> If the radiation is trapped inside, the environment is likely hot and 
>> bright. 
>>
>>
>> Or it's absorbed by the singularity...or whatever is really there.  
>> There's not reasonable picture in which it is "trapped inside" and is 
>> flying around inside the black hole.  Inside a Schawarzschild black hole 
>> "the singularity" is on the future of every world line, including null 
>> ones.  Inside a Kerr-Newman black hole it may be possible to miss "the 
>> singularity" but then it appears to connect to a another spacetime.  Both 
>> of these are solutions for eternal black holes, so when it's a black hole 
>> that forms and then evaporates the solutions may not hold.  However, except 
>> near "the singularity" the analyses would hold and so except for within 
>> nanoseconds of "the singularity" all photons are going to be traveling 
>> toward "the singularity" and not flying around willy-nilly, "trapped" in 
>> the black hole.  They can't turn around because that direction is the past.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> This of course gets a bit weird. I put in a short Penrose diagram of the 
> Kerr-Newman black hole. Matter on the right I region will cross the r_+ 
> horizon and fall into the III spacelike region. From there it must cross 
> the interior horizon at r_-. Now there are two funny points here. The first 
> is whether the r_- horizon is a mass inflation singularity and prevents any 
> information from crossing. 
>
>
> But have you seen this paper:
>
> Mass inflation inside black holes revisited
> Vyacheslav I. Dokuchaev
> (Submitted on 1 Sep 2013 (v1), last revised 21 Feb 2014 (this version, v4))
> The mass inflation phenomenon implies that black hole interiors are 
> unstable due to a back-reaction divergence of the perturbed black hole mass 
> function at the Cauchy horizon. Weak point in the standard mass inflation 
> calculations is in a fallacious using of the global Cauchy horizon as a 
> place for the maximal growth of the back-reaction perturbations instead of 
> the local inner apparent horizon. It is derived the new spherically 
> symmetric back-reaction solution for two counter-streaming light-like 
> fluxes near the inner apparent horizon of the charged black hole by taking 
> into account its separation from the Cauchy horizon. In this solution the 
> back-reaction perturbations of the background metric are truly the largest 
> at the inner apparent horizon, but, nevertheless, remain small. The back 
> reaction, additionally, removes the infinite blue-shift singularity at the 
> inner apparent horizon and at the Cauchy horizon.
>  (or arXiv:1309.0224v4 [gr-qc] for this version)
>
>
> Brent
>

I will take a look at this as soon as possible. I always have quite a stack 
of stuff that I need to read. A part of this of course is that we are not 
certain about the black hole interior. The eternal solutions of Einstein's 
field equations are mathematical idealizations. What occurs physically is 
more difficult to understand because the birth and death of a black hole is 
a topological change, a sort of cobordism on spacetime. General relativity 
does not handle this.

LC
 

>
> The other is a spatial surface in the cosmology region I has two 
> alternatives that connect to two inner timelike regions IV and V. This 
> illustrates some possible monodromy associated with the interior of a black 
> hole. 
>
> The prospect of this monodromy raises the question of whether these inner 
> regions IV and V are in some ways entangled with quantum states in the 
> exterior region. There then might be some physical region there instead of 
> just this being a mathematical idealization. If so this interior region is 
> filled with radiation and particles on closed timelike curves cycling 
> around the singularity. The real question of course is whether there is 
> some entanglement of states between the regions I and II, two timelike 
> regions that may have multiverse considerations, and whether the ambiguity 
> of how one pushes a spacelike surface forwards means there are also 
> entanglements in the two interior regions.
>
> LC
>
>
> 
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subs

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?




On 1/14/2018 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Jan 2018, at 01:36, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 1/11/2018 4:11 AM, David Nyman wrote:



On 11 Jan 2018 04:02, "Brent Meeker" > wrote:




On 1/10/2018 6:56 PM, David Nyman wrote:



On 11 Jan 2018 02:34, "Brent Meeker" mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 1/10/2018 6:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:

If you read the rest of Tallis's piece you'll see that he
criticises the characterisation of the physical
environment as encoding 'information' independent of
interpretation. This objection can be dealt with by the
reversal,


Can it?  Isn't it just /assumed/ that the computational
relations, or number relations, encode information?  That
was my objection that the MGA was missing the necessity of
an environment for its computation to be "about". Bruno has
generally agreed with this and said it just means that the
environment (i.e. physics) is part of what is realized in
the computations of the UD.  But notice that this doesn't
answer a Tallis like objection that "computation is nothing
like experience" and "information is nothing like environment".


But the argument implies that the epistemic entailments of
computation,


That a computation has epistemic entailments is an assumption
that it's a computation /about/ something.  The argument
/assumes/ that so far as I can see.


I think you're right in part, to the extent that Theatatus's 
criterion of knowledge, which includes the assumption of the 
(tautological) truth of the belief, is indeed an explicit axiom.


Aren't you jumping over the question?  If I have a set of diophantine 
equations that instantiate a universal computer and they have an 
integer that is a solution, that's a computation.  But why is it 
"about anything"? which parts of this process constitute knowledge or 
belief?  What proposition is true?


But as is the case with all hypotheses, the burden is then to 
persuade that adopting this axiom


But what exactly is the axiom?  Saying "Yes" to the doctor is the 
axiom that a replacement brain which instantiates all the same 
input-output functions will preserve one's internal narrative and 
memories with no significant differences.  That is identical to 
"Philosophical zombies are impossible."  Which means that intelligent 
behavior entails consciousness.  Which means consciousness can be 
studied by third persons.


is a reasonable step towards shedding some light on the problem 
we've set out to address. And one of the defining characteristics of 
beliefs of the requisite sort is indeed their indubitably, at least 
as a first approximation. IOW, each sentient agent, willy-nilly, is 
irrevocably bound (the 'bet' on a reality) to the primary 
veridicality of phenomena to which it is thereafter both 
epistemically and procedurally committed.


Since "bound" and "committed" are synonyms...I think that was a 
tautology.  But I'm not sure about the function of "willy-nilly", 
"irrevocably", and "primary"  or what would be an example of a belief 
not of the "requisite sort"?




And again, the point of studying the self-referential logics in this 
regard is to provide the kernel of a model of *aboutness* that could 
indeed be understood as  'reaching out', in Tallis's sense, towards 
such a world. It constructs, as it were, a space for the relation of 
the agent and its phenomenal world that could begin to be seen as 
possessing the necessary epistemic and procedural dimensionality, 
which is arguably what is lacking in the construction of a 'world' 
in strictly third personal terms.


I think the construction goes the other way and a straightforward 
presentation of CTE (computational theory of everything) is:


1. Arithmetic exists and instantiates all possible computations via 
relations implicit in diophantine equations.

2. Conscious thoughts are computations


Conscious thoughts are thought by a conscious (first-person).


An inference.  Not an axiom.

A conscious person is not a computation (it is a universal machine 
with some cognitive abilities).


Did I say otherwise?

You can attribute a personhood to a body, but a body cannot attribute 
its consciousness to its body among an infinity of variants, which 
exists in arithmetic, and play a role in his (first person) physics.


There will be an "infinity of variants" inferred but conscious thought.  
What are you saying "exists in arithmetic"?...bodies?  You seem to not 
be taking your "reversal" seriously.



With Gödel’s arithlmetization of metamathematics, as I said, this can 
be handled technically, and makes the reversal constructive and thus 
testable.





3. All possible conscious thoughts occur.
4. There are sequences of conscious thoughts that instantiate the 
thoughts of a person about a world.

5. You are such person.

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

On 1/14/2018 9:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/what-neuroscience-cannot-tell-us-about-ourselves

I understand those criticisms of Searle and they may be right. But
note that arithmetic and computation are nothing like experience
either and all the same criticisms apply to CTM;

Not really. At first sight it looks like that IF we can associate a
consciousness to a person supported by a computation, then we can
certainly (even more would you and Peter Jone say) associate that
consciousness with a material implementation of that computation.

And we can test that theory by messing with the material implementation
and observing the effect on mentation...and the answer is...It's confirmed!

But that is not true. And perhaps we need to be more cautious, and
repeat again that in no case (with our without matter) a consciousness
is associated, still less identical with, a computation.

Consciousness is a first person attribute. It is a mode of belief, and
actually a mode of belief which intersect with truth.

Consciousness is an instinctive/logical belief in a reality formally
connected to … some reality, or “model” of oneself.

That is poetic, but is it empirically true? I don't think consciousness
is a "mode of belief", unless you drastically stretch meaning of
"belief". And what does it mean "to intersect with truth"...if I
generate propositions at random they will, occasionally "intersect with
truth". I think instinctive belief in reality evolved long before
consciousness. Part of the problem is that "consciousness" is thrown
around as though it's meaning is obvious and no distinction is made
between awareness, self-awareness, inner-narrative, social-awareness, etc.

Brent

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Re: Inside Black Holes




On 1/14/2018 5:30 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Saturday, January 13, 2018 at 6:30:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 1/13/2018 2:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Saturday, January 13, 2018 at 2:59:00 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

Classically, the radiation isn't "trapped"; it goes to the
singularity (what the QM does? dunno).  The inflowing
radiation is just that starlight that falls on the event
horizon...which is not particularly bright.

Brent


I'm referring to the INTERIOR of the BH.


So am I.


If the radiation is trapped inside, the environment is likely hot
and bright.


Or it's absorbed by the singularity...or whatever is really
there.  There's not reasonable picture in which it is "trapped
inside" and is flying around inside the black hole.  Inside a
Schawarzschild black hole "the singularity" is on the future of
every world line, including null ones. Inside a Kerr-Newman black
hole it may be possible to miss "the singularity" but then it
appears to connect to a another spacetime.  Both of these are
solutions for eternal black holes, so when it's a black hole that
forms and then evaporates the solutions may not hold.  However,
except near "the singularity" the analyses would hold and so
except for within nanoseconds of "the singularity" all photons are
going to be traveling toward "the singularity" and not flying
around willy-nilly, "trapped" in the black hole. They can't turn
around because that direction is the past.

Brent


This of course gets a bit weird. I put in a short Penrose diagram of 
the Kerr-Newman black hole. Matter on the right I region will cross 
the r_+ horizon and fall into the III spacelike region. From there it 
must cross the interior horizon at r_-. Now there are two funny points 
here. The first is whether the r_- horizon is a mass inflation 
singularity and prevents any information from crossing.


But have you seen this paper:

Mass inflation inside black holes revisited
Vyacheslav I. Dokuchaev
(Submitted on 1 Sep 2013 (v1), last revised 21 Feb 2014 (this version, v4))
The mass inflation phenomenon implies that black hole interiors are 
unstable due to a back-reaction divergence of the perturbed black hole 
mass function at the Cauchy horizon. Weak point in the standard mass 
inflation calculations is in a fallacious using of the global Cauchy 
horizon as a place for the maximal growth of the back-reaction 
perturbations instead of the local inner apparent horizon. It is derived 
the new spherically symmetric back-reaction solution for two 
counter-streaming light-like fluxes near the inner apparent horizon of 
the charged black hole by taking into account its separation from the 
Cauchy horizon. In this solution the back-reaction perturbations of the 
background metric are truly the largest at the inner apparent horizon, 
but, nevertheless, remain small. The back reaction, additionally, 
removes the infinite blue-shift singularity at the inner apparent 
horizon and at the Cauchy horizon.

 (or arXiv:1309.0224v4 [gr-qc] for this version)


Brent

The other is a spatial surface in the cosmology region I has two 
alternatives that connect to two inner timelike regions IV and V. This 
illustrates some possible monodromy associated with the interior of a 
black hole.


The prospect of this monodromy raises the question of whether these 
inner regions IV and V are in some ways entangled with quantum states 
in the exterior region. There then might be some physical region there 
instead of just this being a mathematical idealization. If so this 
interior region is filled with radiation and particles on closed 
timelike curves cycling around the singularity. The real question of 
course is whether there is some entanglement of states between the 
regions I and II, two timelike regions that may have multiverse 
considerations, and whether the ambiguity of how one pushes a 
spacelike surface forwards means there are also entanglements in the 
two interior regions.


LC




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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?




On 1/14/2018 3:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



No examination of its own body will convince it otherwise,
because that examination is always in terms of the *phenomena*
entailed (or 'revealed') as a consequence of its formal
structure, and not directly in terms of that structure itself.

That is also correct, but I was alluding to a More deep reason,
which eventually benefits from the difference between []p, []p &
p, []p & <>t and also []p & <>t & p. I might come back on this.


Yes, please do. What I was referring to was the machine's inability to
*
directly apprehend
*
its
elf in terms of a
formal description.



But the machine can directly apprehend itself in terms of a formal 
description. It can do that, but it cannot prove that it can do that. 
Here there is a very subtle nuance.


In this idealized model of "interviewing" a perfect machine, what does 
"apprehend" mean.  I thought that the machine's apprehension was 
modelled by what it could prove, i.e. it believed what it could prove.  
But now you seem to introduce another mode by which the machines knows 
things.


Brent

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?


> On 12 Jan 2018, at 01:36, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/11/2018 4:11 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 11 Jan 2018 04:02, "Brent Meeker" > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 1/10/2018 6:56 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 11 Jan 2018 02:34, "Brent Meeker" >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 1/10/2018 6:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:
 If you read the rest of Tallis's piece you'll see that he criticises the 
 characterisation of the physical environment as encoding 'information' 
 independent of interpretation. This objection can be dealt with by the 
 reversal,
>>> 
>>> Can it?  Isn't it just assumed that the computational relations, or number 
>>> relations, encode information?  That was my objection that the MGA was 
>>> missing the necessity of an environment for its computation to be "about".  
>>> Bruno has generally agreed with this and said it just means that the 
>>> environment (i.e. physics) is part of what is realized in the computations 
>>> of the UD.  But notice that this doesn't answer a Tallis like objection 
>>> that "computation is nothing like experience" and "information is nothing 
>>> like environment".
>>> 
>>> But the argument implies that the epistemic entailments of computation,
>> 
>> That a computation has epistemic entailments is an assumption that it's a 
>> computation about something.  The argument assumes that so far as I can see.
>> 
>> I think you're right in part, to the extent that Theatatus's criterion of 
>> knowledge, which includes the assumption of the (tautological) truth of the 
>> belief, is indeed an explicit axiom.
> 
> Aren't you jumping over the question?  If I have a set of diophantine 
> equations that instantiate a universal computer and they have an integer that 
> is a solution, that's a computation.  But why is it "about anything"?  which 
> parts of this process constitute knowledge or belief?  What proposition is 
> true?
> 
>> But as is the case with all hypotheses, the burden is then to persuade that 
>> adopting this axiom
> 
> But what exactly is the axiom?  Saying "Yes" to the doctor is the axiom that 
> a replacement brain which instantiates all the same input-output functions 
> will preserve one's internal narrative and memories with no significant 
> differences.  That is identical to "Philosophical zombies are impossible."  
> Which means that intelligent behavior entails consciousness.  Which means 
> consciousness can be studied by third persons.
> 
>> is a reasonable step towards shedding some light on the problem we've set 
>> out to address. And one of the defining characteristics of beliefs of the 
>> requisite sort is indeed their indubitably, at least as a first 
>> approximation. IOW, each sentient agent, willy-nilly, is irrevocably bound 
>> (the 'bet' on a reality) to the primary veridicality of phenomena to which 
>> it is thereafter both epistemically and procedurally committed.
> 
> Since "bound" and "committed" are synonyms...I think that was a tautology.  
> But I'm not sure about the function of "willy-nilly", "irrevocably", and 
> "primary"  or what would be an example of a belief not of the "requisite 
> sort"?
> 
>> 
>> And again, the point of studying the self-referential logics in this regard 
>> is to provide the kernel of a model of *aboutness* that could indeed be  
>>  understood as  'reaching out', in Tallis's sense, towards such a world. 
>> It constructs, as it were, a space for the relation of the agent and its 
>> phenomenal world that could begin to be seen as possessing the necessary 
>> epistemic and procedural dimensionality, which is arguably what is lacking 
>> in the construction of a 'world' in strictly third personal terms. 
> 
> I think the construction goes the other way and a straightforward 
> presentation of CTE (computational theory of everything) is:
> 
> 1. Arithmetic exists and instantiates all possible computations via relations 
> implicit in diophantine equations.
> 2. Conscious thoughts are computations

Conscious thoughts are thought by a conscious (first-person). A conscious 
person is not a computation (it is a universal machine with some cognitive 
abilities). You can attribute a personhood to a body, but a body cannot 
attribute its consciousness to its body among an infinity of variants, which 
exists in arithmetic, and play a role in his (first person) physics.
With Gödel’s arithlmetization of metamathematics, as I said, this can be 
handled technically, and makes the reversal constructive and thus testable.



> 3. All possible conscious thoughts occur.
> 4. There are sequences of conscious thoughts that instantiate the thoughts of 
> a person about a world.
> 5. You are such person.  
> 6. The world (and you) are just inferences (beliefs) from consistent patterns 
> in the sequence of thoughts.

More or less OK, but the point is that this can be made (and has been made) 
precise and testable. And that if

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

> On 11 Jan 2018, at 00:49, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On 11/01/2018 9:09 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> On 1/10/2018 11:23 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>> Searle makes his position even more vulnerable by arguing that not only are 
>>> neural activity and the experience of perception the same but that the 
>>> former causes the latter just as water is “caused” by H2O. This is 
>>> desperate stuff: one could hardly expect some thing A to cause some thing B 
>>> with which it is identical, because nothing can cause itself. In any event, 
>>> the bottom line is that the molecules of H2O and the wet stuff that is 
>>> water are two appearances of the same thing — two conscious takes on the 
>>> same stuff. They cannot be analogous to, respectively, that which 
>>> supposedly causes conscious experiences (neural impulses) and conscious 
>>> experiences themselves."
>>> 
>>> Here's a link to the original piece:
>>> 
>>>  
>>> https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/what-neuroscience-cannot-tell-us-about-ourselves
>>>  
>>> 
>> I understand those criticisms of Searle and they may be right.  But note 
>> that arithmetic and computation are nothing like experience either and all 
>> the same criticisms apply to CTM; something that goes unchallenged on this 
>> list because CTM is always taken as a given and Bruno says, "We must assume 
>> something to begin our theorizing."  But Searle would reject CTM (and has) 
>> for exactly the same criticisms directed against him above.
> 
> I think Tallis's argument against Searle is entirely specious. Searle would 
> appear to be arguing that the properties of H2O molecules, such as the large 
> dipole moment, etc, cause the observed bulk properties of water. It is hard 
> to fault such an argument -- what else could possibly lie behind the bulk 
> properties of water other than the properties of its constituent molecules? 
> By analogy, then, the bulk properties of a brain, such as consciousness, 
> thought, memory, and so on, arise from the properties of the individual 
> neurons and other structures that make up the physical brain -- mind 
> supervenes on the physical brain.
> 
> As you say, Tallis's argument can be raised against the CTM account -- after 
> all, consciousness is not the same thing as a computation.

Indeed.

> However, it can be argued that consciousness arises from, or supervenes on, 
> the properties of some underlying computations. An argument against Searle is 
> thus an argument against CTM, or, in fact, any other reductionist account of 
> consciousness. Tallis simply makes consciousness some magical, inexplicable 
> thing.
> 

An argument against Searle is an argument in favour of Materialism and an 
argument against the CTM.

Consciousness is in the logical relation enforced by the explicit conjunction 
of locally digital machine’s belief and truth, it is an awareness that 
something kicks back. The theory predict that there is a “level” of 
substitution, and that above it we are confronted with a finite number of 
universal machines, with long computational histories, and below the 
substitution level, we are confronted with an infinity of universal numbers and 
their competition to brought your next states. It is equivalences from 
symmetrical or braided groups, as evidences are given by nature, and arithmetic 
(more timidly, no doubt).

The claustrum seems to have the most of the kappa opioid receptor (where salvia 
acts the most), which suggest it is the seed of consciousness, where we are 
“connected” to the arithmetical reality; it is the mammal ancestor of the 
neuronal implementation of Robinson Arithmetic, so to speak. Oh, I see it is 
the favourite brain structure of Christof Koch. I guess salvia might confirms 
this insight. It is the dynamical fixed point and it match all the equivalent 
one at that level. 

Then, for more on this see my answer to Brent. In metaphysics, the materialist 
are the one who seem to bet on some magic, probably so in the Mechanist frame. 
The reversal reverses also the charge of the proof.

Bruno

> Bruce
> 
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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

> On 10 Jan 2018, at 23:09, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/10/2018 11:23 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>> Searle makes his position even more vulnerable by arguing that not only are 
>> neural activity and the experience of perception the same but that the 
>> former causes the latter just as water is “caused” by H2O. This is desperate 
>> stuff: one could hardly expect some thing A to cause some thing B with which 
>> it is identical, because nothing can cause itself. In any event, the bottom 
>> line is that the molecules of H2O and the wet stuff that is water are two 
>> appearances of the same thing — two conscious takes on the same stuff. They 
>> cannot be analogous to, respectively, that which supposedly causes conscious 
>> experiences (neural impulses) and conscious experiences themselves."
>> 
>> Here's a link to the original piece:
>> 
>> https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/what-neuroscience-cannot-tell-us-about-ourselves
>>  
>> 
> I understand those criticisms of Searle and they may be right.  But note that 
> arithmetic and computation are nothing like experience either and all the 
> same criticisms apply to CTM;

Not really. At first sight it looks like that IF we can associate a 
consciousness to a person supported by a computation, then we can certainly 
(even more would you and Peter Jone say) associate that consciousness with a 
material implementation of that computation.

But that is not true. And perhaps we need to be more cautious, and repeat again 
that in no case (with our without matter) a consciousness is associated, still 
less identical with, a computation.

Consciousness is a first person attribute. It is a mode of belief, and actually 
a mode of belief which intersect with truth. 

Consciousness is an instinctive/logical belief in a reality formally connected 
to … some reality, or “model” of oneself.

It happens because the universal (Turing, Church, Post, Kleene) machine/number 
cannot avoid reflecting itself in itself and confronted to the nuance brought 
on oneself forced by incompleteness. 

So with Mechanism (CT + YD) the following becomes theorem in Elementary 
Arithmetic, or more simply, are true (in all models of Peano arithmetic):

1) There exit universal machines

2) those looking correctly inward deduce from their elementary beliefs that 
they are Löbian, and they can see the different modes, including guessing the 
correct communicable propositional  part (axiomatised by G) and even the 
correct propositional non communicable.

As you have assumed Mechanism, then, what UDA should have already made 
intuitively clear, (even if shocking), is that the inferable observable 
(physics) is the FPI calculus on all relative computational state (sigma_1 
sentences). So the abstract probability is one, which determines the logic of 
the measure, is given by what is true in all accessible relative states ([]p) + 
the explicit default hypothesis that there is some reality (<>t): that is, by 
the arithmetic logic of the conjunction of provability and consistency 
restricted to the sigma_1 sentences. That works by offering a quantisation and 
a quantum logic. 

Now, in that setting, assuming the existence of some primary matter seems to 
complicate or to oversimplify the problem, a bit like the “explanation” God 
made it.  What is that matter, how you test its existence better than testing 
mechanism, and how exactly select it consciousness and of which person?

In a sense, mechanism do say “God made it”, but the God is the elementary 
arithmetic that we already taught in school (since about 400 years locally).  
Gödel’s arithmetization of metamathematics embeds the mathematicians in 
arithmetic in a manner which prolongs Everett’s embedding of the physicist in 
physics. That made a priori more histories, but the constraints of correctness, 
consistency gives the working mode, which allows deep/long computations to get 
partially sharable by some universal machine in association with some first 
personal “winner”.

Now, this gives only tools to measure our degree of materialism or 
non-computationalism, which could still be taken as a special oracle in 
arithmetic. That would be the case if the observable obeyed Boolean logic, like 
with classical physics, but here QM saves Mechanism, and thus win this match. 
Nobody claims that was the last match. (The problem is that the materialist 
claims they win the match since Aristotle).

With Mechanism, we do have a theory of consciousness, because incompleteness 
justifies (and the Lôbian machine does prove this already) that there is no 
communicable belief in a reality encompassing oneself in the case there is such 
a reality, and the universal machine is bounded to confuse p, []p, []p &p, etc. 

Observation, like Hubble image of far away/young galaxies suggest that we share 
a long and deep (in Bennett sense) computation (avoidi

Re: Quasars

2018-01-14 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 5:17 AM,  wrote:

> 
> I recently viewed a documentary on Quasars. IIRC, they are interpreted as
> immense BH's with inflowing matter of galactic size to account for their
> brightness, and their redshift, applying Hubble's Law, indicates they are
> far removed, closer to the BB than any galaxies within our observable
> universe. Question: did galaxies form that early after the BB to account
> for the huge inflows of matter and brightness? TIA, AG
>

Quasars formed very soon after the Big bang, almost embarrassedly soon.  A
recently discovered quasar called J1342+0928 is 13.1 billion light years
away and was formed just 690 million years after the Big Bang, and yet it
is powered by a Black Hole of 800 million solar masses. Astronomers
have trouble explaining how a Black Hole could get  that  big  that  fast
by conventional  stellar evolution, but if from day one the universe
already contained 100 solar mass Black Holes that would help a lot in
explaining how that could happen and maybe  give us a hint at what Dark
Matter is too.

We know from the percentage of the elements Hydrogen, Deuterium, Helium and
Lithium in existence  how much regular matter was around one minute after
the Big Bang when nucleosynthesis cooked up these elements, and there is no
room for Dark Matter. So the Black Holes that form the bulk of the
Dark Matter can't have come from the corpses of dead stars made of regular
matter; but maybe Black Holes formed long before nucleosynthesis occurred
when the universe was much less than one minute old and things were too hot
for even protons to exist much less elements.

Stephen Hawking proposed this explanation for Dark Matter some years ago
but the idea had fallen out of favor because it was largely (but not
entirely) ruled out by the data. We know that to account for all the Dark
Matter the Black Holes can't be larger than 100 solar masses because there
would be more gravitational microlensing than we observe. And we know that
to account for all the Dark Matter the Black Holes can't be smaller than 10
solar masses because we'd see Black Hole explosions / evaporations (if they
were REALLY small) and the orbits of widely spaced binary stars would be
disrupted, but we don't see any of that.

But there is still a window for Primordial Black Holes being Dark Matter
that the data hasn't excluded and it's between 10 and 100 solar masses, and
that's just what LIGO discovered. LIGO has  so far detected 6 collisions
between Black Holes ranging in size between 36 and 7 solar masses resulting
in Black Holes of 18, 21, 35, 49, 53, and 62 solar masses. So maybe 85% of
all the matter in the universe is in the form of Primordial Black Holes.

John K Clark

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Re: Inside Black Holes

On Sunday, January 14, 2018 at 9:25:40 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 1:40 AM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
> >> 
>>> I think that would be true if, as in your example, the observer were 
>>> freely falling into the Black Hole, but if I was hovering just outside the 
>>> Event Horizon in a super powerful spaceship I could observe the Black Hole 
>>> evaporating in just a few minutes
>>
>>  
>
> > 
>> That seems doubtful since Hawking radiation has its peak wavelength on 
>> the order of the diameter of the black hole and originates in the vicinity, 
>> i.e. within a few radii of the black hole, not "at the event horizon".
>>  
>>
>
> Most Hawking radiation originates where the tidal forces are the greatest, 
> and that would be at the Event Horizon. The closer I hover above the Event 
> Horizon the slower my clock will tick, so if I hover close enough I can 
> watch the entire Black Hole evaporate away in just a few minutes by my 
> clock even though for you back on Earth that would take a billion trillion 
> years or so. The thing that causes Black Hole evaporation is Hawking 
> radiation, so if I observe one I'm going to have to observe the other, 
> although "observe" may not be the right word, "incinerate" might be better.
>
>  
> John K Clark
>

Where the Hawking occurs is a tad funny. For a distant observer the 
radiation will appear to occur at about 4GM/c^2 from the horizon that has a 
radius of 2GM/c^2. This does correspond to the wavelength of the radiation 
and so forth. However, if you are on an accelerated frame stationary with 
respect to the horizon the radiation occurs closer to the horzion. In the 
limit you reach Planck acceleration ~ 10^{51}m/s^2 the radiation occurs a 
Planck length above the horizon. So what is going on?

If you observe an object fall towards a black hole it will by the tortoise 
coordinate appear to hover just above the horizon. Conversely the quantum 
fields and ultimately quantum bits from that object will appear outside the 
black hole. In effect they appear at two places at the same time! What we 
think of as an event in spacetime as a unique specifier of the state of a 
system is an approximation. With quantum field theory there has been a lot 
of stuff to remove nonlocality, such as Wightman conditions of commutators 
of observables. Quantum nonlocality plays a subtle role and in high energy 
experimental physics its physical influence is considered negligible. 
However, the time dilation physics of a black hole amplifies these nonlocal 
influences so they can no longer be ignored. 

LC

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Re: Inside Black Holes

2018-01-14 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 1:40 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>> 
>> I think that would be true if, as in your example, the observer were
>> freely falling into the Black Hole, but if I was hovering just outside the
>> Event Horizon in a super powerful spaceship I could observe the Black Hole
>> evaporating in just a few minutes
>
>

> 
> That seems doubtful since Hawking radiation has its peak wavelength on the
> order of the diameter of the black hole and originates in the vicinity,
> i.e. within a few radii of the black hole, not "at the event horizon".
>  
>

Most Hawking radiation originates where the tidal forces are the greatest,
and that would be at the Event Horizon. The closer I hover above the Event
Horizon the slower my clock will tick, so if I hover close enough I can
watch the entire Black Hole evaporate away in just a few minutes by my
clock even though for you back on Earth that would take a billion trillion
years or so. The thing that causes Black Hole evaporation is Hawking
radiation, so if I observe one I'm going to have to observe the other,
although "observe" may not be the right word, "incinerate" might be better.

John K Clark

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2018-01-14 Thread David Nyman

On 14 January 2018 at 11:48, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 10 Jan 2018, at 20:23, David Nyman  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10 Jan 2018 13:48, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Jan 2018, at 12:42, David Nyman  wrote:
>
> On 7 January 2018 at 09:52, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 6 Jan 2018, at 21:09, David Nyman  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6 Jan 2018 19:46, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Jan 2018, at 21:04, David Nyman  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5 Jan 2018 19:27, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Jan 2018, at 21:07, David Nyman  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 4 Jan 2018 18:16, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 1:22 PM, David Nyman  wrote:
>>
>> On 4 January 2018 at 11:55, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> > On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>  Now, it
>>>  could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
>>>  argue, we don't know that.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There
>>> seemed to be universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie
>>> is impossible.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume
>>> Mechanism.
>>> >
>>> > But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is
>>> impossible because it exhibits intelligent behavior.
>>>
>>> Well, I think the consensus here is that computationalism is far more
>>> plausible than non-computationalism.
>>> Computationalism makes zombies non sensical.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> >> Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non
>>> computationalist theory of mind.
>>> >
>>> > It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It
>>> is only inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use
>>> include as an axiom that computation produces mind.  One can as say that
>>> intelligent behavior entails mind as an axiom of physicalism.  Logic is a
>>> very cheap standard for theories to meet.
>>>
>>> At first sight, zombies seems consistent with computationalism, but the
>>> notion of zombies requires the idea that we attribute mind to bodies
>>> (having the right behavior). But with computationalism, mind is never
>>> associated to a body, but only to the person having the infinity of
>>> (similar enough) bodies relative representation in arithmetic. There are no
>>> “real bodies” or “ontological bodies”, so the notion of zombie becomes
>>> senseless. The consciousness is associated with the person, which is never
>>> determined by one body.
>>>
>>
>> So in the light of what you say above, does it then follow that the MGA
>> implies (assuming comp) that a physical system does *not* in fact implement
>> a computation in the relevant sense?
>>
>>
>>
>> The physical world has to be able to implement the computation in the
>> relevant (Turing-Church-Post-Kleene CT) sense. You need this for the YD
>> “act of faith.
>>
>> The physical world is a persistent illusion. It has to be enough
>> persistent that you wake up at the hospital with the digital brain.
>>
>>
>>
>> I ask this because you say mind is *never* associated with a body, but
>> mind *is* associated with computation via the epistemic consequences of
>> universality.
>>
>>
>>
>> A (conscious) third person can associate a mind/person to a body that he
>> perceives. It is polite.
>>
>> The body perceived by that third person is itself a construction of its
>> own mind, and with computationalism (but also with QM), we know that such a
>> body is an (evolving) map of where, and in which states, we could find, sy,
>> the electron and proton of that body, and such snapshot is only a
>> computational state among infinitely many others which would works as well,
>> with respect to the relevant computations which brought its conscious state.
>> Now, the conscious first person cannot associate itself to any particular
>> body or computation.
>>
>> Careful: sometimes I say that a machine can think, or maybe (I usually
>> avoid) that a computation can think or be conscious. It always mean,
>> respectively, that a machine can make a person capable of manifesting
>> itself relatively to you. But the machine and the body are local relative
>> representation.
>>
>> A machine cannot think, and a computation (which is the (arithmetical)
>> dynamic 3p view of the sequence of the relative static machine/state)
>> cannot think. Only a (first) person can think, and to use that thinking
>> with respect to another person, a machine is handy, like brain or a
>> physical computer.
>>
>> The person is in heaven (arithmetical truth) and on earth (sigma_1
>> arithmetical truth), simultaneously. But this belongs to G*, and I should
>> stay mute, or insist that we are in the “after-act-of-faith” position of
>> the one betting that comp is true, a

Re: Quasars

Quasars are galaxies with Active Galactic Nuclei (AGN) that are very 
energetic. These galaxies end up with thundering large supermassive black 
holes (SMBHs) and become often elliptic galaxies with low star formation 
rates. The Milky Way and Andromeda galaxies have SMBHs of 4 million and 50 
million solar masses, which make then modest SMBHs and the two galaxies 
have reasonable star formation rates. There are elliptical galaxies in the 
Virgo cluster, Messier 49 and 87, and this cluster of 1500 galaxies is 
potentially what our local cluster of galaxies with M33, M31 and the Milky 
Way is bound to. The Virgo cluster is 54 million light years away and it 
might attract local groups that far out strongly enough so we are bound to 
it.

LC

On Sunday, January 14, 2018 at 4:17:35 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> I recently viewed a documentary on Quasars. IIRC, they are interpreted as 
> immense BH's with inflowing matter of galactic size to account for their 
> brightness, and their redshift, applying Hubble's Law, indicates they are 
> far removed, closer to the BB than any galaxies within our observable 
> universe. Question: did galaxies form that early after the BB to account 
> for the huge inflows of matter and brightness? TIA, AG
>

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Re: Inside Black Holes

On Saturday, January 13, 2018 at 6:30:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/13/2018 2:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 13, 2018 at 2:59:00 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: 
>>
>> Classically, the radiation isn't "trapped"; it goes to the singularity 
>> (what the QM does? dunno).  The inflowing radiation is just that starlight 
>> that falls on the event horizon...which is not particularly bright.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> I'm referring to the INTERIOR of the BH. 
>
>
> So am I.
>
> If the radiation is trapped inside, the environment is likely hot and 
> bright. 
>
>
> Or it's absorbed by the singularity...or whatever is really there.  
> There's not reasonable picture in which it is "trapped inside" and is 
> flying around inside the black hole.  Inside a Schawarzschild black hole 
> "the singularity" is on the future of every world line, including null 
> ones.  Inside a Kerr-Newman black hole it may be possible to miss "the 
> singularity" but then it appears to connect to a another spacetime.  Both 
> of these are solutions for eternal black holes, so when it's a black hole 
> that forms and then evaporates the solutions may not hold.  However, except 
> near "the singularity" the analyses would hold and so except for within 
> nanoseconds of "the singularity" all photons are going to be traveling 
> toward "the singularity" and not flying around willy-nilly, "trapped" in 
> the black hole.  They can't turn around because that direction is the past.
>
> Brent
>

This of course gets a bit weird. I put in a short Penrose diagram of the 
Kerr-Newman black hole. Matter on the right I region will cross the r_+ 
horizon and fall into the III spacelike region. From there it must cross 
the interior horizon at r_-. Now there are two funny points here. The first 
is whether the r_- horizon is a mass inflation singularity and prevents any 
information from crossing. The other is a spatial surface in the cosmology 
region I has two alternatives that connect to two inner timelike regions IV 
and V. This illustrates some possible monodromy associated with the 
interior of a black hole. 

The prospect of this monodromy raises the question of whether these inner 
regions IV and V are in some ways entangled with quantum states in the 
exterior region. There then might be some physical region there instead of 
just this being a mathematical idealization. If so this interior region is 
filled with radiation and particles on closed timelike curves cycling 
around the singularity. The real question of course is whether there is 
some entanglement of states between the regions I and II, two timelike 
regions that may have multiverse considerations, and whether the ambiguity 
of how one pushes a spacelike surface forwards means there are also 
entanglements in the two interior regions.

LC

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Re: Inside Black Holes

On Saturday, January 13, 2018 at 5:56:01 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jan 13, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfield...@gmail.com > wrote:
>
> > 
>> Go to https://jila.colorado.edu/~ajsh/insidebh/ to look an numerical 
>> simulations of what falling into a black hole would appear as. In effect 
>> nothing spectacularly different appears upon crossing the horizon.
>>
>
> I think that would be true if, as in your example, the observer were 
> freely falling into the Black Hole, but 
> if I was hovering just outside the Event Horizon in a super powerful 
> spaceship I could observe the Black Hole evaporating in just a few minutes 
> even though 
> to
>  you
> ,
> who is far away 
> in a much weaker gravitational field, 
> that would take many trillions of years; the only problem is
>  in addition to the Black Hole evaporation
> I would also observe many trillions of years worth of Hawking Radiation in 
> just a few minutes, and that would cook me. However if I had no spaceship 
> and was just freely falling through the Event Horizon the Hawking Radiation 
> wouldn't bother me at all
>  and I couldn't even tell when I reached the Event Horizon.
>  
>
> A
> t least that was the idea before 5 or 6 years ago when 
> the idea of a Black Hole Firewall came up:
>
> http://www.nature.com/news/astrophysics-fire-in-the-hole-1.12726#b8
>
> Such a firewall violates Einstein's equivalence principle and claims even a
>  
> freely 
> falling 
> m
> an 
> will
>  
> will
>  cooked at the Event Horizon, but I don't understand Black Hole Firewalls 
> worth a damn.
>  
>
>  John K Clark
>

The near horizon condition for an accelerated observer is different. If one 
accelerates in order to remain stationary at some distance d from the 
horizon this requires an acceleration a = c^2/d. The spacetime this 
observer witnesses is AdS_2×S^2, which I work out in this page on Stack 
Exchange 
.

This vacuum is negative with no lower bound, which is odd for quantum field 
theory and quantum mechanics with a bounded spectrum, and so quantum field 
are emitted from near the horizon. This accelerated observer in effect 
observes Hawking radiation within a frame that is accelerated in time. As 
the observer is able to accelerate to remain ever closer to the horizon, a 
null congruence with no time, the duration of the black hole is shortened 
ever further. Hence Hawking radiation appears to come gushing out rapidly. 

https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/262735/ads-black-holes/262744#262744

I wrote a post on a possible way to understand the firewall. This issue 
tells us there is some relationship between quantum mechanics and general 
relativity not canonically understood. The initial quantum state of a black 
hole becomes randomized as Hawking radiation is emitted. Once half the mass 
of the black hole is lost to Hawking radiation the quantum states on the 
black hole have been randomized beyond the ability of a quantum error 
correction code.

In some recent work I was motivated by Maryam Mirzakhani's death. She died 
of breast cancer last July, and the news for various reason made me angry. 
I had read one of her paper's back in 2014 when she won the Fields medal, 
and at the time I thought this had something maybe to do with physics. Last 
spring I studied the Ryu-Takayanagi (RT) formula and for some reason the 
day I heard of Maryam's death the insight on how her work connects with 
this hit me.

There is this problem with how gravitation and quantum mechanics merge or 
function in a single system. It is often said we understand nothing of 
quantum gravity, and this is not quite so. Even with the based canonical 
quantization of gravity from the 1970s in a weak limit is computable and 
tells you something. This theoretical understanding is very limited and big 
open questions remain. Of course since then far more progress has been 
made. The AdS/CFT correspondence, the Raamsdonk equivalence between 
entanglement and spacetime and the RT formula are some of the more recent 
developments. These indicate how spacetime physics has a correspondence or 
maybe equivalency with quantum mechanics or quantum Yang-Mills fields. 
However, an obstruction exists that appears very stubborn.

The vacuum is filled with virtual pairs of fields. With a black hole the 
gravity field causes one of these pairs to fall into the black hole and the 
other to escape. This means the quantum particle or photon that escapes as 
Hawking radiation is entangled with the pair that falls into the black 
hole, and so this means Hawking radiation is entangled with the black hole. 
So at first blush there seems to be no problem. However, if we think of a 
thermal cavity heated to high temperature photons that escape are entangled 
with quantum states of atoms composing the cavity. Once the entanglement 
entropy reaches a maximum at ha

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?