Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 2:01:24 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 4:43 PM > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 3:22:04 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 1:16 AM  wrote:
>>>
 I've been looking at the Wiki article on this topic. I find that I 
 really don't understand what it is, or why it's important. Maybe a few 
 succinct words from the usual suspects can be of help. TIA.



>>>
>>> Bruno provided a great definition and background of the Church-Turing 
>>> Thesis. I will try to answer why it is important and comes up often in our 
>>> discussion.
>>>
>>>
>>> The Church-Turing thesis says that anything that is computable is 
>>> computable by any computer.  In other words, there is nothing that the 
>>> computer in your cell phone can't compute, that your laptop or that a super 
>>> computer (or even a quantum computer) can.  It just comes down to having 
>>> enough time and memory.
>>>
>>> This is why you don't need to buy a new phone with new hardware every 
>>> time you want to install a new app.  Regardless of the type of CPU in your 
>>> phone, it can be extended in its power of what it might compute only given 
>>> some new software.  It is in this sense that computers are "Universal", 
>>> they are universal in the same sense that of a universal remote, or in the 
>>> sense that a record player is a universal sound imitating device.  A record 
>>> player might emulate the sounds of an orchestra, Britney Spears, whale 
>>> songs, etc., all it needs is the appropriate record and it can produce the 
>>> sound.
>>>
>>> In the same sense, all a Turing Machine (computer) needs to imitate (or 
>>> emulate) the right program or function is the right software.  Because of 
>>> this, anything that can be described in software, be it a brain emulation, 
>>> an AI, a virtual environment, a virtual machine or operating system, can 
>>> never know what hardware is running it, because the Church-Turing thesis 
>>> says that any computer is capable of running it.
>>>
>>> This is why if consciousness is computable (the computational theory of 
>>> mind) we cannot know what is computing us (e.g. we could be in a matrix 
>>> type simulation for all we know).  The other implication is that if 
>>> computations exist in mathematics (and they do), then we exist within 
>>> mathematics.  Mathematics (or at least the part necessary to describe 
>>> computations) becomes the fundamental science of what we experience and 
>>> what is possible to experience or what we may predict about our future 
>>> experiences (physics).
>>>
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>> If someone digitizes (emulates) the Mona Lisa, is this equivalent to the 
>> Mona Lisa? 
>>
>
> If you digitize a person and put the digitized Mona Lisa before them, it 
> is equivalent to the real Mona Lisa to that person, at least as far as they 
> can tell.
>
>  
>
>> Can you write a function which is not computable? AG 
>>
>>
>>
> If by not computable you mean it never returns, then this is easy:
>
> function foo():
>   while (true)
>   {
>  // loop forever
>   }
>  
> There are also programs for which no one knows if they are computable or 
> not.  If you can prove whether or not this function ever completes, you 
> will be world famous, and may even earn a million dollars (though I think 
> the prize has been retracted, it might be oferred again):
>
> Step 1: Set X = 4
> Step 2: Set R = 0
> Step 3: For each Y from 1 to X, if both Y and (X – Y) are prime, set R = 1
> Step 4: If R = 1, Set X = X + 2 and go to Step 2
> Step 5: If R = 0, print X and halt
>
> All you have to prove is the computer either never gets to step 5 or that 
> it does get to step 5.  Mathematicians have been working on a related 
> problem for 300 years, no one has solved it yet.
>
>
> Jason
>

*I was asking about a well-defined mathematical function that can be 
written in closed form, or possibly as an infinite series. I believe that 
all such functions are computable. I was not discussing subroutines that 
might never terminate. If all well defined mathematical functions are 
computable, why did computability become a big deal? AG *

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Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 4:43 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 3:22:04 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 1:16 AM  wrote:
>>
>>> I've been looking at the Wiki article on this topic. I find that I
>>> really don't understand what it is, or why it's important. Maybe a few
>>> succinct words from the usual suspects can be of help. TIA.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Bruno provided a great definition and background of the Church-Turing
>> Thesis. I will try to answer why it is important and comes up often in our
>> discussion.
>>
>>
>> The Church-Turing thesis says that anything that is computable is
>> computable by any computer.  In other words, there is nothing that the
>> computer in your cell phone can't compute, that your laptop or that a super
>> computer (or even a quantum computer) can.  It just comes down to having
>> enough time and memory.
>>
>> This is why you don't need to buy a new phone with new hardware every
>> time you want to install a new app.  Regardless of the type of CPU in your
>> phone, it can be extended in its power of what it might compute only given
>> some new software.  It is in this sense that computers are "Universal",
>> they are universal in the same sense that of a universal remote, or in the
>> sense that a record player is a universal sound imitating device.  A record
>> player might emulate the sounds of an orchestra, Britney Spears, whale
>> songs, etc., all it needs is the appropriate record and it can produce the
>> sound.
>>
>> In the same sense, all a Turing Machine (computer) needs to imitate (or
>> emulate) the right program or function is the right software.  Because of
>> this, anything that can be described in software, be it a brain emulation,
>> an AI, a virtual environment, a virtual machine or operating system, can
>> never know what hardware is running it, because the Church-Turing thesis
>> says that any computer is capable of running it.
>>
>> This is why if consciousness is computable (the computational theory of
>> mind) we cannot know what is computing us (e.g. we could be in a matrix
>> type simulation for all we know).  The other implication is that if
>> computations exist in mathematics (and they do), then we exist within
>> mathematics.  Mathematics (or at least the part necessary to describe
>> computations) becomes the fundamental science of what we experience and
>> what is possible to experience or what we may predict about our future
>> experiences (physics).
>>
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
> If someone digitizes (emulates) the Mona Lisa, is this equivalent to the
> Mona Lisa?
>

If you digitize a person and put the digitized Mona Lisa before them, it is
equivalent to the real Mona Lisa to that person, at least as far as they
can tell.



> Can you write a function which is not computable? AG
>
>
>
If by not computable you mean it never returns, then this is easy:

function foo():
  while (true)
  {
 // loop forever
  }

There are also programs for which no one knows if they are computable or
not.  If you can prove whether or not this function ever completes, you
will be world famous, and may even earn a million dollars (though I think
the prize has been retracted, it might be oferred again):

Step 1: Set X = 4
Step 2: Set R = 0
Step 3: For each Y from 1 to X, if both Y and (X – Y) are prime, set R = 1
Step 4: If R = 1, Set X = X + 2 and go to Step 2
Step 5: If R = 0, print X and halt

All you have to prove is the computer either never gets to step 5 or that
it does get to step 5.  Mathematicians have been working on a related
problem for 300 years, no one has solved it yet.


Jason

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Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[John Clark]

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 8:26 PM,  wrote:

>>
>> Yes, the Busy Beaver Function is not computable. We know that:
>>
>> BB(1) =1
>> BB(2) =6
>> BB(3) =21
>> BB(4) =107
>>
>
> *>You haven't *written* the function, just its alleged values for
> 1,2,3,4.  What is the function? *
>


Starting with a all zero tape BB(N) is the number of operations any N state
Turing Machine performs after it writes the largest number of 1's and then
halts. It is very important that it halt, some machines will go on forever
but they don't count. For example we know for sure that BB(5) is at least
47,176,870 because one 5 state Turing Machine has been found that halts
after it goes through 47,176,870 operations (and prints 4098 1’s on the
tape), but there are 28 other 5 state machines displaying non-regular
behavior that are well past 47,176,870 operations and 4098 1's. If one of
them eventually halts then that larger number of operations will be BB(5),
if none of them ever halts then 47,176,870 really is BB(5); but the trouble
is we'll never be able to know it’s 47,176,870 because we'll never know
that none of those other 28 5 state machines will never halt because the
Halting problem is insolvable.

John K Clark

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Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, August 22, 2018 at 11:05:15 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 5:43 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> >
>> *Can you write a function which is not computable? *
>
>
> Yes, the Busy Beaver Function is not computable. We know that:
>
> BB(1) =1
> BB(2) =6
> BB(3) =21
> BB(4) =107
>

*You haven't *written* the function, just its alleged values for 1,2,3,4.  
What is the function? AG*

>
> But those are the only values we've be able to calculate with certainty, 
> the problem is the Busy Beaver function grows faster than any computable 
> function. We suspect that BB(5) is 47,176,870 but are far from certain and 
> BB(6) is at least 7.4*10^36534 and BB(7) is at least 10^10^10^10^10^7 but 
> could be much larger. Big as they are all Busy Beaver numbers are finite 
> but after a certain point they are not computable and nobody even knows 
> exactly where that point is. It has been proven that BB(7918) is not 
> computable but what is the smallest non computable-number? Nobody knows but 
> I wouldn't be surprised if it were BB(5).
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re:: Many-minds interpretation?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 22 Aug 2018, at 01:54, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>

The other sort of infinity, the one which I think you disagree with, 
is typical for the  superposition of tensor products, like the 
singlet state ud - du. Before measurement Alice has the same 
probability of finding u, or d for any measurement she can do in any 
direction. Both Alice and Bob are maximally ignorant of their 
possible measurement results. The MW on this, or a MW way to 
interpret this, to keep the rotational symmetry, is that we have an 
infinity of couples Alice+Bob, with each couple being correlated.  
If not, some implicit assumption is made on u and d, like it is a 
preferred base.


But the problems with any such suggestion are obvious. Firstly, Alice 
does not choose her measurement angle in that way, so there is no 
super-superposition created. Secondly, this construction does not 
restore the rotational symmetry in any case. You might have an 
infinite number of Alices, measuring the singlet at all possible 
angles, but that multi-multiverse is not rotationally symmetric 
either! All it needs is for Alice number 7,234,826 to poke her tongue 
out and the rotational symmetry is lost! Of course, you could add yet 
more multiverses to cover every possible deviation of Alice from the 
stationary state. But the process rapidly becomes ridiculous.


So this Rube Goldberg construction of additional multiverses of 
superpositions does not actually restore stable rotational symmetry. 
So why propose such a construction? William of Ockham will rise out 
of his grave to haunt you for such pointless extravagance of entities!


Alice destroys the rotational symmetry in all its universe. Not of the 
whole wave, where Alice does not exist as a determinate subsystem.


I can't really parse this. The point is that when Alice interacts with 
the singlet with her magnet she destroys the rotational symmetry of the 
state. This symmetry is not restored by considering and large system, or 
the whole wave. If anything, enlarging the context in this way simply 
lessens any symmetry that might remain.


I think what you have in mind is a situation such as arises if you shine 
a light through a small aperture. The photon emerges as a spherical 
wave, with the rotational symmetry of such a (hemi-)spherical wave. If 
there is a hemispherical screen downstream, the photon will interact 
with the screen at some single point. If you consider only one branch of 
the SWE evolution, this interaction point breaks the rotational 
symmetry. But if you consider all branches of the wave function 
together, there is a branch for every single point at which the photon 
can hit the screen, so that the symmetry is preserved in the wave 
function as a whole -- over the ensemble of all branches. But that is a 
situation in which the environment with which the photon interacts is 
itself symmetrical. If the screen, rather than being a smooth 
equidistant hemisphere, is just the rough walls of the laboratory, there 
is no symmetry in the points at which the photon can hit the walls, and 
the rotational symmetry is lost, even in the wave function as a whole, 
even by considering the superposition of all possible branches.


The take away message from this is that the symmetry of the original 
system can be lost by interaction with a non-symmetrical environment. 
The boundary conditions of the total system may not have the symmetries 
of the original state. So loss of symmetry is ubiquitous in the 
universe, even for Everettian no-collapse quantum mechanics. If you 
introduce a non-symmetrical interaction into the system, the symmetry is 
lost. That is all that is happening with the measurement of the spin 
projection of the singlet state by Alice. Your idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the tensor product, and your insistence the the 
symmetry be preserved regardless of the non-symmetrical environment, are 
just misguided. There is no need to try to preserve symmetry given 
non-symmetrical boundary conditions.


Since the symmetry is broken, the singlet state no longer exists in its 
original form, and the state that Bob measured is affected by the 
measurement Alice makes. There is no more to it than this. If Alice and 
Bob are space-like separated, there are some interpretational issues 
with this instantaneous influence at a distance. But that just means 
that quantum mechanics is not fully integrated with a total quantum 
theory of space-time. No need to get agitated by this -- ride with it 
until we have a more complete theory. In the meantime, this is what is 
meant by non-locality.


Bruce

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Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[John Clark]

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 5:43 PM,  wrote:

>
> *Can you write a function which is not computable? *


Yes, the Busy Beaver Function is not computable. We know that:

BB(1) =1
BB(2) =6
BB(3) =21
BB(4) =107

But those are the only values we've be able to calculate with certainty,
the problem is the Busy Beaver function grows faster than any computable
function. We suspect that BB(5) is 47,176,870 but are far from certain and
BB(6) is at least 7.4*10^36534 and BB(7) is at least 10^10^10^10^10^7 but
could be much larger. Big as they are all Busy Beaver numbers are finite
but after a certain point they are not computable and nobody even knows
exactly where that point is. It has been proven that BB(7918) is not
computable but what is the smallest non computable-number? Nobody knows but
I wouldn't be surprised if it were BB(5).

John K Clark

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Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 3:22:04 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 1:16 AM > wrote:
>
>> I've been looking at the Wiki article on this topic. I find that I really 
>> don't understand what it is, or why it's important. Maybe a few succinct 
>> words from the usual suspects can be of help. TIA.
>>
>>
>>
>
> Bruno provided a great definition and background of the Church-Turing 
> Thesis. I will try to answer why it is important and comes up often in our 
> discussion.
>
>
> The Church-Turing thesis says that anything that is computable is 
> computable by any computer.  In other words, there is nothing that the 
> computer in your cell phone can't compute, that your laptop or that a super 
> computer (or even a quantum computer) can.  It just comes down to having 
> enough time and memory.
>
> This is why you don't need to buy a new phone with new hardware every time 
> you want to install a new app.  Regardless of the type of CPU in your 
> phone, it can be extended in its power of what it might compute only given 
> some new software.  It is in this sense that computers are "Universal", 
> they are universal in the same sense that of a universal remote, or in the 
> sense that a record player is a universal sound imitating device.  A record 
> player might emulate the sounds of an orchestra, Britney Spears, whale 
> songs, etc., all it needs is the appropriate record and it can produce the 
> sound.
>
> In the same sense, all a Turing Machine (computer) needs to imitate (or 
> emulate) the right program or function is the right software.  Because of 
> this, anything that can be described in software, be it a brain emulation, 
> an AI, a virtual environment, a virtual machine or operating system, can 
> never know what hardware is running it, because the Church-Turing thesis 
> says that any computer is capable of running it.
>
> This is why if consciousness is computable (the computational theory of 
> mind) we cannot know what is computing us (e.g. we could be in a matrix 
> type simulation for all we know).  The other implication is that if 
> computations exist in mathematics (and they do), then we exist within 
> mathematics.  Mathematics (or at least the part necessary to describe 
> computations) becomes the fundamental science of what we experience and 
> what is possible to experience or what we may predict about our future 
> experiences (physics).
>
>
> Jason
>

If someone digitizes (emulates) the Mona Lisa, is this equivalent to the 
Mona Lisa? Can you write a function which is not computable? AG 

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Re: Church-Turing Thesis

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 9:59:30 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Aug 2018, at 08:16, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> I've been looking at the Wiki article on this topic. I find that I really 
> don't understand what it is, or why it's important. Maybe a few succinct 
> words from the usual suspects can be of help. TIA.
>
>
>
> Actually, I have very recently wrote a long post on exactly this (Church’s 
> thesis), but I have decided to first explain the combinators …
>
> Here I give you a simple explanation of what is Church’s thesis (also 
> called Post thesis, Kleene’s thesis, Turing’s thesis, or very often now; 
> the Church’s Turing thesis).
>
> Do you know hat is a function? Do you know what is a function from N to N 
> (where N is the set of natural numbers, i.e. N = {0, 1, 2, 3, …}).
>

*Yes, They're correspondences between two sets; many-to-one, one-to-one, 
but never one-to many. AG *

>
> Now the set of all functions from N to N is very big, and big sets led 
> often to paradoxes, so people have tried to restrict the notion of 
> function, and one of the restriction has consisted in the “computable 
> function”.
>
> Intuitively, a computable function is a function (from N to N) for which 
> we can explain how to compute it (in a finite time, on its finite argument, 
> and the idea is that the explanation to compute the function have to be 
> encodable in a finite way).
>

*Any subtle problems computing a simple polynomial or trigonometric 
function?  AG*

>
> For example, most functions studied by mathematicians are obviously 
> computable, and it is easy to convince oneself that a function is 
> (intuitively) computable. But people sought a precise definition of 
> computable.
>
> Church invented the “lambda calculus” formalism for that effect, like 
> independently Turing invented the Turing (digital) machine for that effect.
>
> Church just defined a computable function by one that we can encode in his 
> lambda calculus. It is his student Kleene who understood that it is has  to 
> be thesis (overlapping philosophy and mathematics). In fact Kleene will see 
> that the existence of universal formalism entails incompleteness 
> quasi-directly.
>
> Turing just defined a computable function by a function computable by a 
> machine, but he saw too that this was a philosophical thesis.
>
> Turing showed, nevertheless the first equivalence theorem: a function is 
> computable by a Turing machine if and only if it is computable by a lambda 
> calculus expression (or a combinator).
>
> *What is a Turing machine? AG*
 

> Post did already,declared that a function is computable if and only if it 
> is computable in his formal definition (Post production system). Post too 
> understood that it was a postulate of high importance. Later it was proved 
> that a function is Post-calculable iff it is Turing calculable, iff it is 
> Church calculable, making all those thesis equivalent.
>

*Please elaborate. AG* 

>
> So the Church-Post-Kleene-Turing-markov … thesis is that a function 
> (always from N to N) is intuitively (human) computable if and only if it is 
> computable by any of those formal system.
>


*Please elaborate. AG *

>
> Gödel will disbelieve in Church thesis, and miss it, despite proving that 
> arithmetic emulates all computable functions, but he was not sure he get 
> them all. Only after reading Turing, will Gödel accept the Church Turing 
> thesis, and thus definition of computable function.
>

*Please elaborate. AG* 

>
> Do you know Cantor theorem? Do you know the theorem asserting that the set 
> of functions from N to N (or from N to {0, 1}) is not enumerable?
>
.
*Are you referring to Cantor's diagonal proof that the rationals are 
countable? I've seen that. I can believe the latter comment, and can see 
it's not easy to prove. AG *

>
> If yes, I will show you that the Church Turing thesis entails 
> incompleteness of al all formal system rather easily. If no, I will send 
> more explanation.
>
> Have you tried to follow the thread of the combinators.
>

*No. AG*
 

> This is again a formal system capable of defining all computable 
> functions. So, Church-thesis is equivalent with “all intuitively computable 
> functions are computable by combinators”. I will prove this.
>
> Tell me if this helped, I am not sure of your background.
>

*Still pretty vague. I have a BA & MA in mathematics, and an MS in physics, 
respectively from Cornell University, The University of Michigan, and 
Northeastern University,  AG *

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -- 
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Re: : Many-minds interpretation?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Aug 2018, at 01:54, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 21 Aug 2018, at 14:53, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
 This is discussed since the beginning of QM. Stop talking like if only you 
 understand Everett.
>>> 
>>> Well, it does not appear as though you do either. You keep adding in 
>>> infinities of observers that are not part of Everett's formulation of QM.
>> 
>> 
>> There are two sort of infinity here. One which I hope you agree with, like 
>> when Alice measure the position of an electron prepared in the state of 
>> lowest energy level of an electron around a proton. The electron state is a 
>> superposition of all position possible in the corresponding orbital. After 
>> measurement she is entangled with that electron, and we have an infinity of 
>> Alice. OK? (I assume of course some classical QM; that might need some 
>> correction when GR is used).
> 
> I am OK with this, as I have said before. This is just the infinity that 
> comes with measuring position or momentum of a particle in a wave packet.
> 
>> The other sort of infinity, the one which I think you disagree with, is 
>> typical for the  superposition of tensor products, like the singlet state ud 
>> - du. Before measurement Alice has the same probability of finding u, or d 
>> for any measurement she can do in any direction. Both Alice and Bob are 
>> maximally ignorant of their possible measurement results. The MW on this, or 
>> a MW way to interpret this, to keep the rotational symmetry, is that we have 
>> an infinity of couples Alice+Bob, with each couple being correlated.  If 
>> not, some implicit assumption is made on u and d, like it is a preferred 
>> base.
> 
> But that is not part of quantum mechanics in Everett's or any other 
> interpretation. It is an infinite superposition that you have added on for 
> your own reasons. I have previously offered some suggestions as to how you 
> could create such a superposition in a conventional way. One obvious 
> possibility is to have Alice choose her measurement angle according to some 
> random quantum process, such as radioactive decay.


That is not why I am talking about. I do not add any superposition, I use only 
the fact that a superposition like ud-du is the same as a superposition u’d’ 
-d’u, so the relative state implied by the first entails the existence of the 
relative sate of the second. By choosing to measure u/d Alice select its 
‘points of view”, and will get a result determine by all the directions (it 
will be completely random. Yet, in all those Old, Bob has the correlated 
particles by common cause. It is almost the definition of the singlet state.




> 
> But the problems with any such suggestion are obvious. Firstly, Alice does 
> not choose her measurement angle in that way, so there is no 
> super-superposition created. Secondly, this construction does not restore the 
> rotational symmetry in any case. You might have an infinite number of Alices, 
> measuring the singlet at all possible angles, but that multi-multiverse is 
> not rotationally symmetric either! All it needs is for Alice number 7,234,826 
> to poke her tongue out and the rotational symmetry is lost! Of course, you 
> could add yet more multiverses to cover every possible deviation of Alice 
> from the stationary state. But the process rapidly becomes ridiculous.
> 
> So this Rube Goldberg construction of additional multiverses of 
> superpositions does not actually restore stable rotational symmetry. So why 
> propose such a construction? William of Ockham will rise out of his grave to 
> haunt you for such pointless extravagance of entities!

Alice destroys the rotational symmetry in all its universe. Not of the whole 
wave, where Alice does not exist as a determinate subsystem.





> 
>> And yes, I do assume locality, if only to illustrate that the MW does not 
>> force the presence of FTL influence (without transfert of information, which 
>> actually would require a third person indeterminacy in Nature, which I 
>> doubt).
>> 
>> It is just a consequence of ud-du = u’d’-d’u’, and the fact that this 
>> implies maximal ignorance of Alice (and Bob) whatever spin-direction is 
>> chosen. After the choice of Alice, and her measurement, neither Alice and 
>> Bob will be able to access a different world. All Alice and Bob will have to 
>> interpret the state like if it was s simple (two terms) superposition. It is 
>> like suppressing the global phase of the state.
> 
> And what is the problem with regarding it like this? Even if you add in these 
> arbitrary multi-superpositions, you end up with an Alice making a single 
> measurement in some particular direction and communicating with her partner 
> Bob, who was always in the same world.

Bt that are two worlds, at some point four, and I multiply them by 2^aleph_0, 
for many reasons.




> All your additional worlds add only smoke and confusion 

Re: : Many-minds interpretation?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Aug 2018, at 22:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/21/2018 6:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Aug 2018, at 14:53, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
> On 21 Aug 2018, at 02:20, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 20 Aug 2018, at 13:18, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> You didn't respond to my earlier post in which I discussed the symmetry 
>>> breaking occasioned by Alice's measurement interaction with the singlet 
>>> state. I copy the relevant parts of my earlier post here:
>>> 
>>> "The fact that Alice's interaction with the state is unitary and can be 
>>> reversed does not mean that the original symmetry still exists in some 
>>> sense. If I place a large weight at some point on the circumference of 
>>> a bicycle wheel, the rotational symmetry of that wheel is lost. The 
>>> fact that I can reverse the process by removing the imposed weight does 
>>> not mean that the altered wheel is still rotationally symmetric in some 
>>> wider view.”
>> 
>> OK, but when the heavy object is removed, at that moment, the symmetry 
>> is back. Then, when Alice makes the measurement, the symmetry is lost 
>> from her point of view, but the general symmetry of the state has not 
>> changed. It is only not retrievable by Alice (unless quantum erasure, 
>> amnesia, etc.).
> 
> Bruno, you have not made the least effort to understand the point I made 
> above,
 
 Stop speculating on people.
>>> 
>>> I am merely responding to what you wrote. No speculation involved.
>> 
>> 
>> How do you know I did not make some effort. Maybe you imagine that I am 
>> clever or something. You might need to develop some sense of pedagogy.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
> or to respond to it intelligently.
 
 Sop making judgement.
>>> 
>>> There has been no intelligent response. No judgement involved.
>> 
>> That is a contradiction.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
> It is difficult to believe that you are actually discussing this in good 
> faith. You just keep repeating your own misunderstandings of the 
> situation.
 
 This is discussed since the beginning of QM. Stop talking like if only you 
 understand Everett.
>>> 
>>> Well, it does not appear as though you do either. You keep adding in 
>>> infinities of observers that are not part of Everett's formulation of QM.
>> 
>> 
>> There are two sort of infinity here. One which I hope you agree with, like 
>> when Alice measure the position of an electron prepared in the state of 
>> lowest energy level of an electron around a proton. The electron state is a 
>> superposition of all position possible in the corresponding orbital. After 
>> measurement she is entangled with that electron, and we have an infinity of 
>> Alice. OK? (I assume of course some classical QM; that might need some 
>> correction when GR is used).
> 
> This assumes that Alice has used a measuring instrument whose interaction is 
> spherically symmetric.  It is because her instrument has an infinite (or at 
> least very big) number of possible results that there are an infinity (or 
> many) Alice's.
> 
>> The other sort of infinity, the one which I think you disagree with, is 
>> typical for the  superposition of tensor products, like the singlet state ud 
>> - du. Before measurement Alice has the same probability of finding u, or d 
>> for any measurement she can do in any direction.
> 
> But direction is chosen via her thought processes which are effectively 
> classical.  Her wf is not rotationaly symmetric. It could be arranged that 
> some quantum random number generator is used to set the detector angle to X.  
> In that case the multiverse would split into many different branches when the 
> qrng result decohered and output X.  But this event would still leave Alice 
> and Bob spacelike separate in the world where the qrng output X.  There will 
> be many branches corresponding to the many possible values of X.  But in each 
> branch the change of the wf when Alice measures the spin along X will be a 
> non-local splitting into "up-X" or "down-X".   At least that's conventional 
> QM.

?

Conventional Everett QM?

That discussion is fruitful, we see clearly where we disagree. It is  on how to 
interpret the many-worlds view of the tensor products, which are admittedly 
weird. 

I think that any interpretation which threats the covariance of the physical 
reality is doubtful. What can happen is that the dream/computations do not 
cohere enough to get any definite global physical reality. But I think it is 
premature to say this, both empirically and theoretically.

Bruno






> 
> Brent
> 
>> Both Alice and Bob are maximally ignorant of their possible 

Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Aug 2018, at 21:25, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/21/2018 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 21 Aug 2018, at 07:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 8/20/2018 9:54 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 On Mon, Aug 20, 2018 at 09:03:04PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> We must be looking at some different enumeration of the argument.  I have:
> 
 Clearly. I was referring to the enumeration in the SANE2004 paper, which 
 is kind of canonical:
>>> OK. I also have the SANE paper.
>>> 
 7) The seventh step introduces the Universal Dovetailer (UD). Let N 
 denotes the set of
 natural numbers. A function from N to N is said to be total if it is 
 defined on all natural
 numbers. A function is said to be computable iff there is a programme 
 FORTRAN which
 computes it12. Church thesis (CT) makes the particular choice of FORTRAN 
 irrelevant. CT
 claims that all computable functions, total or not, are computed by 
 algorithm expressible in
 FORTRAN. In particular all total computable functions are computed by such 
 FORTRAN
 program...
>>> Yes I understood it introduced the UD and per the C-T inferred that all 
>>> possible computations are performed by it.
>>> 
>>> Bruno wrote,"In that case consciousness is associated with a digital 
>>> self-referential entity which cannot distinguish
>>>  a “bottom” (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality"
>>> 
>>> I objected, "But you didn't show that."
>>> 
>>> You responded, "This is directly the result at step 7 of the UDA. And it is 
>>> pretty much required for the Church Turing thesis to hold."
>>> 
>>> So I still don't see why the UD implies consciousness is associated with a 
>>> digital self-referential entity which cannot distinguish a “bottom” 
>>> (primary) physical reality from an arithmetical reality.
>> 
>> It is not the UD which implies this, but just the digital mechanist 
>> hypothesis. A person whose brain is in a vat, with the right configuration, 
>> cannot know that she is in a brain in a vat. Similarly, we cannot know if we 
>> are processed by something primarily physical or not. If I implement the 
>> combinators in FORTRAN or in LISP, no combinators can distinguish the two 
>> from their personal experience (that without observation). Same for the 
>> arithmetical/physical.
>> 
>> The UD is used to formulate the measure problem, not to argue that a digital 
>> machine cannot distinguish an arithmetical from a physical “master machine”, 
>> which is a direct consequence of digital mechanism.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> It seems to me like the rock that computes everything.  The UD is 
>>> effectively running every possible simulation at once
>> So to speak. The universal dovetailer has to dovetail, of course.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> and so is simulating everything at once.  Whether some thread within it 
>>> simulates you or simulates a rock on alpha centauri becomes a matter of 
>>> interpretation.
>> ? If it simulates you, you will feel to be conscious. The point will be that 
>> there is no rock which could ever be simulable by any computer, except those 
>> exloiting directly the infinities of computations below our level of 
>> substitution, like plausibly, a quantum computer.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> The computations of the UD can have no unique interpretation.
>> 
>> A computation *is* an interpretation, made by a universal machine. That is 
>> what the universal do: computation.
> 
> But that doesn't make it an interpretation. 

?

A computation is a relation between a universal machine (or machinery) making 
the universal machine interpreting a program to get some (hopefully) output 
with some input, or none.





> My wristwatch does universal computation.

You can run LISP on your wristwatch? I doubt it. Implement K and S on your 
wristwatch!





> 
>> Then with mechanism, some can be associated to consciousness, when they 
>> emulate self-referential entity.
> 
> Can you watch a running program and tell that it is emulating a 
> self-referential entity or not?


Only those I can build. To be a program computing the factorial function is 
already undecidable. 



> 
>> If curiosity is conscious on Mars, it has to be conscious in the virtual 
>> mars during its training on Earth, and it has to be conscious in arithmetic, 
>> in virtue of the same number relations.
> 
> Exactly my point.  The Mars Rover is not conscious simpliciter, it is 
> conscious of its body and its environment.  The program running on it's cpu 
> could have any interpretation; it is only its connections to the environment 
> that provide a definite interpretation. 

Yes. That is where the nuance []p & p, and []p & <>p come from. 




> The enivronment can be simulated too, but then the closed system cannot 
> provide its own interpretation.  Number relations do not of themselves 
> provide an interpretation.

Yes. Those are higher order dreams, but the physical is bound up by a sort of 

Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Aug 2018, at 21:00, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/21/2018 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The consequence of the brain being digitally emulable at some relevant level 
>> entails that matter obeys the laws of the formal mathematics of Z1 and Z1* 
>> (and others).
> 
> As I understand your theory, the mind (not the brain) is a sequence of states 
> in threads of computation by the UD. 


Not really. The mind of a universal (Löbian) machine is what the machine can 
believe ([]p), know ([]p); etc. on herself.

The UD is Turing equivalent with the set of sigma_1 true sentences, which plays 
the role of the atomic propositions.

I assume only K and S. The theology is derived in the mind of the Löbian 
combinator. The leaves of the UD is only the range of the indeterminacies. To 
have a probability, we need the “<>t” default hypothesis: that is why we matter 
needs the presence of p (truth) or at least <>t (consistency). 

The fall of the souls is the passage from truth to relative consistencies.


> These threads are picked out by some as yet unknown statistic


We know already that its logic is quantum. You forget the translation in 
arithmetic. I assume only Robinson Arithmetic (and much more, of course, at the 
meta level).



> that makes them constitute a sequence of thoughts, aka "observer moments”. 

You need to take iso account the self-referential correctness. I limit myself 
to all machine which believes in arithmetic and are correct. 



> Matter and the physical world exists only as an implication or inference of 
> these thoughts. 


Not really, it is a blend of truth, self-representation, and the hard 
mathematical reality.


> Thats your reversal of psychology and physics. Right?


Only if you add all nuances imposed to incompleteness, and then you say “some 
as yet unknown statistics”, when the problem is that we have already three of 
them, obeying to a quantum logic where they should appear indeed. 

The point is that we have no choice if we take seriously the idea that we can 
survive with Digital brain, but also that the canonical theology, through its 
physics, is testable, and thanks to current QM, it fits rather well.

Are you following the combinators thread? I might explain the relation between 
Church’s thesis, the phi_i and the combinators.  I illustrate that 
computability theory is a branch of mathematics.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Aug 2018, at 20:54, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/21/2018 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>>   If everything is digital,
>> 
>> 
>> 99,98 % of the arithmetical reality is not digitally emulable. Only 
>> brain and computers are digital with mechanism. Our body are not. That is 
>> how the non cloning can be proved from mechanism. No piece of matter at all 
>> could ever be simulated by a computer.
> 
> You contradict yourself within one sentence.  "A brain is digital and our 
> body is not"??
> 
> "No piece of matter at all could ever be simulated by a computer." but it is 
> simulated or created by the UD.


You might need to reread the reasoning. Mechanism is the bet that there is a 
level where we survive a (physical) digital substitution. Matter is the product 
of the indeterminacy on all computations below my substitution level. That is 
not necessarily computable. The range of the indeterminacy is also not 
computable. Indeed, it cannot be said all aberrant histories are eliminated. 
Eventually we need the full quantified qG* (which its highly undecidable)

The UD never simulates “matter”. Matter is a first person plural view of the 
“border of the universal mind”. The universal mind is the mind of the universal 
machine. It is a universal first person indeterminacy phenomenon. The 
mathematics of this has begun with Gödel, Löb, Solovay. Incompleteness makes 
provable into a belief, and introduces the needed nuances to get a 
neoplatonician theology. The measure one logic is given by the arithmetical 
nuances on provability that I have given. The fact that []p obeys a different 
logic than []p & <>t explains why the knowability logic is different from the 
observability logic. That explains where the physical comes from.

About consciousness, all you need to agree with is that your own, here and now, 
is true, knowable, actually indubitable, not provable, not definable. 
That defines a flux of differentiating consciousness with a precise 
mathematical structure, actually half mathematical and half personal.

To simulate matter perfectly, you would need to complete each second the 
complete universal dovetailing. The strange thing: is that it seems we can 
approximate it very well through computation, at different level. The Sigma_1 
arithmetic contains the infinitely many digital approximations of matter, but 
none is correct.

I don’t claim it is true, just that it is testable.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: beautiful visualization of the first million integers

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Thank you. It looks really good. Evgenii 

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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, August 22, 2018 at 2:19:43 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 2:06 AM > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 10:30:01 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:40 PM  wrote:
>>>


 On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 8:02:52 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:20 PM  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 3:04:45 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 1:44 PM  wrote:
>>>


 On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 2:41:12 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 11:49:04 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 15 Aug 2018, at 12:36, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 10:22:40 AM UTC, agrays...@
>>> gmail.com wrote:



 On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 9:58:57 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> > On 14 Aug 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker  
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 8/14/2018 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> How do you explain interference fringes in the two slits? 
> How do you explain the different behaviour of u+d and a mixture 
> of u and d. 
> >> 
> >> If the wave is not real, how doe it interfere even when we 
> are not there? 
> > 
> > How does it interfere with itself unless it goes through 
> both slits in the same world...thus being non-local. 
>
> The wave is a trans-world notion. You should better see it as 
> a wave of histories/worlds, than a wave in one world. I don’t 
> think “one 
> world” is well defined enough to make sense in both Everett and 
> Mechanism. 
>

 *If you start with the error tGhat all possible results of a 
 measurement must be realized, you can't avoid many worlds. Then, 
 if you 
 fall in love with the implications of this error, you are firmly 
 in woo-woo 
 land with the prime directive of bringing as many as possible into 
 this 
 illusion / delusion. This is where we're at IMO. AG *

>>>
>>> *Truthfully, I don't know why, when you do a slit experiment one 
>>> particle at a time, the result is quantum interference. It might be 
>>> because 
>>> particles move as waves and each particle goes through both slits. 
>>> In any 
>>> event, I don't see the MWI is a solution to this problem. It just 
>>> takes us 
>>> down a deeper rabbit hole. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>> Everything is in the formalism, as well exemplified by the two 
>>> slits. If you miss this, then consider the quantum algorithm by 
>>> Shor. 
>>> There, a “particle” is not just going through two slits, but 
>>> participate in 
>>> parallel, yet different computations, and we get an indirect 
>>> evidence by 
>>> the information we can extract from a quantum Fourier transform on 
>>> all 
>>> results obtained in the parallel branches. 
>>>
>>
>> *No. It's all nonsense. AG *
>>
>>>
>>>
> No it's something you can already buy and use today:
>
>
>
> https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/10/ibm-passes-major-milestone-with-20-and-50-qubit-quantum-computers-as-a-service/
>
> Jason
>

 *If you're referring to my critique of the standard quantum 
 interpretation of the superposition of states -- that a system in a 
 superposition is in ALL component states SIMULTANEOUSLY -- show me 
 where 
 that INTERPRETATION is used in quantum computers.*

>>>
>>> It's in the definition of a qubit: 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qubit
>>>
>>
>> *But that's not nearly enough. You have to show where the assumption 
>> is applied. In the case of standard QM, the superposition is written as 
>> a 
>> sum of eigenstates, which are mutually orthogonal. So, as I pointed out 
>> exhaustively with no takers, the assumption isn't used in calculating 
>> probabilities. When you take the inner product of an eigenstate with the 
>> wf, all terms drop out except the eigenvalue whose probability you are 
>> calculating. Is the situation different with qubits*? AG 

beautiful visualization of the first million integers

[Telmo Menezes]

Each integer is represented as a vector of its prime factors, in a
high-dimensionality representation such that:

[1 0 1 0 0 0 0 ...] means that the number has factors 2 and 5 (first
and third primes). Then they apply a dimensionality reduction
algorithm to transform these vectors into 2D vectors with real-valued
coordinates.

I think the result is beautiful:
https://johnhw.github.io/umap_primes/index.md.html

Cheers,
Telmo.

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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 2:06 AM  wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 10:30:01 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:40 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 8:02:52 PM UTC, Jason wrote:



 On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:20 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 3:04:45 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 1:44 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 2:41:12 PM UTC, Jason wrote:



 On Wednesday, August 15, 2018,  wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 11:49:04 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 Aug 2018, at 12:36, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 10:22:40 AM UTC, agrays...@
>> gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 9:58:57 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 > On 14 Aug 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:
 >
 >
 >
 > On 8/14/2018 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 >> How do you explain interference fringes in the two slits?
 How do you explain the different behaviour of u+d and a mixture of 
 u and d.
 >>
 >> If the wave is not real, how doe it interfere even when we
 are not there?
 >
 > How does it interfere with itself unless it goes through both
 slits in the same world...thus being non-local.

 The wave is a trans-world notion. You should better see it as a
 wave of histories/worlds, than a wave in one world. I don’t think 
 “one
 world” is well defined enough to make sense in both Everett and 
 Mechanism.

>>>
>>> *If you start with the error tGhat all possible results of a
>>> measurement must be realized, you can't avoid many worlds. Then, if 
>>> you
>>> fall in love with the implications of this error, you are firmly in 
>>> woo-woo
>>> land with the prime directive of bringing as many as possible into 
>>> this
>>> illusion / delusion. This is where we're at IMO. AG *
>>>
>>
>> *Truthfully, I don't know why, when you do a slit experiment one
>> particle at a time, the result is quantum interference. It might be 
>> because
>> particles move as waves and each particle goes through both slits. 
>> In any
>> event, I don't see the MWI is a solution to this problem. It just 
>> takes us
>> down a deeper rabbit hole. AG*
>>
>>
>> Everything is in the formalism, as well exemplified by the two
>> slits. If you miss this, then consider the quantum algorithm by Shor.
>> There, a “particle” is not just going through two slits, but 
>> participate in
>> parallel, yet different computations, and we get an indirect 
>> evidence by
>> the information we can extract from a quantum Fourier transform on 
>> all
>> results obtained in the parallel branches.
>>
>
> *No. It's all nonsense. AG *
>
>>
>>
 No it's something you can already buy and use today:



 https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/10/ibm-passes-major-milestone-with-20-and-50-qubit-quantum-computers-as-a-service/

 Jason

>>>
>>> *If you're referring to my critique of the standard quantum
>>> interpretation of the superposition of states -- that a system in a
>>> superposition is in ALL component states SIMULTANEOUSLY -- show me where
>>> that INTERPRETATION is used in quantum computers.*
>>>
>>
>> It's in the definition of a qubit:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qubit
>>
>
> *But that's not nearly enough. You have to show where the assumption
> is applied. In the case of standard QM, the superposition is written as a
> sum of eigenstates, which are mutually orthogonal. So, as I pointed out
> exhaustively with no takers, the assumption isn't used in calculating
> probabilities. When you take the inner product of an eigenstate with the
> wf, all terms drop out except the eigenvalue whose probability you are
> calculating. Is the situation different with qubits*? AG
>


 These superposed states either exist or they don't.  Which is it in
 your view?  In my view they exist, because that is the only way to explain
 the computational power of a quantum computer.

>>>
>>> *I am not doubting the existence of the superposed 

Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 10:30:01 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:40 PM > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 8:02:52 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:20 PM  wrote:
>>>


 On Tuesday, August 21, 2018 at 3:04:45 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 1:44 PM  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 2:41:12 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018,  wrote:
>>>


 On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 11:49:04 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Aug 2018, at 12:36, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 10:22:40 AM UTC, agrays...@
> gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, August 15, 2018 at 9:58:57 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 14 Aug 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker  
>>> wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On 8/14/2018 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >> How do you explain interference fringes in the two slits? How 
>>> do you explain the different behaviour of u+d and a mixture of u 
>>> and d. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> If the wave is not real, how doe it interfere even when we 
>>> are not there? 
>>> > 
>>> > How does it interfere with itself unless it goes through both 
>>> slits in the same world...thus being non-local. 
>>>
>>> The wave is a trans-world notion. You should better see it as a 
>>> wave of histories/worlds, than a wave in one world. I don’t think 
>>> “one 
>>> world” is well defined enough to make sense in both Everett and 
>>> Mechanism. 
>>>
>>
>> *If you start with the error tGhat all possible results of a 
>> measurement must be realized, you can't avoid many worlds. Then, if 
>> you 
>> fall in love with the implications of this error, you are firmly in 
>> woo-woo 
>> land with the prime directive of bringing as many as possible into 
>> this 
>> illusion / delusion. This is where we're at IMO. AG *
>>
>
> *Truthfully, I don't know why, when you do a slit experiment one 
> particle at a time, the result is quantum interference. It might be 
> because 
> particles move as waves and each particle goes through both slits. In 
> any 
> event, I don't see the MWI is a solution to this problem. It just 
> takes us 
> down a deeper rabbit hole. AG*
>
>
> Everything is in the formalism, as well exemplified by the two 
> slits. If you miss this, then consider the quantum algorithm by Shor. 
> There, a “particle” is not just going through two slits, but 
> participate in 
> parallel, yet different computations, and we get an indirect evidence 
> by 
> the information we can extract from a quantum Fourier transform on 
> all 
> results obtained in the parallel branches. 
>

 *No. It's all nonsense. AG *

>
>
>>> No it's something you can already buy and use today:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/10/ibm-passes-major-milestone-with-20-and-50-qubit-quantum-computers-as-a-service/
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>> *If you're referring to my critique of the standard quantum 
>> interpretation of the superposition of states -- that a system in a 
>> superposition is in ALL component states SIMULTANEOUSLY -- show me where 
>> that INTERPRETATION is used in quantum computers.*
>>
>
> It's in the definition of a qubit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qubit
>

 *But that's not nearly enough. You have to show where the assumption is 
 applied. In the case of standard QM, the superposition is written as a sum 
 of eigenstates, which are mutually orthogonal. So, as I pointed out 
 exhaustively with no takers, the assumption isn't used in calculating 
 probabilities. When you take the inner product of an eigenstate with the 
 wf, all terms drop out except the eigenvalue whose probability you are 
 calculating. Is the situation different with qubits*? AG 

>>>
>>>
>>> These superposed states either exist or they don't.  Which is it in your 
>>> view?  In my view they exist, because that is the only way to explain the 
>>> computational power of a quantum computer.
>>>
>>
>> *I am not doubting the existence of the superposed states; just their 
>> *interpretation* which is key to achieving the postulated speeds of quantum 
>> computers. See comment below. AG *
>>
>>>  

Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/21/2018 9:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 11:28 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 8/21/2018 9:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 10:50 PM Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 8/21/2018 7:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 7:43 PM Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 8/21/2018 3:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 5:00 PM Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 8/21/2018 2:40 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com
 wrote:



If I start a 200 qubit quantum computer at
time = 0, and 100 microseconds later it has
produced a result that required going through
2^200 = 1.6 x 10^60 = states (more states than
is possible for 200 things to go through in
100 microseconds even if they changed their
state every Plank time (5.39121 x 10^-44
seconds), then physically speaking it **must**
have been simultaneous.  I don't see any other
way to explain this result.  How can 200
things explore 10^60 states in 10^-4 seconds,
when a Plank time is 5.39 x 10^-44 seconds?



It's no more impressive numerically than an
electron wave function picking out one of 10^30
silver halide molecules on a photographic plate to
interact with (which is also non-local, aka
simultaneous).


Well consider the 1000 qubit quantum computer. This is
a 1 followed by 301 zeros.


What is "this".  It's the number possible phase
relations between the 1000 qubits.  If we send a 1000
electrons toward our photographic plate through a 1000
holes the Schrodinger wave function approaching the
photographic plate then also has 1e301 different phase
relations.  The difference is only that we don't control
them so as to cancel out "wrong answers".



The reason I think the quantum computer example is important
to consider is because when we control them to produce a
useful result, it becomes that much harder to deny the
reality and significance of the intermediate states.


Which is why I'm pointing that, while important from our view
of it as a computation, from a physical viewpoint it is
nothing unusual.  If I poked a 100 pinholes in a screen and
shone my laser pointer on it there would the same number of
"intermediate states" between the screen and a photo detector.


Okay.  But this example tends to ignore the intermediate steps of
the computation, in a way that is easier to look over.



For instance, we can verify the result of a Shor calculation
for the factorization of a large prime.  We can't so easily
verify the statistics of the 1e301 phase relations are what
they should be.


This is not only over a googol^2 times the number of
silver halide molecules in your plate, but more than a
googol times the 10^80 atoms in the observable universe.

What is it, in your mind, that is able to track and
consistently compute over these 10^301 states, in this
system composed of only 1000 atoms?



Are you aware of anything other than many-worlds view that
can account for this?


I don't see anyway a many-worlds view can account for it. 
All those qubits have to be entangled and interfere in order
to arrive at an answer.  So they all have to be in the same
world.  Your numerology is just counting interference
relations in this world, they don't imply some events in
other worlds.


Where are these interference relations existing?  We've already
established there are not enough atoms to account for all the states


That's because the states aren't things, they are entanglements,
i.e. relations between things.  That's why the numbers are in
exponential in the number of things. They are not things
themselves, so it's specious to compare them to atoms.


in the whole observable universe (one world), nor are there
enough Plank times to account for iterating over every possible
state involved in the computation in (one world). So where are
all of these states existing and being processed?





Also note that you can only read off 200bits of
information (c.f. Holevo's theorem).


True, but that is irrelevant to the number of
intermediate