Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/21/2018 7:11 AM, Tomas Pales wrote:
I am generally sympathetic to Tegmark's mathematical multiverse idea, 
but I have two comments/criticisms to it:


1) I am not sure whether Tegmark is aware of the so-called 
"instantiation" relation. In philosophy, the instantiation relation is 
the relation between a general and a particular object, where the 
particular object is an instance of the general object. In other 
words, the general object is a property of the particular object. 
Example: general triangle (or triangle "in general") is the property 
of any particular triangle, and any particular triangle is an instance 
of general triangle. Another example: number 2 is a general relation 
that is instantiated in the particular relation between any two 
objects. I am not sure whether Tegmark realizes the difference between 
general objects and their instances, because he said something like: 
when we probe matter we only find numbers (and hence reality is just 
mathematics). But numbers cannot be found in our world; you cannot 
find number 2 sitting on a tree or in the atomic nucleus. You can only 
find instances of number 2, as relations between particular objects. 
Mathematical objects are usually thought to be general objects, but in 
that case there is more in reality than mathematical objects: there 
are general objects /and/ their instances. And in our physical world 
there are /no/ general objects, only their instances. If we want to 
say that there are mathematical objects in our physical world, we 
should include among mathematical objects also non-general objects, 
that is, objects that have no instances. (By the way, there is a 
hierarchy of generality: more general objects are instantiated in less 
general objects and those are ultimately instantiated in non-general 
objects. Non-general objects are often called "concrete", while 
general objects are also called "abstract".)


This appears not to be a well-order hierarchy.  The thing I am sitting 
on is an instance of a chair, and it's concrete.  But it's also an 
instance of a matter, i.e. a collection of particles of the Standard 
Model (which may or may not be the most general category). It's also an 
instance of things I own.




2) While I agree with Tegmark that reality contains all mathematical 
objects (both general and non-general), I think there is also a 
non-mathematical aspect of reality. That's because mathematical 
objects are relations or structures of relations, but relations cannot 
exist without objects between which they hold. While it is true that 
relations can hold between other relations, there should also be 
objects that are non-relations, which ultimately make sense of all 
relations. These non-relations are the non-mathematical objects and 
they (or at least some of them) may be the qualities of consciousness 
(qualia) - because (1) they have an unanalyzable/unstructured nature, 
and (2) they stand in relations to other objects (relations or 
non-relations) that we call "correlates of consciousness".


Can  you clarify with some examples?

Brent

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 11:30:54 AM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 5:22:20 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> BTW,  on "non-relations [which] are the non-mathematical objects and they 
>> (or at least some of them) may be the qualities of consciousness (qualia)", 
>> that is what I try to address in 
>>
>> 
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>>
>> where there is information processing (which is all mathematical 
>> processing) and something else: experience processing.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> I would say that any description is relational and therefore 
> mathematical/logical. When you describe an object you always define/present 
> it in relations to other objects - in relations to its parts or properties. 
> You can't describe the object itself, only give it a label. So you can't 
> describe qualities of consciousness themselves either. Not sure how you 
> would "process" them then.
>
> Is there really a fundamental difference between hardware and software? I 
> mean, software can be seen as part of hardware: software is a particular 
> configuration of electron flows in hardware.
>


Mathematics is genre of fiction 
[ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ ], so 
relations are fictional. "Processing" relations/mathematics has no real 
meaning.

The difference between hardware and software today is somewhat blurred with 
synthetic biology, programmable matter, reconfigurable hardware.

- pt

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Tomas Pales]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 5:22:20 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> BTW,  on "non-relations [which] are the non-mathematical objects and they 
> (or at least some of them) may be the qualities of consciousness (qualia)", 
> that is what I try to address in 
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>
> where there is information processing (which is all mathematical 
> processing) and something else: experience processing.
>
> - pt
>

I would say that any description is relational and therefore 
mathematical/logical. When you describe an object you always define/present 
it in relations to other objects - in relations to its parts or properties. 
You can't describe the object itself, only give it a label. So you can't 
describe qualities of consciousness themselves either. Not sure how you 
would "process" them then.

Is there really a fundamental difference between hardware and software? I 
mean, software can be seen as part of hardware: software is a particular 
configuration of electron flows in hardware.

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Tomas Pales]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 5:52:13 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> If our universe does not have infinitely-computing objects but there are 
> other universes that do, that would seem strange.
>
> Why would our universe be left out? :)
>
>
The mathematical multiverse would contain all possible (consistently 
defined) mathematical structures, both finite and infinite. We would live 
in a finite one. Why? I don't know. Maybe just by accident. Or maybe only 
finite structures can contain conscious entities.  

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 10:43:28 AM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 4:28:21 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>>
>>   "reality contains all mathematical objects"
>>
>>
>> Ironically, Tegmark doesn't believe that at all. He says infinite 
>> mathematical entities are "ruining physics".
>> - 
>> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/
>>
>>
>> The only thing to conclude is that Mad Max published his mathematical 
>> universe hypothesis as a joke!
>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis
>>
>
> Already in his Mathematical Universe paper on arxiv, Tegmark discussed a 
> restricted version of MUH called CUH (computable universe hypothesis). He 
> mentioned that the attractive feature of CUH would be the disappearance of 
> the measure problem and also the exclusion of structures of which we may 
> never know whether they are consistent (due to Godel's second 
> incompleteness theorem) and thus whether they exist. On the other hand, the 
> fact that we cannot calculate probabilities (the measure problem) or find 
> whether a structure is consistent seems like an epistemic problem, not an 
> ontological one. The infinities may exist in reality, we just can't extract 
> useful statistics from them or confirm their existence. But reality doesn't 
> depend on whether we find it useful or whether we can confirm its existence.
>
> The universe in which we live, or even the inflationary multiverse, may be 
> a finite/computable structure but there may also be infinite structures in 
> the larger mathematical multiverse.  
>




If our universe does not have infinitely-computing objects but there are 
other universes that do, that would seem strange.

Why would our universe be left out? :)

- pt 

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Tomas Pales]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 4:28:21 PM UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:

>
>   "reality contains all mathematical objects"
>
>
> Ironically, Tegmark doesn't believe that at all. He says infinite 
> mathematical entities are "ruining physics".
> - 
> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/
>
>
> The only thing to conclude is that Mad Max published his mathematical 
> universe hypothesis as a joke!
> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis
>

Already in his Mathematical Universe paper on arxiv, Tegmark discussed a 
restricted version of MUH called CUH (computable universe hypothesis). He 
mentioned that the attractive feature of CUH would be the disappearance of 
the measure problem and also the exclusion of structures of which we may 
never know whether they are consistent (due to Godel's second 
incompleteness theorem) and thus whether they exist. On the other hand, the 
fact that we cannot calculate probabilities (the measure problem) or find 
whether a structure is consistent seems like an epistemic problem, not an 
ontological one. The infinities may exist in reality, we just can't extract 
useful statistics from them or confirm their existence. But reality doesn't 
depend on whether we find it useful or whether we can confirm its existence.

The universe in which we live, or even the inflationary multiverse, may be 
a finite/computable structure but there may also be infinite structures in 
the larger mathematical multiverse.  

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 9:28:21 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 9:11:03 AM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:
>>
>> I am generally sympathetic to Tegmark's mathematical multiverse idea, but 
>> I have two comments/criticisms to it:
>>
>> 1) I am not sure whether Tegmark is aware of the so-called 
>> "instantiation" relation. In philosophy, the instantiation relation is the 
>> relation between a general and a particular object, where the particular 
>> object is an instance of the general object. In other words, the general 
>> object is a property of the particular object. Example: general triangle 
>> (or triangle "in general") is the property of any particular triangle, and 
>> any particular triangle is an instance of general triangle. Another 
>> example: number 2 is a general relation that is instantiated in the 
>> particular relation between any two objects. I am not sure whether Tegmark 
>> realizes the difference between general objects and their instances, 
>> because he said something like: when we probe matter we only find numbers 
>> (and hence reality is just mathematics). But numbers cannot be found in our 
>> world; you cannot find number 2 sitting on a tree or in the atomic nucleus. 
>> You can only find instances of number 2, as relations between particular 
>> objects. Mathematical objects are usually thought to be general objects, 
>> but in that case there is more in reality than mathematical objects: there 
>> are general objects *and* their instances. And in our physical world 
>> there are *no* general objects, only their instances. If we want to say 
>> that there are mathematical objects in our physical world, we should 
>> include among mathematical objects also non-general objects, that is, 
>> objects that have no instances. (By the way, there is a hierarchy of 
>> generality: more general objects are instantiated in less general objects 
>> and those are ultimately instantiated in non-general objects. Non-general 
>> objects are often called "concrete", while general objects are also called 
>> "abstract".)
>>
>> 2) While I agree with Tegmark that reality contains all mathematical 
>> objects (both general and non-general), I think there is also a 
>> non-mathematical aspect of reality. That's because mathematical objects are 
>> relations or structures of relations, but relations cannot exist without 
>> objects between which they hold. While it is true that relations can hold 
>> between other relations, there should also be objects that are 
>> non-relations, which ultimately make sense of all relations. These 
>> non-relations are the non-mathematical objects and they (or at least some 
>> of them) may be the qualities of consciousness (qualia) - because (1) they 
>> have an unanalyzable/unstructured nature, and (2) they stand in relations 
>> to other objects (relations or non-relations) that we call "correlates of 
>> consciousness".
>>
>> Tomas
>>
>
>
>
>
>   "reality contains all mathematical objects"
>
>
> Ironically, Tegmark doesn't believe that at all. He says infinite 
> mathematical entities are "ruining physics".
> - 
> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/
>
>
> The only thing to conclude is that Mad Max published his mathematical 
> universe hypothesis as a joke!
> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis
>
>
> - pt 
>


BTW,  on "non-relations [which] are the non-mathematical objects and they 
(or at least some of them) may be the qualities of consciousness (qualia)", 
that is what I try to address in 

https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/

where there is information processing (which is all mathematical 
processing) and something else: experience processing.

- pt

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 9:11:03 AM UTC-5, Tomas Pales wrote:
>
> I am generally sympathetic to Tegmark's mathematical multiverse idea, but 
> I have two comments/criticisms to it:
>
> 1) I am not sure whether Tegmark is aware of the so-called "instantiation" 
> relation. In philosophy, the instantiation relation is the relation between 
> a general and a particular object, where the particular object is an 
> instance of the general object. In other words, the general object is a 
> property of the particular object. Example: general triangle (or triangle 
> "in general") is the property of any particular triangle, and any 
> particular triangle is an instance of general triangle. Another example: 
> number 2 is a general relation that is instantiated in the particular 
> relation between any two objects. I am not sure whether Tegmark realizes 
> the difference between general objects and their instances, because he said 
> something like: when we probe matter we only find numbers (and hence 
> reality is just mathematics). But numbers cannot be found in our world; you 
> cannot find number 2 sitting on a tree or in the atomic nucleus. You can 
> only find instances of number 2, as relations between particular objects. 
> Mathematical objects are usually thought to be general objects, but in that 
> case there is more in reality than mathematical objects: there are general 
> objects *and* their instances. And in our physical world there are *no* 
> general objects, only their instances. If we want to say that there are 
> mathematical objects in our physical world, we should include among 
> mathematical objects also non-general objects, that is, objects that have 
> no instances. (By the way, there is a hierarchy of generality: more general 
> objects are instantiated in less general objects and those are ultimately 
> instantiated in non-general objects. Non-general objects are often called 
> "concrete", while general objects are also called "abstract".)
>
> 2) While I agree with Tegmark that reality contains all mathematical 
> objects (both general and non-general), I think there is also a 
> non-mathematical aspect of reality. That's because mathematical objects are 
> relations or structures of relations, but relations cannot exist without 
> objects between which they hold. While it is true that relations can hold 
> between other relations, there should also be objects that are 
> non-relations, which ultimately make sense of all relations. These 
> non-relations are the non-mathematical objects and they (or at least some 
> of them) may be the qualities of consciousness (qualia) - because (1) they 
> have an unanalyzable/unstructured nature, and (2) they stand in relations 
> to other objects (relations or non-relations) that we call "correlates of 
> consciousness".
>
> Tomas
>




  "reality contains all mathematical objects"


Ironically, Tegmark doesn't believe that at all. He says infinite 
mathematical entities are "ruining physics".
- http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/


The only thing to conclude is that Mad Max published his mathematical 
universe hypothesis as a joke!
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis


- pt 

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Tomas Pales]

I am generally sympathetic to Tegmark's mathematical multiverse idea, but I 
have two comments/criticisms to it:

1) I am not sure whether Tegmark is aware of the so-called "instantiation" 
relation. In philosophy, the instantiation relation is the relation between 
a general and a particular object, where the particular object is an 
instance of the general object. In other words, the general object is a 
property of the particular object. Example: general triangle (or triangle 
"in general") is the property of any particular triangle, and any 
particular triangle is an instance of general triangle. Another example: 
number 2 is a general relation that is instantiated in the particular 
relation between any two objects. I am not sure whether Tegmark realizes 
the difference between general objects and their instances, because he said 
something like: when we probe matter we only find numbers (and hence 
reality is just mathematics). But numbers cannot be found in our world; you 
cannot find number 2 sitting on a tree or in the atomic nucleus. You can 
only find instances of number 2, as relations between particular objects. 
Mathematical objects are usually thought to be general objects, but in that 
case there is more in reality than mathematical objects: there are general 
objects *and* their instances. And in our physical world there are *no* 
general objects, only their instances. If we want to say that there are 
mathematical objects in our physical world, we should include among 
mathematical objects also non-general objects, that is, objects that have 
no instances. (By the way, there is a hierarchy of generality: more general 
objects are instantiated in less general objects and those are ultimately 
instantiated in non-general objects. Non-general objects are often called 
"concrete", while general objects are also called "abstract".)

2) While I agree with Tegmark that reality contains all mathematical 
objects (both general and non-general), I think there is also a 
non-mathematical aspect of reality. That's because mathematical objects are 
relations or structures of relations, but relations cannot exist without 
objects between which they hold. While it is true that relations can hold 
between other relations, there should also be objects that are 
non-relations, which ultimately make sense of all relations. These 
non-relations are the non-mathematical objects and they (or at least some 
of them) may be the qualities of consciousness (qualia) - because (1) they 
have an unanalyzable/unstructured nature, and (2) they stand in relations 
to other objects (relations or non-relations) that we call "correlates of 
consciousness".

Tomas

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Quantum outperforms classical

[Telmo Menezes]

Finally a proof that quantum computers outperform classical computers
for a certain class of problems? Thoughts?

"Quantum computers are expected to be better at solving certain
computational problems than classical computers. This expectation is
based on (well-founded) conjectures in computational complexity
theory, but rigorous comparisons between the capabilities of quantum
and classical algorithms are difficult to perform. Bravyi et al.
proved theoretically that whereas the number of “steps” needed by
parallel quantum circuits to solve certain linear algebra problems was
independent of the problem size, this number grew logarithmically with
size for analogous classical circuits (see the Perspective by
Montanaro). This so-called quantum advantage stems from the quantum
correlations present in quantum circuits that cannot be reproduced in
analogous classical circuits."

http://science.sciencemag.org/content/362/6412/308

Cheers,
Telmo.

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Re: The hard problem of matter

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 7:57:02 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Oct 2018, at 00:55, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
>>> unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
>>> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary 
>>> matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in 
>>> primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>>> “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>>>
>>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>>> at all. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>
>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
>> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
>> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>>
>>
>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is 
>> "primary", that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He 
>> knows that QM
>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>> No.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386
>
> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>
> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/
>  
>
>>
>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf
>
>
>
> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about. 
>
>
> Not correct. The language use some ontology (the alphabet, words), but the 
> language per se is independent of an ontology. It does not talk about 
> anything. For this you need to select some formula in the language, and 
> assume that they are talking about something, which is always assumed.
>
>
>
> But that doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno 
> wants to criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls 
> "primitive matter”.  
>
>
> Not at all. I criticise physicalist. Physicists, on the contrary, avoid 
> metaphysics. 
>
> There is not an atom of critics from may part on physics. Only on 
> physicalism. 
> My work has not been criticised by any physicists member of the three jury 
> called to judge the work (for the PhD, the price, etc.).
>
> Critics comes from non-agnostic atheists believer (christian radicals in 
> disguise). They are the one for which a primary universe is a dogma. 
> Physicists do not do that.
>
>
>
>
> But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost uniformly 
> assume that the stuff in their theories has some deeper explanation and is 
> NOT primary. 
>
>
> Yes, that is why they have appreciate my work, in general. The critics 
> comes only from “philosophers”, even only the materialist marxist one. 
> Only. The serious people see that I give a testable theory. I show that 
> some point in metaphysics are testable.
>

*Please state a metaphysical principle or proposition, and the method for 
testing it. AG *

>
>
> There's a difference between saying a metaphysics assumes things and 
> saying that it assumes things which are "primary”.
>
>
> Metaphysics, theology, search the primary things. A things is primary when 
> it HAS TO BE assumed. The universal machinery can be proved to be primary 
> in that sense. But the physicalist consider that only the physical 
> universal machineries are primary, and refuse the idea that the physical 
> appearance can be explained by simpler idea not involving an ontological 
> commitment in a physical universe.
>
> Somehow, you mak

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, October 21, 2018 at 3:04:35 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Oct 2018, at 06:47, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 5:55:46 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 



 On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> 
 >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
 >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem 
 unaware that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
 >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
 theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary 
 matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in 
 primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
 > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea 
 that “matter” is “primary matter”. 

 No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
 to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
 They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been 
 physicists 
 like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
 at all. 

 Brent 

>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>>
>>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
>>> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
>>> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>>>
>>>
>>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is 
>>> "primary", that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He 
>>> knows that QM
>>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>>> No.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386
>>
>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>>
>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … 
>> about the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
>> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf
>>
>>
>>
>> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about.  But that 
>> doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants to 
>> criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive 
>> matter".  But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost 
>> uniformly assume that the stuff in their theories has some deeper 
>> explanation and is NOT primary.  There's a difference between saying a 
>> metaphysics assumes things and saying that it assumes things which are 
>> "primary".
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> My point is that all physicists assume a metaphysics whenever they 
> articulate or adopt a theory, because all theory is expressed in a language.
>
>
> I am not sure of that. They do it like we all do it implicitly in our 
> everyday life, but I have no find a paper in physics, which use any 
> metaphysical hypothesis. It is only the materialist philosopher who does 
> that. Now, some physicists do make a bit of metaphysics after pension, or 
> as amateur, but then they are no more doing physics. They do 
> philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
>




Every physics paper (e.g. looking ones on arXiv) assume some metaphysics. 
There is the English (the natural language) in the paper, but there is the 
mathematical language present there too (technically today written in 
LaTeX:Mathematics [ https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/LaTeX/Mathematics ]). 
Applying Rorty ("contingency of language") and Derrida ("metaphysics of 
presence") reveals the (hidden) metaphysics in the combined 
(natural+mathematical) languages.

It is generally not considered applying Rorty and or Derrida to 
mathematical language, but mathematics is a language* too, like English. 
(or programming languages for that matter).

* technically, family of languages



>
>
>
>
>
>
> As for "primary matter" (in particular, the "primary" part)  this is all I 
> know about what that means:
>
> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism
>
> *Hylomorphis

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Oct 2018, at 06:47, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 5:55:46 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
>>> >>> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
>>> >> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled 
>>> >> "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you 
>>> >> believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>>> > “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>>> 
>>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>>> at all. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>> 
>>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>>> time, of course. Even if they   adopt a theory that someone 
>>> else created, they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean 
>>> Carroll writes about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy 
>>> metaphysics.
>> 
>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", 
>> that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He knows that 
>> QM
>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>> No.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386 
>> 
>> 
>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>> 
>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
>> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/ 
>> 
>>  
>>> 
>>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>> 
>>> - pt
>>> 
>> 
>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
>> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf 
>> 
> 
> 
> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about.  But that doesn't 
> mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants to criticize 
> physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive matter".  But 
> this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost uniformly assume that 
> the stuff in their theories has some deeper explanation and is NOT primary.  
> There's a difference between saying a metaphysics assumes things and saying 
> that it assumes things which are "primary".
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> My point is that all physicists assume a metaphysics whenever they articulate 
> or adopt a theory, because all theory is expressed in a language.

I am not sure of that. They do it like we all do it implicitly in our everyday 
life, but I have no find a paper in physics, which use any metaphysical 
hypothesis. It is only the materialist philosopher who does that. Now, some 
physicists do make a bit of metaphysics after pension, or as amateur, but then 
they are no more doing physics. They do philosophy/metaphysics/theology.






> 
> As for "primary matter" (in particular, the "primary" part)  this is all I 
> know about what that means:
> 
> https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism
> 
> Hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, 
> metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two 
> intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, 
> namely, substantial form. 
> 
> Matter and form, however, are not bodies or physical entities that can exist 
> or act independently: they exist and act only within and by the composite. 
> Thus, they can be known only indirectly, by intellectual analysis, as the 
> metaphysical principles of bodies.
> 
> 
> What I call codicalism is basically a version of hylomorphism, except my 
> "form" is "language", and there

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Oct 2018, at 00:55, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/20/2018 3:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 2:51:30 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
>>> >>> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle 
>>> >> theology" is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled 
>>> >> "primary matter". I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you 
>>> >> believe in primary matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>>> > “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>>> 
>>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>>> at all. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>>> 
>>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, 
>>> they are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes 
>>> about the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
>> 
>> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", 
>> that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He knows that 
>> QM
>>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
>> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  
>> No.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> https://twitter.com/seanmcarroll/status/1051238813236752386 
>> 
>> 
>> Sean Carroll @seanmcarroll
>> 
>> "Realism about the wave function is a good idea. (Even better, … about 
>> the quantum state, but I won’t be picky.)"
>>  re: Realism about the Wave Function   
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15153/ 
>> 
>>  
>>> 
>>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>>> 
>>> - pt
>>> 
>> 
>> "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have 
>> programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it 
>> cannot propose a language for us to speak."
>> -- Richard Rorty, Contingency of Language
>> [pdf] http://web.augsburg.edu/~crockett/120/Rorty-Contingency.pdf 
>> 
> 
> 
> Every language has an ontology, i.e. things it talks about. 

Not correct. The language use some ontology (the alphabet, words), but the 
language per se is independent of an ontology. It does not talk about anything. 
For this you need to select some formula in the language, and assume that they 
are talking about something, which is always assumed.



> But that doesn't mean that it assumes those things are primary.  Bruno wants 
> to criticize physicists for assuming there's something he calls "primitive 
> matter”. 

Not at all. I criticise physicalist. Physicists, on the contrary, avoid 
metaphysics. 

There is not an atom of critics from may part on physics. Only on physicalism. 
My work has not been criticised by any physicists member of the three jury 
called to judge the work (for the PhD, the price, etc.).

Critics comes from non-agnostic atheists believer (christian radicals in 
disguise). They are the one for which a primary universe is a dogma. Physicists 
do not do that.




> But this is just his straw man.  In fact physicists almost uniformly assume 
> that the stuff in their theories has some deeper explanation and is NOT 
> primary. 

Yes, that is why they have appreciate my work, in general. The critics comes 
only from “philosophers”, even only the materialist marxist one. Only. The 
serious people see that I give a testable theory. I show that some point in 
metaphysics are testable.


> There's a difference between saying a metaphysics assumes things and saying 
> that it assumes things which are "primary”.

Metaphysics, theology, search the primary things. A things is primary when it 
HAS TO BE assumed. The universal machinery can be proved to be primary in that 
sense. But the physicalist consider that only the physical universal 
machineries are primary, and refuse the idea that the physical appearance can 
be explained by simpler idea not involving an ontological commitment in a 
physical universe.

Somehow, you make my point here

Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Oct 2018, at 21:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/20/2018 11:24 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 10:33:04 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > >> > wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >>> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
>> >>> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
>> >> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle theology" 
>> >> is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary matter". 
>> >> I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in primary 
>> >> matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
>> > Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>> > “matter” is “primary matter”. 
>> 
>> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them.  They seek theories 
>> to explain phenomena.  They don't start by assuming some metaphysics.  
>> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists 
>> like Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work 
>> at all. 
>> 
>> Brent 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> What physicist doesn't assume some metaphysical assumptions? 
>> 
>> The 3 mentioned above talked  (1 still talks) about metaphysics all the 
>> time, of course. Even if they adopt a theory that someone else created, they 
>> are adopting the metaphysics of that theory. When Sean Carroll writes about 
>> the reality of the wave function, that's some heavy metaphysics.
> 
> Sounds like physics to me. Does Carroll say the wave function is "primary", 
> that there can be nothing more fundamental?  No, he doesn't.  He knows that QM
>  and GR are incompatible and he no doubt hopes to find something that 
> explains both of them.  Does he care whether that new thing is "primary"?  No.

That is why they miss the explanation, and the consciousness problem. They are 
not aware of the difference between matter and primary matter, nor of the 
mind-body problem. Indeed they do physics, not metaphysics, nor fundamental 
cognitive science.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Every language has a metaphysics.
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
>>  
>> -- 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Oct 2018, at 17:33, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/19/2018 11:32 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
 that we can doubt Aristotle theology.
>>> You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle theology" 
>>> is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary matter". 
>>> I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in primary 
>>> matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??”
>> Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
>> “matter” is “primary matter”.
> 
> No, they are not.  It's simply irrelevant to them. 

Which is how and why they miss the metaphysical puzzle. 


> They seek theories to explain phenomena. 

But with mechanism, they explanation is just not working at all, as they need 
to correlate the mind with the observation, and the UDA shows this cannot be 
done through any form of ontological commitment and mind/ontology identity 
thesis.



> They don't start by assuming some metaphysics. 

When they do physics. As ia her said many times, there is no problem with 
physics, only with physicalism.



> They only care that the theory works.  That's why it has been physicists like 
> Wheeler, Tegmark, Hawking,...who have wondered why equations work at all.

That why question lead to the abandon of physicalism in case we assume 
mechanism. That is the point.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
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Re: The hard problem of matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Oct 2018, at 09:23, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, October 20, 2018 at 1:32:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 19 Oct 2018, at 23:43, Brent Meeker > 
> > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 10/19/2018 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> I work with people who studied religion all the times. You seem unaware 
> >> that we can doubt Aristotle theology. 
> > 
> > You seem unaware that there is not such thing.  Your "Aristotle theology" 
> > is a straw man you invented to beat with stick labelled "primary matter". 
> > I'll bet that if you ask a 100 physicists, "Do you believe in primary 
> > matter." you'll get 99 answers of "What??” 
> 
> Because they have been brainwashed since about 529, into the idea that 
> “matter” is “primary matter”. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not sure really what today's physicists think matter is, but of what I've 
> read - e.g. Sean Carroll and Max Tegmark - they seem confused: "It's just 
> information/math" or something like that.
> 
> Makes one want to kick something.
> 
> "After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of 
> Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, 
> and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though 
> we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I 
> never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his 
> foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it -- I 
> refute it thus."
> Boswell: Life
> 
> - pt

The physicists are not aware of the mind-body problem, even when andonning 
primary matter, they remain physicalist. The question is not so much about 
matter than about physics and its possible reduction to another realm. 
I too refute idealism a long time ago by kicking a stone, and said “I refute 
it”, but then I woke up!

Bruno



>  
> 
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