Re: Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/5/2019 10:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle 




Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of 
mathematical objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are 
made true by reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in 
some way real, even though we can’t see, touch or feel them.


According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of 
language which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness 
of names and predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the 
sentence, and also whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name 
refers to an object, then, is a matter of the contribution the name 
makes to the truth of the whole sentence.


Is that true?  Doesn't the sentence have different truth values 
depending on what object a name refers to?  not just whether it refers 
or not?  A name can refer and be meaningful even when the sentence is false.


Brent

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Frege, Wittgenstein on linguistical truth

[Philip Thrift]

https://philosophynow.org/issues/106/Wittgenstein_Frege_and_The_Context_Principle


Frege was equally concerned to reject one kind of account of mathematical 
objectivity – the view that mathematical statements are made true by 
reference to abstract mathematical objects that are in some way real, even 
though we can’t see, touch or feel them. 

According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the 
proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language 
which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and 
predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also 
whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object, 
then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the 
whole sentence.

@philipthrift

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Re: Stochastic spacetime

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, December 5, 2019 at 7:12:35 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> How is the stochastic distribution chosen, or just motivated? What is an 
> entanglement in that theory? It seems nice to related an entanglement 
> theory of space-time with path integral on some stochastic spaces, but it 
> seems only to be a relation of consistency where I would hope for a 
> relation of necessity.
>
> Bruno
>
>
re: https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2399-6528/aaa851/pdf

*To utilize the SM-space for relativistic field theories, the stochastic 
metric should be introduced on a Minkowski manifold. The Minkowski manifold 
equipping the stochastic metric is referred to as the stochastic Lorentz 
metric space (SLM-space) hereafter. *


*It is shown that the QM of a mass point are equivalent to its classical 
mechanics on the SLM-space. The path integration, quantum equation of 
motion, uncertainty relation and commutation relations were re-formulated 
on the SLM-space and shown to be consistent with standard definitions. In 
the formalism proposed in this study, QM is formulated based on the 
extremal entropy principle a priori before classical mechanics. If the path 
integration described in this work is more fundamental than the standard 
definition, the path integral is mathematically well-defined on the 
Gaussian white-noise measure space.*

@philipthrift

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/5/2019 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 10:45 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


On 12/5/2019 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 5 Dec 2019, at 00:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,

It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but crazy?

Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.


Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my
dog died I'd get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The
counterfact then is that my dog did die today.  So responding
the counterfact I get another dog.


In the counter situation, yes (relatively real or not, that is
not relevant here, but it has to make sense)


So you didn't really mean "response to counterfactual inputs". 
You meant responses in some different world, where the input and
the response (and maybe everything else) are different.


The whole question about counterfactuals relates back to philosophical 
questions about what counterfactuals can possible mean when the 
antecedent is manifestly false. I think it was Lewis who proposed an 
analysis of causation in terms of counterfactuals, giving them meaning 
through the concept of "possible worlds". Philosophy has moved on past 
this understanding of counterfactuals, but it seems that Bruno is 
attached to the idea of multiple worlds, so he thinks that 
consciousness depends on a "possible worlds" understanding of the 
response to counterfactual inputs.


Bruno is a logician, so he looks at in terms of Kripke's possible worlds 
modal logic.  But unlike a physicist who takes mathematics and logic to 
be rules of language intended to conserve the validity of inferences in 
the language, he takes them to be proscriptive of reality.  I'm bothered 
by his modal logic of "B" which seems to morph betweeen "believes" and 
"proves" (beweisbar) which he justifies by saying he's referring to 
perfect reasoner who therefore proves, and believes, everything 
provable.  But this not a model of human reasoning.  Factual doesn't 
enter into it, so how can counterfactual.


Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 10:45 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 12/5/2019 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 5 Dec 2019, at 00:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
> consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
> response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,
>
> It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
> what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but 
> crazy?
>
> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.
>
>
> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died I'd
> get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is that my
> dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another dog.
>
>
> In the counter situation, yes (relatively real or not, that is not
> relevant here, but it has to make sense)
>
>
> So you didn't really mean "response to counterfactual inputs".  You meant
> responses in some different world, where the input and the response (and
> maybe everything else) are different.
>

The whole question about counterfactuals relates back to philosophical
questions about what counterfactuals can possible mean when the antecedent
is manifestly false. I think it was Lewis who proposed an analysis of
causation in terms of counterfactuals, giving them meaning through the
concept of "possible worlds". Philosophy has moved on past this
understanding of counterfactuals, but it seems that Bruno is attached to
the idea of multiple worlds, so he thinks that consciousness depends on a
"possible worlds" understanding of the response to counterfactual inputs.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/5/2019 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 5 Dec 2019, at 02:12, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 10:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,

It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but crazy?

Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.


Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog
died I'd get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The
counterfact then is that my dog did die today.  So responding the
counterfact I get another dog.  The same thing eventuates
tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me to the authorites and when
I explain this to the judge he mandates psychiatric care.

Hence Mechanism is false.


I think the point Bruno is making is that consciousness requires 
"counterfactual correctness”,



Not just “consciousness”, also the simpler notion of computation 
requires or even define a notion of counterfactual correctness. It is 
not much more than a semantic for the “if A then B else C”.




by which he appears to mean that consciousness must be such that if 
the inputs are changed (counterfactually), then the output must also 
change.


… must also change (counterfactually). OK.


This hypothesis -- that consciousness requires this "counterfactuall 
correctness" -- was introduced ad hoc in order to protect the movie 
graph argument. If we take the sequence of states through which a 
computation proceeds to give a particular conscious experience and 
reproduce exactly those states on a film or something similar, then 
running through those states will reproduce the same conscious 
experience. They want to avoid this conclusion, so they impose the 
restriction that the sequence of state must be "counterfactually 
correct", i.e., it must respond differently to different input -- 
which the movie graph, being fixed, clearly cannot.


Who they? Not me, and Maudlin makes that move to get a reductio ad 
absurdum of having both mechanism and materialism. Then at the end he 
choses materialism, where I keep Mechanism, but both Maudlin and me 
showed that indeed it is absurd to believe in both mechanism and the 
idea that consciousness is related exclusively to some material events.





That this ad hoc manoeuvre does not prove anything about 
consciousness was shown by Maudlin in his "Olympia" argument.


That is weird. Maudlin, and men  did prove something about 
consciousness, mechanism and materialism.


We show that materialism -> non mechanism, or equivalently that 
mechanism -> non materialism. You can’t have them both.


But it assumes that computation exists in the abstract...simply because 
there's a thing we invented called the existential quantifier.  It's as 
weak as St Anslem's ontological proof; which tellingly Goedel thought he 
could make sound.


Brent




One can restore counterfactual correctness by additional ad hoc 
additions to the graph, without altering the fact that the movie 
record still reproduces the conscious experience.


But the added piece have no role in the actual computation, and so 
that would endow the movie with consciousnes, but also the movies with 
the holes, and all consciousness will supervene on anything, making 
the theory inconsistent.


It is much simpler to study what is a computation, and understand that 
consciousness is in the computation, not in this or that 
implementation of the computation, except statistically below our 
substitution level.






The "competition" is irrelevant to consciousness in this case.



?

Bruno






Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/5/2019 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 5 Dec 2019, at 00:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,

It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but crazy?

Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.


Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog 
died I'd get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact 
then is that my dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I 
get another dog.


In the counter situation, yes (relatively real or not, that is not 
relevant here, but it has to make sense)


So you didn't really mean "response to counterfactual inputs".  You 
meant responses in some different world, where the input and the 
response (and maybe everything else) are different.


Brent




The same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me to 
the authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates 
psychiatric care.


You will need to elaborate this part. You lost me here.





Hence Mechanism is false.


?

Bruno






Brent


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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 4:05 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 5 Dec 2019, at 02:12, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> The "competition" is irrelevant to consciousness in this case
>
> ?
>
> Bruno
>

Sorry. Blame Google's autocorrect in the on-line email editor. Google makes
a living out of attempting to render anything I type as incomprehensible
garbage. One word that Google has never heard of is "decohered"! It has a
wonderful time invariably changing this to "decreed" without even asking
permission. Sometimes not even proof reading my email responses is
sufficient

I think in this case, I maybe typed "completion", but I can't be sure at
this stage...

Bruce

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Re: The largest and smallest Black Holes

[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 4:44 PM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

*> I don't know what happens in this gap between 2.2 and 3.4 solar masses.
> It is possibly a domain for quark stars and related exotic hadronic stars.*
>

If they exist Quark Stars could be the most dangerous objects in the
universe. The stuff they're made of, Strange Matter, would be even denser
than neutronium and unlike neutron star stuff it would be stable at earthly
pressure; in fact it would be more stable than ordinary matter so one
microscopic speck of it would convert the entire planet into a ball of
Strange Matter about a foot in diameter.

  John K Clark


>
>

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The largest and smallest Black Holes

[Lawrence Crowell]

I don't know what happens in this gap between 2.2 and 3.4 solar masses. It is 
possibly a domain for quark stars and related exotic hadronic stars.

LC

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[John Clark]

On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 6:31 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 >>what did the correct answer to the question asked the day before
> yesterday in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and only one city did "you"
> end up seeing yesterday, was it Washington or Moscow?
>
> *> Almost. *
>

Almost my ass, that's all that's going on and it's pretty damn banal.

*> Mechanism predicts* [...]
>

Translation from the original Brunospeak: A very silly theory predicts.


> *> that you will see only one city,*
>

And that very silly theory can not say who that shadowy mysterious person
called Mr.You is, nor can it say what the correct answer to a obvious
question turned out to be, "what one and only one city did Mr.You end up
seeing??". It can't say what the correct answer was *EVEN AFTER* the
"experiment" is long over. And that means it was not an experiment at all,
and it also shows that a question mark does not possess magical powers, it
shows that no punctuation mark can turn gibberish into a question, not even
if is placed at the very end.


> * > What you cannot predict in Helsinki is the particular city you will
> feel to end in.*
>

It can not be pre-dicted and it can not be post-dicted either because Bruno
Marchal does not know what "it" is, or know what exactly the question was,
or know who the hell Mr. You is.

> *The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with
> certainty, I will* [...]
>

By casually throwing in the personal pronoun "I" in a thought experiment
that contains a "I" duplicating machine Bruno has already demonstrated that
Bruno is unable to clearly ask the question much less answer it.

> *You have claim this without ever saying what is unclear,*


WHAT THE HELL?! For over 5 years I have been asking the same question, the
most recent time was just a few days ago in the very post you're responding
to!  I asked and I quote  "what did the correct answer to the question
asked the day before yesterday in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and
only one city did "you" end up seeing yesterday, was it Washington or
Moscow?".  You claim to have derived all sorts of cosmic significant things
from the fact that BEFORE the event it can not be predicted what some
mysterious person named Mr. You will see, but EVEN AFTER the event nobody
knows anything more than what was known BEFORE the event. So the outcome of
the "experiment"  has produced precisely ZERO bits of new information
because everybody already know the man who saw Moscow would become the
Moscow Man and the man who say Washington would become the Washington Man.

> > [...] feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one among
> Washington and Moscow.
>

Forget prediction!! *EVEN AFTER *the experiment is long over you *STILL*
can not answer the question "what one and only one city did you turn out to
see, Washington or Moscow?" and the reason you can't answer it is because
it contains the personal pronoun "you"; and if personal pronoun duplicating
machines are involved that means it is not a question at all, it's just
gibberish with a question mark at the end.

If you can't even clearly say what happened yesterday then you can't have
had been expected to make a clear prediction on the day before yesterday
about what would happen the next day.

John K Clark

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The largest and smallest Black Holes

[John Clark]

In the last month astronomers have broken records, they have found both the
largest and the smallest Black Holes in the universe, at least so far. The
largest Black Hole is 40 billion solar masses plus or minus 800 million.

A 40-BILLION SOLAR MASS BLACK HOLE IN THE CENTRAL GALAXY OF ABELL 85


Even more interesting is the discovery of the smallest Black Hole, it's
probably 3.3 solar masses although it could be as large as 6.1 or as small
as 2.6.

A low-mass black hole–giant star binary system


There are theoretical reasons to think a non-rotating Neutron Star can't
get any more massive than 2.16 solar masses before it collapses into a Black
Hole (unless Quark Stars made of Strange Matter exist), although they might
be as massive as 2.7 solar masses if they're spinning close to the speed of
light. But If a Neutron Star were spinning that fast it would have a huge
magnetic field which would slow it down so it couldn't keep that rate of
spin for long, astronomically speaking.  Magnetars might be Neutron Stars
of that sort, and short lifetime might be why they're so rare, only 23 have
ever been discovered. The most massive Neutron Star ever observed is 2.14
solar masses, very close to the theoretical limit.

John K Clark

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Dec 2019, at 02:12, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 10:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
 consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
 response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness, 
>>> It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
>>> what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but 
>>> crazy?
>> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.
> 
> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died I'd 
> get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is that my 
> dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another dog.  The 
> same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me to the 
> authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates psychiatric care.
> 
> Hence Mechanism is false.
> 
> I think the point Bruno is making is that consciousness requires 
> "counterfactual correctness”,


Not just “consciousness”, also the simpler notion of computation requires or 
even define a notion of counterfactual correctness. It is not much more than a 
semantic for the “if A then B else C”. 



> by which he appears to mean that consciousness must be such that if the 
> inputs are changed (counterfactually), then the output must also change.

… must also change (counterfactually). OK.


> This hypothesis -- that consciousness requires this "counterfactuall 
> correctness" -- was introduced ad hoc in order to protect the movie graph 
> argument. If we take the sequence of states through which a computation 
> proceeds to give a particular conscious experience and reproduce exactly 
> those states on a film or something similar, then running through those 
> states will reproduce the same conscious experience. They want to avoid this 
> conclusion, so they impose the restriction that the sequence of state must be 
> "counterfactually correct", i.e., it must respond differently to different 
> input -- which the movie graph, being fixed, clearly cannot.

Who they? Not me, and Maudlin makes that move to get a reductio ad absurdum of 
having both mechanism and materialism. Then at the end he choses materialism, 
where I keep Mechanism, but both Maudlin and me showed that indeed it is absurd 
to believe in both mechanism and the idea that consciousness is related 
exclusively to some material events.


> 
> That this ad hoc manoeuvre does not prove anything about consciousness was 
> shown by Maudlin in his "Olympia" argument.

That is weird. Maudlin, and men  did prove something about consciousness, 
mechanism and materialism.

We show that materialism -> non mechanism, or equivalently that mechanism -> 
non materialism. You can’t have them both. 


> One can restore counterfactual correctness by additional ad hoc additions to 
> the graph, without altering the fact that the movie record still reproduces 
> the conscious experience.

But the added piece have no role in the actual computation, and so that would 
endow the movie with consciousnes, but also the movies with the holes, and all 
consciousness will supervene on anything, making the theory inconsistent. 

It is much simpler to study what is a computation, and understand that 
consciousness is in the computation, not in this or that implementation of the 
computation, except statistically below our substitution level.




> The "competition" is irrelevant to consciousness in this case.


?

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Dec 2019, at 01:22, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 9:33 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 3 Dec 2019, at 23:06, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> My brain currently has only one state.
>> How do you know that? How could you know that.
>> 
>> It is a pretty good hypothesis.
>>> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these 
>>> do not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states 
>>> consistent with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you 
>>> ever prove such a thing?
>> We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume 
>> mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the 
>> infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness.
>> 
>> The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe is 
>> what it is,
> 
> In which theory of mind? Once you assume non-mechanism, you need to give your 
> theory of mind, and explain how it allows a unique universe.
> 
> No I don't. It is only in your mind that such a thing is necessary.

That is not true. To predict a physical events, and to be able to confirm it, 
if you look in detail, you need an identity brain-mind, which is OK FAPP, but 
when we assume Mechanism, it does no more work. And if you don’t assume 
Mechanism, you still need a theory of mind (if you want a theory of everything, 
which is the subject matter of this forum).



> Science does not need to explain everything before it gets started.

It can always make simplifying assumption, but it has to be always aware that 
those are assumption, and must be able to see the incompatibility between some 
assumption. Mechanism is my working hypothesis in the philosophy of mind (aka 
cognitive science, theology, metaphysics, …).


> A theory of mind can develop in the normal course of science -- it is not an 
> a priori requirement.

Of course. The mind like matter develops well before theories of mind or 
theories of matter, but when we search a theory of everything, we have to get 
them all, and they have to be compatible and related in a coherent manner.



> 
> In fact, quantum mechanics has moved resolutely in the direction of 
> eliminating any requirement of mind, measurement, or observers as 
> fundamentals for the theory.

Quantum mechanics is mainly an extraordinary tools to predict and anticipate 
the result of number-measurement, interpreted in some ways by us, but there is 
simply no unanimity of what it means or represents, or even how to use it with 
gravitation.

You confuse physics and metaphysics here. You give that impression.

The advantage of the mechanist hypothesis is that it gives a reasonably easy 
theory of mind and consciousness, and it reduces the mind-body problem into a 
body problem, and the math explains why there is no explosion of white rabbits 
at it seems in first sight in arithmetic, etc.





> Consequently mechanism, postulating that the physical universe arises out of 
> the statistics over all consistent extensions of the computations underlying 
> consciousness, is going in completely the wrong direction.

Why?

Proving this would refute Mechanism, and would be very interesting.




> By making consciousness central to your theory,

I don’t make consciousness central. It is a consequence of the theory, which is 
not mine, but the one in which many materialist believe (where actually I 
explain why it is incompatible with materialism).




> you are destroying all possibility of an objective science.

Of course not. Are you sure you have understood what I did? I show that 
mechanism and materialism are incompatible, and I show that physics is in the 
head of the machine, and how to derive it, so that we can compare. Then the 
result obtained so far fits with the observation, so mechanism is not yet 
refuted. Claiming that you believe in an ontological physical universe, 
irreducible to anything else is not an argument then we do science.



> Putting the observer as a central element of the theory is what went wrong 
> with the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. The elimination of 
> the personal, the mind, and the observer is central to modern physics.

Yes, in arithmetic too. The universal machine have to grasp what is independent 
on any particular universal machine relative representation, and physics 
becomes invariant for the ontological theories. It looks we share the same 
motivation to be skeptical of the Copenhagen interpretation. Now, you still 
need an observer, to predict what we can feel when we look around. It is not 
central indeed, but eventually the whole physical reality might not be central 
either. With mechanism the physical becomes a subbranch of the theological, 

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Dec 2019, at 00:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
 consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
 response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness, 
>>> It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
>>> what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but 
>>> crazy?
>> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.
> 
> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died I'd 
> get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is that my 
> dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another dog. 

In the counter situation, yes (relatively real or not, that is not relevant 
here, but it has to make sense)


> The same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me to the 
> authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates psychiatric care.

You will need to elaborate this part. You lost me here.



> 
> Hence Mechanism is false.

?

Bruno




> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Dec 2019, at 21:04, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review
>  
> 
>  
> 
> we do, after all, know something about the intrinsic nature of matter, over 
> and above everything we know in knowing the equations of physics. Why? 
> Because we know the intrinsic nature of consciousness and consciousness is a 
> form of matter.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> I don't think mind (intelligence + consciousness) is a form of matter anymore 
> than fast is a form of racing car,


Very good point!


> mind is what a form of matter does when it is organized in certain ways.  


OK; if you want to implement that mind relatively to you. 

And mind is not much what it does, as what it feels, although here we could 
decide to distinguish or not a first person mind (the one which feels) and a 
third person mind (which acts relatively to us, or to some machine).


More generally, mind is what any universal or particular machine do (and could 
feel to do) when given to any universal machinery or machine. “Matter is then 
explained as a first person plural stable and sharable realities” (usually very 
deep in Bennett sense).

If not, you need to explain more on what is matter, and how it makes some 
computations more real than some others. 

Bruno





> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
>  
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> @philipthrift
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Dec 2019, at 18:59, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/4/2019 2:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I am a scientist, and I like Mechanism, not because I would think it is 
>> true, but because the mind-body problem becomes a mathematical problem 
>> (extracting physics from intensional arithmetic/computer science), and we 
>> can already test the proposition physics (and it fits rather well).
> 
> But nothing has been extracted. 

?

That is simply wrong. The propositional logic of all modes of self-reference, 
including the material one, have been extracted, either under the form of an 
axiomatic theory, or through their theorem prover.




> It's like saying you like the God theory because it explains everything, we 
> just have to figure out why God did things the way He did.


But here God is given by something in between very elementary arithmetic and 
the standard model of arithmetic, and we get the explanation of where all 
computations comes from, and we can already ask the (Löbian) universal machine 
where the physical reality comes from, etc. that’s how I got the quantum logics.

You need to study Gödel’s 1931 paper. Despite he missed CT and the universal 
machine, he proved implicitly the Turing universality of his beweisbar 
predicate, and announce the fact that the machine itself (the system of 
Principia Mathematica in Gödel’s pet Löbian machine) can justify its own 
incompleteness conditionally to its consistency. Gôdel illustrate the embedding 
of the “theory of arithmetic” in the arithmetical reality, and more generally 
forever what Post already saw (during some period) which is the embedding of 
the universal machine in (any) universal machineries. That enforces an internal 
many-histories interpretation of arithmetic, in arithmetic. 

So here the God is very simple, everyone already believe in it, assuming they 
believe in what is taught in primary school. And the explanation of how the 
rest emerges, with its psychological and physical modes, is easy once we do 
enough math to understand, let us say, Martin Davis’ chapter four of his Dover 
book “Computability and Unsolvability”, but of course the book of Boolos and 
others can show the progress made since.

You talk like you forget the second part of the SANE04 paper, that is the 
mathematical work, modest compared to the work already done by Gödel, Löb, 
Grzegorczyk, Boolos, Goldblatt, (and Kusnetsov and Muravitskii independently of 
them), up to Solovay G and G* theory.

Anyway, the main thing accessible even by non-expert in logic is that if we 
assume Digital Mechanism, that program is not a matter of choice, iphysics has 
to be reduce to machine’s psychology/theology if wa want to solve the mind-body 
problem. If this does not work, we get evidence that Digital Mechanism is false 
(and John Clark has to revise its contract and ask for some analog machine (and 
good luck to know which one).

Physics is a wonderful and very important science, but physicalism seems to me 
wrong, and is proved wrong when we assume YD + CT.

Bruno





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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Dec 2019, at 12:03, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 9:06:07 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/3/2019 6:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> The opposite of experiential realism.
>> 
>> • A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take 
>> 
>>Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms 
>> 
> One wonders what Klein thinks including subjectivity would look like.  Every 
> example he gives is based on someone report subjective feelings...but reports 
> are objective.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> The subjective/objective distinction is a big rabbit hole to fall into a 
> mind/matter dualism. There is only matter; experiences are material entities:
> 
> One thing we do know about matter is that when you put some very 
> common-or-garden elements (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sodium, potassium, etc) 
> together in the way in which they're put together in brains, you get 
> consciousness like ours – a wholly physical phenomenon. (It's happening to 
> you right now.) And this means that we do, after all, know something about 
> the intrinsic nature of matter, over and above everything we know in knowing 
> the equations of physics. Why? Because we know the intrinsic nature of 
> consciousness and consciousness is a form of matter.

I have no idea how consciousness, a knowledge oneself, would be a priori 
physical.

Assuming mechanism, the physical is an aspect of consciousness, and 
consciousness is an aspect of the self-referential abilities of the numbers and 
(importantly) their relation with truth.

I don’t claim this is true, but this is enforced by the YD + CT. In particular 
CT makes sense of a constructive version of everything, like the universal 
dovetailer, which is a “splashed” version of a universal machine.

And it is testable, and it predicts a many-histories with a quantum topology of 
a sort. It provides some different physical reality possible according to which 
of the quantum logics provided by the self-reference get closer to what we 
observe. In physics too, there is a debate about the relation between quantum 
logic and quantum computation, quantum dynamics, etc.

You need to understand that the mathematical reality kicks back. If CT is 
correct, all theories about digital machines are incomplete and 
incomplete-able, The arithmetical reality explores itself from inside through 
the number relations implementing variate sorts of universal machine and 
relations between those machines. Consciousness is the indubitable experiential 
knowledge of an indubitable but unprovable truth. The Robinsonian machine get 
it already in a sort of innocent way, but the Löbian machine, like Peano 
arithmetic or ZF, have all the means to understand the abyssal nature of their 
ignorance, and even to study its structure and build the tools to explore the 
thing.

The metaphysical/theological notion of primary matter is not something that we 
could see, and seeing is also not an evidence for an ontology. I say this 
because some people talk like if the ontological existence of a physical 
universe could not be doubted. 

Bruno








> 
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>  
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Lawrence Crowell]

No that is not the point. Quantum states on the entropy surface deviate from 
horizon states by the measure to which they are separable. There are no quantum 
 metric fluctuations of a virtual nature.

LC

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Dec 2019, at 23:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 4:43:35 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 10:48 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett > 
> wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not 
>> access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can 
>> personally observe.
>> 
>> That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism.
> 
> Hmm… You *can* say that, but then you need to assess that your invocation of 
> physical brain is such metaphysical mysticism. The point is that this version 
> of metaphysical mysticism is incompatible with the mechanist assumption.
> 
> It is not a metaphysical to believe in the existence of a physical brain 
> underlying our conscious minds -- it is the result of solid scientific 
> evidence. If it is incompatible with the mechanist assumption, then that is 
> because the mechanist assumption is useless rubbish.
> 
> 
> 
>> Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is 
>> determined by quantum Darwinism
> 
> You can’t invoke quantum mechanics when using Mechanism, unless you explain 
> why the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations 
> (realised in arithmetic) seen from inside (a notion handled by the 
> self-referential logic, but some thought experience can give the main ideas 
> without delving too much in the provability logics).
> 
> 
> I can invoke quantum mechanics when doing physics. The trouble with your 
> rubric "the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations 
> seen from the inside..." is that is precisely meaningless. You have never 
> given any indication of what "The statistics on all computations" might mean. 
> How do you select "all computations", and what "statistics" do you use on 
> them? And what might that give you, if anything?
> 
> Your grand promises have never actually delivered anything, Bruno. You seem 
> to think that you can lay down the law about quantum mechanics, but you have 
> no idea how to get even the Schroedinger equation from your "statistics over 
> computations". Until you can actually produce something that even vaguely 
> approaches an account of the physical world we see around us, you can be 
> safely ignored. 
> 
> Bruce
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Something close:
> 
> The universal path integral supports a quantum theory of the universe in 
> which the world that we see around us arises out of the interference between 
> all computable structures.
> 
> The universal path integral
> 
> Seth Lloyd 
> , Olaf 
> Dreyer 
> (Submitted on 12 Feb 2013)
> Path integrals represent a powerful route to quantization: they calculate 
> probabilities by summing over classical configurations of variables such as 
> fields, assigning each configuration a phase equal to the action of that 
> configuration. This paper defines a universal path integral, which sums over 
> all computable structures. This path integral contains as sub-integrals all 
> possible computable path integrals, including those of field theory, the 
> standard model of elementary particles, discrete models of quantum gravity, 
> string theory, etc. The universal path integral possesses a well-defined 
> measure that guarantees its finiteness, together with a method for extracting 
> probabilities for observable quantities. The universal path integral supports 
> a quantum theory of the universe in which the world that we see around us 
> arises out of the interference between all computable structures.


Not sure what they mean by computable structure. But that is the kind of 
physics which get closer and closer to being consistent with mechanism, but 
they still assumes a physical reality and even some big part of quantum 
mechanics making this not usable to solve the mind-body problem. It does 
progress in the tools needed to test Digital Mechanism though.

Bruno







> 
> Comments: 10 pages, plain TeX
> Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
> Cite as:  arXiv:1302.2850  [quant-ph]
>   (or arXiv:1302.2850v1  [quant-ph] 
> for this version)
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Dec 2019, at 23:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 10:48 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not 
>> access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can 
>> personally observe.
>> 
>> That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism.
> 
> Hmm… You *can* say that, but then you need to assess that your invocation of 
> physical brain is such metaphysical mysticism. The point is that this version 
> of metaphysical mysticism is incompatible with the mechanist assumption.
> 
> It is not a metaphysical to believe in the existence of a physical brain 
> underlying our conscious minds -- it is the result of solid scientific 
> evidence.

I agree, especially if you define the brain by some equivalence class of some 
number relation, like mechanism enforces us to do. And that is indeed con 
firmed by Quantum mechanics in the many worlds formulation (where we accept the 
existence of macroscopic superposition).





> If it is incompatible with the mechanist assumption, then that is because the 
> mechanist assumption is useless rubbish.

No, it is a consequence of the Mechanist assumption, unless you postulate that 
a brain is made of irreducible physical elements (energy, matter, space-time, 
etc.).



> 
> 
> 
>> Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is 
>> determined by quantum Darwinism
> 
> You can’t invoke quantum mechanics when using Mechanism, unless you explain 
> why the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations 
> (realised in arithmetic) seen from inside (a notion handled by the 
> self-referential logic, but some thought experience can give the main ideas 
> without delving too much in the provability logics).
> 
> 
> I can invoke quantum mechanics when doing physics. The trouble with your 
> rubric "the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations 
> seen from the inside..." is that is precisely meaningless. You have never 
> given any indication of what "The statistics on all computations" might mean. 
> How do you select "all computations", and what "statistics" do you use on 
> them? And what might that give you, if anything?

All computations exists provably, with the same relative statistics in all 
universal machineries (Turing complete set, Turing universal theories, etc.). 
The precise Turing complete formalism is irrelevant. All universal machineries 
gives rise to the same theology (and thus to the same physics, qualia 
included). Very elementary arithmetic is such a Turing complete formalism and 
it has to be assumed (up to a Turing-equivalence) if we want to be able to 
define what is a computation. 




> 
> Your grand promises have never actually delivered anything, Bruno.

I predicted the “many world” from this well before I knew anything of Quantum 
Mechanics (except as a tool in the study of enzyme behaviour at that time). 
Then it took me 30 years to prove that the physics of all universal machine or 
number is quantum like. The theory explains consciousness and the appearance of 
matter, and this in a completely testable way, and well tested up to now. It is 
the Aristotelian materialism which explains nothing (despite given a good frame 
to do physics, but not to understand it as our discussion and other many debate 
illustrate). I did not promise anything. I submit a new formulation of a 
lasting problem (the mind-body problem) and I found the propositional part of 
the solution. It explains where the physical appearances come from, and why it 
divides into a sharable public domain, and a non sharable private domain.

Non mechanism, on the contrary, invoke personal ontological commitment for 
which there are no evidences at all.




> You seem to think that you can lay down the law about quantum mechanics, but 
> you have no idea how to get even the Schroedinger equation from your 
> "statistics over computations”.

That is wrong. I explain exactly how to do it. The mathematics is just 
complicated, but that does not make it wrong, and what has already been derived 
is more than what physics has ever explained. Physicists use an implicit 
mind-brain identity criteria which works very well FAPP, but is inconsistent 
with Mechanism, and might be consistent with some theory of mind, which is 
still not there. Physicalism is highly speculative, in metaphysics.



> Until you can actually produce something that even vaguely approaches an 
> account of the physical world we see around us, you can be safely ignored. 

You are the one speculating on some ontology without any evidence, and this 
just to avoid that a machine could be able to think (be conscious). You 
speculate on some non mecha

Re: Stochastic spacetime

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 Dec 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 5:04:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Nov 2019, at 00:40, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11/29/2019 2:38 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 9:03 PM Lawrence Crowell >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> > data on the arrival times of photons of different wavelengths from 
>>> > burstars indicates spacetime is incredibly smooth. It is smoother than 
>>> > the Planck scale by 1:50. There is no foam, graininess or discontinuous 
>>> > properties at all. Nottale scale relativity implies there is a fractal 
>>> > structure to spacetime that defines different properties at different 
>>> > scales. What is found empirically is nothing of the sort; spacetime has 
>>> > no preferred structure on any scale. It is smooth. 
>>> 
>>> If the Planck Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance then 
>>> perhaps the reason a Quantum Theory of Gravity has been so hard to find is 
>>> that such a theory does not exist. Perhaps we should try messing with 
>>> Quantum Mechanics to make it fit in with General Relativity rather than the 
>>> other way around.
>> 
>> Or push the entropic theory of gravity, which might go well with the 
>> entanglement theory of spacetime.
> 
> That seems more plausible than messing with quantum mechanics. The problem 
> with the attempts to change the quantum theory is that it makes everything 
> worst if we want to keep it as a good approximation. Sternberg (and plaza in 
> this list) have shown rather convincingly that a slight “delinearisation” of 
> QM makes the many universes even more real, as they not only can interfere, 
> but also can interact (making both GR false, but also violating the laws of 
> thelmrmodynamic. I doubt that we can change the quantum base of physics, and 
> indeed, it becomes a necessity when we assume mechanism, meaning that we 
> would need a non-mechanist theory of mind, also.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> An example of "entanglement theory of spacetime" is path integrals on 
> stochastic metric spaces:
> 
> https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2399-6528/aaa851 
> 


How is the stochastic distribution chosen, or just motivated? What is an 
entanglement in that theory? It seems nice to related an entanglement theory of 
space-time with path integral on some stochastic spaces, but it seems only to 
be a relation of consistency where I would hope for a relation of necessity.

Bruno

Bruno


> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, December 5, 2019 at 5:36:56 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, December 5, 2019 at 3:43:50 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 6:11:25 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 4:29:03 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 2:31:08 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
 wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 1:53:39 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 11:14 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> *>>> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in 
> regions of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist 
> with 
> these quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*
>

 >> OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and 
 that is the entire point because that is all that experimenters can 
 see, 
 then the reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to 
 quantum 
 states. 

>>>
>>> *> I guess this is not quite clear to me. Largely the quantum states 
>>> that form spacetime are quantum gravitation states.*
>>>
>>
>> It seems to me if quantum gravitational states form spacetime, and if 
>> spacetime is smooth and continuous as the Gamma Ray Burst evidence seems 
>> to 
>> show, then 2 distinct points that are less than a Planck Length apart 
>> must 
>> correspond to 2 distinct quantum gravitational states.  Am I wrong?
>>
>
> No it is not possible to know. If you localize a quantum bit to a 
> Planck length it is in a black hole. If you try to localize two qubits 
> arbitrarily closely they caon only be within 2 Planck areas, if on a 
> horizon,or in two Planck volumes if in the bulk. A Planck volume is V_p = 
> (4π/3)ℓ_p^3.So if you try to localize a field is less than two Planck 
> volumes, or within a length 1.26ℓ_p there is a loss of any 
> information about them.
>  
>
>>
>> >> So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is 
 smooth and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a 
 infinite 
 (not just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the 
 Planck 
 Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are 
 just 
 numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason 
 happen to pop out when you mathematically play around with the 
 constants of 
 nature in certain ways?

>>>
>>> *> The number of quantum states are Virasoro, which is in principle 
>>> infinite. However, because the cosmological horizon can only bound a 
>>> finite 
>>> number of such states, as is the case with a black hole with entropy S 
>>> = 
>>> A/4ℓ_p^2, the number of physical states is bounded above. As a result 
>>> the 
>>> Virasoro algebra has high frequency modes that are mathematically 
>>> possible, 
>>> but not physically accessed.*
>>>
>>
>> Then although mathematically infinite as far as physics is concerned 
>> there are only a finite number of quantum gravitational states, but if 
>> quantum states produces spacetime then why does the Gamma Ray Burst 
>> results 
>> say spacetime is smooth and continuous? Can 2 points that are 
>> arbitrarily 
>> close to each other have any physical meaning, does physics need Real 
>> Numbers or not?  
>>
>
> The gamma ray burst data just tells us that different wavelengths of 
> photons have no dispersion. the G(p,p') = 1/(4π(|p - p'|^2 - m^2)) 
> predicts 
> different dispersons for different wavelengths of light. Over distances 
> of 
> billions of light years this would be significant. Nothing of this sort 
> was 
> observed. This means there is no "foaminess" or discreteness to 
> spacetime. 
> This is down to a scale of ℓ_p/50, the last I checked.
>  
>
>>  
>>
>>> *> A Hilbert space H that contains H_a and H_b is not equal to 
>>> H_a×H_b. Any unitary transformation between H_a and H_b defines a 
>>> boundary 
>>> if we trace over one of these so S_a = tr_bS = -kTr_b[ρlog(ρ)] and 
>>> similarly for S_b. We have removed the off-diagonal terms. We then can 
>>> define this as a boundary, aka holographic screen or horizon, between 
>>> sets 
>>> of entangled states. This then defines a form of geometry. The 
>>> transformation between H_a and H_b can just as well be time evolution 
>>> with 
>>> a boundary that separates two temporal regions. The Taub-NUT spacetime 
>>> has 
>>> this characteristic as does the region between the spacelike region 

Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, December 5, 2019 at 3:43:50 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 6:11:25 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 4:29:03 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 2:31:08 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:

 On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 1:53:39 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 11:14 AM Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> *>>> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in 
 regions of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist 
 with 
 these quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*

>>>
>>> >> OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and 
>>> that is the entire point because that is all that experimenters can 
>>> see, 
>>> then the reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to 
>>> quantum 
>>> states. 
>>>
>>
>> *> I guess this is not quite clear to me. Largely the quantum states 
>> that form spacetime are quantum gravitation states.*
>>
>
> It seems to me if quantum gravitational states form spacetime, and if 
> spacetime is smooth and continuous as the Gamma Ray Burst evidence seems 
> to 
> show, then 2 distinct points that are less than a Planck Length apart 
> must 
> correspond to 2 distinct quantum gravitational states.  Am I wrong?
>

 No it is not possible to know. If you localize a quantum bit to a 
 Planck length it is in a black hole. If you try to localize two qubits 
 arbitrarily closely they caon only be within 2 Planck areas, if on a 
 horizon,or in two Planck volumes if in the bulk. A Planck volume is V_p = 
 (4π/3)ℓ_p^3.So if you try to localize a field is less than two Planck 
 volumes, or within a length 1.26ℓ_p there is a loss of any information 
 about them.
  

>
> >> So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is 
>>> smooth and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a 
>>> infinite 
>>> (not just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the 
>>> Planck 
>>> Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are just 
>>> numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason 
>>> happen to pop out when you mathematically play around with the 
>>> constants of 
>>> nature in certain ways?
>>>
>>
>> *> The number of quantum states are Virasoro, which is in principle 
>> infinite. However, because the cosmological horizon can only bound a 
>> finite 
>> number of such states, as is the case with a black hole with entropy S = 
>> A/4ℓ_p^2, the number of physical states is bounded above. As a result 
>> the 
>> Virasoro algebra has high frequency modes that are mathematically 
>> possible, 
>> but not physically accessed.*
>>
>
> Then although mathematically infinite as far as physics is concerned 
> there are only a finite number of quantum gravitational states, but if 
> quantum states produces spacetime then why does the Gamma Ray Burst 
> results 
> say spacetime is smooth and continuous? Can 2 points that are arbitrarily 
> close to each other have any physical meaning, does physics need Real 
> Numbers or not?  
>

 The gamma ray burst data just tells us that different wavelengths of 
 photons have no dispersion. the G(p,p') = 1/(4π(|p - p'|^2 - m^2)) 
 predicts 
 different dispersons for different wavelengths of light. Over distances of 
 billions of light years this would be significant. Nothing of this sort 
 was 
 observed. This means there is no "foaminess" or discreteness to spacetime. 
 This is down to a scale of ℓ_p/50, the last I checked.
  

>  
>
>> *> A Hilbert space H that contains H_a and H_b is not equal to 
>> H_a×H_b. Any unitary transformation between H_a and H_b defines a 
>> boundary 
>> if we trace over one of these so S_a = tr_bS = -kTr_b[ρlog(ρ)] and 
>> similarly for S_b. We have removed the off-diagonal terms. We then can 
>> define this as a boundary, aka holographic screen or horizon, between 
>> sets 
>> of entangled states. This then defines a form of geometry. The 
>> transformation between H_a and H_b can just as well be time evolution 
>> with 
>> a boundary that separates two temporal regions. The Taub-NUT spacetime 
>> has 
>> this characteristic as does the region between the spacelike region 
>> outside 
>> the inner horizon of a black hole and the mysterious region inside.*
>>
>
> You seem to be saying space may not be fundamental but time is. Would 
> that be a fair representation of your views?
>>

Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 6:11:25 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 4:29:03 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 2:31:08 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 1:53:39 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 11:14 AM Lawrence Crowell <
 goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

 *>>> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in 
>>> regions of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist with 
>>> these quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*
>>>
>>
>> >> OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and that 
>> is the entire point because that is all that experimenters can see, then 
>> the reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to quantum 
>> states. 
>>
>
> *> I guess this is not quite clear to me. Largely the quantum states 
> that form spacetime are quantum gravitation states.*
>

 It seems to me if quantum gravitational states form spacetime, and if 
 spacetime is smooth and continuous as the Gamma Ray Burst evidence seems 
 to 
 show, then 2 distinct points that are less than a Planck Length apart must 
 correspond to 2 distinct quantum gravitational states.  Am I wrong?

>>>
>>> No it is not possible to know. If you localize a quantum bit to a Planck 
>>> length it is in a black hole. If you try to localize two qubits arbitrarily 
>>> closely they caon only be within 2 Planck areas, if on a horizon,or in two 
>>> Planck volumes if in the bulk. A Planck volume is V_p = (4π/3)ℓ_p^3.So 
>>> if you try to localize a field is less than two Planck volumes, or within a 
>>> length 1.26ℓ_p there is a loss of any information about them.
>>>  
>>>

 >> So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is 
>> smooth and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a 
>> infinite 
>> (not just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the 
>> Planck 
>> Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are just 
>> numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason 
>> happen to pop out when you mathematically play around with the constants 
>> of 
>> nature in certain ways?
>>
>
> *> The number of quantum states are Virasoro, which is in principle 
> infinite. However, because the cosmological horizon can only bound a 
> finite 
> number of such states, as is the case with a black hole with entropy S = 
> A/4ℓ_p^2, the number of physical states is bounded above. As a result the 
> Virasoro algebra has high frequency modes that are mathematically 
> possible, 
> but not physically accessed.*
>

 Then although mathematically infinite as far as physics is concerned 
 there are only a finite number of quantum gravitational states, but if 
 quantum states produces spacetime then why does the Gamma Ray Burst 
 results 
 say spacetime is smooth and continuous? Can 2 points that are arbitrarily 
 close to each other have any physical meaning, does physics need Real 
 Numbers or not?  

>>>
>>> The gamma ray burst data just tells us that different wavelengths of 
>>> photons have no dispersion. the G(p,p') = 1/(4π(|p - p'|^2 - m^2)) predicts 
>>> different dispersons for different wavelengths of light. Over distances of 
>>> billions of light years this would be significant. Nothing of this sort was 
>>> observed. This means there is no "foaminess" or discreteness to spacetime. 
>>> This is down to a scale of ℓ_p/50, the last I checked.
>>>  
>>>
  

> *> A Hilbert space H that contains H_a and H_b is not equal to 
> H_a×H_b. Any unitary transformation between H_a and H_b defines a 
> boundary 
> if we trace over one of these so S_a = tr_bS = -kTr_b[ρlog(ρ)] and 
> similarly for S_b. We have removed the off-diagonal terms. We then can 
> define this as a boundary, aka holographic screen or horizon, between 
> sets 
> of entangled states. This then defines a form of geometry. The 
> transformation between H_a and H_b can just as well be time evolution 
> with 
> a boundary that separates two temporal regions. The Taub-NUT spacetime 
> has 
> this characteristic as does the region between the spacelike region 
> outside 
> the inner horizon of a black hole and the mysterious region inside.*
>

 You seem to be saying space may not be fundamental but time is. Would 
 that be a fair representation of your views?

>>>
>>> I tried to indicate that both space and time are emergent.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>  
>>>
>>
>>
>> But everything you wrote is in the vocabulary of space+time.
>>
>> Even "wave*length"*.
>>
>> @philipthrift 
>>
>
> This is in reference to the