Artificial Intelligence may be far easier than generally thought
*NM* --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Spam: Artificial Intelligence may be far easier than generally thought
On Sep 23, 6:10 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I don't think it likely that one individual could have gone from B1 to B2 > without being told anything about probability, preference ordering, logic and > mathematics. Just because there is a chain of maybe a few hundred individuals > who did it or contributed to it, it doesn't follow that one person could do > it. Even if that's true, take all the individuals who contributed to the development of Bayesian math. Then the set of individuals can be redefined as functions in a single bigger algorithm, and the same argument applies. > > However, I recommend William S. Cooper's little book, "The Evolution of > Reason" > which takes your idea of development of modern forms of reasoning from simpler > forms seriously and fills out details and also suggests further advances. > The question is, how much basic reasoning structure is built into the human mind? More than likely, not much, in which case the initial functionality could be duplicated by a ridicuously simple algorithm. I'd be willing to wager that all that's there intially (in the human brain) in terms of reasoning mechanisms are a few very simple high- level representations , a few very basic analogy-formation techniques, and a few very simple low-level perceptual 'prims'. >But they commonly violate the rationality standards of Bayesian inference, i.e. >they are inconsistent in their assignment of probabilities. Yes, but doesn't that support what I'm saying? A few vague fuzzy feeble human approximations to Bayesian inference were apparently enough to generate all our current scientific knowledge! Doesn't this suggest that some ridiculously simple initial algorithm is sufficient to capture intelligence? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Artificial Intelligence may be far easier than generally thought
On Sep 22, 11:53 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Marc, > Your closing line is appreciated. > Yet: I still cannot get it: how can you include into an algorithm > those features that had not yet been discovered? Look at it > historically: if you composed such compendium 3000 yeas ago would you > have included 'blank potential' unfilled algorithm for those aspects > that had been discovered as part of the human intelligence since then? > And forwardly: how much would you keep blank for newly addable > features in human intelligence for the next millennia? > Is B2 a closed and complete image? > B1 (IMO) includes potential so far undiscovered beyond the "knowable". > How is that part of the algorithm?> John M > > Yes, its intuitively hard to swallow, John, but it's actually what evolution has been naturally doing... for instance the parents of Albert Einstein were not as smart as Einstein, so something smarter came from something less smart. What I anticipate is that the original algorithm contains a few very simple, basic concepts (which I call 'Prims' or 'Primatives) which are very vague and fuzzy, but in some strange sense, these are all that are required to encompass all knowledge! Hard to swallow yes, but consider the process of moving from a general idea to a more specific idea--- remember that game of questions where someone thinks of a word of you have to gues of what the word is.. you know... Is it animal, vegetable, mineral? and you keep asking more specific questions until you guess the word. So I think learning is just *elaboration* (optimization) of what is actually in some strange sense already in your mind, in a vague fuzzy way. New knowledge is just making what is already there more specific. Rather like the scultpor who already sees a work of art in a block of stone... he's just 'shaping' what is in some sense 'aready there'. And no B2 would not be complete either... there is no reason why it couldn't go on improving itself indefinitely. -- This idea of course is the exact opposite of the way most researchers are thinking about this. They are trying to start with hugely complex low-level mathematics, whereas I'm starting at the *highest* level of asbtraction, and trying to identify those few basic vague, fuzzy 'Prims' which I maintain are all that are needed to in some strange way, encompass all knowledge. So far I've identified 27 basic 'Prims'. I suspect these are all of them. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Artificial Intelligence may be far easier than generally thought
Let the algorithm that represents the brain of a typical new-born baby be denoted as B1. Now surely we can agree that the brain of a new-born baby does not have sophisticated Bayesian machinary built into it? Yes, there must be *some* intrinsic built-in reasoning structure, but everything we know suggests that the intrinsic reasoning mechanisms of the human brain must be quite weak and simple. Let the algorithm which represents the brain of the baby B1 which grew up into a 20-year old with a PhD in Bayesian math be denoted as B2. Now somehow, the algorithm B1 was able to 'optimze' its original reasoning mechanisms by a smooth transformation into B2. (assume there was 'brain surgery', no 'hand coding'). The environment! you may shout. The baby got all its information from human culture (Reading math books, learning from math professors), you might try to argue, that's how B1 (baby) was able to transform into B2 (PhD in Bayes) But this cant be correct. Since, humans existed long before Bayesian math was developed. Every single Bayesian technique had to be developed by a human in the past, without being told. So in theory, B1 could have grown into B2 entirely on its own, without being told anything by anyone about Bayesian math. The conclusion: *There exists a very simple algorithm which is only a very weak approximation to PhD Bayesian reasoning, which is perfectly capable of recursive self-improvement to the PhD level! No hand coding of advanced Bayesian math is needed. Or to simply rephrase: Humans could reason before they discovered Bayes. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
On Sep 15, 6:08 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > But the question is whether there would be any *functional* difference. > > Brent Meeker Sure, if reductionism were true, half of physics wouldn't work. Yudkowsky claims: "It is not that reality itself has an Einstein equation that governs at high speeds, a Newton equation that governs at low speeds, and a "bridging law" that smooths the interface. Reality itself has only a single level, Einsteinian gravity." Ref: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/09/excluding-the-s.html#more But this another non-sequitur in a long long of misconceptions, superficial analysis and non-sequiturs from him. In his example, of course it's true there's only one correct equation (the Einstein one), but this mathematical *equation'* references *physics concepts* on several different levels of abstraction. It's the *concepts* that are non-reducible, not the *equations*. The physics of forces (Newtonian mechanics is not reducible to the physics of simple geometric solids (Greek physics) , nor is the physics of space-time fields (Relativity) reducible to the physics of forces. Each of these (greek physics, newtonian mechanics, relativistic physics) introduced new physical concepts which weren't reducible to the earlier ones. It's not so much that new physics concepts *replaced* the older ones, rather that the new concepts were at * a higher-level of abstraction* than the old. I Also note that modern String Theory says that the fabric of theory itself is composed of concepts of Category Theory, which are high- level mathematical representations of lower-level ones. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
On Sep 15, 12:56 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > 2008/9/14 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > Yudkowsky asks: > > > "What experimental observations would you expect to make, if you found > > yourself in such a universe?" (where reductionism is false) > > > But we *are* in just such as universe! > > Perhaps I could ask the opposite question: what if reductionism were > suddenly made true? Which parts of the universe would stop functioning > or function differently? > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou I think there would no longer be conscious observers for starters. If reductionism were true it would mean that mathematical truth would be entirely algorithmic. No insight would be required, so there would be no place for consciousness. All the delusions of Yudkowsky and co would be true... reasoning would be entirely reducible to Bayesian Inductuion, Intelligence would be entirely reducible to Optimization, Consciousness wouldn't be needed etc etc etc. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
Dear oh dear. AI Researcher Yudkowsky is continuing to perpetuate the same old reductionist mistakes on 'Overcoming Bias': http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/09/excluding-the-s.html#more This is the reason I've long since given up on the poor fellow. He writes: "different levels of organization can have separate representations in human maps, but the territory itself is a single unified low-level mathematical object." He thinks the territory is: "a single unified low-level mathematical object". Nice one. I've love to hear what Bruno thinks of that silly notion. Of course, as other readers in the thread pointed out, mathematical objects themselves cannot be located at any particular location or time in space or time ; if mathematical objects objectively exist (as Yudkowsky himself implies in his sentence), then, their very existence would represent a stark failure of reductionism. Neither inifinite sets nor uncomputable numbers can be identified with any computable physical processes: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/ Of course, the reason mathematicians have to keep coming up with new original concepts is precisely because no single-level mathematical description is sufficient to encompass mathematical truth - as Godel himself proved. Mathematics itself operates on many levels of abstraction. Yudkowsky asks: "What experimental observations would you expect to make, if you found yourself in such a universe?" (where reductionism is false) But we *are* in just such as universe! What do you think Set Theory or Category Theory is? IT IS THE UNIVERSE MAPPING ITSELF It is an 'inner model' or 'map' of mathematics. If the Platonist/ Tegmark view is correct, then the universe itself contains a plethora of mathematical objects at different levels of abstraction, and objectively existing interfaces between them are required, if the consistency of reality is to be maintained. Sets and Categories are objectively existing high-level maps of lower-level level mathematical objects --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
Yes indeed Brent! Tts a very tough problem, and exactly what I've been critizing Bayesianism for. That's what I've been going on about when I talked about how Bayesianism can only fully deal with *Shannon Information* , it can't fully handle the *meaning* (semantics) of the information. So how do we ascribe meaning to mere formalism? Remember the story of John Boole. He developed a means of reasoning about thinking, by matching up the abstract concepts of *algebra* with concrete concepts of *mental logic*. In large part, his ideas were the foundation for Bayesianism. Enter the story of Marc Geddes ;) Like Boole, I’m trying to extend logic further meaning by matching up abstract concepts with concrete logical concepts. In particular, it is highly suspicious that there appears to be a remarkably close match-up between the concepts of *category theory* and the concepts of *analogy formation*. What is even more remarkable, no one but me seems to have noticed ;) So, the meaning is obtained by matching the abstract concepts to the concrete ones. Let’s look once again at the close match between an *analogy*, and a *functor* from category theory: First, observe the definition of an analogy: " Analogy is both the cognitive process of transferring information from a particular subject (the analogue or source) to another particular subject (the target), and a linguistic expression corresponding to such a process." Go to the definition of a functor from category theory: "Given two categories C and D a functor F from C to D can be thought of as an *analogy* between C and D, because F has to map objects of C to objects of D and arrows of C to arrows of D in such a way that the compositional structure of the two categories is preserved" So we can match the meaningful concept (ie 'analogy') to the abstract concept (ie 'functor', from category theory) Intriguing huh? It useful to look at the story of George Boole once again, because he developed computer logic precisely by performing these sorts of match- ups between abstract algebra (meaningless) and basic mental logic (meaningful) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_boole --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
On Sep 12, 5:06 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > Given two categories C and D a functor F from C to D can be thought > > of as an *analogy* between C and D, because F has to map objects of C > > to objects of D and arrows of C to arrows of D in such a way that the > > compositional structure of the two categories is preserved. > > No meaning there either. > > Brent > Given that its been published on wikipedia, I'd say ya need to brush up on ya category theory. Analogies and category theory are very interesting indeed, as a possible means to extend Bayesianism. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analogy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_theory Cheers. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
On Sep 10, 6:13 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Knowledge is usually defined as true belief that is casually connected to the > facts that make it true. That has nothing to do with work (free energy? > computational steps?). You can certainly do a lot of work and end up with a > false belief. The 'Bit and The Pendulum' (Tom Siegfried) is a good popular book discussing the difference between Shannon information and knowledge. Bayesian is no doubt very useful and powerful, but the trouble with Bayesianism is when it starts to become a sort of 'substitute religion' and you have people claiming it's got all the answers to reasoning. It doesn't. It really only deals with *prediction sequences*; you can only assign a meaningful probabilities to something which if there is something being predicted , something you can observe in the future. That's as far as Bayesianisms can get you. There is no way to go from mere prediction sequences to assessing the *meaning* (semantics) of information, no matter what clever manipulations the Bayesianism perform. I think we are due for yet another extension to logic, one which will contain Bayesianism as a special case. I think Bruno had it right, it's all Category Theory- and make the next big leap forward in logic, we need to start using the concepts from Category Theory and apply them to logic, to develop a new logic capable of going beyond Bayesianism and dealing with the semantics of information. But how? Listen to this: Given two categories C and D a functor F from C to D can be thought of as an *analogy* between C and D, because F has to map objects of C to objects of D and arrows of C to arrows of D in such a way that the compositional structure of the two categories is preserved. And therein lies the big clue suggesting that the concepts from category theory can be used to develop a new logic of analogies. And there I shall leave you for now. See you around the galaxy :D --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
On Sep 10, 5:06 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Yes there is. In fact descriptions with fewer free parameters are > automatically > favored by Bayesian inference. > > http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/papers/ockham.pdf > > Brent Meeker > Nice try. That's an interesting paper, but it's merely one guys attempt to try to define the problem in terms of Bayesianism. It does not provide solutions to (a) and (b), which remain unresolved. These types of attempts to try to reduce Occam's razor to Bayes soon run into a big big problem, which I have already mentioned: There is more than one meaure of complexity. For example, *information* is not the same thing as *knowledge*. Shannon information is simply a measure of the degree of randomness in a string, whereas *knowledge* is more a measure of the amount of work that went into producing a string (ie it is *meaningful* information). Effective use of Occam's razor also requires us to judge the simplicity/complexity of *meaningful information* (ie knowledge), not just Shannon information. Bayesianism Induction cannot possibly do this, since it cannot handle the *semantics* (meaning) of the information, only the Shannon information. This it is because it only deals with the *functional* aspects of information... ie patterns as they appear to external observers, rather than what the patterns signify ( the *semantic* aspects of information). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
10 Big Cog-Sci/AGI ideas
*NM* --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
Gunther, Let me further clarify: The problem with Bayesianism is that there is no precise definition of 'simplicity' and 'complexity' for finite strings, which is needed to effectively apply the principle of Occam's razor. To elaborate: (a) There is no measure of simplicity/complexity for finite strings (b) There is no way to justify why compressed descriptions of theories should be favored (Occam's razor) We then apply Schmidhuber's theory of beauty. According to Schmidhuber: "Schmidhuber's Beauty Postulate (1994-2006): Among several patterns classified as "comparable" by some subjective observer, the subjectively most beautiful is the one with the simplest (shortest) description, given the observer's particular method for encoding and memorizing it. See refs [1-5]" http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/beauty.html Then, its clear that (a) and (b) are in fact being resolved via aesthetic judgements. On Sep 9, 6:09 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > On Sep 9, 9:04 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Here is a pertinent paper, just published: > > > Unmasking the Truth Beneath the Beauty: Why the Supposed Aesthetic > > Judgements Made in Science May Not Be Aesthetic at All > > > Cain S. Todd > > International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 22, Issue 1 > > March 2008 , pages 61 - 79 > > DOI: 10.1080/02698590802280910 > > > Cheers, > > Günther > > If it comes down to an argument , between a computer scientist and a > philosopher, never trust the philosopher. > > It's time for me to call in my big guns Jürgen > Schmidhuberhttp://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/beauty.html > > Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Regarding Aesthetics
On Sep 9, 9:04 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Here is a pertinent paper, just published: > > Unmasking the Truth Beneath the Beauty: Why the Supposed Aesthetic > Judgements Made in Science May Not Be Aesthetic at All > > Cain S. Todd > International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 22, Issue 1 > March 2008 , pages 61 - 79 > DOI: 10.1080/02698590802280910 > > Cheers, > Günther If it comes down to an argument , between a computer scientist and a philosopher, never trust the philosopher. It's time for me to call in my big guns Jürgen Schmidhuber http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/beauty.html Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Super-Intelligence (SI) speaks: An imaginary dialogue
On Sep 2, 6:27 pm, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hello again Jesse, > I am going to assume that by trashing computationalism that Marc Geddes > has enough ammo to vitiate Eleizer's various predilections so... to > that end... To make it clear, I'm not trashing computaionalism. I maintain that comp is true (See what Bruno said). It's Bayesianism I'm trashing. And yes, I now have enough 'intellectual ammo' to crush Yudkowsky. Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Super-Intelligence (SI) speaks: An imaginary dialogue
On Sep 2, 1:56 pm, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Marc, > > */Eliezer/*'s hubris about a Bayesian approach to intelligence is > nothing more than the usual 'metabelief' about a mathematics... or about > computation... meant in the sense that "cognition is computation", where > computation is done BY the universe (with the material of the universe > used to manipulate abstract symbols) > . > > *You don't have to work so hard to walk away from that approach...* > Hi Colin, The chess computer 'Deep Blue' was computational, and could play chess better than the (then) chess world champion, Gary Kasparov. But that didn't mean that the programmers understood all the chess, or all the chess had already been played. So I don't think your argument is a good one. You can't rebut Yudkowsy's approach as easily as that ;) But I kind of understand your sentiment, and agree that science can't (and shouldn't be) reduced to mere Bayesian probability shuffling. There are aesthetic judgements involved in science, and I don't think any precise mathematical definition of these aesthetic notions is possible, as Bruno has already opined.Yudkowsky's excessive faith in Bayesian Induction is definitely his weakness. But that doesn't mean we can't make a computational super-intelligence. Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
10 Big Cog-Sci/AGI ideas: I'm ready to beat Eliezer Yudkowsky!
I am here providing a summary of my '10 big ideas' for Cog-Sci/AGI. No justifcation is provided as of yet (that is, my purpose here is merely to clearly and briefly state my 10 big ideas). Their status at this time is of entertaining speculation only. So here's the 10 big ideas: (1) The extreme low entropy density at the beginning of time and the predictable increase in entropy shows that the universe can be thought of an RPOP [Really Powerful Optimization Process] (albiet an extremely poorly optimized one). This is NOT to say that the increase in entropy is the purpose of the universe (that would be ludicrous), rather than the increase in entropy shows that there is a universal optimization pressure, and the universe can be thought of as an integrated, time asymmetric system. Thus, there are universal terminal values. (2) The universal terminal values are ultimately grounded in aesthetics. That is to say, there may be a huge myriad of worth-while terminal values, but my claim is that these are all special cases of 'beauty'. That is, the creation of beauty is the actual purpose of the universe (the thing being optimized by the universal RPOP). (3) Bayesian reasoning is NOT the ultimate system of rational calculation. In fact, analogy formation IS. Whereas, conventional Bayesians would regard analogy formation as a special case of Bayes, my claim is that the converse is actually the case... it is actually Bayes that is a special case of analogy formation, and analogy formation in the most general sense cannot be reduced to Bayesian reasoning. (4) The precise mathematics of analogy formation utilizes the concepts of *category theory*. Analogy formation is equivalent to *ontology merging* - the mapping of a concept from one knowledge domain, to another knowledge domain. Ultimately,ontology/KR [Knowledge Representation] is all of effective intelligence. That is, my claim is that all the puzzles of cognitive science/AI are merely sub-problems of ontology/KR. Theres a simple formula of category theory which tells you exactly how to calculate the 'semantic distance' between any two concepts and carry out the mapping between them. Bayes theorem is merely a special case of this formula. This formula is the *real* secret to the universe! (5) A fully general purpose ontology results in the stratification of reality into three levels - the *platonic* level (which is timeless, and is basically equivalent the Tegmark universe), consisting of *platonic archetypes* (abstractions); the *system* level, consisting of reality as seen by an observers - dynamical systems with input, processing and output; and the *artifact* level, consisting of static *things* that are outputs of the system level above it. (6) From (5) - There exist real *platonic mathematical forms*, which are outside space and time (platonic level), *mathematical systems* , which are the implemented algorithms seen by observers inside space and time, and finally *mathematical artifacts*, which are the onotologies by which observers classify reality. (7) Ontologies are the means by which we *reflect* on knowledge. They are the *internal language of the mind* which we use to *communicate* (map) logical concepts from one domain to another. The formula referred to in my claim (4) provides the solution to the problem of goal stability - it tells you exactly how a mind can hold a stable goal system under reflection - recall - this formula is not Bayesian - instead it uses the math of category theory to show how to map a concept from one knowledge domain (ontology) to another knowledge domain (ontology). (8) Consciousness is generated by the aforementioned *ontology merging* (which, recall, I'm claiming is equivalent to *analogy formation*). It is simply the integration of concepts from different knowledge domains. (9) The ultimately non-Bayesian nature of true, general purpose intelligence is a consequence of Occam's razor. Occam's razar states that the simple is favored over the complex. Popper showed that there are an inifnite number of theories compatible with any given finite set of observations - successful induction requires an non-Bayesian ingredient - this the means of *setting the priors* to reduce the number of initial possibilities under consideration to manageable number. Occam's razor itself cannot be reduced to Bayes, because judgements about what is simple and complex depend on *the semantics* (logical meaning) of the theories under consideration, whereas Bayes only deals with predication sequences - detection of externally observable patterns. Bayes only deals with *functionality* (externally observable consequences) - full intelligence deals with *semantics* (the meaning of concepts), and this goes beyond mere Bayesian probability shuffling. (10) The universal terminal values (which, recall, I'm suggesting are all sub-values of 'beauty'), are a consequence of (1)-(9). Recall, that I said that I thought that
Re: Intelligence, Aesthetics and Bayesianism: Game over!
On Jul 31, 1:26 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Popper showed that an infinite number of theories is compatible is any > > given set of finite observations. Mere algorithmic shuffling to > > calculate Pr(B) probablities according to the Bayes formula won't help > > much. Successful induction needs principles to set the priors are set > > correctly. > > Yes, I was partially agreeing with you. Psychotic people often still > manage very well with deductive reasoning, but they get the big > picture wrong, obviously and ridiculously wrong. So there must be more > to discovering truth about the world than mere algorithmic shuffling. > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - > Ah. Good. Glad to hear you agree. Incidentally, there was a feature in the last edition of 'New Scientist' in the 'Opinion' section, about what's wrong with 'excessive rationality': http://www.newscientist.com/contents/issue/2666.html >The idea is that good mathematics is beautiful. Good music and paintings often have a deep mathematical structure. No reason to throw away the math. Cheers, Günther True Gunther, but working out math ain't my job, and I don't need it to built an AI any way. AI's an engineering problem, not a science problem. I'm not terribly concerned about *what is* (science), I'm a lot more interested in *what could be* (creative hacking). There's far too many geeks on Internet messageboards and blogs babbling away about abstract theories of *what is* (science). This detracts from the business of actually working on *what could be* (creative hacking) The *what is* of pure math, has a practical counterpart - the *what could be* of ontology and computer programming ;) We don't need to understand the pure math to do the ontology and programming ;) Just good design principles. Cheers MJG --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Intelligence, Aesthetics and Bayesianism: Game over!
>But what is aesthetics the study of? Of beauty? That's it isn't it? But how can something as plastic as "beauty" have any kind of terminal value that you and I can both share? Do aesthetic terminal values decide where something fits into "aesthetic reality" or something like that? By the way, thanks for showing that "artistic intelligence" may actually represent a form of scientific understanding, a thought dear to my heart. Kim Jones -- >Marc, I would agree with you that aesthetics is an important driving principle, and the top scientist _do_ recognize this (see for instance many quotes by Albert Einstein in this direction). Also, you should have a look at Nietzsche - science and the aesthetic pervade his work! Cheers, Günther Yes, good Kim and Gunther- I’m now adopting the radical belief that intelligence has a lot more to do with art, than math ;) Good initial link on aesthetics: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aesthetics So throw away all those math books , forget about Bayes, and start studying the arts: painting, music and so on and so forth. We’ll finally solve the AI stuff…with art. On Jul 30, 2:34 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Marc, > > I would agree with you that aesthetics is an important driving > principle, and the top scientist _do_ recognize this (see for instance > many quotes by Albert Einstein in this direction). > > Also, you should have a look at Nietzsche - science and the aesthetic > pervade his work! > > Cheers, > Günther > > > > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Two issues I wish to mention, here. > > > Firstly, I present a few rapid-fire ideas about objective morality, > > culminating in an integration of aesthetics, intelligence, and > > morality, all in a few brief sentences ;) > > > Secondly, I give a mention to computer scientist Randy Pausch, who > > recently died. > > > As regards the first issue: > > > It’s been said there are clear ways to determine physical and > > mathematical facts, but nothing similar for values. But, in point (2) > > below I point out what appears to be an objectively existing set of > > values which underlies *all* of science. I present two brief but > > profound points that I what readers to consider and ponder carefully: > > > Point (1) there is a clear evolution to the universe. It started from > > a low-entropy-density state, and is moving towards a higher-entropy > > density, which, remarkably, just happens to coincide with an increase > > in physical complexity with time. In the beginning the universe was in > > a state with *the lowest possible* entropy. This is expressed in the > > laws of thermodynamics and big bang cosmology. So it simply isn’t true > > that there is no teleology (purpose) built into the universe. The laws > > of thermodynamics and modern cosmology (big bang theory) clearly > > express the fact that there is. > > > Point (2) the whole of science relies on Occam’s razor, the idea that > > the universe is in some sense ‘simple’. It must be emphasized that > > Occam’s razor pervades all of science – it is not simply some sort of > > ‘add on’. As Popper pointed out, an infinite number of theories could > > explain any given set of observations; therefore any inductive > > generalization requires a principle – Occam’s razor – to get any > > useful results at all. > > > Here is the point that most haven’t quite grasped - Occam’s razor is > > *a set of aesthetic principles* - the notion of ‘simplicity’ is *a set > > of aesthetic principles*; Why? Because it is simply another way of > > saying that some representations are more *elegant* than others, which > > is the very notion of aesthetics! I repeat: the whole of science only > > works because of a set of *aesthetic principles* - a *set of values*. > > > If all values are only subjective preferences, it would follow that > > the whole of science relies on subjective preferences. But subjective > > preferences have only existed as long as sentiments – therefore how > > could physical laws have functioned before sentiments? The idea that > > all values are subjective leads to a direct and blatant logical > > contradiction. > > > Both these points are related and simply inexplicable without > > appealing to objective terminal values. At the beginning of time the > > universe was in the simplest possible state (minimal entropy density). > > Why? Occam’s razor is wide-ranging and pervades the whole of science. > > The simple is favored over the complex – that is– Occam’s razor is a > > set of aesthetic value judgments without which not a single Bayesian > > result could be obtained. > > > *Every single Bayesian result rests on these implicit value judgments* > > to set priors. It must be repeated that *not one single scientific > > result could be obtained* without these secret (implicit) value > > judgments which set priors, that our defenders of the Bayesian faith > > on these forums are trying to pretend are not part of science! > > > The secret to intell
Re: Intelligence, Aesthetics and Bayesianism: Game over!
On Jul 30, 1:22 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I've long been puzzled by the phenomenon of delusion in intelligent, > rational people who develop psychotic illness. For example, out of the > blue, someone starts to believe that their family have been replaced > by impostors. Their facility with deductive logic remains intact, and > it is tempting to try to argue with them to show that their belief is > false, but it doesn't work. The Bayes equation is: > > Pr(A|B) = Pr(B|A).Pr(A)/Pr(B) > A = they are impostors > B = they're acting weird > > The problem is that they overestimate Pr(A), the prior probability, > and underestimate Pr(B). A very dull, but sane, person can see this, > but they can't. Intelligence doesn't seem to help at all. > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou- Um. I'm not totally sure what relevance this has to what I posted. Popper showed that an infinite number of theories is compatible is any given set of finite observations. Mere algorithmic shuffling to calculate Pr(B) probablities according to the Bayes formula won't help much. Successful induction needs principles to set the priors are set correctly. Which is largely based on aesthetic judgements. Read the Graham essay: http://www.paulgraham.com/taste.html You'll get it some day - unfortunately, I suspect, the mererely Bayesian probablity shuffling you're using to update your beliefs may take an inifinite time to converge to my beliefs ;) Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Intelligence, Aesthetics and Bayesianism: Game over!
Two issues I wish to mention, here. Firstly, I present a few rapid-fire ideas about objective morality, culminating in an integration of aesthetics, intelligence, and morality, all in a few brief sentences ;) Secondly, I give a mention to computer scientist Randy Pausch, who recently died. As regards the first issue: It’s been said there are clear ways to determine physical and mathematical facts, but nothing similar for values. But, in point (2) below I point out what appears to be an objectively existing set of values which underlies *all* of science. I present two brief but profound points that I what readers to consider and ponder carefully: Point (1) there is a clear evolution to the universe. It started from a low-entropy-density state, and is moving towards a higher-entropy density, which, remarkably, just happens to coincide with an increase in physical complexity with time. In the beginning the universe was in a state with *the lowest possible* entropy. This is expressed in the laws of thermodynamics and big bang cosmology. So it simply isn’t true that there is no teleology (purpose) built into the universe. The laws of thermodynamics and modern cosmology (big bang theory) clearly express the fact that there is. Point (2) the whole of science relies on Occam’s razor, the idea that the universe is in some sense ‘simple’. It must be emphasized that Occam’s razor pervades all of science – it is not simply some sort of ‘add on’. As Popper pointed out, an infinite number of theories could explain any given set of observations; therefore any inductive generalization requires a principle – Occam’s razor – to get any useful results at all. Here is the point that most haven’t quite grasped - Occam’s razor is *a set of aesthetic principles* - the notion of ‘simplicity’ is *a set of aesthetic principles*; Why? Because it is simply another way of saying that some representations are more *elegant* than others, which is the very notion of aesthetics! I repeat: the whole of science only works because of a set of *aesthetic principles* - a *set of values*. If all values are only subjective preferences, it would follow that the whole of science relies on subjective preferences. But subjective preferences have only existed as long as sentiments – therefore how could physical laws have functioned before sentiments? The idea that all values are subjective leads to a direct and blatant logical contradiction. Both these points are related and simply inexplicable without appealing to objective terminal values. At the beginning of time the universe was in the simplest possible state (minimal entropy density). Why? Occam’s razor is wide-ranging and pervades the whole of science. The simple is favored over the complex – that is– Occam’s razor is a set of aesthetic value judgments without which not a single Bayesian result could be obtained. *Every single Bayesian result rests on these implicit value judgments* to set priors. It must be repeated that *not one single scientific result could be obtained* without these secret (implicit) value judgments which set priors, that our defenders of the Bayesian faith on these forums are trying to pretend are not part of science! The secret to intelligence is aesthetics, not Bayesian math. Initially, this statement seems preposterous, but the argument in the next paragraph is my whole point, so it merits careful reading (the paragraph is marked with a * to show this is the crux of this post): *As regards the optimization of science, the leverage obtained from setting the priors (Occam’s razor – aesthetics – art) is far greater that that obtained from logical manipulations to update probabilities based on additional empirical data (math). Remember, the aesthetic principles used to set the priors (Occam’s razor) reduce a potentially infinite set of possible theories to a manageable (finite) number, whereas laborious mathematical probability updates based on incoming empirical data (standard Bayesian theory) is only guaranteed to converge on the correct theory after an infinite time, and even then the reason for the convergence is entirely inexplicable. The * paragraph suggests that aesthetics is the real basis of intelligence, not Bayesian math, and further that aesthetic terminal values are objectively real. For those who do initially find these claims preposterous, to help overcome your initial disbelief, I point to a superb essay from well- respected computer hacker, Paul Graham, who explains why aesthetics plays a far greater role in science than many have realized: ‘Taste for Makers’: http://www.paulgraham.com/taste.html As regards the second issue, I’d like to draw readers’ attention to computer scientist Randy Pausch. Randy Pausch was a computer scientist who developed the famous ‘Alice’ software to teach programming in a virtual reality setting. He was a virtual reality expert, a professor in Human-Computer Interaction at Carnegie Mellon University. In August,
Re: UDA Step 7
On Mar 28, 11:08 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Marc, > > Le 28-mars-08, à 08:53, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > > > > Hi guys, > > > Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to > > COMP. > > OK. > > > > > I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics. Nevertheless, > > the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different > > domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and > > *abstract math*, which *look* very different to each other. > > Sure. I would add psychology, theology, sociology, etc. Well, perform a top-level decomposition of knowledge domains from the most to the least general, and you can actuallly catch math in the act of dividing into different knowledge domains. It's true that any such classification of reality is a mental construct, but this does not mean that all classification schemes are equal...some are far more useful than others and a careful decomposition of knowledge domains results in a single unified scheme 'dropping out' mathematical categories start to *decompose*, or *crystallize* into the reality we experience. Here's the beginning of my proposed decomposition (most abstract first, moving down through the list you move down through the knowledge hierarchy - so for example, Category Theory is most general, it 'eats' Algebra, which in turn 'eats' Discrete Math and so on down the list) PLATONIC (MULTIVERSE LEVEL) Category Theory - Calculus, Analysis, Number Theory, Peano Axioms, ZF- Set Theory Algebra- Field, Group, Ring Discrete Math - Algorithm, Cellular automation, Church-Turing, Combinatoraics, Computability, Godel, Lob, Graph Theory, Iteration, Recurison Aesthetics - Beauty, Sublimity Morality - Ethics, Social Contract, Utilarianism, Consequentalism Virtue - Archetype, Virtue Ethics Field Physics - Geometry, Standard Model, Trigonometry, Relativity Mechanics - Classical Mechanics, Hamiltonian Models, Lagrangian Mechanics Digital Physics - Computational Complexity, P=NP, Kolmogorov Complexity COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL (REALITY AS SEEN BY AN OBSERVER) Reflective Reasoning - Analogy formation, Prototyping, Consciousness Probability Theory - Bayes, Inductive Reasoning, Bayesian Networks Symbolic Logic - Boolean Algebra, First-Order Logic, Predicate Logic, Modal Logic Communication - Emotion, Linguistics, Semantics, Semiotics Decision Theory - Economics, Pareto Efficientcy, Game Theory, Utility Psychology - Developmental, Evolutionary, Social Data Communications - Information Theory, Information Integration, Global WorkSpace Thermodynamics - Memory-Prediction Model, Memory, Neural Network, 0th-3rd Laws Chemistry - Chemical Kinematics OBJECT LEVEL (ARTIFACTS - BY PRODUCTS OF COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL) Data Modeling / High Level - Ontology, Relational Databases, Semantic Web, Lisp, Ruby Software Architectures/ Mid Level - Design Pattern, Object Oriented, Java Operating Systems/Low Level - Linux, Windows, DOS, C Programming Language Sociology - Group, Role Politics - Democracy, Humanism, Socialism, Libertarianism Narrative Art - Fantasy, Science Fiction, Computer Games Virtual Reality - HTML, XML, World Wide Web, Human-Computer Interaction, GUI Mechanical Engineering - Computer Engineering, Internet, Telecommunications, Robotics Solid State Physics - Chemical Engineering, Nanotechnology, Electrical Engineering, Circuits -- Do you see how the original mathematical categories decompose and how there's a neat knowledge hierarcy emerging? All of these fields have in some sense *emerged* purely from *mathematical categories*, and each fits neatly in its rightful place. As of 2008, only the people on the everything-list start to see all ;) "Here we are.born to be kings. Were the princes of the universe. Here we belong.fighting to survive. In a world with the darkest powers. And here we are.were the princes of the universe. Here we belong.fighting for survival. Weve come to be the rulers of your world. I am immortal.i have inside me blood of kings. I have no rival.no man can be my equal. Take me to the future of your world. Born to be kings.princes of the universe. Fighting and free.got your world in my hand. Im here for your love and Ill make my stand. We were born to be princes of the universe. No man could understand.my power is in my own hand. Ooh.ooh.ooh.ooh.people talk about you. People say youve had your day. Im a man that will go far. Fly the moon and reach for the stars. With my sword and head held high. Got to pass the test first time - yeah. I know that people talk about me I hear it every day. But I can prove you wrong cos Im right first time. Yeah.yeah.alright.watch this man fly. Bring on the girls. Here we are.born to be kings.were the princes of The universe.here we belong.born to be kings. Princes of the universe.fighting and free. Got the world in my hands.Im here for your love. And Ill make my stand. We were born to be princes of the universe." - Queen, "
Re: UDA Step 7
Hi guys, Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to COMP. I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics. Nevertheless, the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and *abstract math*, which *look* very different to each other. My misunderstanding was based on the fact that I couldn't (and still don't fully) see how they could be the same. But yes, I'm now convinced of COMP. The relationship is subtle, but I'm now think that the *Mathematical* domain is primary (most general), the *Teleological* domain is less general, and the *Physical* domain is least general. So Math is the bedrock, which supercedes Teleology, which in turn supercedes Physics. --- As regards the Consciousness discussion, there are three things you need to remember about it; (1) It's not a thing, it's a process (2) It's not just a *physical* process, it's also a *mathematical* process (3) It's not just what the process *does* (it's function), it's what the process *signifies* I think if you just bear in mind these 3 simple points about consciousness, you won't go far wrong. After about 6 years of ganashing my teeth and nearly going insane thinking about these issues, I have now reached my own tentative (in principle) answers on most of the big questions, to my own satisfaction. --- I don't think *any* of the current scientific or philosophical persepctives on consciousness are quite right. Consciousness *is* physical, but it's not *just* physical, it also extends into the mathematical domain. So I think that none of the materialist or dualist positions are correct. I was fooled by *functionalism* for a while, but I don't think that's quite right either. See point (3) above - it's true that consciousness is a process, just as the functionalists say. but it's not what the process *does* (functionalism) that is identical to consciousness, but what the process *signifies* - consciousness is a *logical representation* of the meaning of a concept - it is a *language* for representing concepts - this is NOT the same thing as functionalism. Cheers all --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Paper: MCRT: An Upper Ontology for General Purpose Reality Modeling' (Brief, 2 600 words)
I have uploaded the paper as a formatted Word Doc, which is easier on the eye: http://everything-list.googlegroups.com/web/MCRTOntology.doc?gda=3dFfBEE6sAh9xrcEfYjLcJeK--tyllM2puGzdo9sGlIZYEi4rGG1qiJ7UbTIup-M2XPURDRrROYvly_CiqS44qlTBAu-5KylSQ9gG5gUBwiOovY3VA There is also a preliminary UML Domain Model (diagram) of the MCRT, which I posted on this site before (but this is one is slightly updated to the final fully correct version). It is always much easier to understand something through a visual data model... which after all is the very essence of logical *communication* . My brief paper can be thought of as the missing documentation for this diagram. http://everything-list.googlegroups.com/web/Top%20Level%20Domain%20Model%20of%20the%20Mathematico.mht?gda=5_Mrn146sAh9xrcEfYjLcJeK--tyllM2puGzdo9sGlIZYEi4rGG1qiJ7UbTIup-M2XPURDRZyEDs1_cQYDTyc-3qAHuNivMQ60Yoz7x_O7qBqZtZkgjJ2HNns_RkUb8_lxJZA2M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Paper: MCRT: An Upper Ontology for General Purpose Reality Modeling' (Brief, 2 600 words)
'MCRT: An Upper Ontology for General Purpose Reality Modeling'
By Marc Geddes
Sydney, Australia
22th March, 2008
Abstract
In this paper I explore the consequence of two assumptions:
(1) A model of reality can be entirely captured by an Upper Ontology
and Data Models are Logical Communications
(2) A method of general purpose reality modeling is equivalent to a
Universal Parser
Introduction
To design a general purpose method of reality modeling I assume that
such a method is equivalent to a 'universal parser' - ie. A system of
translation between different logical representations of concepts.
High-level logical representations (ie data models) can be considered
as methods of logical communication. Thus, the aim is the
construction of an Upper Ontology capable of encompassing all other
ontologies (ie a general purpose representation of the domain
'knowledge' which enables the translation between all other more
specific ontologies (ie general purpose ontology merging).
Previously, I designed the skeleton out-line of the Upper Ontology
('Top Level Domain Model of the Mathematico-Cognition Reality Theory',
Marc Geddes, First correct version: 4th Dec, 2007, everything-list).
This is MCRT (the Mathematico-Cognition Reality Theory). It appears
that the process of data modeling can be separated into three general
types: Mathematical (Software Development - or SD), Teleological (The
creation of value systems - ie. Story Narration - or SN) and Physical
(Virtual Reality - or VR). The initial aim then, is the elaboration
of MCRT, the development of the triple-aspect ontology and the study
of the relationships between SD, SN and VR ontologies.
Initial Knowledge Base: MCRT Ontology
MCRT Upper Ontology provides a skeleton structure for the proposed
Upper Ontology . This paper provides the beginnings of the
specification of MCRT Upper Ontology.
MCRT is an Upper Ontology, an abstract top-level representation of
'reality' at the highest possible level of description.
Knowledge Domains
Sub-domains of reality are areas of 'Concept Space'(CS) classified by
three KR axes.
1st Axis: Physics, Teleology, Mathematics
2nd Axis: Platonic, Cognition, Artifact
3rd Axis: Independent, Relative, Mediating
A brief description of each axis follows. The meaning of each domain
is then elaborated on through references to known fields and examples.
1st Axis:
Physics (PHY): Domains related to material entities. Concerned with
space and geometry - or the classification of whether things are
'Solid' or 'Empty'.
Teleology (TEL): Domains related to goal directed entities. Concerned
with values - or the classification of whether things are 'Good' or
'Bad' relative to agents.
Mathematics (MAT): Domains related to knowledge itself (meta-data).
Concerned with logicalimplications - or the classification of
models of reality as 'True' or 'False'.
2nd Axis:
Platonic (PLA): Domains related to abstract universal entities. These
are entities which are postulated to be eternal and unchanging, and
cannot be located in any finite region of reality (they are
abstract). This is simply anything which is 'abstract', 'constant',
and 'applicable to any region of reality'.
Cognition (COG): Domains related to systems. Systems have three main
characteristics: (i) Input, (ii)
Processing, (iii) Output. Simply, the term means 'system' in the most
general sense.
Artifact (ART): Domains related to particular things. An artifact is
an instantiated object, a particular instance of something with
particular attributes and behaviours. This is close to the meaning of
'object' in the sense of OOP (Object Oriented Programming).
3rd Axis:
Independent (IND): Domains related to intrinsic properties.
Properties of things in themselves, without reference to external
objects. An 'element' in the most general sense of the term.
Relative (REL): Domains related to functional (external) properties.
The relation or effect something has on things external to itself. A
'function' or 'action' in the most general sense of these terms.
Mediating (MED): Domains related to signifying (semantic) properties.
How something is represented or 'appears' to something else. An
'icon', 'signal' or 'means of communication' in the most general sense
of the term.
Reference: The third axis is similar to the ontological classification
scheme of Charles Pierce, hence, the same names have been used.
However the definitions given here are not identical to Pierces.
The following summarizes the concepts that each axis attempts to
capture.
1st Axis:
PHY - Geometry
TEL - Value
MAT - Implication
2nd Axis:
PLA - Universal (Abstraction)
COG - System (Process)
ART - Particular (Object)
3rd Axis:
IND - Comprising (is made of)
Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
On Nov 28, 9:56 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > You only need models of cellular automata. If you have a model and > rules for that model, then one event will follow after another event, > according to the rules. And after that event will follow another more > event, and so on unlimited. The events will follow after eachother even > if you will not have any implementation of this model. Any physics is > not needed. You don't need any geometric properties. > > In this model you may have a person called Torgny writing a message on a > google group, and that event may be followed by a person called Marc > writing a reply to this message. And you don't need any implementation > of that model. > > -- > Torgny A whole lot of unproven assumptions in there. For starters, we don't even know that the physical world can be modelled solely in terms of cellular automata at all. Digital physics just seems to be the latest 'trendy' thing, but actual evidence is thin on the ground. Mathematics is much richer than just discrete math. Discrete math deals only with finite collections, and as such is just a special case of algebra. Algebraic relations extend beyond computational models. Finally, the introduction of complex analysis, infinite sets and category theory extends mathematics even further, beyond even algebraic relations. So you see that cellular automata are only a small part of mathematics as a whole. There is no reason for thinking for that space is discrete and in fact physics as it stands deals in continuous differential equations, not cellular automata. Further, the essential point I was making is that an informational model of something is not neccesserily the same as the thing itself. An informational model of a person called Marc would capture only my mind, not my body. The information has to be super-imposed upon the physical, or embodied in the physical world. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
On Nov 28, 3:16 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 27-nov.-07, à 05:47, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > > Geometric properties cannot be derived from > > informational properties. > > I don't see why. Above all, this would make the computationalist wrong, > or at least some step in the UDA wrong (but then which one?). I'll find the flaw in UDA in due course ;) > I recall that there is an argument (UDA) showing that if comp is true, > then not only geometry, but physics, has to be derived exclusively from > numbers and from what numbers can prove (and know, and observe, and > bet, ...) about themselves, that is from both extensional and > intensional number theory. > The UDA shows *why* physics *has to* be derived from numbers (assuming > CT + "yes doctor"). > The Lobian interview explains (or should explain, if you have not yet > grasp the point) *how* to do that. > > Bruno > If the UDA is sound that would certainly refute what I'm claiming yes. I want to see how physics (which as far I'm concerned *is* geometry - at least I think pure physics=geometry) emerges *purely* from theories of sets/numbers/categories. I base my claims on ontological considerations (5 years of deep thought about ontology), which lead me to strongly suspect the irreducible property dualism between physical and mathematical properties. Thus I'm highly skeptical of UDA but have yet to property study it. Lacking resources to do proper study here at the moment :-( Time will tell. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
On Nov 28, 1:18 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dear Marc, > > > Physics deals with symmetries, forces and fields. > > Mathematics deals with data types, relations and sets/categories. > > I'm no physicist, so please correct me but IMHO: > > Symmetries = relations > Forces - could they not be seen as certain invariances, thus also > relating to symmetries? > > Fields - the aggregate of forces on all spacetime "points" - do not see > why this should not be mathematical relation? > > > The mathemtical entities are informational. The physical properties > > are geometric. Geometric properties cannot be derived from > > informational properties. > > Why not? Do you have a counterexample? > > Regards, > Günther > Don't get me wrong. I don't doubt that all physical things can be *described* by mathematics. But this alone does not establish that physical things *are* mathematical. As I understand it, for the examples you've given, what happens is that based on emprical observation, certain primatives of geometry and symmetry are *attached to* (connected with) mathematical relations, numbers etc which successfully *describe/predict* these physical properties. But it does not follow from this, that the mathematical relations/numbers *are* the geometric properties/symmetrics. In order to show that the physical properties *are* the mathematical properties (and not just described by or connected to the physical properties), it has to be shown how geometric/physical properties emerge from/are logically derived from sets/categories/numbers alone. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
On Nov 27, 3:54 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Besides which, mathematics and physics are dealing with quite > > different distinctions. It is a 'type error' it try to reduce or > > identity one with the other. > > I don't see why. Physics deals with symmetries, forces and fields. Mathematics deals with data types, relations and sets/categories. The mathemtical entities are informational. The physical properties are geometric. Geometric properties cannot be derived from informational properties. > > > > > Mathematics deals with logical properties, > > I guess you mean "mathematical properties". Since the filure of > logicism, we know that math is not really related to logic in any way. > It just happens that a big part of logic appears to be a branch of > mathemetics, among many other branches. I would classify logic as part of applied math - logic is a description of informational systems from the point of view of observers inside time and space. > > > physics deals with spatial > > (geometric) properties. Although geometry is thought of as math, it > > is actually a branch of physics, > > Actually I do think so. but physics, with comp, has to be the science > of what the observer can observe, and the observer is a mathematical > object, and observation is a mathematical object too (with comp). > > > since in addition to pure logical > > axioms, all geometry involves 'extra' assumptions or axioms which are > > actually *physical* in nature (not purely mathematical) . > > Here I disagree (so I agree with your preceding post where you agree > that we agree a lot but for not always for identical reasons). > Arithmetic too need extra (non logical) axioms, and it is a matter of > taste (eventually) to put them in the branch of physics or math. > > Bruno > I don't think it's a matter of taste. I think geoemtry is clearly physics, arithmetic is clearly pure math. See above. Geometry is about fields, arithmetic (in the most general sense) is about categories/sets. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
>When I talk about "pure mathematics" I mean that kind of mathematics you have >in GameOfLife. There you have "gliders" that move in the GameOfLife-universe, >and these gliders interact with eachother when they meet. These gliders you >can see as physical objects. These physical objects are reducible to pure >mathematics, they are the consequences of the rules behind GameOfLife. -- Torgny That kind of mathematics - models of cellular automata - is the domain of the theory of computation. These are just that - models. But there is no reason for thinking that the models or mathematical rules are identical to the physical entities themselves just because these rules/models can precisely predict/explain the behaviour of the physical objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
On Nov 23, 8:49 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev: > > > > > As far as I tell tell, all of physics is ultimately > > geometry. But as we've pointed out on this list many times, a theory > > of physics is *not* a theory of everything, since it makes the > > (probably false) assumption that everything is reducible to physical > > substances and properties. > > I think that everything is reducible to physical substances and > properties. And I think that all of physics is reducible to pure > mathematics... You can't have it both ways. If physics was reducible to pure mathematics, then physics could not be the 'ontological base level' of reality and hence everything could not be expressed solely in terms of physical substance and properties. Besides which, mathematics and physics are dealing with quite different distinctions. It is a 'type error' it try to reduce or identity one with the other. Mathematics deals with logical properties, physics deals with spatial (geometric) properties. Although geometry is thought of as math, it is actually a branch of physics, since in addition to pure logical axioms, all geometry involves 'extra' assumptions or axioms which are actually *physical* in nature (not purely mathematical) . --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
On Nov 23, 1:10 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Now such work raises the remark, which I don't really want to develop > now, which is that qualifiying "TOE" a theory explaining "only" forces > and particles or field, is implicit physicalism, and we know (by UDA) > that this is incompatible with comp. Yes indeed Bruno. As far as I tell tell, all of physics is ultimately geometry. But as we've pointed out on this list many times, a theory of physics is *not* a theory of everything, since it makes the (probably false) assumption that everything is reducible to physical substances and properties. Thus we both are in agreement on this, but for different reasons (you because, you think math is the ultimate basis of everything aka COMP, me, because of my property dualism, aka the need for a triple-aspect explanation of physical/teleological/ mathematical properties as the basis for everything). We keep telling mainstream scients, but mainstream scients are not listening to us. *sigh*. > Yet I bet Lisi is quite close to the sort of physics derivable by > machine's or number's introspection. Actually, getting physics from so > "few" symmetries is a bit weird (I have to study the paper in detail). > With comp, we have to explain the symmetries *and* the geometry, and > the quantum logic, from the numbers and their possible stable > discourses ... If not, it is not a theory of everything, but just a > classification, a bit like the Mendeleev table classifies atoms without > really explaining. But Lisi's theory seems beautiful indeed ... > > Bruno > There's too many people mucking around with physics - I do wish more people were working on computer science. Physics is the most advanced of our sciences, but computer science lags behind. It just seems to be an unfortunate historical accident that physical theories developed first and then lots of social status got attached to theoretical physics (stemming from the glorification of Newton in Europe). As a result, physics has advanced well ahead of comp-sci, and there's lots of money and status attached to physics breakthroughs. But comp- sci is actually far more important to us in practical sense - artificial general intelligence would be way way more valuable than any fundamental physics breakthrough. We would have had real AGI long ago if there was the same money and glory for comp-sci as there is for physics *sigh*. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
My answers to Wei Dai's questions.
On another list Wei Dai posted some questions. At this time I wish to attempt some answers to be placed on public record. These were excellent questions. Wei Dai wrote>>> >Here are my questions: >How does math really work? Why do we believe that P!=NP even though we don't have a proof one way or the other? Math is composed of three levels of abstraction: (1) Patonic forms that exist outside of space and time http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/ (2) Cognitive systems that consist of information processing (algorithms, logic, probability networks) Exmaples: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-order_logic http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~murphyk/Bayes/bayes.html (3) Human artifacts that consist of human created categories and representations of things (ontologies) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_%28computer_science%29 When doing human mathematics, we are attempting to match (2) - our cognitive systems of logic which exist inside space and time to (1) the platonic forms which exist outside space-time. We can thus legitimately assign true/false designations to mathematical assertions. (a postulated platonic form may explain or fail to explain the operations of our computations- if the postulated platonic form fails to explain empricial properties of computational systems we assign the designation 'false' to the mathematical assertion. If the postulated platonic form does explain empricial computational properties we have empirical evidence for calling it 'true'). (3) - ontologies - data models - programming languages - are 'secondary mathematical properties' (analgous to 'secondary physical properties' such as color in the physical domain). These are human inventions which we use to reflect upon (reason about) mathematics. >How does induction really work? Why do we intuitively know that, contra Solomonoff Induction, we shouldn't believe in the non-existence of halting-problem oracles no matter what evidence we may see? See above. Be careful to seperate out the notion of induction as an empirical mathematical *procedure* (system which exists inside space and time), from the notion of the abstract platonic form which that procedure represents (this is the algebraic relation or category which has a platonic existence outside space and time). When doing Induction we engaging in generalizations. This is the process of modifying our postulated explanations about platonic forms (relations, categories) as new information comes in. (see above - we are attempting to match our own finite information about platonic forms with the platonic forms themselves). The probabilities and uncertainties are not properties of the platonic forms themselves. They simply reflect our own uncertainities about these platonic forms, arising from the fact that we are finite beings existing inside space and time. >Is there such a thing as absolute complexity (as opposed to complexity relative to a Turing machine or some other construct)? Yes there is. See above. Asbolute complexity is a platonic notion which exists outside space and time - it is what enbables one to fix the 'mathematical identitiy' a given Turing machine existing inside space and time. >How does qualia work? Why do certain patterns of neuron firings translate into sensations of pain, and other patterns into pleasure? Qualia arise from the fact that there are many different ways to *represent* the same reality in logical terms. Ontology is the means through which the mind *reflects* upon mathematics. An ontology is a way of *communicating* (representing) logical meanings. To do this the mind has to divide reality up into *objects*, *attribites* and *relations*. See wiki entry on ontology: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_%28computer_science%29 But any given ontology is a *secondary mathematical property* - it is an invention of the mind, not a feature of reality itself. There are many different ways of *dividing up* reality into an ontology, and hence the mind ends up with many different ontologies. An order to create an integrated logical view of reality, the mind has to have a way to translate between all the different ontology. The logical meaning of a concept is thus: A collection of ontologies A way to translate between them in order to integrate them. And this way of representing logical concepts are what generate Qualia. To summarize: Qualia are logical *represenations* of the meaning of concepts consisting of onotologies and ontology merging - this is compatible with global workspace theory - see - http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/baars/other/BaarsFranklinTICS2003.pdf and information integration theory see http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42 >How does morality work? If I take a deterministic program that simulates a neuron firing pattern that represents pleasure, and run it twice, is that twice as good as running it once? Or good at all? There are three levels of abstraction in morality, just as th
Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?
On Oct 31, 7:40 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Decisions require some value structure. To get values from an ontology you'd > have to get around the Naturalistic fallacy. > > Brent Meeker- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - Decision theory has this same problem. Decision theory doesn't require values. The preferences (values) are plugged in from outside the theory. Decision theory is merely a way of computing the best way to achieve the desired outcomes. It doesn't say what we should desire though. Decision theory is too hard for me and too complex. What I'm suspecting is that it's not the final word. I'm looking for a higher level theory capable of deriving the results in decision theory indirectly without me having to directly work them out. My suspicion currently focuses on communication theory, knowledge representation and data modelling (ontology). Rather than 'getting values out' I think values are most likely somehow implicitly built into the structure of ontology itself. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: What are the consequences of UD+ASSA?
On Oct 31, 3:28 pm, "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > 4. For someone on a practical mission to write an AI that makes sensible > decisions, perhaps the model can serve as a starting point and as > illustration of how far away we still are from that goal. Heh. Yes, very interesting indeed. But a huge body of knowledge and a great deal of smartness is needed to even begin to grasp all that stuff ;) As regards AI I gotta wonder whether that 'Decision Theory' stuff is really 'the heart of the matter' - perhaps its the wrong level of abstraction for the problem. That is it say, it would be great if the AI could work out all the decision theory for itself, rather than having us trying to program it in (and probably failing miserably). Certainly, I'm sure as hell not smart enough to come up with a working model of decisions. So, rather than trying to do the impossible, better to search for a higher level of abstraction. Look for the answers in communication theory/ontology, rather than decision theory. Decision theory would be derivative of an effective ontology - that saves me the bother of trying to work it out ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI
Danny, The depressed people are the sane ones. My post is merely 'existential angst' caused by knowledge of the world and myself as I really am.With knowledge comes unhappiness and happiness is the happiness of ignorance. Ever read the short story of 'Green Magic'? That story is available on-line: http://www.infinityplus.co.uk/stories/green.htm I am like 'Howard Fair' and I suffered the same fate in the story that he did. --- "Where do you go?" Fair asked in wonder and longing. "May I go with you?" The sprite, swirling a drape of bright green dust over its shoulders, shook his head. "You would be less than comfortable." "Other men have explored the worlds of magic!" "True: your uncle Gerald McIntyre, for instance." "My uncle Gerald learned green magic?" "To the limit of his capabilities. He found no pleasure in his learning. You would do well to profit by his experience and modify your ambitions." The sprite turned and walked away. Jaadian assented. "You have not accepted my advice." Fair shrugged. "You asked me to remain ignorant, to accept my stupidity and ineptitude." "And why should you not?" asked Jaadian gently. "You are a primitive in a primitive realm; nevertheless not one man in a thousand can match your achievements." Fair agreed, smiling faintly. "But knowledge creates a craving for further knowledge. Where is the harm in knowledge?" By stages so gradual he never realized them he learned green magic. But the new faculty gave him no pride: between his crude ineptitudes and the poetic elegance of the sprites remained a tremendous gap, and he felt his innate inferiority much more keenly than he ever had in his old state. Worse, his most earnest efforts failed to improve his technique, and sometimes, observing the singing joy of an improvised manifestation by one of the sprites, and contrasting it to his own labored constructions, he felt futility and shame. In one terrible bittersweet spasm, he gave up. He found Jaadian weaving tinkling fragments of various magics into a warp of shining long splines. With grave courtesy, Jaadian gave Fair his attention, and Fair laboriously set forth his meaning. Jaadian returned a message. "I recognize your discomfort, and extend my sympathy. It is best that you now return to your native home." - Howard Fair sat in his apartment. His perceptions, augmented and sharpened by his sojourn in the green realm, took note of the surroundings. Only two hours before, by the clocks of Earth, he had found them both restful and stimulating; now they were neither. His books: superstition, spuriousness, earnest nonsense. His private journals and workbooks: a pathetic scrawl of infantilisms. Gravity tugged at his feet, held him rigid. The shoddy construction of the house, which heretofore he never had noticed, oppressed him. Everywhere he looked he saw slipshod disorder, primitive filth. The thought of the food he must now eat revolted him. ... "Sometimes I wish I could abandon all my magic and return to my former innocence." "I have toyed with the idea," McIntyre replied thoughtfully. "In fact I have made all the necessary arrangements. It is really a simple matter." He led Fair to a small room behind the station. Although the door was open, the interior showed a thick darkness. McIntyre, standing well back, surveyed the darkness with a quizzical curl to his lip. "You need only enter. All your magic, all your recollections of the green realm will depart. You will be no wiser than the next man you meet. And with your knowledge will go your boredom, your melancholy, your dissatisfaction." Fair contemplated the dark doorway. A single step would resolve his discomfort. He glanced at McIntyre; the two surveyed each other with sardonic amusement. They returned to the front of the building. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI
On Oct 16, 11:37 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > If it is ''a'-rtificial' I question the 'natural one' (following > > Bruno's fear of the (natural?) 'super stupidity'.) Yet I don't think > > Marc wants to let himself denature into an artifact. > > Not necessarily, but look at Saibal's recent answer! > This raises a question for Mark. What if the "future "SAI"", "SI" > should we say, are computationalist? Marc, is it ok if those SI > reincarnate you digitally? Could they decide without your consent > (without being super-stupid?). Your points are well taken Bruno. We should be highly suspicious of any 'authority' that thinks to act without our consent. As for cryonics, Saibal , I think it's a good option. If necessary, I'm quite prepared to put myself in the freezer - I have no intention of getting any older than a biological age of 65 - if I live that long I might be the first guy in the world to volunteer for a 'live freeze' (I would probably have to move to a country where there are laws allowing for assisted suicide though!) > > Again, not necessarily. Buddhism, unlike Christianity, has always been > very aware that "religious truth", once "institutionalized" get wrong > ... > To kill the buddha, or sompetimes just the master, is a way to remind > the monk that they have to find the truth in themsleves and never to > take any master talk for granted. > > > In our (definition-wise) lower mentality it is not likely that we can > > 'kill' the smarter. So the condition involves the un-possibility, even > > if we are capable to recognise them > > - what we are not likely to be. > > Agreed. It was just a parabola for driving attention against any use of > authoritative argument in the field of fundamentals. > Ah! But the lobian machine too can be shown allergic to such argument. > It's a universal dissident. Unforunately, humans, like dog are still > attracted to the practical philosophy according to which the "boss is > right" (especially when wrong!) > > Bruno > > PS Perhaps this week I will got the time to send the next post in the > "observer-moment = Sigma_1 sentence". > Well, I'm pleased to hear the lobian machine is a 'universal dissident'. I wouldn't want to imply that 'the boss is right'. All I was implying was that (in the case of super-intelligence) the boss would be *stronger*. Whether the boss is right or not, we little guys wouldn't have much power so our negotiating power would be seriously limited initally. The best that could be hoped for from such a hypothetical 'social contract' in the beginning is that the SI doesn't hurt us. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI
On Oct 14, 3:39 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Take care, trust yourself and "kill all the "SAI"" on the road, to > paraphrase a well known Buddhist idea. Either you are sufficiently > clever to understand the SAI arguments, showing you are already an SAI > yourself, and your message is without purpose, or you are not, in which > case, to keep soundness (by lobianity), you better be skeptical, (and > not to abide so quick imo). > > Unless you want to loose your universality, and be a slave, a tool. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Heh. Bruno, I continue to analyse my current (human) condition to try to find a way out of this mess (I'm not a happy bloke). Still considering many possibilities. Given the possibility that super- intelligences do already (or will in the future) exist, there's a chance that a non-interference policy is being/will be pursued, but that there's a way to get their attention - it could be a simple matter of indicating that you are aware of the possibility and requesting to 'sign' a 'social contract'. Get in early now! ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI
12th October, 2007 Marc Geddes Auckland New Zealand --- This is Marc Geddes , I am publically requesting to form a social contract with SAI (Super Intelligence).I am aware of the existence of SAI and SAI-space and am of sound mind and my own volition requesting to be removed from human space and uplifted to SAI space at the earliest possible opportunately. I agree to abide by all rules and boundaries set by SAI as per my responsibilities under the social contract. Thank you. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism
On Oct 3, 12:23 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I think that beauty is effectively a channel from our > unconscious. When we think that something is beautiful (or conversely > ugly), some unconscious processing has taken place according to some > criterion and presented to the conscious mind on a scale of ugly to > beautiful representing how desirable that thing is for the task at > hand. > > Beauty often goes together with simplicity, or with symmetry, as these > are very useful concepts evolutionary (finding a genetically superior > mate - see literature on the effect of parasites; finding effective > theories of the world - simpler is indeed better for various reasons). > > Cheers > The specific things we find beautiful come from our evolutionary history, but that doesn't mean that there aren't objective 'platonic archetypes' . Our conscious experience of beauty is a communication between a mind and a thing. The thing is a *pointer* (reference) to an objective platonic form. Any number of things could potentially play the role of the pointer.The specific thing that triggers a conscious experience of 'beauty' is contingent on our evolutionary history, but the aeathetic value is not in the thing itself, but the platonic archetype it points to. Consciousness is the communication system of the mind and thus the entire sentient experience is based on signs and symbols (representations of things). Signs and Symbols are the true language of reflection and human experience - humans are the symbol using animals.Everything traces back to signs and symbols and thus all assessments of value ultimately trace back to assessments about the aesthetics of signs and symbols. The study of signs and symbols is known as semiotics and the American philosopher Charles Peirce was its champion. Peirce almost grasped 'the secret' so very long ago ;) Signs and symbols control the world, not phrases and laws. ~ Confucius (b 551 BCE), Chinese thinker, social philosopher --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism
Make sure you get the spelling right ;) - Utilitarianism The trouble with Utilitarianism is that it's only concerned with one aspect of values - relations between rational agents. Further, although it's a good approach for practical calculation , it fails to deal with the explanatory abstraction underlying values. The actual abstraction that Utiliarianism is concerned with is 'Liberty' (or Volition), and a theory of morality at the deepest level deals directly with Volition, not Utility. Utility is a secondary concept and Utilitarianism a derivative calculational tool. Volition per se is not the final basis for value by the way. Beauty is. You heard it here first. Aesthetics is the deepest level of value theory and the theory of Liberty (Volition) is merely a sub-set of this. In defense of Beauty as the ultimate basis of value, I present to you: Natasha Vita More :) --- "When I think about the decline of the values America was built upon, stemming from The Bill of Rights and the world of Thomas Paine, I long for the underlying essence of beauty. (When one thinks of Naomi Wolf, it is almost impossible not to think about her writings on beauty (thus the connection)) You might say, "What the hell does beauty have to do with human behavior, tryanny and politics?!" Beauty, according to Le Corbusier, stemming from Pythagoras, is mathematical in symmetry and proportion. Beauty, according to Benjamin Franklin, is found in simple yet carefully orchestrated musical tunes. According to Thomas Jefferson "The beauty of the second amendment is that it will not be needed until they try to take it." According to Simone Weil, "Justice, truth, and beauty are sisters and comrades." "Beauty, throughout history, generally has been associated with that which is good. Likewise, the polar opposite of beauty is generally considered to be ugly and is often associated with evil. ... This contrast is epitomized by classic stories such as Sleeping Beauty. Likewise, beauty according to Goethe, from his 1809 Elective Affinities, is 'everywhere a welcome guest'. Moreover, human beauty "acts with far greater force on both inner and outer senses, so that he who beholds it is exempt from evil and feels in harmony with himself and with the world."(Wakjawa 2007) "An Occasional Letter On The Female Sex" (Thomas Paine, August 1775) reflects on bondage and suffering at the cost of beauty." But isn't beauty a deeply valued sense of life that begets the desire for freedom to express and experience? Paine was a "[c]hampion of the chaos of change and the beauty of unrestrained libertarianism" (Rushton 2006) The London Chronicle reprinted Ben Franklin's Causes of the American Discontents before 1768 (1774). Paine was distressed and wanted to revolt against what he thought was a completely corrupt state. He thought of America as a land were the lovers of freedom were uniting against the tyranny. And that tyranny was an illness, a sickness in human behavior. An unwelcome guest." Ref: http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/2007-September/037813.html Of course it's all in my top-level domain model of reality here: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity Just code that design and consult it for the answers to all questions ;) Look at the Platonic classes in the center - first Virtue , then Morality (concerned with Volition) and finally Beauty at the deepest level of abstraction. It's beauty that's at the core of it all, not Volition. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: against UD+ASSA, part 1
On Sep 27, 2:15 pm, "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Yes. So my point is, even though the subjective probability computed by ASSA > is intuitively appealing, we end up ignoring it, so why bother? We can > always make the right choices by thinking directly about measures of > outcomes and ignoring subjective probabilities. > OK, new thought experiement. ;) Barring a global disaster which wiped out all of the humanity or its descendents, there would exist massively more observers in the future than currently exist. But you (as an observer) find you born amongst the earliest humans. Since barring global disaster there will be massively more observers in the future, why did you find yourself born so early? Surely your probability of being born in the future (where there are far more observers) was much much higher than your chances of being born so early among a far smaller pool of observers? The conclusion appears to be that there is an overwhelming probability that we are on the brink of some global disaster which will wipe out all humanity, since that would explain why we don't find ourselves among the pool of future observers (because there are none). Is the conclusion correct? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The physical world is real
On Sep 23, 10:39 pm, Youness Ayaita <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > There have always been two ways to interpret the interrelationship > between the physical world and our minds. There's a lot more than two ways. >The first one is to consider > the physical world to be fundamental; from this perspective, the > appearance of the mind is to be understood with the help of some > neurological theory that maps physical states of the brain to states > of the mind or observer moments. Not neccesserily. There are several possible variations on taking the physical world to be fundamental. Strong materialism does not map physical states to observer moments - strong materialism - or 'eliminativism' - says that observer moments are merely a human construct we use to describe what are really physical processs. According to this doctrine, you can't rightly talk about observer moments at all. What you have described above is weak materialism - weak materialism - or property dualism - would agree that the physical world is fundamental, but allow that observer moments are still real 'ontological primatives' which attach to (map to) the physical. See my next paragraph below. >The second way starts with the mind, > denying the fundamental role of the physical world. According to this > assumption, the physical world is introduced with the help of a theory > of physics mapping mental states to physical states that reproduce the > mental state within themselves. Imprecisely speaking, the second way > questions the reality status of the physical world. As I mentioned, there are still other possibilities. Neither of your two possibilities is compatible with *comp*. According to comp (which seems to be the most popular position on this list) it's the mathematical world which is fundamental. Both the mind and physical reality emerge from mathematics. So there's a third possibility there. The second possibility you mention has a long history of ignominious failure - Idealist approaches seem to lead to mysticism mostly and have not helped the advance of science. I think we can rule out Idealism . I think it's got to be either *comp* (mathematics is fundamental), or some variation on possibility 1 - at the end of the day I'd have to go with possibility 1 - weak materialism (only physical substances exist), but with some kind of property dualism (additional non-physical propties can attach themselves to physical substances - these non-physical properties supervene on - are dependent on the physical - but are not reducible to them). > > Both ways allow the elaboration of an ensemble theory. The first > approach starts from the ensemble of all physical worlds (or formally > with descriptions thereof). The second approach uses the ensemble of > all observer moments (or descriptions thereof). When Rolf expressed > the idea "UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe" (which is similar to > the second approach), I wrote: "I have always been hopeful that both > approaches will finally turn out to be equivalent." The third possibility (comp) starts with an ensemble of mathematical relations , not an ensemble of all physical worlds, nor an ensemble of all observer moments. > > It's a very trivial fact though that the two approaches are not > equivalent. Nonetheless it's interesting to note it. I argue that we > have good reasons to discard the second approach. The fundamental role > will be assigned to the physical worlds (hence the title of this > message). The difference between the two approaches leads to different > expections to the question "What will I experience next?". > Consequently it can be measured empirically. We find this result by > observing that different physical worlds may produce the same observer > moment (e.g. if the physical worlds differ in a detail not perceivable > by the observer). This assigns a higher probability to the observer > moment when chosen randomly in order to answer the question (it's > multiply counted because it appears more than once in the everyting > ensemble). Opposed to this, every observer moment (in the RSSA within > a given reference class) would have an equal probability to be > selected if we used the second approach. > > I think that the quantum mechanical Born rule strongly supports the > first approach: Observer moments are weighted according to a specific > formula. They don't have equal probability! > > Example: Both quantum states, |A> = |0>/sqrt(2) + |1>/sqrt(2) and > |B> = |0>/sqrt(3) + |1>/sqrt(1.5) > lead to the same two possible observer moments when a measurement in > the (|0>,|1>) basis is performed. According to the Born rule the > probabilites for the two observer moments are equal for |A> and > different for |B>. Starting from the second approach (observer moments > are fundamental) this result cannot be understood. > > If we take this result seriously, Bostrom's self-sampling assumption > > "Each observer moment should reason as if it were randomly selec
Re: Max Tegmark: The Mathematical Universe
Max himself posted about this on the everything-list here: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/7da9934267f64acf/690ccf0715150a36#690ccf0715150a36 A popular article was also the feature in last week's 'New Scientist': http://www.newscientist.com/channel/fundamentals/mg19526210.500-mathematical-cosmos-reality-by-numbers.html --- Now is a good time for me to summarize my objections once again. As I said recently to Bruno, here's the problem with the idea that everything is mathematics: "I think we need to draw a careful distinction between the *process* of reasoning itself, and the external entities that reasoning is *about* *(ie what it is that our theories are externally referencing). When you carefully examine what mathematics is all about, it seems that it is all about *knowledge* (justified belief). This is because math appears to be the study of patterns and when meaning is ascribed to be these patterns, the result is knowledge. So: so Math <> Meaningful Patterns <> Knowledge. Since math appears to be equivalent to knowledge itself, it is no surprise that all explanations with real explanatory power must use (or indirectly reference) mathematics. That is to say, I think it's true that the *process* of reasoning redcues to pure mathematics. However, it does not follow that all the entities being *referenced* (refered to) by mathematical theories, are themselves mathematical. It appears to me that to attempt to reduce everything to pure math runs the risk of a lapse into pure Idealism, the idea that reality is 'mind created'. Since math is all about knowledge, a successful attempt to derive physics from math would appear to mean that there's nothing external to 'mind' itself. As I said, there seems to be a slippery slipe into solipsism/idealism here." --- Another major problem is this idea of pure 'baggage free' description that Max talks about (the removal of all references to obervables , leaving only abstract relations). The problem with this , is that, by definition, it cannot possibly explain any observables we actually see. Notions of space and agency (fundamental to our empirical descriptions), cannot be derived from pure mathematics, since these notions involve attaching additional 'non-mathematical' notions to the pure mathematics. As I pointed out in another recent thread on this thread, the distinctions required for physical and teleological explanations of the world appear to be incommensurable with mathematical notions. We cannot possibly explain anything about the empirical reality we actually observe without attaching additional *non-mathematical* notions to the mathematics. "I've talked often about 'the three types of properties' (for my property dualism) : Mathematical, Teleological and Physical. These three properties are based on three different kinds of distinction: Mathematics: The distinction is *model/reality* (or mind-body, information, concept). Teleology: The distinction is *observer/observerd* (self- other or 1st person/3rd person, intention) Physics: The distinction is *here/there* (space, geometry). These are simply three incommensurable types of distinction. You (believers in comp) can try to derieve the observer/observed and here/ there distinctions from the model/reality distinction all you want, you just won't succeed." --- There are yet more problems with Max's ideas. For instance, he says in the New Scientist article that: 'mathematical relations, are by definition eternal and outside space and time'. Certainly, there have to be *some* mathematical notions that are indeed eternal and platonic (if one believes in arthematical realism), but it also makes sense to talk about some kinds of mathematical objects that exist *inside* space-time and are not static. As I pointed out in another thread here, implemented algoithms (instantiated computations) are equivalent to *dynamic* mathematical objects which exist *inside* space-time: "Let us now apply a unique new perspective on mathematics - we shall now attempt to view mathematics through the lens of the object oriented framework. That is to say, consider mathematics as we would try to model it using object oriented programming - what the classes, methods and objects of math? This is a rather un-usual way of looking at math. Mathematical entities, if they are considered in this way at all, are not regarded as 'Objects' (things with state, identity and behaviours) but merely as static class properties. For instance the math classes in the Java libraries consist of static (class) variables and class methods. But consider instead that there could be mathematical 'objects' (in the sense of entites with states, identities and behaviours). What could these mathematical 'objects' look like? if there are mathematical objects they have to be dynamic. This conflicts with standard platonic pictures of math as entities which are ete
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Sep 19, 2:23 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Schmidhuber and me do agree on comp (100% > agreement: we have the same hypothesis). And relatively to the comp hyp > and the importance of the universal machine Schmidhuber and me are much > closer than with Tegmark whi is just very naïve about notion of > mathematical reality. *sigh*. I of course, don't even agree with comp. One day when I'm better educated, I'm going to have to come back and teach both you, Schmidhuber and Tegmark a lesson ;) Now the problem is that, unlike many people in > this list, Schmidhuber does not address neither the mind body problem > nor the 1-3 person distiinction, and the relativity of states which > derives from that distinction. This forces him to literally defend the > idea that randomness in nature never really exist, which is hard to > justify in front of the physical branch of history we are living. This > does not makes his work wrong, but at least incomplete (and then he > should use Bennett notion of depth for the cosmological/geographical > aspect (like I do in Conscience et mécanisme: using just Kolmogorov is > not enough, but here I am going out topic. You should think carefully about the distinctions you just mentioned (1st-3rd person distinction) and mind-body problem, because it seems to me that the reality of these distinctions is precisely what is at odds with comp. I've talked often about 'the three types of properties' (for my property dualism) : Mathematical, Teleological and Physical. These three properties are based on three different kinds of distinction: Mathematics: The distinction is *model/reality* (or mind-body, information, concept). Teleology: The distinction is *observer/observerd* (self-other or 1st person/3rd person, intention) Physics: The distinction is *here/there* (space, geometry). These are simply three incommensurable types of distinction. You (believers in comp) can try to derieve the observer/observed and here/ there distinctions from the model/reality distinction all you want, you just won't succeed. Nor will materialists ever succeed in extracting a model/reality and observer/observed distinction from a here/there distinction. That's why both materialism *and* comp must fail. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Sep 19, 1:18 pm, Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Marc: > > The objects I use are divisions of the list - such divisions are > static elements of the power set. > > My objects have nothing to do with programing and do not change - > they can be the current state of a something on its path to completion. > > Hal > It sounded to me like you were confusing universals and particulars. The list of properties used to define an object (the univerasl) cannot be equated to a particular instance of an object possessing these properties (a particular). That's why in programming there's a sharp division between classes and objects when modelling the world. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Sep 18, 1:24 pm, Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Youness: > > Bruno has indeed recommended that I study in more detail the > underlying mathematics that I may be appealing to. The response that > I have made may be a bit self serving but at this point in my life I > am having difficultly adding yet another area of skill to my resume. My advise: Listen to Bruno. Your ideas are riddled with very basic errors. Example below: Basic Error: > There is no reason to create a multi-layered system distinguishing > between a sub list and the object it identifies. Yes there is. Objects not only have identities, they also have states and behaviours. This is object-oriented-programming 101. A set of properties only defines an identity condition. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Sep 13, 11:47 pm, Youness Ayaita <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I see two perfectly equivalent ways to define a property. This is
> somehow analogous to the mathematical definition of a function f: Of
> course, in order to practically decide which image f(x) is assigned to
> a preimage x, we usually must know a formula first. But the function f
> is not changed if I do not consider the formula, but the whole set
> {(x,f(x))} instead, where x runs over all preimages.
>
> Concerning properties, we normally have some procedure to define which
> imaginable thing has that property. But I can change my perspective
> and think of the property as being the set of imaginable things having
> the property. This is how David Lewis defines properties (e.g. in his
> book "On the Plurality of Worlds").
>
> If you insist on the difference between the two definitions, you may
> call your property "property1" and Lewis's property "property2".- Hide quoted
> text -
>
Surely you are just talking about the well-known distinction between
intensional and extensional definitions:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intensional_definition
"An intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by giving all
the properties required of something that falls under that definition;
the necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the set being
defined."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extensional_definition
"An extensional definition of a concept or term formulates its meaning
by specifying its extension, that is, every object that falls under
the definition of the concept or term in question."
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Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Sep 1, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols. > > Peano's axioms aren't an algorithm. Er..you're right here of course. I'm getting myself a bit confused again. Careful when thinking about these profound topics - it's easy to get oneself tied in knots. So lets try to get this right. What I should have said is that there are different levels of abstraction in one's descriptionsPeano's axioms are a mathematical description at a higher level of abstraction than a description of a computational procedure. >Algorithms are computational procedures and aren't necessarily written in >symbols. Writing the symbols might be an *instance* of an algorithmic >process. As I type >my computer is executing algorithms that are embodied in >electronic processes. Well, there's the 'algorithm' itself (considered as a *static* data structure), and there's the algorithm considered in the sense you are talking about, as an implemented computational system or process. Again, more than one sense of mathematical terms. But again, you're right that in neither sense does the algorithm need to be written in symbols. Writing the symbols would a *physical* instance of a static description. > > > So three senses of math here: > > > (1) The platonic forms (which are timeless and not in space and > > time) > > > (2) An actual implemenation of these forms in space-time (a > > *process* or computation) > > > and > > > (3) The symbolic representation of (2) - an algorithm as written on > > a peice of paper, described , drawn as diagram etc. > > > You can see that the *process of counting* (2) is not the same as the > > description of counting (3). When you (Brent) engage in counting > > your brain runs the algorithm. But a description of this process is > > simply symbols written on a piece of paper. > > No, a description is Peano's axioms or some other axioms that describe the > numbers and their relations. Yes, you're right, see above, I was a little confused at time of writing that. There's more than one level of description for math terms is what I meant to say. Of course all math has a descriptive component, but consider the possibility that platonic math forms do exist. Then of the sake of argument one needs to distinguish between *descriptions* of a thing and the thing itself. Peano's axioms are one kind of description...the kind that I thing do correspond to objectively existing platonic math forms. The second level of description would be a description of a computational procedure this level of description corresponds to well. computional procedures of course. Finally you have the third level of description which is of an algorithm considered as a static data structure and I don't think that this third level of description is objective, but would agree that it's simply a human DP Modelling concept. The symbols written on paper would be a *physical* instance of this third level of description. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical > truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be > translated in or by the theory/machine. But is the meta-theory *about* PA, itself classified as either PA or 'Arithmetical truth' ? The meta-theory itself (when enacted as a computation) cannot be classified as either, it seems to me. So it appears there's a third category which is neither arithmetic (descriptions) nor Arithemetic (platonic truth). And recognizing this third category is the solution to the puzzle of reflection OK! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 31, 9:40 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I said to Brent, > > Le 31-août-07, à 11:00, Bruno Marchal a écrit : > > > So, no, I don't see why you think my objection is a non-sequitur. It > > seems to me you are confusing arithmetic and Arithmetic, or a theory > > with his intended model. > > Brent, rereading your post I think there is perhaps more than one > confusion. I cannot really be sure, because your wording "arithmetic" > is ambiguous. > > Let me sum up by singling out three things which we should not be > confused: > > 1) A theory about numbers/machines, like PA, ZF or any lobian machine. > (= finite object, or mechanically enumerable objet) > > 2) Arithmetical truth (including truth about machine). (infinite and > complex non mechanically enumerable object) > > 3) A meta-theory of PA (that is a theory about PA) (again a > mechanically enumerable object) > > Only a meta-theory *about* PA, can distinguish PA and arithmetical > truth. But then Godel showed that sometimes a meta-theory can be > translated in or by the theory/machine. Rich theories/machine have > indeed self-referential abilities, making it possible for them to guess > their limitations. By doing so, such machines infer the existence of > something transcendenting (if I can say) themselves. > > OK? > > Bruno > I wonder how a machine actually does this. You see it's all about knowledge representation. Any machine has to be able to draw a distinction between a control class (its own internal reasoning processes) and a model class (the thing being modelled). But the actual class responsible for managing this distinction cannot itself be classified as either a control class or a model class. This is why I say that reflection (as in the case of self-referential machines) is really all *communication* - only the system is not communicating with an external user... *the system is communicating with itself*. That is to say, a class responsible for reflection is actually a VIEW class - it's *presenting* (symbolically) a slice of its own internal knowledge to itself. Thus does the problem of reflection entirely reduce to KR (knowledge representation) and ontology (assignation of designated meaning) to symbols. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 31, 6:21 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Le 29-août-07, à 23:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > I *don't* think that mathematical > properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I > think they are properties *of the thing itself*. > > >>> I agree with you. If you identify "mathematical theories" with > >>> "descriptions", then the study of the description themselves is > >>> metamathematics or mathematical logic, and that is just a tiny part of > >>> mathematics. > >> That seems to be a purely semantic argument. You could as well say > >> arithmetic is metacounting. > > > ? I don't understand. Arithmetic is about number. Meta-arithmetic is > > about theories on numbers. That is very different. > > Yes, I understand that. But ISTM the argument went sort of like this: I say > arithmetic is a description of counting, abstracted from particular instances > of counting. You say, no, description of arithmetic is meta-mathematics and > that's only a small part of mathematics, therefore arithmetic can't be a > description. > > Do you see why I think your objection was a non-sequitur? > > Brent aMeeker Mathematical concepts have more than one sense, is the point I think Bruno was trying to make. For instance consider algebra - there's *Categories* (which are the objectively existing platonic mathematical forms themselves) and then there's the *dynamic implementation* of these categories:the *process* of algebraic operations (like counting). But processes themselves (computations) are *not* equiavalent to the *descriptions* of these processes. The description itself is an algorithm written in symbols. So three senses of math here: (1) The platonic forms (which are timeless and not in space and time) (2) An actual implemenation of these forms in space-time (a *process* or computation) and (3) The symbolic representation of (2) - an algorithm as written on a peice of paper, described , drawn as diagram etc. You can see that the *process of counting* (2) is not the same as the description of counting (3). When you (Brent) engage in counting your brain runs the algorithm. But a description of this process is simply symbols written on a piece of paper. As to Godel, I agree with Bruno. The point is that there are *perfectly meaningful* mathematical questions expressed in the language of some formal system for which the answers can't be found within that system. This shows that math is bigger (extends beyond) any system as described by humans ; so math itself is objectively real and can't be just descriptive. If math were just descriptive, all meaningful math questions should be answerable within the human described system. --- PS Hee hee. This is getting easier and easier for me. My old opponents elsewhere are getting slower and slower. That's because they started from the 'bottom up' and are progressing more and more slowly as they try to go to higher levels of abstractions. (so they've run into a brick wall with the problem of 'reflection'). I, on the other hand, started at the very highest level of abstraction and my progress is getting faster and faster as I move down the levels of abstraction LOL.. (Note: The PS was just a digression - nothing to do with this thread or list). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 30, 1:37 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 29-août-07, à 12:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > > Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when > > expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear > > distinction between the language used to express mathematical concepts > > and the concept itself. > > OK. > > > Pure math concepts themselves consist of: > > Formal Systems, Relations and Differential Equations.They are > > abstract concepts which are precisely defined > > Not necessarily Well OK I take back the part about 'precisely defined'. But it seems to me that all of mathematics can be classified after three different categories - that is - there is natural 'three-fold' division of mathematics. Threeness does seem to be fundamental to onotlogy at the deepest level doesn't it? ;) All of math is three things: At the most basic level - *Predicates*. At a some what higher, more general level of abstractrion - *Relations* (including categories and functions). Finally at the most general level, differential equations. Relations could be thought of as a special case of calculus, predicates in turn as a special case of relations. BUt the most power (greatest level of generality) seems to reside in analysis and calculus. Would you agree with this? Predicates are the intrinsic aspect of math, relations fromwelll... they are...asbtracted relational properties of predicates. Finally calulus seems the boundaries and limts (literally! no pun intended) for the math-scape in which predicates and relations reside. > > > and it is provable > > matter to determine the equivalence (or not) of different symbolic > > representations of them. > > N. I hope I will be able to prove this in due time to David, > but even if you limit yourself to one prrograming language, it is > provable that you have no general tools to see if two different > programs compute the same function. At some point this is important to > notice. > Mathematical reality kicks back! (This goes in your direction). > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Sorry my mistake. But surely you can compare one specific instance of a program with another specific instance. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 29, 1:10 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > So are mathematics human creations (c.f. William S. Cooper, "The Evolution of > Logic"). There is no sharp distinction between what is expressed in words > and what is expressed in mathematical symbols. Darwins theory of evolution > is no more accurately expressed in mathematical notation. Any scientific theory (including Darwin's) *is* more accurate when expressed in mathematical notation. You *can* draw a clear distinction between the language used to express mathematical concepts and the concept itself. Pure math concepts themselves consist of: Formal Systems, Relations and Differential Equations.They are abstract concepts which are precisely defined and it is provable matter to determine the equivalence (or not) of different symbolic representations of them. > > So Deutsch has an overly generous criterion for "exist". Does he consider > epicycles real because they were indispensable to Ptolemy's theory of the > cosmos. I'd go with Dr. Johnson - it exists if I kick it and it kicks back. Deutsch uses exactly the example you just gave! Dr Johnson's critera ;). Read his book. > > >Grammer doesn't match the criteria. Math does. It's > > easy to cut out English concepts say, and replace them with other > > modes of descriptions. I don't see scientists labriously trying > > refactor all their mathematical explanations to refer only to material > > observables. > > Actually a theory that dispenses with unobservables is usually considered > preferable, by application of Occam's razor. No, occam's razor says pick the theory with the most explanatory power and the one that simplifies explanations the most. The quantity of observations versus unobservables is quite irrelevent. >For example in Newtonian mechanics force was an important concept, but later >it was dropped. So what is it's status now? It's still a mathematical >concept - but according to Deutsch it's not part of reality. The concept hasn't been dropped just re-defined. > Your argument, even if I agreed with it, would only justify counting as > objectively real those mathematical concepts that appear in a true theory of > reality - and unfortunately we never know which one that is. > > Brent Meeker We don't have to know to certainty, just base judgements on available evidence. At this point in the debate I guess we can just maintain our entrenched positions. It all boils down to realist verus non- realist philosophy. But I repeat my observation that as a purely pragmatic matter, non-realist positions are not helpful for the progress of science. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 29, 4:03 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is
> >> left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information
> >> is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be
> >> perfectly reproduced by anyone who has at hand all the relevant third
> >> person information, even if it can't be reproduced in his own mind.
> >> You can build a bat which will to itself feel like a bat if you know
> >> every scientific detail about bats and have appropriately capable
> >> molecular assemblers at your disposal.
>
> > Yes of course. But your ability to do this would not enable you to
> > determine what the bat was actually feeling solely from the physical
> > facts alone.
>
> So you say. I'm not so sure.
Go back to our previous discussions. A complete material description
of something cannot be mapped to subjective experiences without using
knowledge about subjective experience. If you know that neurons X are
firing in way Y, for sure, the subjective experience is entirely
dependent on this process, but how do you know what subjective
experience this material process is actually causing? You can't know
without having knowledge of the *correlation* (mapping) between the
material procceses and subjective experience. And in using knowledge
of this correlation, you would be slipping in references to subjective
experience in your explanations. ('cheating' as it were).
>
> > I agree that mental properties are depedent on the physical
> > substance. The physical substance might be what is fundmanetal. But
> > physical *properties* are what emerge from the movements of the
> > underlying substance.
>
> Huh? How does gravitational mass emerge from movement? And what does
> "emerge" mean?
mass appears to be intrinsic to a physical thing itself (ie
*substance*), not a property resulting from physical processes.
'Emerge' simply means that properties are not intrinsic but are a
result of physical interactions and processes.
>
> >Futher there are other non-physical properties
> > which appear as well - mathematical for example.
>
> Is being countable a physical or a mathematical property? As I see it,
> mathematical and logical "properties" are properties of our descriptions of
> the things. They are desirable properties for any predictive description
> because they avoid self-contradiction; something that would render a
> prediction meaningless, but would be fine for a poem.
>
being countable is of course of a mathematical property. And your
point here is at the heart of our disagreement. Because of the
argument from indispensability, I *don't* think that mathematical
properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things. I
think they are properties *of the thing itself*. Some kinds of
description (ie mathematical concepts) can't be dispensed with in our
explanations of reality. Therefore the simplest explanations is that
these concepts exist objectively.
> >This point is that
> > there's an essential difference between specific physical properties
> > (which can be objectively measured - as in the the exmaple of
> > circulation), and subjective experiences, which are not reducible to
> > specific physical properties
>
> You keep asserting that, but exactly the same thing was said about life.
Yes, but I can explain exactly what the difference is in the case of
mind/brain. Mental properties are mathematical patterns. Physical
properties are not.
>
> >(subjective experiences are a
> > *mathematical pattern* , and the same pattern could be enacted on
> > anything- you could have intelligent silicon, rocks, clouds or
> > anything. Further thesse patterns cannot be directly objectively
> > measured.
>
> Why can't such patterns be measured? If I create an intelligent computer,
> why can't I follow it's operation?
You *can* measure the physical correlates of these patterns. But the
point that I (and David) had been making that the physical correlates
of these patterns are not the mathematical pattern (ie the mental
process) itself.
>
>
>
> > If I would only make one essential argument here it is:
>
> > It's known for a fact that there exist mathematical concepts (infinite
> > sets) which are indispensible to our explanations of reality but which
> > can't be explained in terms of any finite physical processes.
>
> I don't think so. Infinities in physical theories are just convenient
> approximations for something very big.
>
> Brent Meeker
I would carefully read Rudy Rucker's 'book of Infinity. It is a
through rebutting of the idea that 'inifinites in physical theories
are just conveient approximations'. The whole of cantor's set theory
simply doesn't work without assuming that the infinities are things in
themselves. There is more than one kind of infinity.
It all comes down to perspective. The attempt to reduce everything to
material concepts would severely l
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 29, 4:20 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Thanks for spelling it out. > > > (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of > > reality. > > So are grammatical concepts. No they aren't. Grammatical concepts are human creations, which is precisely shown by the fact that they *can* be dispensed with and replaced with scientific concepts which give a more accurate description of reality. > > What does it mean for a concept to be real? I don't find the argument from > indispenability convincing. It's like saying because we don't know how to > describe something without words, the words are real things. Not really. According Deutsch's 'Critera For Reality' (ref: 'The Fabric Of Reality', David Deutsch) , an application of occam's razor says that something should be considered to 'objectively exist' if taking the concept out of our theory made the explanation more complex or impossible. (ie the concept can't be dispensed with without complications). Grammer doesn't match the criteria. Math does. It's easy to cut out English concepts say, and replace them with other modes of descriptions. I don't see scientists labriously trying refactor all their mathematical explanations to refer only to material observables. It's not even possible. And that's why mathematical concepts should be taken to be objectively real. > > >And patterns cannot be > > objectively measured in the way that specific physical properties can > > (See Ray Kurweil 'The Singularity Is Near' for agreement of this). > > Appeal to authority? No, a reference to a more detailed explanation of the point (so I don't have to laboriously type the argument here). > > I don't think anyone ever doubted that subjective experiences are processes - > and in that sense non-material. But that doesn't show that they can exist > apart from the material. Or that the existence and evolution of the process > cannot be elucidated by purely material descriptions. I could as well > observe that all patterns of any kind are instantiated in material. > > Brent Meeker > > Indeed all scientific evidence indicates that subjective experiences are entirely dependent on the material. Be careful to respond only to what I actually said rather than what you thought I said. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 28, 6:31 pm, "Torgny Tholerus" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] skrev: > > > > > (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there > > exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained > > in terms of finite physical processes. > > How can you prove that infinite sets exists? > > -- > Torgny Tholerus Greg Cantor showed that they were indispensible for further progress in mathematics (See 'Cantor' or Rudy Rucker 'Infinity and the Mind' (1982). From (1) and (2) , (3) (reality of infinite sets) follows. But this is goes beyond what is necessery for the actual argument that subjective experiences are non-material. It was simply given as an example of a mathematical concept for which it is absolutely clear-cut that the concept cannot be explained in physical terms. All that is neccessery for the argument is the point made in (4) - that 'patterns' are not equivalent to specific physical properties and cannot be objectivity measured (Ray Kurzweil agrees with this conclusion - see his book). Then from the rest, the conclusion is proven subjective experiences are non-material. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I don't find your arguments at all convincing. In fact I don't think you've > even given an argument - just assertions. Here the points of a clear-cut argument. These are not 'just assertions': (1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of reality. (2) If something is indispensible to our explanation to the simplest (most likely) position is that the concept is objectively real (See David Deutch, 'Criteria for existence', 'Mathematical Platonism' and 'Argument From indispensibility') (3) From (1) and (2) mathematical concepts are objectively real. (4) There is an essential difference between specific objectively measurable concepts (as for instance in the case of 'circulation') and mental concepts. The difference is that mental processes are *patterns* (See 'Functionalism') and patterns don't rely on specific physical properties (for instance clouds, bricks, computers or anything) could all be conscious if they enacted the right pattern. So subjective experiences are *patterns*. And patterns cannot be objectively measured in the way that specific physical properties can (See Ray Kurweil 'The Singularity Is Near' for agreement of this). (5) Patterns are mathematical in nature. (6) Subjective experiences are patterns (from 4). Therefore subjective experiences are mathematical properties (from 5). (7) From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real. But there exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained in terms of finite physical processes. Therefore mathematical concepts cannot be reduced to material processes. They abstract (non- material) but objectively real things. (8) From (6) subjective experiences are mathematical properties. >From (7) mathematical properties are abstract (non-material). Therefore subjective experiences are non-material properties. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 28, 12:53 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > > I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I > > > accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you > > > (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word "fundamental". The base > > > property seems to me more deserving of being called "fundamental" than > > > the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to > > > a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the > > > information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this > > > extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information > > > was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case. > > > > [If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the > > > particular example, but not the general point.] > > > Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link > > Bruno gave: > >http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html > > > Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and > > 'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely > > physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of > > the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base > > level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that > > aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does > > not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor > > does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery* > > for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify > > aesthetic properties. > > > Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your > > brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences > > without additional *non-physical* assumptions. That is because,as I > > agreed with Bruno (see my previous post), all the explanatory power of > > reason is *mathematical* in nature. In short, in order for you to > > know how a complete specification of your brain state was correlated > > with your aesthetic preferences, you would have to use your own > > *subjective experiences* as a calibrator in order to make the > > correlation (ie When brain state X, I feel/experience Y). And these > > subjective experiences are not themsleves physical, but, as I have > > explained again and again, *Mathematical* properties. > > There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is > left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information > is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be > perfectly reproduced by anyone who has at hand all the relevant third > person information, even if it can't be reproduced in his own mind. > You can build a bat which will to itself feel like a bat if you know > every scientific detail about bats and have appropriately capable > molecular assemblers at your disposal. Yes of course. But your ability to do this would not enable you to determine what the bat was actually feeling solely from the physical facts alone. (If you put matter together the right way, I agree you will be able to create consciousness, but you won't be explain what type of consciousness is created solely from physical data). So the fact that subjective experience is entirely dependent on physical substances does not provide a sufficient explanation of subjective experience. > physical necessity unless you are a substance dualist, since the usual > definition of supervenience says that same brain state implies same > mind state. (It isn't a matter of logical necessity because property > dualism is logically possible.) In this sense, the mental properties' > dependence on the physical properties is asymmetrical, which is why I > say the physical properties are more fundamental. You might agree with > this analysis but simply have a different definition of "fundamental". I agree that mental properties are depedent on the physical substance. The physical substance might be what is fundmanetal. But physical *properties* are what emerge from the movements of the underlying substance. Futher there are other non-physical properties which appear as well - mathematical for example. > > What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation > was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that > the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, > but the circulatory system as a whole was something emergent and not > at all obvious, in the same way that mind was emergent. Alternatively, > a superintelligent being could claim that the mind was as obviously > the result of brain activity as circulation was the result of > cardiovascular activity. > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou Alternatively a superintelligent being might be quick to cast
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 27, 6:45 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I don't know whether you're hair splitting or speaking loosely, but the above > is off the point in a couple of ways. In the first place empirical science > is inductive not deductive; so there is a trivial sense in which you can't > deduce any empirical fact, such as someone's aesthetic preferences. More > broadly you can deduce aesthetic preferences, though of course that takes a > theory. A theory is non-physical, but it isn't necessarily an assumption - > it may be very well supported inductively. In fact I can give and easy > example of such deduction and I don't even need to directly observe your > brain. I predict that you prefer the appearance of nude young women to that > of nude young men. > > Brent Meeker Well yes, science is both deductive and inductive (with the deductive thought of as a special case of the inductive). Yes, you can infer aesthetic preferences from a theory, which doesn't have to be an assumptuion. You are off-topic though. The discussion was a debate over whether non-physical aspects (for instance aesthtics preferences) are entirely explainable in terms of physical aspects (ie particles, forces and fields). I've argued convincing that they aren't, since any level of non-physical description has to slip in non-physical components -ie subjective experiences about nude young woman ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
View this page "MCRT Domain Model: Eternity"
Click on http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity - or copy & paste it into your browser's address bar if that doesn't work. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 22, 11:55 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I
> accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you
> (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word "fundamental". The base
> property seems to me more deserving of being called "fundamental" than
> the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to
> a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the
> information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this
> extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information
> was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case.
>
> [If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the
> particular example, but not the general point.]
Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link
Bruno gave:
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html
Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and
'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely
physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of
the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base
level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that
aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does
not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor
does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery*
for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify
aesthetic properties.
Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your
brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences
without additional *non-physical* assumptions. That is because,as I
agreed with Bruno (see my previous post), all the explanatory power of
reason is *mathematical* in nature. In short, in order for you to
know how a complete specification of your brain state was correlated
with your aesthetic preferences, you would have to use your own
*subjective experiences* as a calibrator in order to make the
correlation (ie When brain state X, I feel/experience Y). And these
subjective experiences are not themsleves physical, but, as I have
explained again and again, *Mathematical* properties.
>
>
> They have to be in there somewhere, since it appears that a particular
> brain state is necessary and sufficient for a particular aesthetic
> preference. In the same way, cardiovascular system activity is
> necessary and sufficient for the circulation of the blood. The
> difference between the two cases is that with circulation it is
> obviously so but with mind it is not obviously so: we can imagine the
> appropriate brain activity without mind but not the appropriate
> cardiovascular activity without circulation. But maybe this is just a
> problem with our imagination!
Ah, but there is a difference! In the example you gave, circulation
is *defined* by the specific physical characteristics of
cardiovascular activity. But the mind is *not* defined by specific
physical characteristics of the brain (this is the error that
philosopher John Searle keep making). In the example of circulation
you gave, you can take direct objective measurements of the physical
characteristics of cardiovascular activity. But as Ray Kurzweil
pointed out in his book 'The Singularity Is Near', you cannot take
direct objective measurements of a mind. That's because the workings
of a mind are not defined by any specific physical characteristics of
the system, but are *mathematical* properties ('patterns') as
explained by 'Functionalism'. Further, these mathematical properties
are not just fictions (words we use to explain things better) but
appear to be dispensable to our explanations of reality. These points
indicate a big and real difference between your example (circulation)
and mind/brain.
>
> I have to think about this further, but I have questions. As well as
> the initial point I made about what deserves to be called fundamental
> (perhaps a definition is called for?), I don't see why certain
> categories are irreducible. For example, chemistry (physical
> transformations) could be seen as a special case of what you call
> mechanics (laws of the actions of forces), chiefly the electrostatic
> force. Also, it would be helpful if you could describe the underlying
> motivation and history of the model, or refer me to previous posts if
> I've missed them.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
Refer my model again:
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity
The reason I don't think that categories in my model are reducible
across the *horizontal* axis is because of property dualism, as I have
explained. The reason I don't that that the categories in my model
are reducible across the *vertical* axis is because of the difference
in levels of abstraction (this may indeed have something to do with
R
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Comp is a short expression made for "computationalism". > Computationalism, which I called also "digital mechanism" is Descartes > related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often > precise by defining comp to be the conjunction of Church Thesis and > "yes doctor". The "yes doctor" assumption is the bet that there is a > level of description of yourself such that you would survive from some > digital reconstruction of your body (the 3-person "you") made at that > level. > From this I don't think it is entirely obvious that materialism (evn > weak materialism, i.e. physicalism) fails. Actually it is the main > point that I try to convey, and it is the object of the Universal > Dovetailer Argument (UDA). > We don't have to postulate physical laws, if comp is true they have to > emerge on even a tiny fragment of arithmetical truth. The UDA is not > constructive (so, after UDA, it still could be that the shorter > derivation of the physical laws from number is intrinsically not > feasible). But then I show how computer science and mathematical paves > the way of an actual short (but complex) derivation of at least the > necessity of a quantum computer as an invariant of all universal > machine neighborhood: this should provide a path from bit to qubits. > The quantum uncertainty emerges from the fact that once a machine look > at herself below her substitution level, she has to find trace of the > entire set of computations going through its actual relative comp > state. Sounds interesting. > > > Under my > > version, remember, the primatives are Physical, > > But I don't follow you here. Even without comp I don't take the > "physical" for granted. Science (including theology) appeared when > human took some distance with "naive realism", despite billions of year > of evolution which programmed us to take seriously our local > neighborhood. But you can understand intellectually that the existence > of primary matter asks for an act of faith. I don't see that the existence of the material world is any more or less an act of faith than the existence of the mathematical world. So these same remarks could be applied to *comp*. >Nobody has ever prove that > that exists, and the very old dream-metaphysical argument put a > reasonable doubt that such a proof can vere been presented. Now, with > comp, I pretend that matter is devoid of any explanation power. Even if > you postulate the existence of matter, you will not been able to use it > to justify any belief, be them on mind or even matter. But I let you > study the UDA which is supposed to explain that. I think we need to draw a careful distinction between the *process* of reasoning itself, and the external entities that reasoning is *about* *(ie what it is that our theories are externally referencing). When you carefully examine what mathematics is all about, it seems that it is all about *knowledge* (justified belief). This is because math appears to be the study of patterns and when meaning is ascribed to be these patterns, the result is knowledge. So: so Math <> Meaningful Patterns <> Knowledge. Since math appears to be equivalent to knowledge itself, it is no surprise that all explanations with real explanatory power must use (or indirectly reference) mathematics. That is to say, I think it's true that the *process* of reasoning redcues to pure mathematics. However, it does not follow that all the entities being *referenced* (refered to) by mathematical theories, are themselves mathematical. It appears to me that to attempt to reduce everything to pure math runs the risk of a lapse into pure Idealism, the idea that reality is 'mind created'. Since math is all about knowledge, a successful attempt to derive physics from math would appear to mean that there's nothing external to 'mind' itself. As I said, there seems to be a slippery slipe into solipsism/idealism here. That's why I'm highly skeptical of your UDA. I think both yourself (Bruno) and (and you Max Tegmark!) need to carefully think through consider the implications of your postulate that all is math. If the implications seem to be pointing to something unscientific (ie Idealism/Solipsism) then this might indicate a serious problem with your postulates ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: $US 2 million math puzzle challenge
On Aug 24, 3:46 am, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > I think I will spend my limited time and energy on the decaying earth > > doing other things. Without even knowing much about the puzzle other > > than reading the puzzle description, my guess is that without some > > historic breakthrough on some unsolved problem in algebra, no matter > > what algorithmic method (except for possibly quantum computation) is > > used, the complexity requires more time and interest than is contained > > in the remaining history of mankind. > > > Tom > > In fact, it likely could be that the problem is already proved (in > algebra) to be too complex for non-quantum algorithms to solve in > history, and that the focus of the prize is then on the development of > quantum computation.- Hide quoted text - > According to what I read, a solution to the puzzle is likely to be equivalent to a solution to the P=NP problem. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 22, 4:41 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > That's a pity. I thought it might be something comprehensible, rather > than just plain mysterious. > > Cheers > The ida of property dualism is very simple: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism It just means that the same underlying reality can manifest itself as multiple properties. Let me give a couple of analogies (bear in mind that these are only analogies). Take a glass of water 50% fill. It has two properties: 'Glass Half Fill' 'Glas Half Empty' Same thing, two different properties. Look at the picture here: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/YoungGirl-OldWomanIllusion.html Same picture two different perspectives: 'Old Lady' 'Young Woman' -- Multiple perspectives of the same reality, all perspectives equally valid. Neither perspective is more fundamental than the others. Remember the rough analogies above and now move to my proposed real exmaple: 'Mathematical Description' 'Physical Description' 'Teleological Description' Multiple properties, same reality. All of these three kinds of descriptions are on the same level. Nothing is 'emerging' from anything. All three perspectives are equally real and no one of them is fundamental. That's it. Really simple. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reflectivity solved. Consciousness Explained.
(Reflectivity and Consciousness Part 2 - Strategies For Attacking The Puzzles) Consider the two hypotheses put forward. I have suggested that an effective communication system, consciousness and reflectivity are all the same thing. This is the means through which the sub-agents of the mind talk to each in order to integrate their behaviour. And so intimate does the link between mathematics and knowledge appear to be - when we consider algorithms as 'dynamical mathematical objects' the picture we are drawn to suggests a network of 'knowledge nodes' with consciousness itself as the DP Modelling Language of the mind. Bring together the ideas suggested and a new strategy for solving reflectivity suggests itself. Solving Reflectivity *Firstly, stop searching for the oxy-moronic 'Reflective Decision Theory'. There isn't one. Reflectivity, we have established, is not in the decision making business, it's in the communications business. The tools we should be deploying to solve reflectivity are the tools of Communication Theory, *not* the tools of Decision Theory. *Secondly, bring to bear the tools that already exist for an analogous field: the field of data communications. Deploy the language of nodes, time messaging and networking. *Thirdly, investigate further the connections between the computer science and the pure mathematical sciences to obtain further insights and unifications of helpful concepts. Model mathematics using the object oriented paradigm and consider algorithms as 'mathematical objects' which can have states, identities and behaviours. This approach leads naturally to the big idea that consciousness is 'The DP Modelling Language Of The Mind' *Draw analogies to other fields of mathematics to obtain clues about specific tools for use in attacking reflectivity puzzles. For instance, concepts from Calculus are suspected to be relevant. Recall that Reflection was considered to be 'a network of interacting knowledge nodes' and 'a system of interacting dynamical mathematical objects'. These are concepts roughly analogous to physical objects moving through fields, which is modelling using Calculus. The concept of a 'Limit' looks important. Considering again our cognitive network of interacting sub-agents, unified behaviour involves moving the system towards an optimal 'Limit'. This again, brings to mind the concept of a 'Limit' from the branch of calculus, for calculus itself is the science of limits. Conclusion A sketch of some new perspectives was here suggested for attacking the puzzles of consciousness and reflectivity. It was suggested that reflectivity is not what it is believed to be. It is not, it was here argued, a part of Decision Theory, but instead should be thought of as part of Communication Theory. Two core hypotheses were suggested. (1) That the function of consciousness is as an internal communication system of the mind which enables sub-agents to interact effectively and (2) That reflectivity can be considered as a network of interacting dynamical 'mathematical objects' (knowledge nodes) which points to an equivalence between reflectivity and consciousness and suggests that conscious itself is the 'DP Modelling Language Of The Mind'. A few more specific ideas were suggested, namely that the mathematics of Calculus (and especially the concept of a 'Limit') could be highly relevant to the solution to the twin puzzles of consciousness and reflectivity. -- (Whew). Done. (Marc winks at the world and grins) 'Reflectivity and Consciousness' by Marc Geddes 22nd August, 2007 Auckland, New Zealand --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Reflectivity solved. Consciousness Explained.
Here is out-lined the sketch of a strategy for attacking the puzzles of reflectivity and consciousness. Reflectivity is the puzzle how a cognitive system can effectively reason about its own internel processes - reasoning about reasoning. Consciousness is here used in the sense of subjective experience, including sensations and feelings. The strategy considers Reflectivity not to be a part of decision making, but rather as a system of internal communciation. Consciousness is considered as a mathematical proccess strongly associated with knowledge representation. It is argued that consciousness and reflectivity are one and the same one. --- A long standing puzzle in decision theory is how decision theory could be applied to itself - that is, how could the cognitive provesses of decision making be applied to reason about these very proccesses (reflection). The reason there is not yet any 'Reflective Decision Theory' is likely to be that the very concept itself is ill- conceived. That is, there is no 'Reflective Decision Theory'. Concepts of 'Utility', goals and decisions about how to most effectively achieve these goals are the domain of a cognitive 'decision making' system. And 'Decision Theory' is the science of such systems. But the concepts can only be applied to 'external goals' (i.e goals in the external world). To attempt to solve 'Reflectivity' by trying to deploy the same concepts of decision theory to the internal workings of the cognitive system is simply an invalid use of these concepts. The first step to solving reflectivity then, involves attempting to ascertain the true nature of 'Reflection'. For 'Reflectivity' is *not* in fact, in the decision making business. The true role of 'Reflection' it seems is *Communciation*. That is to say, it appears that 'Reflectivity' should be thought of, not as part of *Decision Theory*, but instead as part of *Communication Theory*. This is because any cognitive system of sufficient complexity to achieve genuine intelligence appears to require the division of the system into seperate modular 'sub-agents' which interact with each other to achieve desirable results. Marvin Minsky wrote a famous book 'The Society of Mind' emphasizing this soup of many interacting agents. It's not enough for a cognitive so composed to merely have an effective system of decision making. There must also be an effective *Communication System* to integrate and co-ordinate the behaviour of the all the sub-agents into an effective whole. And this is the aspect of AI research that has been neglected. Further, the connection between 'Communication' and "Reflectivity' has appeared to elude the minds of the best and brightest. But it is here being established that an effective communication system *is precisely the solution to reflectivity*. The two problems are one and the same. If the hypothesis is correct, new strategies for atatcking the reflectivity puzzle can be formulated. For one thing, there is a wide body of pre-existing knowledge on Communications Theory which can start to brought to bear on the reflectivity puzzles. For another, analogies from the field of computer networking can be ported over to the reflectivity problem. For instance: Consider sub-agents as nodes, the combined actions of the sub-agents as networks and the interactions of the sub-agents as data transfers. But what justification is there for thinking that this hypothesis is applicable to reflectivity? To see the reasons, let us consider that other great puzzle, subjective consciousness, or subjective experience. What is consciousness. For all the huge volume of past words expended in this debate, there emerge three key points: The first point is that consciousness is not a *thing*. It is a *process*. The second point is that consciousness is not something concrete. It is not for instance, a process similar to digestion. The process instead appears to involve *asbtract patterns* (functionalism). Patterns are abstractions which are the essence of mathematics. Thus we can say that consciousness is a *mathematical process*. And the third point is that consciousness appears to involve a cognitive system examining aspects of its own internal operation. All three points should immediately lead us to suspect that consciousness is connected to 'Reflectivity'. On the first point, conscious as a proccess ; a working reflection system is also a process. On the second point, consciousness as patterns (mathematical abstractions) ; a working reflection system involves reasoning about reasoning ; reasoning uses predicate logic and probabilities - fields of mathematics. Further, patterns are both the essence of mathematics and representations of knowledge itself. So a series of reasoning steps (an algorithm) is really a mathematical construction. Finally on the thrid point, a cognitive system examining its own internal working smacks of reflection immediately. Thus a reasonable a
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 22, 11:26 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Marc, how does your property dualism differ from the account of > emergence I give in "On Complexity and Emergence"? (If indeed it does > differ!). > > Cheers > I've only given your text a quick skim so far. As far as I can tell, property dualism has got nothing to do with complexity and emergence. Property dualism is a rather subtle position in ontology. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 21, 10:31 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Well, return to a concrete example. Yesterday, I thought red was the > best colour for my new car, but today I think blue is better. My > aesthetic values would seem to have changed. There must be some reason > for this, of course. At one level, the reason may be something such as > "I now realise that blue is a better colour", or "I don't want my car > to be the same colour as half the other cars in the street". But at a > more fundamental level than this, the reason is that physical changes > in my brain have caused me to change my mind. Perhaps there is an even > more fundamental level than this, such as mathematical Idealism, which > underpins physics, but this seems to me if anything yet another step > removed from calling the aesthetic values themselves fundamental. > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - Here you are implicitly assuming that there is ONE fundamental level of reality only. Why do you keep making this assumption? Property Dualism says that there is more than one way to describe reality, and each way is no more or less fundamental than the other. Your motivations are not *caused* by the physical processes in your brain. Instead, I think it's more accurate to say that your motivations are *super-imposed* on top of these physical processes. But motivations, not being physical, can't cause physical changes (indeed they can exert no causal influence on the physical world at all). Nor are physical processes in any sense *causing* changes in your motivations.Of course since we know that our minds are dependent on the physical world, motivational states have to be *correlated* with the physical states. But correlation is not causation. Physics only describes physical properties. Physics can give a complete explanation of the state changes in the *physical* properties of your brain, but these properties are all about particles, energy and fields. They are not about aesthetic preferences. The physical explanations cannot explain your aesthetic preferences. Where in the particles, energy and fields in your brain can you find aesthetic preferences? ;) I postulate a three-fold property dualism - my proposed three ways to describe reality are *Physical, *Teleological and *Mathematical. You could describe the same reality in any one of these three ways, but I think its a mistake to say that any one of these ways is more or less fundmental than the others. It helps if you look at the diagram I posted - the physical concepts are all displayed in the left column , the teleological concepts are all in the middle column, and the mathematical concepts are all in the right column (concepts classified by subject area). The idea is that the concepts in one row are all on the same level- none is more or less fundamental than the others. Here's the diagram: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 19-août-07, à 08:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility > of comp. OK? > Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT quite the same as Chalmer's version. Again, Chalmer's apparently makes phenomenal properties primatives, but I do not. Under my version, remember, the primatives are Physical, Teleological and Mathematical entities. 'phenomenal' properties are just a word we use to describe what are really mathematical properties. My version need not conflict with *comp*. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 20, 9:45 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with
> > the physics argument I gave above).
>
> > *Consider an agent with a set of motivations A
> > *Consider the transition of that agent to a different set of
> > motivations B (ie the agent changes its mind about something)
>
> > Question: Why did agent A transition from motivation set A to
> > motivation set B?
>
> > Assumption: The transition must be explicable
>
> > Conclusion: There must exist objective 'laws of value' which explain
> > why there was a transition from state A to state B.
>
> > And that argument (greatly fleshed out of course) basically proves
> > that that such objective principles exist, given only the assumption
> > that reality is explicable.
>
> But surely the transition from A to B must be fully explained by the
> laws of physics underlying physical transitions in the agent's brain,
> or state transitions in an abstract machine.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
*sigh*. Only if Teleological explanations (discussions about agent
motivations) can be completely reduced to (replaced by) physical
explanations (discussions about physics). I don't think they can,
since I advocate 'property dualism'. I'm saying that you have three
different kinds of properties (Physical, Teleological, Mathematical)
which are correlated with each other (as science requires) but that
you cannot fully reduce mathematical and teleological explanations to
physical explanations.
IF you accept that teleological properties are not identical to
physical properties ('Property Dualism'), THEN my sketch of the
argument for the existence of objective laws of value holds. But
that's a very big 'if' of course.
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Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract > > Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete > > information would agree with. > > Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no "observer" can have > complete information. But they good agree on many subsets of > propositions. Agreed. I should have said 'all observers with *sufficient* information'. > > > 'redness' is not a *thing* it's a *process* - as a phenomenal > > (subjective) quality it's a *mathematical* property associated with > > the running of an algorithm (or computation) . But this is NOT a > > *physical* property. The mathematical property (redness) is *attached > > to* (resides in, is dependent upon) the physical substrate > > implementing the algorithm giving rise to the subjective experience , > > but the mathematical property *per se* is not physical. It's > > abstract. It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical > > properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge > > (meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one > > (see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same > > and no amount of semantic trickery is going to reduce one to the > > other. > > Math is not physics. But a lot of people argues (incorrectly imo) that > you can reduce math to physics. And I do agree that the concept of > quantum information can be used to defend that idea (again, not > convincingly imo). But I agree with you here. I don't think math can be reduced to physics. I thought I was clear about this. I made it clear I thought mathematical properties are not the same as physical properties. Physical properties are about energy transfers, mathematical properties are about knowledge (meaningful patterns). > Actually I made a point (UDA) that if the brain (or whatever is > necessary for consciousness to manifest itself) is a digitalizable > entity, then it is just impossible that physics is not > derivable---ontically and epistemologically---from number/computer > science. Hmm. I doubt physics is 'derivable' from numer/computer theory (becuase of the property dualism I am advocating). But I don't think math is derivable from physics either. I need to study this UDA argument (which I'll get to in due course). > Of course by admitting dualism, you already abandon comp. (I do > nevertheless agree with some point you make here and there). > Actually intersubjective agreement is similar to the first person > plural notion of comp, and should comprise experimental physics, world > sharing, etc. But it is just a form of objectivity, at some level. It's true I've recently settled on property dualism. But could you please explain exactly what you mean by *comp* so I can determine if there's a conflict? > > But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility > of comp. OK? My 'property dualism' is quite the same as Chalmer's version. Chalmers apparently makes phenomal properties primatives. I don't do that. My 'primatives' are *Physical properties*, *Teleological Properties* and *Mathematical Properties*. I would then identity phenomal properties with mathematical properties. I think phenomenal properties are just a word we use to describe what are really mathematical properties. Again, please explain exactly what you eman by *comp*. > > I share nevertheless your platonism on some value (truth, justice, > freedom, even beauty on which Plato, Plotinus and the greeks, and > indians, have succeeded in changing my mind. > I'm not sure I understand your notion of explanation, from previews > posts. Physics, does not really explain, it does some genuine and quite > wonderful compression of the data, but it presupposes somehow the > mystery (existence, consistence, consciousness) by abstracting from the > observer. Such an abstraction has been a brilliant and quite useful > methodological simplifying idea, but it is just an error to abandon the > search of a global picture of the "world" in which qualitative > apprehension, by humans or machines, are taken seriously. Again, I thought I made it clear I wasn't trying reduce everything to physics. > > Also, you take as axiom that reality is explainable, but taking into > account we belongs to that reality, rises the fact that some feature of > reality are not explainable by us. Despite we can bet on some negative > (limitative) meta-explanation. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - I'm not sure where we disagree here. By 'explainable' I don't mean 'fully explainable' (since of course there are things like uncomputables which aren't comprehensible), I just meant that I think there do exist meta-explanations of reality (in the form of eternal conceptual schemes) at high enough levels of abstraction. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received t
Re: Major revision to my Top-Level Ontology
On Aug 21, 3:10 am, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I searched in vain > forhttp://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MCRT_ClassDiagram.html > > "The page you have requested could not be found. (404)" > > As an explanation of the meaning of eternal truth etcetera, this > to me seems redolent of Douglas [of blessed memory] Adams' > "God's last words to His/Her creatures": > > "WE APOLOGISE FOR THE INCONVENIENCE" > > Regards > > Mark Peaty CDES > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ > > Heh. You don't find it because I decided to take it off my Google space and instead up-load it here to the 'Everything-List'. It's under 'Files'. Here it is: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/mcrt-domain-model-eternity At a superficial look it just names the 27 subject areas that I think need to be researched for achieving a true TOE. So it will valuable for new-comers wanting to know what areas they should research. At a deeper look though.'42' (Hitch-Hiker's Gude) :D I've put 'the answer' without the documenation ;) Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 20, 9:26 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 20/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. > > > No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some... > > Surely not on this list! > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou Nah, nothing to do with this list, I'm talking about experiences on other lists. Enough to put a person off the web for life. Some real nasty minded creeps out there all right. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Here's to Eternity
We are all playing the game of 'Eternity' ;) I have uploaded to the list my final version of the top-level 'solution' to the puzzle of eternity. (Revised yet again but this one is the very last - promise). The page is my domain model for all reality at the highest possible level of abstraction.I am the supreme master of system analysis. My system analyses don't lie. ( I have the qualifications to prove it - straight A's and B's in programming and DP modelling papers from AUT University) I tell you that this domain model is the solution to everything. For those who seek a clue, the answers are there. But in any event, the 27 named subject areas are a good 'pointer' to what subjects new-comers to reality theory need to research. It's a good arrow to point new-comers in the right direction. "Five card stud, nothing wild, the skies the limit" Good luck ringers. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
>3PV observation and analysis _may_ eventually turn up with objective >criteria that establish universally consistent and reliable >correlation between certain brain processes and certain reported >phenomenal experiences Of course. It appears from all scientific evidence that phenomenal experiences are completely dependent upon physical processes. But this does *not* establish that phenomenal experiences are *identical* to physical processes. From the fact that phenomenal experiences supervene upon physical processes, it does not follow that one is reducible to the other. I repeat: (1) Phenomenal properties are mathematical properties. Mathematical properties are not human fictions, but are objectively real things, since they are indispensable for our explaantions of reality. *Mathematical properties are about meaningful patterns (knowledge). *Physical properties are about energy transfers. *They are correlated but they're not the same thing. They're as different as milk and water. And any-one who can't see this is blind. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Question: why do you _want_ > to think that there are objective values? > G. Here's my answer: I want to to think that there are objective values because I dislike the idea that important aspects of our (human) existence are inexplicable. And make no mistake, without objective values, aspects of the human condition *would* be simply inexplicable. Here's the argument, by analogy with physics: *Consider a physical object in state A. *Consider the transition of that object to state B. Question: What explains why the object transitioned from state A to state B? Assumption: The transition must be explicable. Conclusion: There exists objective physical laws which explain why there was a transition from state A to state B. -- Now consider sentient agent motivations (and remember the analogy with the physics argument I gave above). *Consider an agent with a set of motivations A *Consider the transition of that agent to a different set of motivations B (ie the agent changes its mind about something) Question: Why did agent A transition from motivation set A to motivation set B? Assumption: The transition must be explicable Conclusion: There must exist objective 'laws of value' which explain why there was a transition from state A to state B. And that argument (greatly fleshed out of course) basically proves that that such objective principles exist, given only the assumption that reality is explicable. As I explained, I don't regard ethical rules or goals *per se* as objective. They are human constructs. But at a deeper level of abstraction, there have to be general principles which explain such things as values. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 19, 11:17 pm, "Giu1i0 Pri5c0" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Marc welcome back! I had not seen you here for months. No. That's because after the terrible insults levelled at me by some I had to take a break to make absolutely certain that my arguments, theories (and java code) are all impeccable and unbeatable ;) And I'm very pleased to report that they now are. As you know, I've been studying computer science. A year in I'm fluent in java, object oriented technology, data and process modelling, UML, Systems Analysis etc etc. I make a decent system analysis and programmer, but I don't have much math talent. Kinda knew that already. Any way, after absorbing all this knowledge my thoughts are clear, crisp and fully sane. My theories cut with impossible speed and power now. I have come through my own 'existential crises' and all my basic contentions are proven correct. You can be sure that the fact I've shown up again means that I'm very very very very very very very very very very very very very confident I was right about it all. :D > Concerning objective values, as we have discussed in the past, I don't > see any rational argument in support of their existence. Ah yes, this old debate. I started out sure that objective values existed, I had a period of serious doubt, now I'm sure again :) Please carefully read my earlier posts in this threads. >For example > if one has chosen to consider the elimination of the human species as > a priority value (like some fundamentalist deep ecologists have > written), there is just no way you or I can rationally persuade them > of the contrary. Of course we _can_ try to persuade them not to act, > but this does not have much to do with values. Ah, you see, this *not* what I mean by 'objective values'. I was able to see how objective values could exist by carefully seperating out different levels of abstraction. As I explain, there are three levels of asbtraction: (1) An ethical rule itself (2) A goal and procedures for moving towards goal (the optimization target) (3) Platonic Ideals (1) and (2) are not objective. Only (3) is. And I don't think (3) takes the form of a value directly. It's a wholly abstract construction of the form: beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G H I J K etc Look at the example above. No goal or ethical rule is specified here. It's simply an abstraction which could be applied to many possible situations. Rather like the laws of physics. It's certainly true that the ethical rules we make are human constructs. I agree with you there. But as I explain above, on a higher level of abstraction there can still be objective platonic ideals. I will try to explain this more fully later. Cheers --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 19, 9:25 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Marc, refers to "a commonality averaged across many events and agents" so > apparently he has in mind a residue of consensus or near consensus. Correct. >Color preferences might average out to nil except in narrow circumstances, >e.g. "Green people are bad." or "Ferraris should be red." So "objective" >really means "intersubjective agreement" among humans. If color preferences averaged to nil then there are no objective color preferences. My very definition of objective values implies that some preferences can't average to nil (or by definition, these preferences could not be objective). "intersubjective agreement" per se isn't exactly the same as *objective*. The intersubjective agreement is *implied by* the proposed objectiveness. That is, the intersubjective agreement was my proposed way to empirically test the objective preference hypothesis. >I wonder how big a sample is needed though to qualify as "objective"? >Everybody? including children? In a lot of the world women would be excluded >from the count. What about animals? Good question. > > > > >> Finally, the proof that objective values exist is quite simple. > >> Without them, there simply could be no explanation of agent > >> motivations. > > So you would say that the actions of say a serial killer can only be > explained by pointing to some aspect of his values that we share, e.g. sexual > satisfaction? Not exactly. The *physical* actions of a serial killer have physical explainations. But If the serial killer clearly had teleological motives, then these motives require explanation (by the very nature of the scientific world view). And this implies the objective existence of platonically existing value preferences. > You might, with great advances in neuroscience, infer what values an agent > holds from the physical description. That would be explanation in one sense. > In general there is no such thing as "the explanation" of something. An > explanation must start with something you understand or accept and show how > something you didn't understand follows. So there can be different > explanations depending on where you start and the level of the thing to be > explained. I agree that there's different kinds of explanations. That was exactly my point. I agree that 'you might, with great advances in neuroscience, infer what values an agent holds from the physical descriptions'. But this inference would NOT be a *telelogical explanation*, it would only be a *physical explanation*. Think levels of explanations. Physical properties invovle energy. Teleologial properties involve preferences and goals. There's a 'property dualism' here again. No amount of explanations involving energy transfer are going to give you explanations in terms of preferences and goals. You could show how the two sets of properties are correlated. But descriptions of correlations are not explanations. A *teleological explanation* requires you to explain why some social happening caused an agent to move from teleological state A to teleological state B. And no merely physical explaantion can possibly do this. > > >The teleological properties of agents (their goals and > >> motivations) simply are not physical. For sure, they are dependent on > >> and reside in physical processes, but they are not identical to these > >> physical processes. This is because physical causal processes are > >> concrete, where as teleological properties cannot be measured > >> *directly* with physical devices (they are abstract) . > > >> The whole basis of the scientific world view is that things have > >> objective explanations. > > Here too "objective" means something like "intersubjective agreement". The > conservation laws of physics can be derived from invariance under change of > point of view of the observer. Well, yeah, I sort of agree, but see the caveat I gave earlier. 'Objective' *implies* intersubjective agreement. Although the two terms are not the same, I agree that *in practice* (in terms of emperical realiy), "intersubjective agreement" is what "objective" means. > > >Physical properties have objective > >> explanations (the laws of physics). Teleological properties (such as > >> agent motivations) are not identical to physical properties. > > But there's not as much intersubjective agreement as in physics either. Some > actions are motivated by religous piety, some by biological hunger. There is certainly far less intersubjective agreement than in physics. That's why I emphaszied an 'averaging' across agents. Something like statistical rules across many events and agents. > > >> Something needs to explain these teleological properties. QED > >> objective 'laws of teleology' (objective values) have to exist. > > In one sense of explanation, motivations are explicable by evolution. If > your ancestors didn't love their children you w
Re: Why Objective Values Exist
On Aug 19, 12:26 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a > particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we > can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However, > if I like red and you like blue, how do we decide which colour is > objectively better? No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete information would agree with. "What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to predict agent emotional reactions to social events." > > You could make a similar claim for the abstract quality "redness", > which is associated with light of a certain wavelength but is not the > same thing as it. But it doesn't seem right to me to consider > "redness" as having a separate objective existence of its own; it's > just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon. I don't agree that 'redness is just a name we apply to a physical phenomenon' (although I agree with you its not an objectively existing primative). I thought about these issues hard out for a long long long long long long LONG time before finally nailing 'em. Unfortunately the answers are not something I easily explain in short sentences on Internet messageboards ;) 'redness' is not a *thing* it's a *process* - as a phenomenal (subjective) quality it's a *mathematical* property associated with the running of an algorithm (or computation) . But this is NOT a *physical* property. The mathematical property (redness) is *attached to* (resides in, is dependent upon) the physical substrate implementing the algorithm giving rise to the subjective experience , but the mathematical property *per se* is not physical. It's abstract. It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge (meaningful patterns). Old David Chalmers was right about this one (see his 'property dualism'). The two properties just ain't the same and no amount of semantic trickery is going to reduce one to the other. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Why Objective Values Exist
Objective values are NOT specifications of what agents SHOULD do. They are simply explanatory principles. The analogy here is with the laws of physics. The laws of physics *per se* are NOT descriptions of future states of matter. The descriptions of the future states of matter are *implied by* the laws of physics, but the laws of physics themselves are not the descriptions. You don't need to specify future states of matter to understand the laws of physics. By analogy, the objective laws of morality are NOT specifications of optimization targets. These specifications are *implied by the laws* of morality, but you can understand the laws of morality well without any knowledge of optimization targets. Thus it simply isn't true that you need to precisely specify an optimization target ( a 'goal') for an effective agent (for instance an AI). Again, consider the analogy with the laws of physics. Imperfect knowledge of the laws of physics, doesn't prevent scientists from building scientific tools to better understand the laws of physics. This is because the laws of physics are explanatory principles, NOT direct specifications of future states of matter. Similarly, an agent (for instance an AI) does not require a precisely specified goal , since imperfect knowledge of objective laws of morality is sufficient to produce behaviour which leads to more accurate knowledge. Again, the objective laws of morality are NOT optimization targets, but explanatory principles. The other claim of the objective value sceptics was that proposed objective values can't be empirically tested. Wrong. Again, the misunderstanding stems from the mistaken idea that objective values would be optimization targets. They are not. They are, as explained, explanatory principles. And these principles CAN be tested. The test is the extent to which these principles can be used to understand agent motivations - in the sense of emotional reactions to social events. If an agent experiences a negative emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as bad'. If an agent experience a positive emotional reaction, mark the event as 'agent sees it as good'. Different agents have different emotional reactions to the same event, but that doesn't mean there isn't a commonality averaged across many events and agents . A successful 'theory of objective values' would abstract out this commonality to explain why agents experienced generic negative or positive emotions to generic events. And this would be *indirectly* testable by empirical means. Finally, the proof that objective values exist is quite simple. Without them, there simply could be no explanation of agent motivations. A complete physical description of an agent is NOT an explanation of the agent's teleological properties (ie the agent motivations). The teleological properties of agents (their goals and motivations) simply are not physical. For sure, they are dependent on and reside in physical processes, but they are not identical to these physical processes. This is because physical causal processes are concrete, where as teleological properties cannot be measured *directly* with physical devices (they are abstract) . The whole basis of the scientific world view is that things have objective explanations. Physical properties have objective explanations (the laws of physics). Teleological properties (such as agent motivations) are not identical to physical properties. Something needs to explain these teleological properties. QED objective 'laws of teleology' (objective values) have to exist. What forms would objective values take? As explained, these would NOT be 'optimization targets' (goals or rules of the form 'you should do X'). They couldn't be, because ethical rules differ according to culture and are made by humans. What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to predict agent emotional reactions to social events. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: $US 2 million math puzzle challenge
On Aug 9, 11:47 pm, Scipione <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Marc, > > I knew this puzzle quite well; i tried to order it but i have some > trouble > obtaining it (i'm italian and as you can readhttp://uk.eternityii.com/ > Italy isn't included in the country where such puzzle is sold and > where the > solution can come from (!) ). > > > So...meanwhile i tried to obatin my own copy, i would like to see how > is the > real puzzle...hence...i would ask you if you could be so kind to take > and > send me a picture of the gameboard filled with all the pieces (but > please > dont' put them in the winning order: i want to solve it by my > self ;) ) > Raffaele.. Sorry I can't publically share information about the puzzle pieces. This message comes with the game: "Christopher Monckton holds the copyright in all the ETERNITY and ETERNITY II puzzles. The details of the pieces of the clue puzzles as well as of the prize puzzle are protected by copyright, and any circulation of them, in any form or medium, will result in action for breach of copyright. To protect other solvers, the judges will disqualify any entry whose existence becomes publicly known before the date of the annual scrutiny following its submission, and any entrant who has publicly disclosed any details of any of the Eternity II pieces in any form or medium." But there seem to be many places where it's available. Hope you find a copy from somewhere. > Anyway i started to work on it: i'm studing the problem creating my > own > software working on some "possible" puzzle; however as you can > understand, > the right approach depends on the particular distribution of symbols > (the > number of different "triangles" used in the pieces and their > combinations) > chosen by the author of the real game. I too am creating software to try to solve the puzzle. I have a class diagram - software enginnered using my MCRT ontology of course ;) and am now implementing the design. There is a group on Yahoo you may be interested in where many people are talking about using AI / Genetic Algorithms etc to try to crack the puzzle. Link to the group below. Good luck: http://games.groups.yahoo.com/group/eternity_two/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Major revision to my Top-Level Ontology
Addendum: Some further revisions since yesterday... I was almost there yesterday but not quite. The last of my confusions have cleared. The final revision for my top-level onotlogy is completely 'locked in'. Added brief descriptions of top-level classes: http://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MCRT_ClassDiagram.html The important point is that there appear to be 27 fundamental ontological primatives for reality which cannot be simplified or merged any further. These 27 primatives generate 27 irreducible classes for any completely general model of reality. And the classes appear to be related to each other in a very precise way. Below I give the brief descriptions of what I believe these classes to be and the domain model (see link below) hints at the precise nature of the relationship I think I may have discovered. I now believe I understand literally 'everything' (in the general conceptual sense at least). Of course the devils is in the details and decades may pass before a precise new scientific theory emerges. Be patient whilst I write up more information about my theory, since I've revealed very little so far. But I'm very very very confident but I've hit the metaphorical bullseye at the center of literally everything. The 27 fundamental irreducible classes are as follows: Field Physics: Laws of space and time Thermodynamics: Laws of energy exchange Mechanics: Laws of the action of forces Computational Physics: Physical systems Chemistry: Physical transformations Robotics: Directed physical actions Solid State Physics: Properties of static concrete objects Engineering: Properties of static complex structures Data Communications: Properties of communication hardware and information theory Virtue: Ideals for personal goals or the study or Eudaimonia (Self Fulfillment) Morality: Ideals for social interaction or the study of Liberty Aesthetics: Ideals for communication or the study of Beauty Social Psychology: Roles and Personas of agents Decision Theory: The process of agent decision making Communication: Agent interaction for the exchange of meaningful inforamtion Economics: Goods and Services Memetics: Cultural Beliefs Linguistics: Social Languages Symbolic Logic: Formal systems and Mathematical foundations Category Theory: Numbers and Algebra Calculus: Analysis: Limits and Rates of Change Theory Of Computation: Formal Proof Theory and Deductive Reasoning Bayesian Induction: Probability Theory and Inductive Reasoning Reflective Possibility Theory: Reflective Reasoning Software: Computer Programs and Applications Software Engineering: Design, Analysis and Implementation of software Modelling Languages: Scientific/Programming languages for data modelling --- Annotation in my Log-Book reads: Date: 06 August, 2007 Time: 4.45pm Place: 'Gloria Jean's Coffee', Borders, Queen Street, Auckland,New Zealand Note: At this time I completed the top-level MCRT Ontology. At the conceptual level this is the day I finally understood everything! About 5 years have passed since I first started trying for the top- level ontology of reality. (Date Started: Mid 2002. Date Finished: Aug, 2007). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Major revision to my Top-Level Ontology
For those who saw the domain model of my top-level ontology there's been some major re-classifications of the knowledge domains. I've added a little bit more explanation on the page but still haven't written much up yet. I'm too busy attempting to implement the model as actual software ;) Link: http://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MCRT_ClassDiagram.html Very sinple to look at but it rewards careful thought ;) The blood, sweat and tears I had to put in to finally finally finally understand all. It's all crystal clear-cut to me now. Beautiful! :D There really was an objective morality you know. You really can't have full general intelligence without qualia you know (conscious subjective experience). And any recursively self-improving general intelligence really is ethical automatically you know. I always was right. This is what my opponents never grasped. That at the highest level of abstraction there really is *No difference between the model and reality*. (At the Platonic Level of my domain model, there is NO difference between the model and the reality). The model IS the reality. The map IS the territory. (See the debate on this point I had in earlier threads on this list). Now I really do understand all. 'Ware of me enemies of humanity! I hold the keys to the universe and I will reave the prison bars around me to rubble! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
$US 2 million math puzzle challenge
Just bought a really fun puzzle called 'Eternity 2', which has just been released and has a $US 2 million prize for the first person to complete it. It's basically a jig-saw puzzle on a 16*16 board. There are 256 puzzle pieces and you have to fit them together so that the shapes and colors match for each of the 4 edges. You can use a computer to try possible combos. Really addictive and interesting. It's defintely suspectible to computer attack (Note: 'Eternity 1' - designed by the same guy- was won by a math student who cracked it in only 5 months and was awarded the 1 million pound prize). Official web-site (practice with a small-board demo version on-line): http://uk.eternityii.com/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A Natural Axiomatization of Church's Thesis
Of course. They probably copied the idea off my posts here and on SL4 and wta- talk. I stated pretty clearly on numerous occasions that there was more than one way to define causality. I clearly stated on numerous occasions that physical causality was not the only kind of causality, but that there was also a 'mathematical causality' whereby math could be considered as the movements of mathematical objects through 'abstract time' (ie this is exactly the description of an abstract state machine). If that wasn't clear enough I posted a precise UML Domain Model to this list months ago and gave a clear explanation in a thread in which I pointed out the three UML modelling levels and how they related to the classes representing mathematical concepts in my domain model. The classes on the left-hand side of my diagram are physical classes. They are clearly accompanied by the mathematical classes (right hand side of my diagram). I clearly said in thread on this list that the bottom classes (Models) were represented the 'Conceptual' level (in UML modelling), the top-classes (Systems) represented the Functional level (UML), and the middle classes in my diagram (Tools) were the state-change level (UML). Based on this information you can clearly see that the right-hand classes in my diagram (representing the fields of mathematics) are equivalent to an abstract state-machine. Bottom right class (conceptual level) - Formal System (classical algorithm). Top right class (systems level) - Representational and middle right class (state change level ) - Theory Of Compuation - abstract state machine. Here is the link to the general Domain Model I posted here: http://marc.geddes.googlepages.com/MCRT_ClassDiagram.html BTW: I should point out here to readers that numerous debates still continuing on the transhumanist lists Jef frequents are already clearly resolved by my domain model and (admittedly general but still clear) explanations I've given here. Example: The debate on Extropy list over the nature of time. Clik this thread: http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/2007-July/036916.html Again, refer to my domain model and the explanation I gave to this list on thread on the matter some time back. My Domain model clearly reveals Barbours mistake (Barbour's thesis was that only 'B' time exists).. Whilst a time-less description of reality can be given (the 'Conceptual Level' - botttom classes in my diagram) - this description is incomplete. You need to add the 'Methods' of reality (think of reality as software). Software has both classes and methods... class attributes are timeless but class attributes alone give an incomplete description of the software system (you should think of the whole universe as a software system being modelled by UML). Add the 'Methods' of reality (represented by the classes on top row of my diagram and their implementations specified by the state-transitions represented by middle classes in my diagram) and you get 'A Time- flow. I could give numeous other examples of many long-standing puzzles my domain model clearly resolves but I will spare transhumanist pseudo-intellectuals further embarassment. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 7, 7:50 pm, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I have to disagree, if human goals were not tied to evolution goals > then human should not have proliferated. > > Quentin- Hide quoted text - > Well of course human goals are *tied to* evolution's goals, but that doesn't mean they're the same. In the course of pursuit of our own goals we sometimes achieve evolution's goals. But this is incidental. As I said, evolution explains why we feel and experience things the way we do but our goals are not evolutions goals. You don't eat food to maximize reproductive fitness, you eat food because you like the taste. This point was carefully explained by Steven Pinker in his books (yes he agrees with me). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive > technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal "reproduce", and see the goal > "feed" as only a means to the higher level goal "survive". However, *that* > goal is very difficult to shake off. We take survival as somehow profoundly > and self-evidently important, which it is, but only because we've been > programmed that way (ancestors that weren't would not have been ancestors). > Sometimes people become depressed and no longer wish to survive, but that's > an example of neurological malfunction. Sometimes people "rationally" give > up their own survival for the greater good, but that's just an example of > interpreting the goal so that it has greater scope, not overthrowing it. > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou Evolution doesn't care about the survival of individual organisms directly, the actual goal of evolution is only to maximize reproductive fitness. If you want to eat a peice of chocolate cake, evolution explains why you like the taste, but your goals are not evolutions goals. You (Stathis) want to the cake because it tastes nice - *your* goal is to experience the nice taste. Evolution's goal (maximize reproductive fitness) is quite different. Our (human) goals are not evolution's goals. Cheers. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 6, 10:01 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I was not arguing that evolution is intelligent (although I suppose it
> depends on how you define intelligence), but rather that non-intelligent
> agents can have goals.
Well, actually I'd say that evolution does have a *limited*
intelligence. OK I agree that the system 'Evolution' has goals. But
according to my definition anything with a goal has some kind of
intelligence. This is only a quibble over deifnitions though, since
I'm now agreeing with you that 'systems' in general can have goals.
Any thing you call an 'Agent' has to have a goal almost my definition
in my view.
>We are the descendants of single-celled organisms,
> and although we are more intelligent than they were, we have kept the same
> top level goals: survive, feed, reproduce. Our brain and body are so
> thoroughly the slaves of the first replicators that even if we realise this
> we are unwilling, despite all our intelligence, to do anything about it.
Nope. You are confusing the goal of evolutions ('survive, feed,
reproduce') with human goals. Our goals as individuals are not the
goals of evolution. Evolution explains *why* we have the preferences
we do, but this does not mean that our goals are the goals of our
genes. (If they were, we would spend all our time donating to sperm
banks which would maximize the goals of evolution).
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Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 5, 10:20 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Why would you need to change the goal structure in order to improve > yourself? Improving yourself requires the ability to make more effective decisions (ie take decisions which which move you toward goals more efficiently). This at least involves the elaboration (or extension, or more accurate definition of) goals, even with a fixed top level structure. > Evolution could be described as a perpetuation of the basic > program, "survive", and this has maintained its coherence as the top level > axiom of all biological systems over billions of years. Evolution thus seems > to easily, and without reflection, make sure that the goals of the new and > more complex system are consistent with the primary goal. It is perhaps only > humans who have been able to clearly see the primary goal for what it is, > but even this knowledge does not make it any easier to overthrow it, or even > to desire to overthrow it. Evolution does not have a 'top level goal'. Unlike a reflective intelligence, there is no centralized area in the bio-sphere enforcing a unified goal structure on the system as the whole. Change is local - the parts of the system (the bio-sphere) can only react to other parts of the system in their local area. Furthermore, the system as a whole is *not* growing more complex, only the maximum complexity represented in some local area is. People constantly point to 'Evolution' as a good example of a non-conscious intelligence but it's important to emphasize that it's an 'intelligence' which is severely limited. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 5, 6:50 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> public static void main(String[] a) {
>
> println("Sometimes I get this strange and wonderful feeling");
> println("that I am 'special' in some way.");
> println("I feel that what I am doing really is significant");
> println("to the course of history, that I am in some story.");
> println("Sometimes I wish that I could find out whether what");
> println("I am doing is somehow significant, that I am not just");
> println("a duplicatable thing, and that what I am doing");
> println("is not 'meaningless'.");
>
> }
>
> You can make more complicated programs, that is not so obvious, by
> "genetic programming". But it will take rather long time. The nature
> had to work for over a billion years to make the human beings. But with
> genetic programming you will succeed already after only a million
> years. Then you will have a program that is equally conscious as you are.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
An additional word of advise for budding programmers. For heaven's
sake don't program in Java! It'll take you one million years to
achieve same functionality of only a few years of Ruby code:
http://www.wisegeek.com/contest/what-is-ruby.htm
Cheers!
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Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 5, 5:05 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > However, what would be wrong with a super AI that just had large amounts > > of pattern recognition and symbolic reasoning intelligence, but no > > emotions at all? > > Taken strictly, I think this idea is incoherent. Essential to intelligence > is taking some things as more important than others. That's the difference > between data collecting and theorizing. It is a fallacy to suppose that > emotion can be divorced from reason - emotion is part of reason. An > interesting example comes from attempts at mathematical AI. Theorem proving > programs have been written and turned loose on axiom systems - but what > results are a lot of theorems that mathematicians judge to be worthless and > trivial. Yeah. That's the difference between *reflective intelligence* and ordinary *symbolic logic*+*pattern recognition*. I would say that ordinary reason is a part of emotion. (or reflective intelligence encompasses the other two types). But you're right, you can't divorce conscious experience from reason. It's from conscious experience that value judgements come. > > > Finally, the majority of evil in the world is not done by psychopaths, > > but by "normal" people who are aware that they are causing hurt, may > > feel guilty about causing hurt, but do it anyway because there is a > > competing interest that outweighs the negative emotions. > > Or they may feel proud of their actions because they have supported those > close to them against competition from those distant from them. To suppose > that empathy and reflection can eliminate all competition for limited > resources strikes me as pollyannish. > > Brent Meeker- The human brain doesn't function as a fully reflective system. Too much is hard-wired and not accessible to conscious experience. Our brains simply don't function as a peroperly integrated system. Full reflection would enable the ability to reach into our underlying preferences and change them. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 4, 11:15 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 04/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > See you haven't understood my definitions. It may be my fault due to > > > the way I worded things. You are of course quite right that: 'it's > > possible to correctly reason about cognitive systems at least well > > enough to predict their behaviour to a useful degree and yet not care > > at all about what happens to them'. But this is only pattern > > recognition and symbolic intelligence, *not* fully reflective > > intelligence. Reflective intelligence involves additional > > representations enabling a system to *integrate* the aforementioned > > abstract knowledge (and experience it directly as qualia).Without > > this ability an AI would be unable to maintain a stable goal structure > > under recursive self improvement and therefore would remain limited. > > Are you saying that a system which has reflective intelligence would be able > to in a sense emulate the system it is studying, and thus experience a very > strong form of empathy? Yes >That's an interesting idea, and it could be that > very advanced AI would have this ability; after all, humans have the ability > for abstract reasoning which other animals almost completely lack, so why > couldn't there be a qualitative (or nearly so) rather than just a > quantitative difference between us and super-intelligent beings? But I don't think this is qualitatively different to what humans do already. It does seem that our ability to feel does in part involve emulating other people's inner motivational states. See the research on 'Mirror Neurons' . Or again, Daniel Goleman's 'Social Intelligence' talks about this. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neurons It seems that we humans are already pretty good at reflection on motivation already. Certainly reflection on motivation gives rise to feelings. Emotions are the human strength. Our 'cutting edge' so to speak. But remember that 'reflection on motivation' is only one kind of reflection. There are other kinds of reflection that we humans are not nearly so good at. I listed three general classes of reflection above - one type of reflection we humans seem to be very poor at is 'reflection on abstract reasoning' (or reflection on logic/ mathematics). With regard to this type of reflection we rather in an analogous position to the emotional retard. We have symbolic/abstract knowlege of mathematics (symbolic and pattern recognition intelligence), but this is not directly reflected in our conscious experience (or at least it is only in our conscious awareness very weeakly). For example, you may know (intellectually) that 2+2=4 but you do not *consciously experience* this information. You are suffering from 'mathematical blind sight'. Now giving a super-human a strong ability to reflect on math/logic *would* definitely be a qualitative difference between us and super-intellects. But here is something really cool: By intensely forcing yourself and training yourself to think constantly about math/logic, it may be possible for a human to partially draw math/logic into actual conscious awareness! I can tell you here that in fact I claim to have done just that and the result is very interesting ;) Suffice it to say that I believe that math/logic knowledge appears in consciousness as a sort of 'Ontology-Scape'. Just as the ability to reflect on motivation gives rise to emotional experience, so I believe that the ability to reflect on math/logic gives rise to a new kind of conscious experience... what I call 'the ontology scape'. As I said, I am of the opinion that if you really force yourself and train yourself, it's possible to partially draw this 'Ontology scape' into your own conscious awareness. > > However, what would be wrong with a super AI that just had large amounts of > pattern recognition and symbolic reasoning intelligence, but no emotions at > all? It could work as the ideal disinterested scientist, doing theoretical > physics without regard for its own or anyone else's feelings. You would > still have to say that it was super-intelligent, even though it it is an > idiot from the reflective intelligence perspective. It also would pose no > threat to anyone because all it wants to do and all it is able to do is > solve abstract problems, and in fact I would feel much safer around this > sort of AI than one that has real power and thinks it has my best interests > at heart. As I said Intelligence has three parts: Pattern Recognition, Symbolic Reasoning and Reflective.You can't cut out 1/3rd of real intelligence and still expect your system to still function effectively! ;) A system mssing reflective intelligence would have serious cognitive deficits. (in fact , for the reasons I explain below, I believe such a system would be unable to improve itself). > > Secondly, I don't see how the ability to fully empathise would hel
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 3, 11:11 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Determining the motivational states of others does not necessarily involve
> feelings or empathy. It has been historically very easy to assume that other
> species or certain members of our own species either lack feelings or, if
> they have them, it doesn't matter. Moreover, this hasn't prevented people
> from determining the motivations of inferior beings in order to exploit
> them. So although having feelings may be necessary for ethical behaviour, it
> is not sufficient.
You are ignoring the distinction I made between three different kinds
of general intelligence. I gave there different definitions remember:
*Pattern Recognition Intelligence
*Symbolic Reasoning Intelligence
*Reflective Intelligence
A mere 'determination of the motivational states of self and others'
does not by itself constitute *reflective intelligence* according my
definitions. Not only must the motivational states of self/others by
determined and represented (this process by itself does not require
ethics or sentience), these representations must be *reflected* upon.
Only this final step, I'm saying, leads to ethical behaviour. Once
you have a system performing *full* reflection correctly, you get
feelings. And, I maintain, there is no real difference between
feeling and motivation.
.
>
> Psychopaths are often very good at understanding other peoples' feelings, as
> evidenced by their ability to manipulate them. The main problem is that they
> don't *care* about other people; they seem to lack the ability to be moved
> by other peoples' emotions and lack the ability to experience emotions such
> as guilt. But this isn't part of a general inability to feel emotion, as
> they often present as enraged, entitled, depressed, suicidal, etc., and
> these emotions are certainly enough to motivate them. Psychopaths have a
> slightly different set of emotions, regulated in a different way compared to
> the rest of us, but are otherwise cognitively intact.
See what I said above about the distinction between three different
kinds of general intelligence. It's true that the psychopath can
indeed understand others in an *abstract* *intellectual* sense
(pattern recognition and symbolic reasoning intelligence), but what
the psychopath lacks is the ability to fully *reflect* upon this
understanding (reflective intelligence).
You yourself admit: 'psychopaths have a slightly different set of
emotions, regulated in a different way compared to the rest of us'.
Therefore it simply isn't true that the psychopath is 'cognitively
intact'. Again, the psychopath can obtain an abstract, intellectual
understanding of others, but lacks the ability to fully reflect upon
this information in order to directly experience it (as qualia).
It is documented that psychopaths are lacking the ability to
experience the full range of emotions - specifically they appear
unable to fully experience certain negative emoptions such as fear and
sadness. (Although they can, as you point out, experience *some*
kinds of emotions). See the book 'Social Intelligence' ( by Daniel
Goleman) for references about the emotional deficits of psychopaths.
>
> Thus it appears that reflective
>
> > intelligence is automatically correlated with ethical behaviour. Bear
> > in mind, as I mentioned that: (1) There are in fact three kinds of
> > general intelligence, and only one of them ('reflective intelligence')
> > is correlated with ethics.The other two are not. A deficit in
> > reflective intelligence does not affect the other two types of general
> > intelligence (which is why for instance psychopaths could still score
> > highly in IQ tests). And (2) Reflective intelligence in human beings
> > is quite weak. This is the reason why intelligence does not appear to
> > be much correlated with ethics in humans. But this fact in no way
> > refutes the idea that a system with full and strong reflective
> > intelligence would automatically be ethical.
>
> Perhaps I haven't quite understood your definition of reflective
> intelligence. It seems to me quite possible to "correctly reason about
> cognitive systems", at least well enough to predict their behaviour to a
> useful degree, and yet not care at all about what happens to them.
> Furthermore, it seems possible to me to do this without even suspecting that
> the cognitive system is conscious, or at least without being sure that it is
> conscious.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou-
See you haven't understood my definitions. It may be my fault due to
the way I worded things. You are of course quite right that: 'it's
possible to correctly reason about cognitive systems at least well
enough to predict their behaviour to a useful degree and yet not care
at all about what happens to them'. But this is only pattern
recognition and symbolic intelligence, *not* fully reflective
intelligence. Reflective intelligence involves additional
representations enabl
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 3, 9:20 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 03/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> The third type of conscious mentioned above is synonymous with
>
> > 'reflective intelligence'. That is, any system successfully engaged
> > in reflective decision theory would automatically be conscious.
> > Incidentally, such a system would also be 'friendly' (ethical)
> > automatically. The ability to reason effectively about ones own
> > cognitive processes would certainly enable the ability to elaborate
> > precise definitions of consciousness and determine that the system was
> > indeed conforming to the aforementioned definitions.
>
> How do you derive (a) ethics and (b) human-friendly ethics from reflective
> intelligence? I don't see why an AI should decide to destroy the world,
> save the world, or do anything at all to the world, unless it started off
> with axioms and goals which pushed it in a particular direction.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
When reflective intelligence is applied to cognitive systems which
reason about teleological concepts (which include values, motivations
etc) the result is conscious 'feelings'. Reflective intelligence,
recall, is the ability to correctly reason about cognitive systems.
When applied to cognitive systems reasoning about teleological
concepts this means the ability to correctly determine the
motivational 'states' of self and others - as mentioned - doing this
rapidly and accuracy generates 'feelings'. Since, as has been known
since Hume, feelings are what ground ethics, the generation of
feelings which represent accurate tokens about motivational
automatically leads to ethical behaviour.
Bad behaviour in humans is due to a deficit in reflective
intelligence. It is known for instance, that psychopaths have great
difficulty perceiving fear and sadness and negative motivational
states in general. Correct representation of motivational states is
correlated with ethical behaviour. Thus it appears that reflective
intelligence is automatically correlated with ethical behaviour. Bear
in mind, as I mentioned that: (1) There are in fact three kinds of
general intelligence, and only one of them ('reflective intelligence')
is correlated with ethics.The other two are not. A deficit in
reflective intelligence does not affect the other two types of general
intelligence (which is why for instance psychopaths could still score
highly in IQ tests). And (2) Reflective intelligence in human beings
is quite weak. This is the reason why intelligence does not appear to
be much correlated with ethics in humans. But this fact in no way
refutes the idea that a system with full and strong reflective
intelligence would automatically be ethical.
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Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
Consciousness is a cognitive system capable of reflecting on other cognitive systems, by enabling switching and integration between differing representations of knowledge in different domains. It's a higher-level summary of knowledge in which there is a degree of coarse graining sufficient to lose precise information about the under-lying computations. Current experience is integrated with past knowledge in order to provide higher-level summaries of the meaning of a concept. Any cognitive system capable of reflection in this sense is conscious. In essence, conscious is what *mediates* between different representations of knowledge... as mentioned above... the ability to switch between and integrate different representational systems. There are three general types of consciousness arising from the fact that there are three different classes of cognitive systems which could be potentially reflected upon. The first are systems which perceive physical concepts. When this perception is reflected upon, we experience sensations. The second are systems which perceive teleological concepts... closely related to our motivational systems. When this is reflected upon, we experience emotions (or more accurately feelings). The third type of consciousness is very weak in humans... it's the ability to reflect upon systems which perceive logical/mathematical things. Reflection upon these systems is consciously experienced as an 'ontology-scape' (in a sense, conscious awareness of the theory of everything). But as mentioned, this last type of consciousness is very weak in humans, since our ability to reflect upon our own cognitive systems is quite small and not done by the brain directly (when engaged in logical reasoning, we humans are not generally reflecting on our thoughts directly, but via indirect means such as verbal or visual representations of these thoughts). The third type of conscious mentioned above is synonymous with 'reflective intelligence'. That is, any system successfully engaged in reflective decision theory would automatically be conscious. Incidentally, such a system would also be 'friendly' (ethical) automatically. The ability to reason effectively about ones own cognitive processes would certainly enable the ability to elaborate precise definitions of consciousness and determine that the system was indeed conforming to the aforementioned definitions. Much of the confusion surrounding these issues stems from the fact there's not one definition of 'general intelligence', but THREE. There's the ability to detect patterns (which does not require sentience), there's the ability to engage in symbolic reasoning (which also does not require sentience), finally there's the ability to engage in reflective reasoning (reasoning about reasoning). And it's this third definition intelligence which DOES by necessity entail consciousness. It also, by necessity entails ethical behaviour. Now there those who point to powerful systems such as 'Corporations' and 'Evolution' to try to argue that you can have intelligence without consciousness. But these arguments are not convincing. It's true that, for instance 'Evolution' is an intelligence system in ONE sense, but it's certainly NOT a *reflective intelligence*. Nor, is , for instance a 'Corporation'. A 'corporation' has SOME of the sub-systems of person-hood, but not all of them. The existence of non-sentient cognitive systems which display *some* of the features of intelligence is a LONG way from establishing that you can have *reflective intelligence* without consciousness. As has been pointed out, RPOPS such as for instance 'Evolution' are NOT capable of reflective intelligence and therefore cannot be taken as a disproof of the claim that reflective intelligence must by necessity automatically be friendly and sentient. The reason I elaborate this carefully is because you will, on certain mailing lists, run into a number of artificial intelligence crack-pots claiming that (1) You can have reflective intelligence without consciousness and (2) AI's with reflective intelligence don't have to be ethical and might destroy the world. Ignore these crack-pot claims when you see them. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?
On May 9, 5:55 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > But what is mathematics? It's three things I think: Categories, > Relations and Propositions. Of these, Relations and Propositions > refer to discrete (finite) knowledge. But Categories includes the > other two, since categories can also deal with the infinite. So it > would appear that the ultimate root of it all is *Categories* > (Category Theory). Number Theory/Sets are general kinds of category. > Machines/Computer Science deal with finite categories.- Hide quoted text - > Slight corrections. Categories, Relations, Propositions can of course all deal with the infinite. But it's Categories that are fundamental (the most general mathematical concepts). The TOE (theory of everything) is *itself* a class (in OOP) as I mentioned. But it should be classified as a 'Category'. Now based on my arguments that in the case of mathematical categories the map is the terriority, you see the miracle?Remember: The TOE is *itself* a category. The *theory* of all reality IS reality :D Peculiar indeed. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > But according to your "map=territory" philosophy all these incompatible > theories exist physically. What does that mean? All but one of them must > describe some other universe and we just don't know which ones? Or do you > mean they "exist physically" as representational tokens in the brains of > physicists? They certainly don't exist like tables and chairs. > > Brent Meeker- I shall try to clarify here., since this is a pretty bad mis- understanding of what I've been saying. Most of the time it's true that theories and reality are indeed two different things. In this thread, Stathis gave some examples in which I agreed that the theory was obviously *not* the reality. For instance, in the case of the concept of an 'election', the terms there are just human constructs used to simplify what was going on. And in the case of for instance, observation of chimpanzees, 'laws of chimpanzee behaviour' had no reality outside human conceptions as I clearly agreed. So it's hard to see how it could came across to you that I was arguing for such an obviously absurd premise that map=territory always. Only in the case of some highly peculiar concepts was I arguing this. (namely certain non-reductionistic mathematical and abstract/ informational concepts). I was arguing that these concepts are the exception to the general rule that map is not territory. ie I was arguing that mathematical/certain informational concepts have a highly peculiar nature which breaks the general rule. And then only in the cases where we are dealing with a true/consistent theory. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > >> How can Everett's "every possibility is realized" be logically compatible > >> with Bohm's "there's only one, deterministic outcome", we just don't know > >> which one" and Griffith's "it's a probabilistic theory so some things > >> happen and some don't". I can hardly imagine less compatible > >> interpretations of the same mathematics. I could add Cramer's > >> transactional interpretation and Feynmann's zig-zag in time > >> interpretation. Are all those maps or territories? > > > Well of course the ontological details are indeed quite incompatible. > > The status of QM is still very much 'in the air' at the moment, so we > > don't yet know with any degree of certainty. But that can (and > > should) change once both theory and observation progresses in the > > future. > > And will reality change too - or is reality different from theories that > describe it? > Of course reality doesn't change. The question of map versus territory is *not* an all or nothing question. *sometimes* the map equals the territory. Most of the time it does not. > > But according to your "map=territory" philosophy all these incompatible > theories exist physically. What does that mean? All but one of them must > describe some other universe and we just don't know which ones? Or do you > mean they "exist physically" as representational tokens in the brains of > physicists? They certainly don't exist like tables and chairs. > > Brent Meeker- To say that map=territory always would obviously be absurd. Only in the case of the parts of our theories which are *correct* does the map equal the territory. When our theories are wrong, these theories are quite different to reality and certainly don't physically exist ;) The fact that we can't know for sure which parts of our theories are wrong and which are right isn't a problem. Most of the time the map is not the territory. But for *some* concepts (correct concepts!) it is. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery - Coarse graining is the answer!?
On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > How can Everett's "every possibility is realized" be logically compatible > with Bohm's "there's only one, deterministic outcome", we just don't know > which one" and Griffith's "it's a probabilistic theory so some things happen > and some don't". I can hardly imagine less compatible interpretations of the > same mathematics. I could add Cramer's transactional interpretation and > Feynmann's zig-zag in time interpretation. Are all those maps or territories? Well of course the ontological details are indeed quite incompatible. The status of QM is still very much 'in the air' at the moment, so we don't yet know with any degree of certainty. But that can (and should) change once both theory and observation progresses in the future. But most of these interpretations do use some similiar concepts. As I mentioned, the idea of some sort of 'wave of possibilities' for instance. Even Bohm's 'only one outcome' still uses the wave concept (the guiding 'pilot wave'). So it's not as if 'anything goes', ontologically speaking. Progress is being made. > > >Further, all of them actually use some of the > > same concepts they just ascribe different ontological status to them. > > On the wiki: > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretation_of_quantum_mechanics > > > Of course it wouldn't be surprising if QM were modified in the > > future. But all interpretations make use of something like a 'wave of > > possibilities', by the Alain Aspect experiements, it's known that > > future theories would have to have either non-locality or > > indeterminism. And there are other general empirically established > > features of QM that would have to remain the same. > > Of course every physicist from Newton to Einstein would have said there are > generally empirically established features of mechanics like locality, > determinism, independence of momentum and position variables, and flow in > phase space that must remain the same. > > Brent Meeker- The example I gave of the Alain Aspect experiments (testing Bell inequality) did point to proof of some quite specific features - according to these experiments, all future theories replacing QM would have to have either indeterminism or non-locality. So progress is made... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
